Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary
Structure. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1965. 1-52.
The discipline pursues objects which are determined for him, or at least seem to be determined for him, but the model of all chivalry. We shall call this model the mediator of desire. On Literary Criticism
The triangle is no Gestalt. The real structures are inter-subjective. They cannot be localized anywhere the triangle has no reality whatever; it is a systematic metaphor, systematically pursued. Because changes in size and shape do not destroy the identity of this figure, as we will see later, the diversity as well as the unity of the works can be simultaneously illustrated. The purpose and limitations of this structural geometry may become clearer through a reference to structural models. The triangle is a model of a sort, or rather a whole family of models. But these models are not mechanical like those of Claude Levi-Strauss. They will allude to the mystery, transparent yet opaque, of human relations. All types of structural thinking assume that human reality is intelligible; it ios a logos, and as such, it is an incipient logic, or it degrades itself into a logic. It can thus be systematized, at least up top a point, however unsystematic, irrational, and chaotic it may appear even to those, or rather especially to those who operate the system. A basic contention of this essay is that the great writers comprehend intuitively and concretely, through the medium of their art, if not formally, the system in which they were first imprisoned together with their contemporaries. Literary interpretation must be systematic because it is the continuation of literature. It should formalize implicit or already half- explicit systems. To maintain that criticism will never be real knowledge. The value of a critical thought dpends not on how it cleverly manages to disguise its own systematic nature or on how many fundamental issues it manages to shirk or to dissolve but on how much literary substance it really embraces, comprehends, and makes articulate. The goal may be too ambitious but it is not outside the scope of literary criticism. It is the very essence of literary criticism. Failure to reach it should be condemned but not the attempt. Everything else has already been done. (Girard, p. 3)
Definition of Desire Desire according to the Other and the seminal function of literature are also found in the novels of Flaubert. Emma Bovary desires through the romantic heroines who fill her imagination. The second-rate books which she devoured in her youth have destroyed her spontaneity. We must turn to Jules de Gaultier for the definition of this bovarysm which he reveals in every one of Flauberts characters: The same ignorance, the same inconsistency, the same absence of individual reaction seem to make them fated to obey the suggestion of an external milieu, for lack of an auto-suggestion from within. In his famous essay, entitled Bovarysm, Gaultier goes on to observe that in order to reach their goal, which is to see themselves as they are not, Flauberts heroines find a model for themselves and imitate from the person they have decided to be, all that can be imitated, everything exterior, appearance, gesture, intonation, and dress. The external aspects of imitation are the most striking; but we must above all remember that the characters of Cervantes and Flaubert are imitating, or believe they are imitating, the desires of models they have freely chosen. Here history is nothing but a kind of literature; it suggests to all Stendhals characters feelings and, especially, desires that they do not experience spontaneously. When he enters the service of the Renal family, Julien borrows from Rousseaus Confessions the desire to eat at his mas- [end of p. 5] ters table rather than at that of the servants. Stendhal uses the word vanity (vanite) to indicate all these forms of copying and imitating. The vaniteux is brother to Don Quixote and Emma Bovary. And so in Stendhal we again find triangular desire. (Girard, p. 6)
Vaniteux
A vaniteux will desire any object so long as he is convinced that it is already desired by another person whom he admires. The mediator here is a rival, brought into existence as a rival by vanity, and that same vanity demands his defeat. The rivalry between mediator and the person who desires constitutes an essential difference between this desire and that of Don Quixote, or of Madame BovaryValenod, on the other hand, can steal the tutor from the M. de Renal; the Marechale de Fervacques can take Julien from Mathilde de la Mole. In most of Standhals desire it: it is mediator himself desires the object or could desire it, it is even this very desire, real or presumed, which makes this object infinitely desirable in the eyes of the subject. The mediation begets a second desire exactly the same as the mediators. This means that one is always confronted with two competing desires. The mediator can no longer act his role of model without also acting or appearing to act the role of the obstacle. Like the relentless sentry of the Kafka [end of p. 7] Internal Mediation and External Mediation Romantic works are, therefore, grouped into two fundamental categories---but within these categories there can be an infinite number of secondary distinctions. We shall speak of External mediation when the distance is sufficient to eliminate any contact between the two spheres of possibilities of which the mediator and the subject occupy the respective centeres. We shall speak of internal mediation when this same distance is sufficiently reduced to allow these two spheres to penetrate each other more or less profoundly. Obviously it is not physical space that measures the gap between mediator and the desiring subject. Although geographical location might be one factor, he distance between mediator and the subject is primarily spiritual. (Girard, p. 9) The hero of external mediation proclaims aloud the true nature of his desire. He worships his model openly and declares himself his disciple. We have seen Don Quixote himself explain to Sancho the privileged part Amadis plays in his life. Mme Bovary and Leon also admit the truth about their desires in their lyric confessions. The parallel between Don Quixote and Madame Bovary has become classic. It is always easy to recognize analogies between two novels of external mediation. Imitation in Stendals work at first seems less absurd since there is less of that divergence between the worlds of disciple and model which makes a Don Quixote or an Emma Bovary so grotesque. And yet the imitation is no less strict and literal in internal mediation than in external mediation. If it seems surprising it is not only because the imitation refers to a model who is close, but also because the heor of internal mediation, far from boasting of his efforts to imitate, carefully hides them. The impulse toward the object is ultimately an impulse toward the mediator; in internal mediation this impulse is checked by the mediator himself since he desires, or perhaps possesses, the object. Fascinated by his model, the disciple inevitablu sees, in the mechanical obstacle which he puts in his way, proof of the ill will borne him. Far from declaring himself a faithful vassal, he thinks only of repudiating the bonds of mediation. But these bonds are stronger than ever, for the mediators apparent hostilitu does not diminish his prestige but instead augments it. The subject is convinced that the model considers himself too superior to accept him as a dciple. The subject is torn between two opposite feelings toward his moder---the most submissive reverence and the most intense malice. This is the passion we call hatred. Only someone who prevents us from satisfying a desire which he himself has inspired in us is truly an object of [end of p. 11] hatred, The person who hates himself for the secret admiration concealed by his hatred. In an effort to hide this desperate admiration from others, and from himself, he no longer wants to see in his mediator anything but an obstacle. The secondary role of the mediator thus becomes primary, concealing his original function of a model scrupulously imitated. In the quarrel which puts him in opposition to his rival, the subject reverses the logical and chronological order of desires in order to hide his imitation. He asserts that his own desire is prior to that of his rival; according to him, it is the mediator who is responsible for the rivalry. Everything that originates with this mediator is systematically belittled although still secretly desired. Now the mediator is a shrewd and diabolical enemy; he tries to rob the subject of his most prized possessions; he obstinately thwarts his most legitimate ambitions. (Girard, p. 11)
Jealousy and envy
Jealousy and envy imply a third presence: object, subject, and a third person toward whom the jealousy or envy is directed. These two vices are therefore triangular; however we never recognize a model in the person who arouses jealousy because we always take a jealous persons attitude toward the problem of jealousy. Like all victims of internal mediation, the jealous person easily convinces himself that his desire is spontaneous, in other words, that is deeply rooted in the object and in this object alone. As a result he always maintains that his desire preceded the intervention of the mediator. He would have us see him as an intruder, a bore, a terzo incomodo who interrupts a delightful tete-a-tete. Jealousy is thus reduced to the irritation we all experience when one of our desires is accidentally thwarted. But true jealousy is infinitely more profound and complex; it walways contains an element of fascination with the insolent rival. Furthermore, it is always the same people who suffer from jealousy. Is it possible that they are all victims by repeated accidents? Is it fate that creates for them so many rivals and throws so many obstacles in the way of their desires? We do not believe it ourselves, since we say that these chronic victims of jealousy or of envy have a jealous temperament or an envious nature. What exactly then does such a temperament or nature imply if not an irresistible impulse to desire what Others desire, in other words to imitate the desires of others? Max Scheler numbers envy, jealousy, and rivalry among the sources of ressentiment. He defines envy as a feeling of impotence which vitiates our attempt to acquire [end of p. 12] something because it belongs to another. He observes, on the other hand, that there would be no envy, in the strong sense of the word, if the envious persons imagination did not transform into concerted opposition the passive obstacle which the possessor puts in his way by the mere fact of possession. Mere regret at not possessing something which belongs to another and which we covet is not enough in itself to give rise to envy since it might also be an incentive for acquiring the desired object or something similarEnvy occurs only when, our efforts to acquire it fail and we are left with a feeling of impotence. (Girard, p. 13)
The analysis is accurate and complete ; it omits neither the envious persons self- deception with regard to the cause of his failure, nor the paralysis that accompanies envy. But these elements remain isolated; scheler has not really perceived their relationship. On the other hand everything becomes clear, everything fits into a coherent structure if, in order to explain envby, we abandon the object of rivalry as a staring point and choose instead the rival himself, i.e., the mediator, as both a point of departure for our analysis and its conclusion. Possession is merely a passive obstacle; it is frustrating and seems a deliberate expression of contempt only because the rival is secretly revered. The demigod seems to answer homage with a curse. He seems to render evil for good. The subject would like to think of himself as the victim of an atrocious injustice but in his anguish he wonders whether perhaps he does not deserve his apparent condemnation. Rivalry therefore only aggravates mediation; it increases the mediators prestige and strengthens the bond which links the object to this mediator by forcing him to affirm openly his right or desire of possession. Thus the subject is less capable than ever of giving up the inaccessible object: it is on this object and it alone that the mediator con- [end of p. 13]fers his prestige, by possessing or wanting to possess it. Other objects have no worth at all in the eyes of the envious person, even though they may be similar to or indeed identical with the mediated object. Everything becomes clear when one see that the loathed rival is actually a mediator. Max Scheler himself is not far from the truth when he stares in Ressentiment that the fact of choosing a model for oneself is the result of a certain tendency, common to all men, to compare oneself with others, and he goes on to say, all jealousy, all ambition, and even an ideal like the imitation of Christ is based on such comparisons. But this intuition remains isolated. Only the great artists attribute to the mediator the position usurped by the object; only they reverse the commonly accepted hierarchy of desire.
The Romantic Vaniteux The romantic vaniteux always wants to convince himself that his desire is written into the nature of things, or which amounts to the same thing, that it is the emanation of a serene subjectivity, the creation of ex nihilo of a quasi-divine ego. Desire is no longer rooted in the object perhaps, but it is rooted in the subject; it is certainly not [end of p. 15] rooted in the Other. The objective and subjective fallacies are one and the same; both originate in the image which we all have our own desires. Subjectivisms and objectivisms, romanticisms and realisms, individualisms and scienticisms, idealisms and positivisms appear to be in opposition but are secretly in agreement to conceal the presence of the mediator. All these dogmas are the aesthetic or philosophic translation of world views peculiar to internal mediation. They all depend directly or indirectly on the lie of spontaneous desire. They all defend the same illusion of autonomy to which modern man is passionately devoted. (Girard, p. 16)
List of books to read: Emma Bovary and the novels of Flaubert Chapter 1 as an overview of how the novels will be read