Embed Doc
Copy Link
Readcast
Collections

CommentGo Back

Download

Chapter 6 of Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth, translated by Susanne K. Langer, NewYork, Harper & Brothers, 1946 [Dover Publications, 1953], 83-99. The book was “[o]riginally published in German as Number VI of the ‘Studien der Bibliothek Warburg,’ under the editorship of Fritz Saxl” as Sprache und Mythos: Ein Beitrag zum Problem derGötternamen. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1925, 87pp.This little study, entitled Sprache und Mythos, reveals the genesis of some of those greatconclusions for which he [Cassirer] is known to the world; it gives one a look into themental laboratory where new ideas are generated and developed.Susanne K. Langer,Translator’s PrefaceLanguage and myth stand in an original and indissoluble correlation with one another,from which they both emerge but gradually as independent elements. They are twodiverse shoots from the same parent stem, the same impulse of sym-bolic formulation,springing from the same basic mental activity, a concentration and heightening of simplesensory experience.Ernst CassirerPosted August 29, 2008

The Power of Metaphor

Ernst Cassirer

The foregoing considerations have shown us how mythical and verbal thought areinterwoven in every way; how the great structures of the mythic and linguistic realms,respectively, are determined and guided through long periods of their development bythe same spiritual motives. Yet one fundamental motive has so far remained unnoticed,which not only illustrates their relationship, but offers an ultimate explanation of it.That myth and language are subject to the same, or at least closely analogous, lawsof evolution can really be seen and understood only in so far as we can uncover thecommon root from which both of them spring. The resemblances in their results, in theforms which they produce, point to a final community of function, of the principleswhereby they operate.In order to recognize this function and represent it in its abstract nakedness, we haveto pursue the ways of myth and language not in their progress, but in regress—back tothe point from which those two divergent lines emanate.And this common center really seems to be demonstrable; for, no matter how widelythe contents of myth and language may differ, yet the same form of mental conception isoperative in both. It is the form which one may denote as metaphorical thinking; thenature and meaning of metaphor is what we must start with if we want to find, on theone hand, the unity of the verbal and the mythical worlds and, on the other, theirdifference.It has frequently been noted that the intellectual link between language and myth ismetaphor; but in the precise definition of the process, and even in regard to the generaldirection it is supposed to take, theories are widely at variance. The real source of metaphor is sought now in the construction of language, now in mythic imagination;sometimes it is supposed to be speech, which by its originally metaphorical nature begetsmyth, and is its eternal source; sometimes, on the contrary, the metaphor-ical characterof words is regarded as a legacy which language has received from myth and holds infee. Herder, in his prize essay on the origin of speech, emphasized the mythic aspect of all verbal and propositional conceptions.

As all nature sounds; so to Man, creature of sense, nothing could seem morenatural than that it lives, and speaks, and acts. A certain savage sees a tree, withits majestic crown; the crown rustles! That is stirring godhead! The savage fallsprostrate and worships! Behold the history of sensuous Man, that dark web, in itsbecoming, out of verbis nomina—and the easiest transition to abstract thought!For the savages of North America, for instance, everything is still animate;everything has its genius, its spirit. That it was likewise among Greeks andorientals, may be seen from their oldest dictionary and grammar—they are, aswas all nature to their inventor, a pantheon! A realm of living, actingcreatures. . . . The driving storm, the gentle zephyr, the clear fountain and themighty ocean—their whole mythology lies in those treasure troves, in verbis andnominibus of the ancient languages; and the earliest dictionary was thus asounding pantheon.

The romantics followed the way indicated by Herder; Schelling, too, sees in languagea “faded mythology,” which preserves in formal and abstract distinctions what mythologystill treats as living, concrete differences.

Exactly the opposite course was taken by the “comparative mythology” that wasattempted in the second half of the nineteenth century, especially by Adalbert Kuhn andMax Müller. Since this school adopted the methodological principle of basingmythological comparisons on linguistic comparisons, the factual primacy of verbalconcepts over mythic ones seemed to them to be implied in their procedure. Thusmythology appeared as a result of language. The “root metaphor” underlying all mythicformulations was regarded as an essentially verbal phenomenon, the basic character of which was to be investigated and understood. The homonymity or assonance of denotative terms was supposed to break and direct the way for mythic fantasy.Let us consider, then, that there was, necessarily and really, a period in thehistory of our race when all the thoughts that went beyond the narrow horizon of our everyday life had to be expressed by means of metaphors, and that thesemetaphors had not yet become what they are to us, mere conventional andtraditional expressions, but were felt and understood half in their original and half in their modified character . . . . Whenever any word, that was at first usedmetaphorically, is used without a clear conception of the steps that led from itsoriginal to its metaphorical meaning, there is danger of mythology; wheneverthose steps are forgotten and artificial steps put in their places, we havemythology, or, if I may say so, we have diseased language, whether thatlanguage refers to religious or secular interests . . . . What is commonly calledmythology is but a part of a much more general phase through which all languagehas at one time or other to pass.

Before one can attempt any decision between these antagonistic theories, this battlefor the priority of language over mythology or myth over language, the basic concept of metaphor requires scrutiny and definition.One can take it in a narrow sense, in which it comprises only the consciousdenotation of one thought content by the name of another which resembles the former insome respect, or is somehow analogous to it. In that case, metaphor is a genuine “translation”; the two concepts between which it obtains are fixed and independentmeanings, and betwixt them, as the given terminus a quo and terminus ad quem, theconceptual process takes place, which causes the transition from one to the other,whereby one is semantically made to stand proxy for the other.Any attempt to probe the generic causes of this conceptual and nominal substitution,and to explain the extraordinarily wide and variegated use of this sort of metaphor (i.e.,the conscious identification of avowedly diverse objects), especially in primitive forms of thinking and speaking, leads one back to an essential attitude of mythic thought andfeeling. Heinz Werner, in his study of the origins of metaphor, has presented a veryplausible argument for the supposition that this particular kind of metaphor, the

circumlocution of one idea in terms of another, rests on quite definite motives arisingfrom the magical view of the world, and more especially from certain name and wordtaboos.

But such a use of metaphor clearly presupposes that both the ideas and their verbalcorrelates are already given as definite quantities; only if these elements, as such, areverbally fixed and defined can they be exchanged for one another. Such transpositionand substitution, which operate with a previously known vocabulary as their material,must be clearly distinguished from that genuine “radical metaphor” which is a conditionof the very formulation of mythic as well as verbal conceptions.Indeed, even the most primitive verbal utterance requires a transmutation of acertain cognitive or emotive experience into sound, i.e., into a medium that is foreign tothe experience, and even quite disparate; just as the simplest mythical form can ariseonly by virtue of a transformation which removes a certain impression from the realm of the ordinary, the everyday and profane, and lifts it to the level of the “holy,” the sphereof mythico-religious “significance.” This involves not merely a transfer-ence, but a realμετάβασις εις αλλα γενος; in fact, it is not only a transition to another category [themeaning of the Greek phrase.—A.F.], but actually the creation of the category itself.If, now, one were to ask which of these two types of metaphor begets the other—whether the meta-phorical expressions in speech are produced by the mythic point of view, or whether, on the contrary, this point of view could arise and develop only on thebasis of language—the foregoing considerations show that this question is reallyspecious. For, in the first place, we are not dealing here with a temporal relation of “before” and “after,” but with the logical relation between the forms of language and of myth, respectively; with the way the one conditions and determines the other.This determination, however, can be conceived only as reciprocal. Language andmyth stand in an original and indissoluble correlation with one another, from which theyboth emerge but gradually as independent elements. They are two diverse shoots fromthe same parent stem, the same impulse of symbolic formulation, springing from thesame basic mental activity, a concentration and heightening of simple sensoryexperience.In the vocables of speech and in primitive mythic figurations, the same inner processfinds its consummation: they are both resolutions of an inner tension, the representationof subjective impulses and excitations in definite objective forms and figures. As Useneremphatically said:It is not by any volition that the name of a thing is determined. People do notinvent some arbitrary sound-complex, in order to introduce it as the sign of acertain object, as one might do with a token. The spiritual excitement caused bysome object which presents itself in the outer world furnishes both the occasionand the means of its denomination. Sense impressions are what the self receivesfrom its encounter with the not-self, and the liveliest of these naturally strive forvocal expression; they are the bases of the separate appellations which thespeaking populace attempts.

Now this genesis corresponds precisely, feature for feature, with that of the “momentary gods.” Similarly, the significance of linguistic and mythic metaphors,respectively, will reveal itself, so that the spiritual power embodied in them may beproperly understood, only as we trace them back to their common origin; if one seeksthis significance and power in that peculiar concentration, that “intensifi-cation” of senseexperience which underlies all linguistic as well as all mythico-religious formula-tions.If we take our departure once more from the contrast which theoretical or “discursive” conception presents, we shall find indeed that the different directions whichthe growth of logical (discursive) and mythic-linguistic conception, respectively, havefollowed, may be seen just as clearly in their several results. The former begins withsome individual, single perception, which we expand, and carry beyond its original