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Abstract
On the day of their trial, a substantial number of felony defendants fail to appear.
Public police have the primary responsibility for pursuing and rearresting defendants
who were released on their own recognizance or on cash or government bail. De-
fendants who made bail by borrowing from a bond dealer, however, must worry
about an entirely different pursuer. When a defendant who has borrowed money skips
trial, the bond dealer forfeits the bond unless the fugitive is soon returned. As a
result, bond dealers have an incentive to monitor their charges and ensure that they
do not skip. When a defendant does skip, bond dealers hire bounty hunters to return
the defendants to custody. We compare the effectiveness of these two different systems
by examining failure-to-appear rates, fugitive rates, and capture rates of felony de-
fendants who fall under the various systems. We apply propensity score and matching
techniques.
I. Introduction
* The authors’ names are in alphabetical order. We wish to thank Jonathan Guryan, Steve
Levitt, Lance Lochner, Bruce Meyer, Jeff Milyo, Christopher Taber, Sam Peltzman, and seminar
participants at Claremont McKenna College, the American Economic Association annual meet-
ings (2002), George Mason University, Northwestern University, and the University of Chicago.
1
These figures are from the State Court Processing Statistics (SCPS) program of the Bureau
of Justice Statistics and can be found in U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties (various years). We describe the data at greater
length below. The SCPS program creates a sample representative of 1 month of cases from
the 75 most populous counties (which account for about half of all reported crimes). In 1996,
the sample represented 55,000 cases, which in turn represent some 660,000 filings in a year
and 1,320,000 filings in the nation. The absolute figures are calculated using this total, and
93
94 the journal of law and economics
5
William M. Landes, The Bail System: An Economic Approach, 2 J. Legal Stud. 79, 105
(1973); William M. Landes, Legality and Reality: Some Evidence on Criminal Procedure, 3
J. Legal Stud. 287 (1974); Stevens H. Clark, Jean L. Freeman, & Gary G. Koch, Bail Risk:
A Multivariate Analysis, 5 J. Legal Stud. 341, 385 (1976); Samuel L. Myers, Jr., The Economics
of Bail Jumping, 10 J. Legal Stud. 381, 396 (1981).
6
Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 Stan.
L. Rev. 987, 1047 (1994), demonstrates the subtlety of the distinctions made by bond dealers
in setting bail bond rates. Although the courts (in New Haven, Connecticut, in 1990) set higher
bail amounts for minority defendants than for whites, Ayres and Waldfogel find that bond
dealers acted in precisely the opposite manner. What this pattern suggests is that judges set
higher bail for minority defendants than for white defendants with the same probability of
flight. Bond dealers are then induced by competition to charge minorities relatively lower bail
bond rates.
7
Floyd Feeney, Foreword, in Bail Reform in America, at ix (Wayne H. Thomas, Jr., ed.
1976), for example, writes that “the present system of commercial surety bail should be simply
and totally abolished. . . . It is not so much that bondsmen are evil—although they sometimes
are—but rather that they serve no useful purpose.” American Bar Association, Criminal Justice
Standards, ch. 10, Pretrial Release, Standard 10–5.5, Compensated Sureties, 114–15 (1985),
refers to the commercial bond business as “tawdry” and discusses “the central evil of the
compensated surety system.” When Oregon considered reintroducing commercial bail, Judge
William Snouffer testified, “Bail bondsmen are a cancer on the body of criminal justice” (quoted
in Spurgeon Kennedy & D. Alan Henry, Commercial Surety Bail: Assessing Its Role in the
Pretrial Release and Detention Decision (1997)). Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun called
the commercial bail system “offensive” and “odorous.” See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357
(1971).
8
In order to provide appropriate incentives, money bail is typically higher for the rich than
the poor. Thus, it is not a priori necessary that money bail should discriminate against the
poor, although in practice this does occur owing to nonlinearities and fixed costs in the bail
process. Assume that money bail is set so as to create equal FTA rates across income classes.
In such a case, there is no discrimination against the poor in the setting of bail. But if the bail
96 the journal of law and economics
rates, for example, may be higher for those defendants charged with minor
crimes—perhaps these defendants reason that police will not pursue a failure
to appear when the underlying crime is minor—and defendants charged with
minor crimes are more likely to be released on their own recognizance than
on surety release. A second reason, however, is that bond dealers, just like
other lenders, have numerous ways of creating appropriate incentives for
borrowers.
Most obviously, a defendant who skips town will owe the bond dealer the
entire amount of the bond. Defendants are often judgment proof, however,
so bond dealers ask defendants for collateral and family cosigners to the
bond (which is not done under the deposit bond system). If hardened criminals
do not fear the law, they may yet fear their mother’s wrath should the bond
dealer take possession of their mother’s home because they fail to show up
for trial. In order to make flight less likely, bond dealers will also sometimes
monitor their charges and require them to check in periodically. In addition,
bond dealers often remind defendants of their court dates and, perhaps more
important, remind the defendant’s mother of the son’s court date when the
mother is a cosigner on the bond.15
If a defendant does fail to appear, the bond dealer is granted some time,
typically 90–180 days, to recapture him before the bond dealer’s bond is
forfeited. Thus, bond dealers have a credible threat to pursue and rearrest
any defendant who flees. Bond dealers report that just to break even, 95
percent of their clients must show up in court.16 Thus, significant incentives
exist to pursue and return skips to justice.
Bond dealers and their agents have powerful legal rights over any defendant
who fails to appear, rights that exceed those of the public police. Bail en-
forcement agents, for example, have the right to break into a defendant’s
home without a warrant, make arrests using all necessary force including
deadly force if needed, temporarily imprison defendants, and pursue and
return a defendant across state lines without the necessity of entering into
an extradition process.17
At the time they write the bond, bond dealers prepare for the possibility
of flight by collecting information that may later prove useful. A typical
application for bond, for example, will contain information on the defendant’s
residence, employer, former employer, spouse, children (names and schools),
spouse’s employer, mother, father, automobile (description, tags, financing),
15
See Mary A. Toborg, Bail Bondsmen and Criminal Courts, 8 Just. Sys. J. 141, 156 (1983).
Bail jumping is itself a crime that may result in additional penalties.
16
Drimmer, supra note 11, at 793 (1996); Morgan Reynolds, Privatizing Probation and Parole,
in Entrepreneurial Economics: Bright Ideas from the Dismal Science 117, 128 (Alexander
Tabarrok ed. 2002).
17
Drimmer, supra note 11. See also Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366 (1873).
98 the journal of law and economics
18
We thank Bryan Frank of Lexington National Insurance Corporation for discussion and
for sending us a typical application form.
19
Bob Burton, Bail Enforcer: The Advanced Bounty Hunter (1990).
20
Good bond dealers master the tricks of their trade. One bond dealer pointed out to us, for
example, that the first three digits in a social security number indicate in what state the number
was issued. This information can suggest that an applicant might be lying if he claims to have
been born in another state (many social security numbers are issued at birth or shortly thereafter),
and it may provide a lead for where a skipped defendant may have family or friends.
21
Francis X. Clines, Baltimore Gladly Breaks 10-Year Homicide Streak, N.Y. Times, January
3, 2001, at A11.
22
George Lecky, Police Name “200 Most Wanted,” Cincinnati Post, September 5, 1997, at
1A.
23
See Jane Prendergast, Warrant Amnesty Offered for 1 Day, Cincinnati Enquirer, November
19, 1999, for description of a similar program in Kenton County, Kentucky. See also Henry
K. Lee & Kenneth Howe, Plan to Clear Backlog of Warrants: Santa Clara County Offering
Amnesty to Some, S.F. Chron., January 12, 2000, at A15.
24
Howe and Hallissy, supra note 3.
25
Id.
bail jumping 99
people wanted for violent crimes, including more than 2,600 outstanding
homicide warrants.26 Kenneth Howe and Erin Hallissy report that “local, state
and federal law enforcement agencies have largely abandoned their job of
serving warrants in all but the most serious cases.” Explaining how this
situation came about, they write, “As arrests increased, jails became over-
crowded. To cope, judges, instead of locking up suspects, often released them
without bail with a promise to return for their next court date. For their part,
police, rather than arrest minor offenders, issued citations and then released
the suspects with the same expectation. When suspects failed to appear for
their court dates, judges issued bench warrants instructing police to take the
suspects into custody. But this caused the number of warrants to balloon,
and the police did not have the time or staff to serve them all.”27
Y 1 … Y M ⊥ TFX p x. (2)
v m,l p E(Y mFT p m) ⫺ E pmFml[E(Y lFp mFml (X), T p l)FT p m]. (3)
30
Matching methods are common among applied statisticians and natural scientists but have
only recently been analyzed and applied by econometricians and economists. Papers on the
econometric theory of matching include Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, supra note 4; and Guido
W. Imbens, The Role of the Propensity Score in Estimating Dose-Response Functions (Technical
Working Paper No. 237, Nat’l Bur. Econ. Res. 1999). More applied work includes James J.
Heckman, Hidehiko Ichimura, & Petra E. Todd, Matching as an Econometric Evaluation Es-
timator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Program, 64 Rev. Econ. Stud. 605, 654
(1997); Dehejia & Wahba, supra note 4; Michael Lechner, Programme Heterogeneity and
Propensity Score Matching: An Application to the Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policies
(Contributed Paper No. 647, Econ. Soc’y World Congress 2000). Our multitreatment application
is closest to that of Michael Lechner, Identification and Estimation of Causal Effects of Multiple
Treatments under the Conditional Independence Assumption (Discussion Paper No. 91, IZA
1999).
31
Lechner, Identification and Estimation of Causal Effects, supra note 30; Imbens, supra
note 30.
32
Lechner, Identification and Estimation of Causal Effects, supra note 30.
bail jumping 101
from the marginal probabilities p l (x) and p m (x) estimated from a discrete-
choice model. In this case,
p m (x)
E[ p mFml (x)Fp l (x), p m (x)] p E [ p l (x) ⫹ p m (x) ]
Fp l (x), p m (x) p p mFml (x).
(4)
We use an ordered probit model (see further below) to generate propensity
scores.
It is important to emphasize that the propensity scores are not of direct
interest but rather are the metric by which members of the treated group are
matched to members of the “untreated” group (“differently” treated in our
context). After matching, and given the conditional independence assumption,
the treated and untreated groups can be analyzed as if treatment had been
assigned randomly. Thus, differences in mean FTA rates across matched
samples are estimates of the effect of treatment.
Less formally, matching on propensity scores can be understood as a
pragmatic method for balancing the covariates of the sample across the dif-
ferent treatments.33 Note that the covariates that we care most about balancing
are those that affect the treatment outcome. Assume, for example, that X
influences treatment selection but does not independently influence treatment
outcome. If the goal of the selection model were to consistently estimate the
causes of treatment selection, we would want to include X in the model, but
it is not necessarily desirable to include it when the purpose is to create a
metric for use in matching.34 A simple example occurs when X predicts
treatment exactly. Inclusion of X would defeat the goal of matching because
all propensity scores would be either zero or one. Similarly, we will include
model variables in the propensity score that may affect the treatment outcome
even if they do not casually affect treatment selection.
example, number of prior arrests), sex and age of the defendant,35 release
type (surety, cash bond, own recognizance, and so on), rearrest charges for
those rearrested, whether the defendant failed to appear, and whether the
defendant was still at large after 1 year, among other categories.
In addition to the main release types, there are minor variations. Some
counties, for example, release on an unsecured bond for which the defendant
pays no money to the court but is liable for the bail amount should he fail
to appear. Because the incentive effects are very similar, we include unsecured
bonds in the deposit bond category.36 Instead of a pure cash bond, it is
sometimes possible to put up property as collateral. Since property bonds
are rare (588 observations in our data, less than 2 percent of all releases),
we drop them from the analysis.37 Finally, some counties may occasionally
use some form of supervised release. In the first year of our data set, su-
pervised release is included in the own-recognizance category. Supervised
release often means something as simple as a weekly telephone check-in, so
including these with own recognizance is reasonable. Supervised release is
not a standard term, however, and other forms, such as mandatory daily
attendance of a drug treatment program, are likely to be more binding. To
maintain comparability across years, we follow the practice established in
the first year of the data set by classifying supervised release with own
recognizance. Because supervised release is more binding than pure own
recognizance, this can only lower FTA rates and other results in the own-
recognizance sample, thus biasing our results away from finding significant
differences among treatments.38
In Table 1, the mean FTA rates for release categories are along the main
diagonal, with the number of observations in square brackets. The preliminary
analysis suggests that FTA rates are lower under surety bond release than
under most other types of release. Off-diagonal elements are the difference
between the FTA rate for the row category and the FTA rate for the column
category. The FTA rate for those released under surety bond is 17 percent.
Compared with surety release, the FTA rate is 3 percentage points higher
under cash bonds, 4 percentage points higher under deposit bonds, and 9
percentage points higher under own recognizance (all these differences are
35
The State Court Processing Statistics data are more complete and better organized than
the National Pretrial Reporting Program data. The former, for example, include information
on the race of the defendant that the latter do not.
36
We drop observations missing data on the bail amount.
37
Another reason to drop property bonds is that it is difficult to compare the bail for these
releases to other release types. A defendant, for example, may put up a $250,000 house as
collateral for $25,000 in bail. Although we know the bail amount, we do not know the value
of the collateral property other than that it must, by law in many cases, be higher than the
value of the bail amount. A cash or surety bond, therefore, is not equivalent to a property bond
for the same bail amount.
38
We find similar results by restricting the data set to the years in which supervised release
is given a distinct category.
bail jumping 103
TABLE 1
Mean Failure-to-Appear Rates by Release Category, 1988–96
Note.—Mean failure-to-appear (FTA) rates (in %) for release categories, rounded to the nearest integer,
are along the main diagonal, with the number of observations in square brackets. Off-diagonal elements
are the difference between the mean FTA rate for the row category and the mean FTA rate for the column
category.
** Statistically significant at the greater than 1% level.
statistically significant at greater than the 1 percent level). Put slightly dif-
ferently, compared with surety release, the FTA rate is approximately 18
percent higher under cash bond, 33 percent higher under deposit bond, and
more than 50 percent higher under own recognizance.
Table 1 also presents some information on emergency release. Emergency
releasees are defendants who are released solely because of a court order to
relieve prison overcrowding. Emergency release is not a treatment—the treat-
ment is own recognizance—but rather an indication of what happens when
neither judges nor bond dealers play their usual role in selecting defendants
to be released.39 One would expect that relative to those released under other
categories, these defendants are likely to be accused of the most serious
crimes, have the highest probability of being found guilty, and have the
fewest community ties. In addition, these defendants have neither monetary
incentive nor the threat of being recaptured by a bounty hunter to induce
them to return to court. As a result, a whopping 45 percent of the defendants
who are given emergency release fail to appear for trial. The large differences
between the FTA rates of those released on emergency release and every
other category indicate that substantial and successful selection occurs in the
decision to release. Emergency release is thus of some special interest, al-
though not directly related to the focus of this paper.
Although the preliminary data analysis is suggestive, the difference-in-
means analysis could confound effects due to treatment with effects due to
selection on, for example, defendant characteristics such as the alleged crime.
39
Even under emergency release, some selection can occur. Judges and jailers, for example,
could order that more inmates be paroled to make room for the most potentially dangerous
accused defendants, inmates could be shipped out of state, or the court order could be (tem-
porarily) ignored. The costs of selection, however, clearly rise substantially when jail space is
tightly constrained.
104 the journal of law and economics
V. Results
40
The median deposit bond amount is $5,000, and releasees typically must deposit 10 percent
or less of the bond amount.
41
We have also estimated the results using a multivariate logit model. The results are sub-
stantively similar (on the ordered probit model, see, for example, William H. Greene, Econ-
ometric Analysis (4th ed. 2000)).
bail jumping 105
B. Matching Quality
A match is defined as the pair of observations with the smallest difference
in propensity scores so long as the difference is less than a predefined caliper.
If a match cannot be made within the caliper distance, the observations are
dropped. We use matching with replacement, so the order of matching is
irrelevant, and every untreated observation is compared against every treated
observation.44
The match quality is good, as we match large proportions of the sample
despite using a caliper of only .0001.45 Figure 1A presents a box-and-whiskers
plot of the propensity scores for each treatment category (including the “treat-
ment” of not released) conditional on the actual treatment. The leftmost part
of the graph, for example, gives the box-and-whiskers plot for the propensity
of being in the own-recognizance, deposit, cash, surety, and not-released
treatments for all defendants in the own-recognizance treatment.46
42
Ayres & Waldfogel, supra note 6, identifies eight characteristics that judges may consider
in setting bail: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense (if relevant), (2) the evidence
against the defendant, (3) the defendant’s prior criminal record, (4) the defendant’s prior FTA
record, (5) the defendant’s family ties, (6) the defendant’s employment record, (7) the de-
fendant’s financial resources, and (8) the defendant’s community ties. Although Ayers and
Waldfogel’s study deals only with Connecticut, the criteria are similar in other states.
43
The use of county effects in the selection equation is noteworthy because it implies that
matching will occur with “quasi”-fixed effects. A true fixed-effects estimator would require
that comparable observations come from within the same county. The matching estimator takes
into account county effects when seeking a match but does not insist that every match must
be within county. In particular, some counties do not release on deposit bond, and others do
not release on surety bond. A fixed-effects estimator would not use information from these
counties in estimating the effect of the deposit and surety treatments. The matching estimator
will use information from these counties if matching is strong on other variables. A pure fixed-
effects estimator may also be important, however, and in the working version of this paper,
Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Public versus Private Law Enforcement: Evidence from
Bail Jumping (Working paper, George Mason Univ. 2003), we pursue this alternative approach.
Results are consistent with those discussed here.
44
Dehejia & Wahba, supra note 4, finds that matching with replacement is considerably
superior to matching with nonreplacement.
45
When matching on variables with fewer observations, such as fugitive rates conditional
on failure to appear as we do below, we match using a caliper of .001. The caliper size makes
little difference to the results.
46
In a box-and-whiskers plot, the box contains the interquartile range (IQR): the observations
between the 75th percentile (the top of the box) and the 25th percentile (the bottom of the
box). The horizontal line toward the center of each box is the median observation. The whiskers
are the so-called adjacent values that extend from the largest observation less than or equal
Figure 1.—A, p-score distribution for each release type conditional on actual release (the
order within type is own recognizance, deposit, cash, surety, not released); B, pairwise p-score
distributions for own recognizance versus surety.
bail jumping 107
to the 75th percentile plus 1.5 # IQR and the smallest observation greater than or equal to
the 25th percentile minus 1.5 # IQR. Points outside the box and whiskers are called extreme
values or outside points and for clarity are not plotted in this graph. In this plot, the width of
the box is proportional to the square root of the number of observations in that category.
47
Another interesting aspect of the box-and-whiskers plot is that it suggests that almost
everyone can be released on their own recognizance, even those who might in another time
and place be released only with high bail. Thirty percent of released defendants accused of
murder, for example, were released on their own recognizance.
48
It is possible to find defendants who were released who might not have been released—
thus, the data are consistent with the adage that it is better to let 10 guilty men go free than
jail one innocent man.
108 the journal of law and economics
TABLE 2
Treatment Effects of Row versus Column Release Category on Failure-to-
Appear Rates using Matched Samples, 1988–96
Note.—Mean failure-to-appear rates (in %) for release categories for the full sample are along the main
diagonal. Off-diagonal elements are the estimated treatment effects of the row category versus the column
category. Standard errors are in parentheses—the first standard error assumes that the p-score is estimated
with certainty; the second uses bootstrapping to estimate the standard error including uncertainty of the
p-score. Matching caliper p .0001.
** Statistically significant at the greater than 1% level (two sided).
Unlike Table 1, both the top and bottom halves of Table 2 are filled in;
this is because the estimate of the treatment on the treated is conceptually
different from the estimate of the treatment on the untreated (differently
treated). For example, the effect of the surety treatment relative to own
recognizance for those who were released on surety bond is not necessarily
the exact opposite of the effect of own recognizance relative to surety bond
on those who were released on their own recognizance. As it happens, how-
ever, our estimates of these effects are similar. The estimate of the effect of
own recognizance relative to surety on those who were released on their own
recognizance, for example, is 6.5 percentage points, similar in size but op-
posite in sign to the ⫺7.3 surety effect relative to own recognizance of those
who were released on surety bond. The similarities across diagonals suggest
that either (or both) treatment selection or treatment effect does not interact
strongly with defendant characteristics. One possible exception is that the
deposit bond treatment relative to cash is estimated at 4.1 percentage points,
while the cash bond treatment relative to deposit is estimated at ⫺1.5 per-
centage points.
⫺6.5, which is within 1 standard deviation of the ⫺7.3 matching estimate. We do a more
detailed comparison of linear regression and matching results further below.
52
We use the term “bounty hunter” or “bail enforcement agent” to refer to private pursuers
of felony defendants. Bond dealers typically pursue their own skips. Literal bounty hunters
are typically not called in unless the skip is thought to have crossed state or international lines.
Services like Wanted Alert (http://www.wantedalert.com) regularly post ads in USA Today that
list fugitives and their bounties.
110 the journal of law and economics
TABLE 3
Treatment Effect of Row versus Column Release Category on the Fugitive Rate
using Matched Samples, Conditional on Failure to Appear, 1988–96
Note.—Mean fugitive rates (in %), defined as failures to appear that last longer than a year, for release
categories for the full sample are along the main diagonal, with the number of observations in that category
conditional on a failure to appear in square brackets. Off-diagonal elements are the difference between the
mean fugitive rate for the row category and the mean fugitive rate for the column category estimated using
matching. Standard errors are in parentheses. Matching caliper p .001.
** Statistically significant at the greater than 1% level (two sided).
each category. The estimated treatment effects for the row versus column
variables are shown in the off-diagonals with standard errors in parentheses.
The probability of remaining at large for more than a year conditional on
an initial FTA is much lower for those released on surety bond. The surety
treatment results in a fugitive rate that is lower by 17, 15.5, and 25.6 per-
centage points compared with the own-recognizance, deposit bond, and cash
bond treatments, respectively. In percentage terms, the fugitive rates under
surety release are 53, 47, and 64 percent lower than the fugitive rates under
own recognizance, deposit bond, and cash bond, respectively. Similarly, the
own recognizance, deposit, and cash bond treatments result in fugitive rates
that are 29, 47, and 47 percent higher than under the surety treatment.
There are also some interesting nonsurety effects in Table 3. Note that the
fugitive rate conditional on an FTA is higher for cash bond than for release
on own recognizance. Earlier (see Table 2) we had found that the FTA rate
was lower for cash bond than for release on own recognizance. This suggests
that defendants on cash bond are less likely to fail to appear than those
released on their own recognizance, but if they do fail to appear, they are
less likely to be recaptured. The result is pleasingly intuitive. A defendant
released on his own recognizance has little to lose from failing to appear
and thus may fail to appear for trivial reasons. But a defendant released on
cash bond has much to lose if he fails to appear, and thus those who do fail
to appear do so with the goal of not being recaptured.
The propensity score method can be very informative about the entire
distribution of treatment effects. In Figure 2, we graph smoothed (running-
mean) FTA and fugitive rates against surety p-scores for the own-
recognizance and surety treatments (conditional on being in either the surety
or own-recognizance treatment). (We omit graphs for the other treatment
comparisons for brevity.) The two downward-sloping, thinner curves graph
smoothed FTA rates against the p-scores for those defendants released on
bail jumping 111
Figure 2.—Failure-to-appear and fugitive rates by own recognizance versus surety treatment
plotted against p-scores.
their own recognizance or surety bond. The slope of each line indicates the
direction and strength of the effect of observable characteristics on selection
in that treatment. The difference between the own-recognizance and surety
lines at any given propensity score is an estimate of the treatment effect,
controlling for observable characteristics. The difference is roughly constant,
which indicates that despite some mild selection, the treatment effect is
roughly independent of observable characteristics.
For both the own-recognizance and surety treatments, FTA rates decrease
as the propensity for being in the surety treatment increases. That is, FTA
rates decrease as observable characteristics move in the direction of predicting
surety release. The decline is gentle; moving from a near-zero propensity to
a near-one propensity reduces the FTA rate by approximately 5 percentage
points. The effect is sensible if we recall that many FTAs are short term—
the defendant forgets the trial date or has another pressing engagement. These
sorts of FTAs are likely to be more common for defendants with observable
characteristics that predict low p-scores because judges release most defen-
dants on their own recognizance and reserve surety release for defendants
accused of more serious crimes. Few people will forget to show up for their
murder trial, but some may do so if the trial involves a driving offense. At
the same time, however, we expect that defendants accused of more serious
crimes—who have more to lose from being found guilty—are more likely
112 the journal of law and economics
Figure 3.—Kaplan-Meier survival function for defendants on surety bond versus those
released on cash bond or deposit bond or released on their own recognizance—using matched
samples.
skip bail is evident within a week of the failure to appear.53 By 200 days,
the surety survival rate is some 20–30 percentage points, or 50 percent, lower
than the survival rate for those out on cash bond, deposit bond, or their own
recognizance; that is, the probability of being recaptured is some 50 percent
higher for those released on surety bond relative to other releases. (Note that
there are three surety bond survival functions, one for each comparison group,
but these are nearly identical.)
A log-rank test confirms Figure 3; we can easily reject the null hypothesis
of equality of the survivor functions—defendants released on surety bond
are much more likely to be recaptured (that is, less likely to remain at large,
or “survive”) than those released on their own recognizance, deposit bond,
or cash bond.54
53
A number of estimates have been made that bounty hunters take into custody between
25,000 and 35,000 fugitives a year, depending on the year (see various sources in Drimmer,
supra note 11; and also W. P. Barr, letter to Charles T. Canady on the Bounty Hunter Re-
sponsibility Act, NABIC Bull., March 2000). These figures are consistent with a recapture rate
of over 95 percent and are consistent with the number of fugitives on surety bond. It appears,
therefore, that almost all fugitives on surety bond are recaptured by bail enforcement agents
and not by the police. Bounty hunters, however, will sometimes track down defendants and
then tip police as to their whereabouts, so police will sometimes be involved in some aspects
of recapture.
54
The exact results of the log-rank test and similar results matching on propensity score and
bail can be found in Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 43.
114 the journal of law and economics
TABLE 4
Effect of Alternative Treatment versus Surety Bond on Failure-to-Appear and
Fugitive Rates (Conditional on Failure to Appear), 1988–96
Own Recognizance
versus Deposit versus Cash versus
Surety Bond Surety Bond Surety Bond
Treatment effect on failure-to-appear rates ⫹7.8** (1.6) ⫹6.2** (1.8) ⫺1.6 (4.4)
Treatment effect on fugitive rates ⫹14.8** (2.3) ⫹19.8** (2.9) ⫹35.7** (8.0)
Note.—Individuals from states that have banned surety bonds are matched with similar individuals
released on surety bond. Standard errors are in parentheses. The matching caliper is .0001.
** Statistically significant at the greater than 1% level (two sided).
TABLE 5
Mean Rearrest Rates by Release
Category, 1988–96
Rate (%) N
Own recognizance 14.9 20,945
Deposit bond 13.3 3,605
Cash bond 14 2,482
Surety bond 12 9,202
TABLE 6
Effect of Surety Treatment Effect versus other Release Types on Rearrest
Rates using Samples Matched on p-Score and Bail, 1988–96
rates. Recall from Table 2 that we found that FTA rates were slightly higher
under surety than under the cash bond treatment. The evidence from rearrest
rates suggests that unobservable characteristics may be responsible for part
of this and that the true treatment effect is somewhat lower. Similarly, al-
though we found large negative effects on fugitive rates from the surety
treatment (relative to cash treament), the evidence suggests that, if anything,
the true treatment effects are even more negative.58
The rearrest data allow for another interesting comparison. For a small
subset of our data, 1,331 observations from 1988 and 1990, we know the
rerelease type for those individuals who are arrested and released on a second
charge. We do not know whether the individual failed to appear on the second
charge, which is why we do not have repeated observations. Nevertheless,
the second arrest and release data may be revealing.
Suppose that the initial release is own recognizance and the second release
is via surety bond. By monitoring and possibly recapturing the defendant if
he skips on the second trial, bail bondsmen and their agents create a positive
externality with respect to fugitive rates on the first trial. This potential
externality means that we need not compare own-recognizance to surety
releases to measure a surety treatment effect. Instead, we can compare de-
fendants released on their own recognizance with other defendants released
on their own recognizance in their first release and on surety bond in their
second release. Similarly, we can compare fugitive rates on the first trial for
defendants whose first and second releases were own recognizance and own
recognizance with those whose first and second releases were own recognizance
and surety bond. With this comparison, we control for selection effects on the
first release.
The unconditional fugitive rate of defendants who are released on their
58
Since we find that rearrest rates vary little by treatment category, we should also find that
treatment effects measured in the rearrest sample, that is, using only those defendants who
were subsequently arrested for a second crime, should be similar to those found in the one-
arrest sample. We have run these matching tests on propensity score and bail and do find
similar results, which we omit for brevity.
bail jumping 117
TABLE 7
Unconditional Fugitive Rates by Arrest-
Rearrest Category, 1988, 1990
Category Rate
1. Own and not rearrested 8.48 [17,828]
2. Own-own 8.04 [191]
3. Own-surety 1.49 [134]
4. t-test (row 1 ⫺ row 3) 2.9; p(1 1 3 p .0019)
5. t-test (row 2 ⫺ row 3) 2.6; p(2 1 3 p .0047)
own recognizance and not rearrested is 8.48 percent.59 The fugitive rate of
defendants who are released on their own recognizance and who are rearrested
and then released again on their own recognizance is almost identical, 8.04
percent. But the fugitive rate for those defendants initially released on their
own recognizance but then rearrested and rereleased on surety bond is just
1.9 percent. The difference between the own-recognizance and the own-
recognizance⫹surety fugitive rate is statistically significant at the greater
than 1 percent level. The difference between the own-recognizance⫹own-
recognizance and own-recognizance⫹surety rate, which controls for rearrest,
is also statistically significant at the greater than 1 percent level. Table 7
summarizes.
In the working paper,60 we supplement the above analysis in a variety of
ways to control for county effects, individual effects observed by judges but
unobserved by us, and pure unobserved effects of a very general nature. 61
Most generally, the cream that judges skim are released on their own re-
cognizance and deposit bond, while the skim are released on cash or surety
bond. Consistent with this, observable selection effects on fugitive rates are
positive, and the evidence from a variety of independent tests suggests that
unobservable characteristics are not biasing our results upward. Taken to-
59
Earlier we focused on fugitive rates conditional on having FTA. We focus on unconditional
fugitive rates here because we have fewer observations. We have data on rearrest and rerelease
type for 1988 and 1990.
60
Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 43.
61
One of our supplementary tests is a completely independent test using instrumental var-
iables. When jails become overcrowded, judges are pressured to release individuals on their
own recognizance rather than run the risk of setting a bail amount that the defendant might
not be able to secure. (We present evidence in the working paper that bond dealers understand
that overcrowded jails mean less surety business.) We define Ratio as the county jail population
divided by the official jail capacity. A value of Ratio greater than one indicates overcrowding.
We suggest that jail overcrowding is not likely to be correlated with unobservables that affect
FTA and fugitive rates. Using Ratio as an instrumental variable, we again find that surety bail
significantly reduces fugitive rates. For details, see Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 43.
118 the journal of law and economics
gether, the evidence suggests that we have good estimates that surety release
reduces FTA rates, survival times, and fugitive rates.
VII. Conclusions
When the default was for every criminal defendant to be held until trial,
it was easy to support the institution of surety bail. Surety bail increased the
number of releases relative to the default and thereby spared the innocent
some jail time. Surety release also provided good, albeit not perfect, assurance
that the defendant would later appear to stand trial. When the default is that
every defendant is released, or at least when many people believe that “in-
nocent until proven guilty” establishes that release before trial is the ideal,
support for the surety bail system becomes more complex. How should the
probability of failing to appear and all the costs this implies, including higher
crime rates, be traded off against the injustice of imprisoning the innocent
or even the injustice of imprisoning the not-yet-proven guilty? We cannot
provide an answer to this question, but we can provide a necessary input to
this important debate.
Defendants released on surety bond are 28 percent less likely to fail to
appear than similar defendants released on their own recognizance, and if
they do fail to appear, they are 53 percent less likely to remain at large for
extended periods of time. Deposit bonds perform only marginally better than
release on own recognizance. Requiring defendants to pay their bonds in
cash can reduce the FTA rate similar to that for those released on surety
bond. Given that a defendant skips town, however, the probability of recapture
is much higher for those defendants released on surety bond. As a result,
the probability of being a fugitive is 64 percent lower for those released on
surety bond compared with those released on cash bond. These finding in-
dicate that bond dealers and bail enforcement agents (bounty hunters) are
effective at discouraging flight and at recapturing defendants. Bounty hunters,
not public police, appear to be the true long arms of the law.
bail jumping 119
APPENDIX
TABLE A1
Ordered Probit on Stringency of Release
Variable Coefficient
Local conditions:
Time, in days, to scheduled start of trial ⫺.5821 (.0038)
Local clearance rate (total arrest/total crime) .3957 (.1799)
Defendant is charged with:
Murder .35915** (.051044)
Rape .376661** (.032135)
Robbery .146899** (.028193)
Assault .208538** (.039397)
Other violent crime .048705⫹ (.02932)
Burglary ⫺.10109** (.027554)
Theft ⫺.16676** (.029142)
Other property crime .212824** (.026824)
Drug trafficking ⫺.1147** (.027033)
Other drug crime ⫺.01139 (.041254)
Driving-related crime ⫺.18755** (.016514)
Defendant characteristics:
Age .000854 (.000653)
Female (yesp1) .873055** (.080055)
Active criminal justice status .191588** (.013974)
Previous felonies .244761** (.013558)
Previous failure to appear .123918** (.015137)
Note.—The model includes county and year effects (not shown). Asymptotic standard
errors are in parentheses. There are 58,585 observations.
⫹
Statistically significant at the greater than 10% level.
** Statistically significant at the greater than 1% level (two-sided test).
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