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34 (2003) 73109
www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa
This inscrutable principle of an original
organization: epigenesis and looseness of t
in Kants philosophy of science
John H. Zammito
Department of HistoryMS42, P.O. Box 1892, Rice University, Houston, TX 77005, USA
Abstract
Kants philosophy of science takes on sharp contour in terms of his interaction with the
practicing life scientists of his day, particularly Johann Blumenbach and the latters student,
Christoph Girtanner, who in 1796 attempted to synthesize the ideas of Kant and Blumenbach.
Indeed, Kants engagement with the life sciences played a far more substantial role in his
transcendental philosophy than has been recognized hitherto. The theory of epigenesis,
especially in light of Kants famous analogy in the rst Critique (B167), posed crucial ques-
tions regarding the looseness of t between the constitutive and the regulative in Kants
theory of empirical law. A detailed examination of Kants struggle with epigenesis between
1784 and 1790 demonstrates his grave reservations about its hylozoist implications, leading
to his even stronger insistence on the discrimination of constitutive from regulative uses of
reason. The continuing relevance of these issues for Kants philosophy of science is clear from
the work of Buchdahl and its contemporary reception.
2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Epigenesis; Empirical law; Kant; Blumenbach; Buchdahl; Girtanner
Blumenbach . . . rightly declares it to be contrary to reason that raw matter should
originally have formed itself in accordance with mechanical laws, that life should
have arisen from the nature of the lifeless, and that matter should have been able
to assemble itself into the form of a self-preserving purposiveness by itself; at
the same time, however, he leaves natural mechanism an indeterminable but at
the same time also unmistakable role under this inscrutable principle of an original
E-mail address: zammito@rice.edu (J.H. Zammito).
0039-3681/03/$ - see front matter 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0039-3681(02)00092-4
74 J.H. Zammito / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 73109
organization, on account of which he calls the faculty in the matter in an organized
body (in distinction from the merely mechanical formative power [Bildungskraft]
that is present in all matter) a formative drive [Bildungstrieb] (standing, as it were,
under the guidance and direction of that former principle).
1
One of the most important contributions of Gerd Buchdahl to the history and the
philosophy of science was his argument for a crucial looseness of t between the
transcendental and the empirical elements in Kants epistemology.
2
The issues of
Buchdahls exposition remain at the center of ongoing disputes concerning Kants
philosophy of science and indeed Kants transcendental method altogether.
3
While
Buchdahl and others seek to rescue Kant from what Peter Strawson once dubbed
the non-sequitur of numbing grossness of making natural science a priori, everyone
who has dealt at all carefully with the Kantian texts is aware of the ambiguities in
the Konigsbergers formulations and the challenge to coherent interpretation they
pose.
4
Buchdahl generously ascribes this to the thinness of the conceptual language
available to Kant for his exposition, and he resists the view that Kant lacked perspi-
cuity regarding the questions at issue.
5
That is indeed the high road of historical
reconstruction, which renders Kant most charitably for presentist concerns and by
presentist standards. I must confess to a less sanguine view of the historical Kant,
though I enlist wholeheartedly in the endeavor to naturalize Kantian philosophy of
science for our own purposes.
6
The historical Kants intransigence over the question
of hylozoism, I wish to argue, put decisive obstacles before any naturalistic coher-
ence in his philosophy of science.
One way to situate the issue of the historical versus the reconstructed Kantian
philosophy of scienceone where the difference makes a differenceis to consider
how the scientic community of Kants own day construed Kants proposals.
7
Parti-
cularly salient in this context is the group of life scientists that Timothy Lenoir more
than twenty years ago dubbed the Gottingen school.
8
In Lenoirs view, Kants
philosophy of science played a major role in helping to shape the theoretical foun-
dations of the life sciences led by Johann Friedrich Blumenbach after 1790. Indeed,
from the late 1780s to the late 1790s Blumenbachs ideas on natural history
underwent a thorough revision in light of Kants analysis of the conceptual foun-
dations for the construction of a scientic theory of organic form.
9
Blumenbach
1
Kant (1790), AA 5, 424.
2
Buchdahl (1965), (1967), (1969), (1971), (1984), (1986).
3
Friedman (1986), (1991), (1992a), (1992b); Butts (1991); Allison (1991), (1994); Guyer (1990a),
(1990b); Kitcher (1983), (1986), (1993), (1994).
4
The allegation, from Strawson (1966), is discussed in all the texts cited above.
5
On thinness of language, see Buchdahl (1967), p. 213.
6
In particular, I am very interested in the pragmatist-naturalist reconstructions of philosophers of
science like Kitcher (1993), (1994), and Rescher (2001).
7
See, e.g., Williams (1973); Barnaby (1988); Gregory (1989).
8
Lenoir (1980), (1981a), (1981b), (1988).
9
Lenoir (1980), p. 77. The fullest acknowledgment of Kant, entailing abandonment of ideas Blumen-
bach had long held, came after 1797.
75 J.H. Zammito / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 73109
began serious consideration of the philosophy of Kant in 1786 as a direct conse-
quence of the dispute surrounding Kants reviews of Herders Ideen zur Philosophie
der Geschichte der Menschheit, especially Kants controversy with Georg Forster.
10
But already ve years before, in 1781, Blumenbach proposed the most important
revision in the eighteenth-century elds of embryology and physiology with his idea
of the Bildungstrieb and his implied endorsement of epigenesis.
11
The period between
1786 and 1797 brought the Gottingen physiologist and the Konigsberg philosopher
into direct communication, and there is clear evidence that Blumenbach assimilated
many aspects of Kantianism into his scientic methodology. There is also evidence
in the converse direction, i.e., Kants assimilation of Blumenbachs scientic method-
ology into his own exposition of philosophy of science. What is not so clear is the
ultimate cogency of either of these assimilations.
There are important issues of historical reconstruction that remain to be sorted
out.
12
While one could pursue that in the direction of further developments in the
life sciences, as Lenoir and others have done, I will pursue the other direction: the
implications for Kants philosophy of science. In taking up Kants philosophy of
science in what one commentator has provocatively titled the transcendent science
of biology these scientists encountered head-on the tensions in Kants system of
empirical entailment, precisely those issues of the looseness of t between the
constitutive and the regulative in Kants critical epistemology.
13
One of the most notable endeavors to assimilate Kantian thought into the practice
of the life sciences at the end of the eighteenth century, and one which has the
distinction of explicit endorsement by both Kant and Blumenbach, is Christoph Girt-
anners U
ber das Kantische Prinzip fur die Naturgeschichte (1796). Girtanners work
offers a very useful starting point for assessing how Kant was being understood by
Blumenbach and the Gottingen school at the decisive moment. Through Girtanner
we can see how the specic issues at stake in Kants biological thought open out
onto the deepest issues of his philosophy of science, indeed of his transcendental
philosophy altogether.
1. Girtanners Kantische Prinzip
In Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view (1798) Kant specically cel-
ebrated Christoph Girtanner for the latters exposition of the theory of race. Under
the heading On the Character of Races Kant wrote: As to this subject I can refer
to what Girtanner has stated so beautifully and carefully in explanation and further
development (of my principles).
14
Kant also referred to Girtanner repeatedly as auth-
10
On the dispute itself see Riedel (1980).
11
Blumenbach (1781).
12
On this crucial and still not denitively interpreted reception, see Lenoir (1980), pp. 8998; Sloan
(2001); Bernasconi (2001b).
13
Zumbach (1984).
14
Kant (1798), AA 7, 320.
76 J.H. Zammito / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 73109
oritative in the lecture materials for his Physical geography, which Rink edited and
published in 1802.
15
Now, Kant was remarkably chary of publicly praising other
authors, and rarely did he acknowledge that anyone grasped his thought properly,
much less extended it. But Girtanners extension of Kants work followed just the
vein that Kant himself had indicated his theory of race would require were it to
become a serious scientic research program.
16
Rather ungenerously labeled an outsider and an eccentric by one of the few
scholars to have written of him, Christoph Girtanner deserves a bit more consider-
ation than this would imply.
17
It is no small thing to have both Immanuel Kant and
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach refer to ones work as the denitive exposition of a
crucial matter in eighteenth-century life science. Girtanner was born in St. Gallen,
Switzerland in 1760.
18
He studied rst at Lausanne, then at Strasbourg, and nally
from 1780 to 1782 at Gottingen, where he completed a medical degree under the
direction of Blumenbach. Girtanners studies encompassed botany, chemistry and
mineralogy before culminating in medicine. His dissertation was on limestone and
its organic origins. After a brief stint back home in Switzerland as a physician,
Girtanner began to travel. In 1784 he went to Paris, then on to Edinburgh, in each
locus making crucial intellectual contacts. In Paris, he familiarized himself with
Lavoisiers chemical revolution. In Edinburgh he came into contact with William
Cullen and with the theories of the latters maverick student, John Brown.
19
Girtanner
became an honorary member of the Royal Medical Society of Edinburgh and a
foreign member of the Royal Society of Science of Edinburgh and proved a crucial
gure in transmitting the thought of the late Scottish Enlightenment to Germany. As
such a crucial intermediary, Blumenbach recommended him in 1786 to become a
corresponding member of the Gottingen Academy of Science.
20
Back in Gottingen
briey in 1787, Girtanner became a close friend of the other great scientic mind
at that University, Georg Lichtenberg. Then his urge to travel overtook him again
and he went on a grand tour which culminated in his witnessing the events of the
French Revolution in Paris, 1789.
21
His rst major publication appeared in French in the Journal de physique of 1790,
a two-part essay entitled Memoires sur lirritabilite consideree comme principe de
15
Kant (1802), AA 9, 185, 234, 313314, 319.
16
In a letter responding to the publisher Breitkopfs invitation to submit a more extended work on race
in 1778, Kant, declining the invitation, explained: my frame of reference would need to be widely
expanded and I would need to take fully into consideration the place of race among animal and plant
species, which would occupy me too much and carry me into extensive new reading which in a measure
lies outside my eld, because natural history is not my study but only my game . . . (Kant to Breitkopf,
April 1, 1778, AA 10, 227230). The project of extending consideration of race to animals and plants
took up the bulk of Girtanners study.
17
Querner (1990), p. 125.
18
Wegelin (1957).
19
Ibid., pp. 142143.
20
Querner (1990), p. 124.
21
Indeed, Girtanner produced a substantial volume of political commentary on the revolution, but that
is another story.
77 J.H. Zammito / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 73109
vie dans la nature organisee.
22
The rst part surveyed thought on the crucial ques-
tion of organic form and its medical implications, drawing especially on Haller and
without acknowledgementBrown. The second part sought to explain the character
of irritability in terms of Lavoisiers new chemistry. The rst part drew down upon
Girtanner the probably justied charge of plagiarism (of Brown) and the second the
equally justied charge of excessive speculation (on the role of oxygen in
physiology), but the result was to make him a widely known theorist of life science.
Girtanner settled in Gottingen in 1790 as a physician and private scholar. In 1792
he published two major contributions to the propagation of Lavoisiers anti-phlogistic
chemistry in Germany.
23
In 1794 he published a major work on the illnesses of
children which established him as one of the leading clinical writers of the day, a
status conrmed a few years later in a series of massive works on venereal disease
(1798), on John Browns medical system (1798) and on the work of Erasmus Darwin
(1799). This extraordinary string of publications made Girtanner one of the most
important authors in medical science in the decade. Still, Girtanners study of Kant
did not leap to the publics attention. Indeed, Girtanner had to write his own review
of the work for the Gottingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen.
24
His book appeared
in 1796; the acknowledgments from Kant and Blumenbach came only some years
later. By 1800, in any event, it could matter no longer to Girtanner, prematurely
dead of a lung disorder.
It would appear that Girtanner began learning about Kant around the same time
Blumenbach did, and that, like Blumenbach himself, Girtanner was stimulated by
Kants controversy with Herder and Forster, which drew the attention of most of
the leading life scientists in Germany.
25
In 1787 Girtanner corresponded regarding
Kants philosophy of science with Karl Reinhold, who had converted from a defender
of Herder into the decisive popularizer of Kant in 1786.
26
In 1788, Girtanner formed
a personal acquaintance in Edinburgh with one of Kants disciples, Johann Jachmann,
who served as an intermediary between Blumenbach and Kant in the 1790s.
27
Once
back in Gottingen from 1790 onward, Girtanner participated in the Blumenbach cir-
cle during the years17951797that Lenoir has contended were decisive for the
assimilation of Kantianism by Blumenbach and his school.
28
These were the years
of the composition and reception of Girtanners work, which he dedicated to Blumen-
bach as a contribution to that very endeavor.
Girtanner presented Kants thought as the paradigm for a new research program
in the life sciences under the rubric of Naturgeschichte, and he exemplied the power
22
I have consulted the English version: Two Memoirs translated from the French of Dr. Girtanner,
in Beddoes (1815).
23
Girtanner (1791), (1795).
24
See Goettingische Anzeigen 171, St. 2, Bd. 24 (October, 1796). The information that Girtanner wrote
his own review is taken from Querner (1990), p. 123 n.
25
See the documentation of this controversy in Fambach (1959), pp. 357397.
26
Sloan (1979), p. 138; Lenoir (1980), p. 99.
27
Sloan (1979), p. 138. See Jachmann to Kant, October 14, 1790, AA 11, 201213.
28
Lenoir (1980), p. 88.
78 J.H. Zammito / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 34 (2003) 73109
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saliency in Kants philosophy of science, as evidenced not only by his two essays
on race but above all by his controversy with Georg Forster around that issue.
29
I
have argued that this saliency was already emergent in the original essay on race of
1775/77.
30
That essay began to set the terms in which the critical Kant understood
himself and wished to be understood as a Naturforscher.
31
Ten years later, provoked
by Herder and then challenged by one of the premier natural scientists of the day,
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