On the Foundation of Our Belief in a Divine Government of the Universe

Johann Gottlieb Fichte

The author of the present essay has for some time recognized it as his duty to set before a larger
public the results of his philosophical work on the above subject. Hitherto this has been made available
only to the auditors of his academic lectures. He had intended to present his ideas on this subject with the
definiteness and precision that is appropriate to the sanctity which it possesses for so many honorable
persons. nfortunately the author!s time was occupied with other tasks and the e"ecution of his plan had to
be repeatedly postponed.
#s coeditor of the present journal$ the author is obliged to put before the public the following essay of
an e"cellent philosopher and this has facilitated the e"ecution of the plan just mentioned. The %Forberg!s&
essay' coincides on many points with the present author!s own convictions and hence he can on several
matters simply refer the reader to it as an e"position of his own position as well. &n other respects$
however$ the %Forberg!s& essay$ although not e"actly opposed to the present author!s views$ has not (uite
reached the latter!s position) and this makes it imperative to make the present writer!s position publicly
known$ especially since he believes that his special intellectual approach involves more basic issues than
those usually raised by philosophers. However$ for the time being nothing more is attempted than a sketch
of this approach. # more elaborate treatment will have to wait for another occasion.
The tendency to treat the so*called moral proof or any of the other arguments for the e"istence of God
as genuine proofs has been a source of almost universal confusion and is likely to remain so for a long
time. The assumption is apparently made that belief in God was for the first time given to the human race
by means of such argumentation. +oor philosophy, & should like to know how your representatives who$
after all$ are also only human beings obtain what they wish to give us by means of their proofs) or if these
representatives are in fact beings of a higher nature$ one wonders how they can count on obtaining
acceptance and understanding in us others without presupposing something analogous to their belief. -o$
this is not how things stand. +hilosophy can e"plain facts.it cannot bring them into e"istence e"cept for
the one fact of philosophy itself. #s little as it will occur to the philosopher to persuade mankind to believe
from now on in the e"istence of material objects in space or to treat the changes of these objects as
successive events in time$ so little should he be inclined to persuade mankind to believe in a divine
government of the world. #ll of this happens without any persuasion on the philosopher!s part and he
accepts these facts without (uestion. &t is the business of the philosopher to deduce these facts as
necessarily implied in the essence of rational beings as such. Hence our procedure must not be regarded as
a conversion of the unbeliever but as a deduction of the believer!s conviction. /ur only task is to deal with
the causal (uestion. 0How does man arrive at his belief12
&n dealing with this (uestion it is essential to realize that this belief must not be represented as an
arbitrary assumption which a human being may make or not make as he sees fit.as a freely chosen
decision to take as true what the heart desires and because the heart desires it and as a supplement or
substitute for the insufficiency of the available logical arguments. 3hat is founded in reason is absolutely
necessary) and what is not necessary is therefore a violation of reason. # person who regards the latter as
fact is a deluded dreamer$ however pious his attitude may be.
3here now will the philosopher$ who presupposes belief in God$ search for the necessary ground
which he is supposed to furnish1 4hould he base himself on the alleged necessity with which the e"istence
or the nature of the world of the senses implies a rational author1 The answer must be an emphatic 0no.2
For he knows only too well that such an inference is totally unwarranted$ although misguided thinkers have
made such a claim in their embarrassment to e"plain something whose e"istence they cannot deny but
whose true ground is hidden from them. The original understanding$ which is placed under the
guardianship of reason and the direction of its mechanism$ is incapable of such a step. /ne may regard the
world of the senses either from the point of view of common sense which is also that of the natural
sciences or else from the transcendental standpoint. &n the former case reason is re(uired to stop at the
e"istence of the world as something absolute5 the world e"ists simply because it does and it is the way it is
simply because it is that way. From this point of view something absolute is accepted and this absolute
being simply is the universe5 the two are identical. The universe is regarded as a whole which is grounded
in itself and complete by itself. From this point of view$ the world is an organized and organizing whole
containing the ground of all phenomena within itself and its immanent laws. &f$ while occupying the
standpoint of the pure natural sciences$ we demand an e"planation of the e"istence and nature of the
universe in terms of an intelligent cause$ our demand is total nonsense.
6oreover$ the assertion that an intelligent being is the author of the world of the senses does not help
us in the least.it is not really an intelligible pronouncement and what we get are a few empty words
instead of a genuine answer to a (uestion that should not have been raised in the first place. #n intelligent
being is un(uestionably constituted by thoughts) and the first intelligible word has yet to be spoken on the
subject of how$ in the monstrous system of a creation out of nothing$ thoughts can be transmuted into
matter$ or how$ in a system that is hardly more rational$ the world can become what it is as the result of the
action of thoughts upon self*sufficient eternal matter.
&t may be admitted that these difficulties vanish if we adopt the transcendental standpoint. There is
then no longer an independent world5 everything is now simply a reflection of our inner activity. However$
one cannot in(uire into the ground of something that does not e"ist and we cannot thus assume something
outside of it in terms of which it is to be e"plained.
3e cannot start from the world of the senses in order to climb to the notion of a moral world order so
long$ that is$ as we really start with the sense*world and do not surreptitiously introduce a moral order into
it.
/ur belief in a moral world order must be based on the concept of a supersensible world.
There is such a concept. & find myself free from any influence of the sense*world$ absolutely active in
and through myself$ and hence & am a power transcending all that is sensuous. This freedom is not$
however$ indefinite5 it has its purpose$ and this is not a purpose received from the outside but rather one
posited by the free self from its inner nature. 6y own self and my necessary goal are the supersensible
reality.
& cannot doubt this freedom or its nature without giving up my own self.
& cannot doubt this$ & say.& cannot even think of the possibility that things are not this way$ that this
inner voice might deceive me and that it re(uires to be authorized and justified by reference to something
e"ternal. 7oncerning this insight & cannot engage in any further rationalizations$ interpretations$ or
e"planations. &t is what is absolutely positive and categorical.
& cannot transcend this insight unless & decide to destroy my inner nature.& cannot (uestion it
because & cannot will to (uestion it. Here is the limit to the otherwise untamed flight of reason.here we
find the voice that constrains the intellect because it also constrains the heart. Here is the point where
thinking and willing are united and where harmony is brought into my being. & could indeed (uestion the
insight concerning my freedom if & wanted to fall into contradiction with my own self$ for there is no
immanent limitation confining the reasoning faculty5 it freely advances into the infinite and must be able to
do this since & am free in all my utterances and only & myself can set a limit to myself through my own
will. /ur moral vocation is therefore itself the outcome of a moral attitude and it is identical with our faith.
/ne is thus (uite right in maintaining that faith is the basis of all certainty. This is how it must be) since
morality$ if it is really morality$ can be constructed only out of itself and not out of any logi cally coercive
argumentation.
& could (uestion the insight of my moral freedom if & were ready to plunge into a bottomless abyss 8if
only in a theoretical fashion9) if & were ready to forego absolutely any firm point of reference) if & were
prepared to do without that certainty that accompanies all my thinking and without which & could not even
set out on speculative in(uiries. For there is no firm point of reference e"cept the one indicated here5 it is
founded in the moral sentiment and not in logic) if our rational faculty does not get to it or else proceeds
beyond it$ the result is that we find ourselves in an unbounded ocean in which each wave is pushed along
by some other wave.
:y adopting the goal set before me by my own nature$ and by making it the purpose of my real
activity$ & ipso Jiicto posit the possibility of achieving this purpose through my actions. The two statements
are identical.to adopt something as my purpose means that & posit it as something real at some future
time) if something is posited as real$ its possibility is thereby necessarily implied. & must$ if & am not to
deny my own nature$ first set myself the e"ecution of this goal5 and & must$ secondly assume that it can be
realized. These are in fact absolutely identical5 they are not two acts but the one indivisible act dictated by
the moral sentiment.
/ne should note the absolute necessity of what has here been shown. 8The reader is re(uested to grant
me for the moment that the possibility of realizing the ultimate moral goal has been demonstrated.9 3e are
not dealing with a wish$ a hope$ a piece of reflection and consideration$ of grounds pro and con$ a free
decision to assume something whose opposite one also regards as possible. Given the decision to obey the
laws of one!s inner nature$ the assumption is strictly necessary5 it is immediately contained in the decision)
it is in fact that decision.
/ne should also observe the logical se(uence of the ideas here presented. The inference is not from
possibility to reality$ but the other way around. /ur contention is not5 & ought since & can) it is rather5 & can
since & ought. That & ought and what & ought to do comes first and is most immediately evident. &t re(uires
no further e"planation$ justification$ or authorization. &t is intrinsically true and evident. &t is not based on
or conditioned by any other truth$ but on the contrary all other truths are conditioned by it. This logical
order has fre(uently been overlooked. # person who maintains that & must first know whether & can do
something before & can judge that & ought to do it$ is thereby$ if he is making a practical judgment$ negating
the primacy of the moral law and hence the moral law itself$ while$ if he is making a theoretical judgment$
he thereby totally misconstrues the original se(uence of our rational processes.
To say that & must simply adopt the goal of morality$ that its realization is possi ble and possible
through me$ means that every action which & ought to perform and the circumstances that condition such an
action are means to my adopted goal. &t is in the light of this that my e"istence$ the e"istence of other moral
beings and of the world of the senses as our common stage receive their relation to morality. # wholly new
order is thus brought into being and the sense*world with all its immanent laws is no more than the support
underlying this order. The world of the senses proceeds in its course according to its eternal laws in order
to provide freedom with a sphere of operation$ but it does not have the slightest influence on morality or
immorality$ it does not in any way control a free being. The latter soars above all nature in self*sufficiency
and independence. The realization of the purpose of reason can be accomplished only through the efforts of
free beings$ but because of a higher law this purpose will un(uestionably be attained. &t is possible to do
what is right and every situation is geared to this through the higher law just mentioned5 because of this
law the moral deed succeeds infallibly and the immoral deed fails just as certainly. The entire universe now
e"hibits a totally different appearance to us.
This change in appearance will be further illuminated if we raise ourselves to the transcendental
viewpoint. Transcendental theory teaches that the world is nothing but the sensuous appearance$ given
according to intelligible rational laws$ of our own inner activity$ our own intelligence operating within
boundaries that must remain incomprehensible) and a human being cannot be blamed if he has an uncanny
feeling when faced with the total disappearance of the ground underneath him. The boundaries just
mentioned are admittedly beyond our understanding as far as their origin is concerned. However$ practical
philosophy teaches that this does not significantly affect anything of practical importance. The boundaries
are the clearest and most certain of all things.they determine our fi"ed position in the moral arrangement
of things. 3hat you perceive as a conse(uence of your position in this moral order has reality and$
moreover$ the only reality that concerns you5 it is the permanent interpretation of the injunction of your
duty$ the living e"pression of what you ought to do simply because you ought to do it. /ur world is the
sensualized material of our duty) the latter is the truly real in things$ the genuine primal stuff of all
appearances. The compulsion with which our belief in things is forced upon us is a moral compulsion.the
only one that can be e"erted upon a free being. -obody can$ without destruction of his nature$ surrender
his moral calling to such a degree that it cannot preserve him$ within the limits previously mentioned$ for a
higher and nobler future state. 7onsidered as the result of a moral world order$ this belief in the reality of
the sense*world can even be regarded as a kind of revelation. &t is our duty that is revealed in the world of
the senses.
This is the true faith5 this moral order is the ;ivine which we accept. &t is constituted by acting rightly.
This is the only possible confession of faith5 to do what duty prescribes and to do this gaily and naturally$
without doubt or calculation of conse(uences. #s a result$ this ;ivine becomes alive and real in us) every
one of our deeds is performed in the light of this presupposition and all their conse(uences will be pre*
served in the ;ivine.
True atheism$ unbelief and godlessness in the real sense$ consists in calculation of conse(uences$ in
refusing to obey the voice of one!s conscience until one thinks one can foresee the success of one!s actions
and in thus elevating one!s own judgment above that of God and in making oneself into God. He who wills
to do evil in order to produce good is a godless person. nder a moral government of the world good
cannot come out of evil) and as certainly as one believes in the former$ so one cannot believe the latter. <ou
must not lie even$ as a result$ the world were to collapse and become a heap of ruins. :ut this last is only a
manner of speaking5 if you were permitted to believe seriously that the world would collapse$ then at the
very least your own nature would be self*contradictory and self*destroying. &n fact you do not believe this$
you cannot believe it$ and you are not even permitted to believe it5 you know that the plan of the world!s
preservation does not contain a lie.
The faith just stated is the whole and complete faith. This living and effective moral order is identical
with God. 3e do not and cannot grasp any other God. There is no rational justification for going beyond
this moral world order and for inferring the e"istence of a separate entity as its cause. /ur original reason
certainly does not make any such inference and it does not know any such separate entity.only a
philosophy that misunderstands its own nature draws such an inference. &s this moral world order no more
than a contingent entity$ something that might not be$ that might be as it is or otherwise so that its e"istence
and nature re(uires to be e"plained in terms of a cause$ so that belief in it re(uires to be legitimized by
showing its ground1 &f you will stop listening to the demands of a worthless system and if instead you will
consult your own inner nature$ then you will find that the moral world order is the absolute beginning of all
objective knowledge 8just as your freedom and your moral vocation are the absolute beginning of all
subjective knowledge9 and all other objective knowledge must be founded and conditioned by it$ while the
moral world order itself cannot be conditioned by anything else$ since outside of it there is nothing else.
<ou cannot even attempt the e"planation %of the moral order= without falsifying and endangering the nature
of the original assumption. The assumption of a moral world order is such that it is absolutely self*evident
and it does not tolerate any supporting arguments. <et you wish to make the assumption dependent on such
argumentation.
#nd this ratiocination$ how can you succeed with it1 #fter you have undermined the immediate
conviction$ how do you then proceed to fortify it1 &ndeed$ it does not stand well with your faith if you can
embrace it only on condition that it has an e"ternal source and if it collapses in the absence of such a
support.
>ven if one were to permit you to draw this inference and$ as a conse(uence$ to conclude that an
author of the moral world order e"ists$ what would that conclusion amount to1 This entity is supposed to
be distinct from you and from the world$ it is supposed to engage in activities in the world in accordance
with its plans and must therefore be capable of having ideas$ of having personality and consciousness. :ut
what do you mean by 0personality2 and 0consciousness21 &t is plain that when you use these words$ you
refer to what you have found and come to know in yourself under these labels. The least attention to these
notions will teach you that they can be properly employed only if what they refer to is limited and finite.
<ou therefore make the entity to which you apply these predicates into something finite. <ou have not$ as
you intended to$ succeeded in thinking about God.you have merely multiplied yourself in your thoughts.
<ou can no more e"plain the moral world order by reference to this entity than by reference to yourself5 the
moral world order remains une"plained and absolute as before. &ndeed$ in talking the way you do$ you
have not engaged in any genuine thinking at all$ but you have merely disturbed the air with empty sounds.
<ou could have predicted this outcome without difficulty. <ou are a finite being and how can that which is
finite grasp and understand the infinite1
&f faith keeps to what is immediately given$ it remains firm and unshakable) if it is made dependent on
the concept %of the personal God just discussed= then it becomes shaky$ for the concept is impossible and
full of contradictions.
&t is therefore a misunderstanding to maintain that it is doubtful whether or not there is a God. /n the
contrary$ that there is a moral world order$ that in this order a definite position has been assigned to every
rational individual and that his work counts$ that the destiny of every person 8unless it is the conse(uence
of his own conduct9 is derived from this plan$ that without this plan no hair drops from a head$ nor a
sparrow from a roof$ that every good deed succeeds while every evil one fails and that everything must go
well for those who love only the good.all this is not doubtful at all but the most certain thing in the world
and the basis of all other certainty$ in fact the only truth that is objectively absolutely valid. /n the other
side$ anybody who reflects just a moment and who is candid about the outcome of this reflection cannot
doubt that the concept of God as a separate substance is impossible and contradictory. &t is permissible to
say this openly and put down the idle chatter of the schools in order to elevate the true religion of joyful
morality.