Ettlin Harris Appt Counsel r4f

Dennis Ettlin, Pro Se
27222 Paseo Lomita

San Juan Capistrano, CA 92675
310-795-9507

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,
SOUTHERN DIVISIONSANTA ANA

Case No. 8:14-cv-00324-DOC-(JPR)
Dennis ETTLIN, an individual;
Plaintiff

PLAINTIFFS REQUEST FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

AND

FOR THIS COURT TO DIRECT
THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL TO
INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
UNDER
BOTH 18 USC 1964 (A) AND (B)

vs.
Kamala Harris, an individual,
James Otero, an individual,
Otis D. Wright, III, an individual,
George H. King, an individual,
Dolly M. Gee, an individual,
Jan Levine, an individual,
Gloria Molina, an individual,
Zev Yaroslavsky, an individual,
Don Knabe, an individual,
Michael Antonovich, an individual,
United States of America,
State of California,
County of Los Angeles,
Chris Ryan Legal, Sr.
Does 1-10,
(any judge assigned to this case who
received Judicial Benefits)
Defendants

DOE #1, Derek Hunt
DOE #2, Tani Cantil-Sakauye
DOE #3, Kathleen E. O'leary
DOE #4, Tim Donnelly

Date:

Time:
Ctrm: 9D (Hon. David O. Carter)

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Request for Appointment of Counsel and for Attorney General RICO Proceedings 1
Ettlin_Harris_Appt-Counsel-r4f.docx
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES. ................... 3
A. CRIMINAL CASE PRECEDENT .................................................................... 3
B. CIVIL CASE PRECEDENT ............................................................................. 4
C. FINANCIAL ABILITY .................................................................................... 4
II. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS ............................................................................ 5
A. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS CJP ANALYSIS CRITICAL ........................... 5
B. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS RICO ENTERPRISE ....................................... 7
A. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS I.R.S. INVESTIGATION ................................. 8
B. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS CAMPAIGN FINANCE FRAUD ................... 8
C. ARTICULATION OF CLAIMS PRO SE ......................................................... 9
1. SCOPE AND INTEGRATION OF SETTLEMENT ....................................... 10
2. SETTLEMENT REQUIRES EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATION .......................... 10
3. SETTLEMENT REQUIRES LIAISON ACTIVITY ........................................ 10
4. SETTLEMENT REQUIRES COST DETERMINATIONS ............................. 11
III. NATIONAL LAW FIRM NEEDED ............................................................ 11
IV. REQUEST FOR COURT TO REQUEST RICO PROCEEDINGS ......... 12
A. RICO ENTERPRISE DESCRIPTION ........................................................... 12
B. CIVIL REMEDIES UNDER 18 U.S. CODE 1964 ...................................... 16
C. CIVIL REMEDY ARGUMENT ..................................................................... 17
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 18

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) .................................................................... 6
United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 809-810 (9th Cir. 1999) ................................ 7
Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328 (1986) .......................................................... 4
Wright v. Director of Corrections, Grady, 2011; 07-55988; (9th Cir. 2011) ............ 4

STATUTES
18 U.S.C. 2 ............................................................................................................ 16
18 USC 1956 ........................................................................................................ 15
18 USC 1961-1968 ................................................................................................ 7
18 USC 1961(A) .................................................................................................... 15
18 USC 1964 ....................................................................................................... 4, 1
28 U.S.C. 1654 ........................................................................................................ 3
28 USC 1915 .......................................................................................................... 4
CA Family Law 3651 .............................................................................................. 5
CA Government Code of Courts, Title 8, 68206.6 ................................................ 8

CONSTITUTION
Article I, 9 ................................................................................................................ 5
Article VI, 19 ........................................................................................................... 5
OTHER
California Civil Code section 52(b) ........................................................................ 11

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I. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES.
Precedent is well established for appointment of counsel in both criminal
and civil cases. Plaintiff requests the Court to appoint Counsel for Plaintiff. When
properly presented before an unbiased court, and a jury, the law and the
Constitution clearly favor the Plaintiff. The constitutional issues raised by Plaintiff
are vital to 36 million Californians. The necessary changes in the law could be
minor and the costs to Defendants could be minor. Plaintiff seeks judicial economy
and efficiency for the legal briefs and discovery, forensic analysis, and draft
guidelines and legislation. Additionally, the dispute resolution process is best
conducted among peers. A national firm would place Plaintiff on an equal footing
during a trial or negotiation.
Plaintiff will show that his request for Counsel meets the two primary
criteria often used for indigent criminal cases and that the presence of a RICO
enterprise justifies appointment of a nationally recognized law firm as counsel in
this civil case. Such appointment will further the interests of judicial economy. A
national firm would also be less susceptible to any backlash from Judges through
the California State Bar or Supreme Court. That threat of backlash is evident in
Plaintiffs inability to retain counsel. Even Judicial Watch, which litigated
Sturgeon I and II, is unwilling to get involved in this extension of their very own
case. Furthermore, the conflicts of interest are so deep that even the federal Pro Se
Clinic in Santa Ana cannot ethically assist Plaintiff in the simplest of legal
practice.
A. CRIMINAL CASE PRECEDENT
Plaintiff is allowed to proceed Pro Se under 28 U.S.C. 1654, which
provides, In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their
own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are
permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.

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Appointment of Counsel for protection of Civil Rights in criminal cases is
well established in the federal Criminal Courts (Rule 44). Under 28 USC 1915,
indigent prisoners may request the Court to appoint counsel for their civil rights
cases. In Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328 (1986) and Wright v. Director of
Corrections, Grady, 2011; 07-55988; (9th Cir. 2011) two criteria are consistently
used to evaluate such requests:
1. "(T)he likelihood of success on the merits [and],
2. (T)he ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the
complexity of the legal issues involved.
B. CIVIL CASE PRECEDENT
Appointment of counsel in civil cases for non-indigent Plaintiffs is clearly
established under 18 USC 1964 (a) to prevent and restrain RICO enterprises.
Plaintiff asserts this also includes determining and establishing civil remedies for
Plaintiff when elected law enforcement officials fail to perform their duties.
Under both 18 USC 1964 (a) and (b) this court may direct the United States
Attorney General to institute proceedings. Under 18 USC 1964 (c) this court
may further institute a satisfactory performance bond against Defendants. The
fee for such a bond could easily cover the up-front legal fees for a national firm.
This case presents important and complex issues of constitutional law, which
impact the entire State. Plaintiff has limited access to the community of national
law firms and thus has no reasonable means to obtain such professional,
unimpeachable and independent counsel.
The Court has broad powers to appoint Counsel for Plaintiff.
C. FINANCIAL ABILITY
Plaintiff, while not indigent and not wealthy, cannot afford the financial
costs of fully prosecuting this case in a timely manner. Plaintiff has already spent
the majority of his separate and marital property in legal and forensic accounting
fees for his divorce case, which now is merely a void order. Plaintiff estimates

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approximately 5,000 hours of legal research, motions, and trial work for a
minimum of $1,500,000 of fees and costs will be needed for trial, determination of
monetary damages and the writing of changes in state and county law.
Furthermore, Plaintiff has requested in his complaint that any award for
damages to Plaintiff be placed in a charitable trust benefitting Plaintiffs children
and such non-profit organizations as he may designate. Plaintiff is still subject to
CA Family Law 3651 and does not wish to ignite another round of spousal
support divorce litigation over any awards.
II. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS
Plaintiffs case is built solidly on the analysis and published writings of the
judiciary, the legislature and the executive branch. Plaintiffs case is founded
firmly in the United States and California Constitutions. Plaintiff will succeed on
the law. All of the Defendants claim the payments are legal and require no action
by anyone. Defendants only defenses are various claims to immunity. Therefore,
none of the Defendants address any of the main legal issues central to this case.
A. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS CJP ANALYSIS CRITICAL
The Defendants and the state Courts continue to evade Plaintiffs key legal
arguments There is still no response to:
1. The California Constitutions which plainly states that the payment of
judges is a State responsibility in Article VI, 19
2. The Sturgeon I and II cases both clearly re-iterate the state
responsibility
3. SBX2 11 Section 5 immunity clearly violates Article I, 9 against
retroactive immunity
4. The Attorneys General rulings from 1956, 1967, 1976, and 1978
clearly establish the unconstitutionality of the payments
5. The Commission on Judicial Performance analysis invalidating
Section 5 immunity can withstand an unbiased Courts review

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6. The Commission on Judicial Performance analysis clearly questions
the propriety of judges using operating funds to pay themselves
(Commissioners) additional salary and benefits
7.
8. The 1995 California Law Revision Commission acknowledgement
that the benefits were probably illegal, the consequences HUGE, and
that no one was likely to object.
Defendants do NOT refute any of Plaintiffs above citations. They totally
ignore the analyses in items 4-7 above. They also totally ignore Plaintiffs oft-cited
questions from of the Sturgeon decisions.
9. Why did the Fourth Appellate Court foresee and thus encourage
challenges by taxpayers?
10. Why did the Judicial Council and the California Judges Association
fail to hold public hearings and rush into law the unnecessary and
redundant SBX2 11 Section 5 immunity?
Defendants also refuse to fully cooperate in discovery and are likely engaged
in violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Plaintiff has clearly
presented the necessary evidence, although it must be presented properly to the
court. It should be noted that Counsel Kevin McCormick flatly refused to provide
any discovery documents, and County Defendants have not replied at all.
Plaintiffs has provided a Statement of Uncontroverted Facts within the
proceedings of this case. Defendants do not refute and cannot overcome the CJP
analysis; or the interim nature of SBX2_11; or the Fourth Appellates
encouragement of this challenge to the county payments. PLAINTIFF WILL
PREVAIL.

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B. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS RICO ENTERPRISE
Plaintiff clearly describes below the criminal RICO enterprise
1
and the
various elements required in 18 USC 1961-1968. Section 1961(1) defines
racketeering activity as any crime enumerated in subdivisions A, B, C, D, E, F,
or G of that subsection. No crime can be a part of a RICO pattern of racketeering
activity unless it is included in this subsection.
The California Judiciary, Legislature and Executive branches all recognize
the serious cost impacts on the state budget and thus are not likely to act. Local
county officials likewise do not wish to raise the issue. The $33 million spent by
counties in 2009 is probably above $50 million today. Extending equal statewide
benefits to all county Superior Courts would likely top $100 million annually, and
prompt demands for repayment to the counties of easily $400 million. In a state
that cannot even properly house its prison inmates, it is unreasonable for Plaintiff
to expect the Governor, Attorney General, Legislature or the Judicial Council to
each step up to their constitutional responsibilities. Neither the Defendants nor the
Legislature or Judicial Council have resolved the county payments issue on their
own.
The elements of a RICO enterprise clearly exist; Defendants only try to
claim immunity, ignoring the use of bribes in violation of United States v. Frega,
179 F.3d 793, 809-810 (9th Cir. 1999). The judges in Los Angeles County and
Orange County are clearly not County employees
2
; they have no separate
employment contract; and thus any monies paid as salary or deferred
compensation in excess of state Controller reimbursements (as provided in Govt
Code 68206.6) are in violation of I.R.S. regulations and campaign finance statutes.

1
CRIMINAL RICO : 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968; A Manual for Federal
Prosecutors, Fifth revised edition, October 2009

2
Prior proceedings in this case confirm no contract exists and the county is only
partially reimbursed for benefits paid to judges.

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A. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS I.R.S. INVESTIGATION
The Criminal Investigation-Public Corruption unit of the I.R.S is
investigating the fraudulent application of California Government Code of Courts,
Title 8, 68206.6. That section authorizes a procedure whereby a county payroll
system functions as a third party payroll service to judges and court employees
provided, 1) payment is made by the state in advance of the states salary and
benefits authorized by state law, and 2) no increase or decrease in payment is made
by the county. This statute, cited by the County defendants as authorization for the
supplemental payments, expressly forbids any supplemental judicial payments--
Nothing in this section, and no procedure adopted pursuant to this section,
shall increase or decrease any compensation or benefits available to, or received
by, superior court judges as a result of being paid from a state payroll.
Willful violation of this statue by Los Angeles County, by Orange County
and by the Superior Court of California, Counties of Los Angeles and Orange
causes the tax obligations of the supplemental judicial benefits to be fraudulent,
knowingly incorrect. A national law firm is needed to represent Plaintiffs claim
and provide a knowledgeable interface between the court and the I.R.S.
B. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS CAMPAIGN FINANCE FRAUD
The California Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) Form 700 is
used to identify campaign contributions. One category excluded from reporting is
salary. Since judicial benefits are not salary, and are not just gifts of public funds,
the county payments should have been reported as campaign contributions. Since
the judicial elections typically cost only $5,000 - $15,000, the county payments
fully covered all the campaign costs for judges.
The fictitious wage tax-deductible campaign contribution scheme used by
the counties, if deemed lawful, is a new campaign finance tool that offers no limits
and can be used for non-judicial offices.

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C. ARTICULATION OF CLAIMS PRO SE
Plaintiff addresses the second criteria for appointment of counsel in two
parts. Plaintiff, however, meets this criteria for appointment of counsel because
any significant resolution of this matter, whether by trial or by negotiated
settlement, will require an amount of effort that is not reasonable for one person to
undertake.
The first portion is, (T)he ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims
pro se Plaintiff has demonstrated his ability to articulate his claims Pro Se,
addressing the immediate legal issues involved, the resulting damages and his
attendant claims. The heavy legal analyses have already been done by previous
Attorneys General, the CJP, the legislative commission, and the Fourth Appellate
Court. The Auditor-Controller has already confirmed that judges do and continue
to receive payments from the County. The two Sturgeon cases also demonstrate
that citizens are aware of the issues and they won critical victories in the effort to
stop this public corruption.
The second portion is, ... in light of the complexity of the legal issues
involved. While the issues are straightforward and Plaintiff is fully capable of
articulating his claims and violations of his rights, presenting them to a jury and to
the Court in a manner that will survive on appeal is beyond Plaintiffs experience
and legal skills. This court needs proposed solutions that, to date, have escaped the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of Californias government. Plaintiff is
not qualified to develop and present such legislative proposals to resolve this
dispute. Proposed legislative solutions are equally important to the determination
of remedies of the RICO violations against Plaintiff.
These cases present multiple important issues of constitutional law, which
impact our entire community. Plaintiff does not wish to become a co-conspirator
by simply accepting a cash settlement. Plaintiffs civil rights are not for sale. Any
redress and remedy must be based on constitutionally compliant laws and related

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government codes. Plaintiffs success is based on the failures of certain laws.
Those laws must be identified and changed as part of the remedy. A
constitutionally valid scheme for paying judges must be defined and implemented
as part of the remedy in this case to avoid similar cases in the future. That remedy
will also be the foundation for assessing injuries to Plaintiff and to others with void
orders. The Fourth Appellate Court deferred to the other branches of government
and nothing happened in four years.
Plaintiff estimates that 10,000 hours (5 person-years of effort) of legal and
forensic work will be required to fully resolve this case in a reasonable two- or
three-year timeframe. Plaintiff is simply not capable of providing that level of
effort in such a short period. Therefore, Plaintiff has included legal fees as part of
his relief.
1. SCOPE AND INTEGRATION OF SETTLEMENT
Plaintiffs case will either go to trial or result in complex negotiations. Many
counties will be affected. The 2009 Judicial Council report on county payments is
seriously flawed and incorrect. It must be updated and corrected. Significant state-
wide investigative research and forensic analysis will be required for county
statutes, payments, reimbursements, and tax payments. Only a national law firm
would bring the instant credibility to undertake such work and present it to the
court.
2. SETTLEMENT REQUIRES EXTENSIVE
NEGOTIATION
Research and analysis will be followed by proposals for legislation and
government code modification. Significant negotiation will be take place in order
to reach a settlement. Again, a national law firm can expedite that process.
3. SETTLEMENT REQUIRES LIAISON ACTIVITY
Any permanent settlement must be constitutionally compliant. SBX2_11
must be repealed. New state-wide judicial compensation must be considered and

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prescribed by the Legislature. The judiciary must have an input and the
legislative branch must provide adequate funding for any proposed solution. Only
a national law firm can provide the required depth and expertise for this activity.
4. SETTLEMENT REQUIRES COST DETERMINATION
OF VOID ORDERS
The determination of damages for Plaintiff requires a review of Superior
Court interests in several categories of court cases. A new commission can
establish and define county (and related jurisdictional) interests in various classes
of legal proceedings. This class list will allow a tribunal to process the plague of
void orders created by the unconstitutional county payments. A Task Force
approach provides a model for such review.
III. NATIONAL LAW FIRM NEEDED
Plaintiff requests appointment of a national law firm in light of the number
of legal issues and the number of organizations involved, the scope of the RICO
enterprise, the bureaucracy of implementing legislation and judicial rule changes,
and the technical challenges of successfully transferring judicial salaries to a state
payroll system. The selected national law firm must be insulated from excessive
ties to the California legal profession and judiciary. The national civil rights law
firm must possess the range of technical skills identified above as well as the
credibility to engage in the necessary liaison with governmental leaders required
for any implementation.
Plaintiff is not asking for Pro Bono assistance. The remedies in this case
provide multiple avenues to recover attorney fees and costs generated by this case.
Plaintiff has requested reimbursement for attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1988, California Civil Code section 52(b) and section 52.1(h), and California
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. This case would not diminish the pool of
legal services available to indigent litigants, nor would it otherwise reduce the
caseload of the for-pay legal profession.

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Until the court makes a ruling that supports Plaintiffs claim, no individual
attorney or small California firm has the stature to withstand the retaliation of the
counties and the California judiciary. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot find his own
counsel to pursue this case and certainly cannot finance his full defense.
The successful outcome of Plaintiffs case is likely to be followed by claims
from a long list of other plaintiffs seeking a similar settlement. An extended
remedy in this case would greatly enhance judicial efficiency. A Court or 3-Judge
Panel is needed to review the law and a jury is needed to determine the material
issues of fact supporting plaintiffs claims. Defendants are not indigent and in fact
have very deep pockets with which to litigate, resist, and stonewall this
court.
IV. REQUEST FOR COURT TO REQUEST AG TO INSTITUTE RICO
PROCEEDINGS
A. RICO ENTERPRISE DESCRIPTION
Defendants maintain a sophisticated RICO scheme that limits Plaintiffs
access to legal representation in California, provides Defendants tax-advantaged
tax-deductible campaign contributions, and introduces county biases into the laws
and regulations reviewed by the Judicial Council and other organizations of the
Judicial branch. By litigating and objecting to this scheme, there is great likelihood
that Plaintiff will suffer significant and irreparable harm.
Plaintiff alleges that the individuals of the Los Angeles Superior Court and
of the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County engage in activities that meet
all the elements of a RICO enterprise by Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants publicly stated purpose of the RICO enterprise is to INFLUENCE
judicial officers to choose employment in Los Angeles with a supplemental
increase in their salary. In reality, the influence-peddling payments are the
proximate cause for judicial bias and failure of bench officers to recuse when the
county has any interest in the case. Plaintiff further alleges that county biases affect

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the legal reviews of laws by Judges (influenced by county payments) of the
Judicial Council and Administrative Office of the Court, and this has a forseeable
consequence of denying Plaintiff his equal constitutional rights when he entered
the Superior Court system and he was forseeably deprived of his various rights and
property. These interests were injured by reason of a violation of RICOs
substantive racketeering provisions.
The individuals in Los Angeles county began the racketeering conduct in
approximately 1988 when the Zolin memo was sent by the County Counsel to the
Court Counsel, acknowledged the unconstitutionality of County payments to the
State-employee Judges, but nonetheless recommended the county make the
payments. The Superior Court apparently did not object and the payments started
in approximately 1990. The practice continues to the present day and has been
partially copied by 34 other counties.
The racketeering enterprise is comprised of numerous elements and sub-
elements. The participants are associated via governmental organizations in the
judicial and executive branches as well as private associations. These include the
County of Los Angeles (supervisors, CEO, payroll services); the Superior Court,
County of Los Angeles (Presiding Judge, Court Counsel, Auditor); Judicial
Council (executives, Administrative Office of the Courts), the Supreme Court of
California (Justices, State Bar); the State of California (Governor, Attorney
General, Legislature); the private associations of judges (California Judges
Association) and of lawyers (various county Bar Associations), and specialized
groups such as the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers. The members of
this enterprise seek a similar goal of increasing the salaries of certain individuals
and currying the influence (favor or sympathy) of judges. The counties are the
largest single users of the courts and sympathetic judges both reduce litigation
costs and enable the instigating individuals (supervisors) to receive higher salaries.
Over time, conduct of this enterprise has involved increasing numbers of judges

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and now, a large majority of current and past judges and justices have received the
payments, making dis-interested and un-biased justice impossible in California.
The enterprise has assured its own survival and continuation.
The control of the organization is based solidly with the individuals of the
county government units making the unconstitutional payments. In 2010, the
scrutiny of the Sturgeon cases caused the Los Angeles supervisors to further
conceal their control by assigning the amount of increases to be determined by the
Los Angeles County CEO and not by their own line item budget authority. The
same supervisors are: using Los Angeles County legal resources to defend the
unconstitutional payments; and using changes to the Brown Act to conceal
discussions with the Governor; using threats of significant new costs to the state
($100 million annually, $400 million reimbursement) to silence the Governor, the
Attorney General and the Legislature; concealing the Superior Court mis-
appropriation of operating funds to pay Commissioners and Court Counsel by
using the L.A. County payroll system to pay Court employees under the guise of
paying all judges; and relying on key County management personnel such as the
CEO and County Counsels Litigation Cost Manager whose reports assess the
effectiveness and real cost savings to the County based on non-jury judicial
decisions (see Complaint A-89); as well as lower level staff ([T]he [Reves] Court
made clear that RICO liability may extend to those who do not hold a managerial
position within an enterprise, but who do nonetheless knowingly further the illegal
aims of the enterprise by carrying out the directives of those in control.). Since the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California was a huge proponent of
increased judicial salaries and the county payments, the State Bar could be counted
on to severely discipline any lawyer who dared to raise the issue of
unconstitutionality or bias.
The pattern of racketeering activity shows continuity of criminal activity.
The multiple predicate acts of bribery, election fraud, tax evasion, and gender

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based discrimination are related to each other. Instead of simple cash payments, the
payments are treated as wages from Los Angeles County. The second payment for
the same work is also classified by the county as a government salary and thus
avoids the scrutiny of Californias Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC),
specifically the Form 700. The so-called wages, or fictional wages allow Los
Angeles County to allocate money to retirement accounts where the taxes on the
county payments are deferred. The so-called wages also use tax-favored provisions
for medical expenses. This single scheme greatly enhances the value of the
payments to the judges and reduces scrutiny from the public and other agencies.
Over time, the pattern of criminal activity acquires credibility and acceptance as
the normal mode of operation. The laws, which preclude reducing a judges pay
during his term are invoked to continue the payments. There is no plan or threat,
even after SBX2_11, to end the payments. After 23 years, there is no obvious
termination point. Since 1990, the enterprise has defeated any external threat to the
continuation of the racketeering activities. There is no known internal threat to the
continuation of this pattern of racketeering activities.
The payments fall under prohibited racketeering activities covered by
designated federal law. Plaintiff alleges the following predicate act violations of
Federal law:
18 USC 1961(A) any act or threat involving ... bribery which is chargeable
under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year;
any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18,
United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery);... section 1954
(relating to unlawful welfare fund payments).sections 15811592
(relating to peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons);...section 1956
(relating to the laundering of monetary instruments (18 USC 1956 . (ii)
with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section

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7201[Attempt to evade or defeat tax] or 7206 [Fraud and false statements] of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986] ).
18 U.S.C. 2, however, one who aids and abets the commission of a federal
crime is treated as if he had committed the crime as a principal and can be
charged under RICO if the crime is one set forth in Section 1961(1)(B)-(G).

B. CIVIL REMEDIES UNDER 18 U.S. CODE 1964
The civil remedies available to Plaintiff under RICO are limited to treble
damages and attorneys' fees. However, such remedies are dependent upon the AG
proceedings under this section. Plaintiff requests this court to initiate such 18 U.S.
Code 1964 proceedings.
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction
to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by
issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any
person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any
enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or
investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting
any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the
enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or
foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any
enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this
section. Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any time
enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other
actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds,
as it shall deem proper.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold
the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorneys fee, except that no person may rely upon any
conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or
sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962. The

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exception contained in the preceding sentence does not apply to an
action against any person that is criminally convicted in connection
with the fraud, in which case the statute of limitations shall start to run
on the date on which the conviction becomes final.
(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United
States in any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under
this chapter shall estop the defendant from denying the essential
allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding
brought by the United States. (emphasis added)

C. CIVIL REMEDY ARGUMENT
The RICO statutes do not authorize private parties to seek injunctive relief.
However, Section 1964(a) authorizes courts to enter injunctive relief, and Section
1964(b) authorizes only the Attorney General to bring injunctive actions and to
obtain temporary injunctive relief. Section 1964(c) authorizes private parties to sue
for treble damages and attorneys' fees, but not for any other relief. The structure
of those provisions indicates that Congress intended to vest the Attorney General
with the exclusive authority to bring suit for injunctive relief.
Congress's intent not to authorize a private injunctive action is confirmed by
the treatment of the issue under the antitrust laws. The Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209-
210, created a public injunctive action and a private treble damages action. This
Court interpreted that Act to foreclose a private injunctive action. Because RICO
tracks the language and structure of the Sherman Act, Congress is presumed to
intend that RICO be similarly interpreted.
That presumption is strengthened by comparison of RICO with the Clayton
Act. Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15(a)) carries forward the Sherman
Act's treble damages provision, and Congress added a new provision, Section 16 of
the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 26), that expressly authorizes a private action for
injunctive relief. The fact that Congress used Section 4 of the Clayton Act as the
template for RICO's treble damages provision, 18 U.S.C. 1963(c), without also

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including a counterpart to Section 16 of the Clayton Act, compels the conclusion
that Congress intended no such private injunctive right under RICO.
RICO's purposes are fully consistent with the absence of a private right to
seek injunctive relief. Congress authorized wide-ranging injunctive relief in civil
RICO actions, such as corporate reorganization and dissolution. 18 U.S.C. 1964(a).
Congress logically vested the Attorney General with the exclusive authority to seek
such relief.
V. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs damages are a result of his encounter with the Courts but the
greater damage is the loss of his constitutional rights. Their value is difficult to
discern, cannot be retrieved and thus irreparable. Plaintiff requests appointment of
counsel to redress these violated rights and the Courts explicit request to the U.S.
Attorney General to institute proceedings to achieve wide-ranging injunctive relief.

Respectfully submitted by,
Dated March 21, 2014
______________________________
Dennis ETTLIN, Pro Se
27222 Paseo Lomita
San Juan Capistrano, CA 92675
310-795-9507
dennis@ettlin.net

1
PROOF OF SERVICE

I am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am a resident of or
employed in the county where the service took place. My residence or business
address is
2465 E. Orangethorpe Ave., Fullerton, CA 92831

On March 21, 2014, I served a copy of the following document

PLAINTIFFS REQUEST FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
AND
FOR THIS COURT TO DIRECT THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
GENERAL TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS UNDER
BOTH 18 USC 1964 (A) AND (B)

by first class mail, on the interested parties in this action (SEE ATTACHED
SERVICE LIST FOR PARTIES), by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a
sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as stated on the
attached service list. I deposited such envelope in the mail. According to F.R.C.P.
Rule 5(b)(2)(C), in which event service is complete upon mailing;
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and the State
of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on March 21, 2014 at Orange County, California,

________________________________
Debbie Peterson

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SERVICE LIST
Case No. 8:14-cv-00324-DOC-(JPR)

Kamala Harris
Counsel: Douglas E. Baxter, Esq., Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
110 West A Street, Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92101

Jan Levine
Counsel: Kevin McCormick, Esq.
Benton, Orr, Duval, &Buckingham
39 North California Street, Post Office Box 1178
Ventura CA 93001

Gloria Molina, Zev Yaroslavsky, Don Knabe, Michael Antonovich
Counsel: Natalie Price, Esq.
Lawrence Beach Allen and Choi PC
2677 North Main Street Suite 370 Santa Ana, CA 92705

Chris Ryan Legal, Sr.
Counsel: Pro Se
Authorized Email : chrislegal55@yahoo.com
P. O. Box 5133, San Pedro, CA 90731

Derek Hunt, Kathleen E. Oleary
Counsel: Sarah L. Overton
Cummins, McClorey, Davis, Acho & Assoicates, P.C.
3801 Univerity Avenue, Suite 560
Riverside, CA 92501

George King, James Otero, Dolly Gee, Otis Wright II
Counsel: Robert Ira Lester AUSA
Office of US Attorney Civil Division
300 North Los Angeles Street Room 7516
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Tani Cantil-Sakauye
No appearance therefore: c/o Supreme Court of California
350 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102-4797

Ettlin Harris Appt Counsel r4f

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