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Reforming the Congolese Security Sector: Which Way Forward?
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 A panel discussion
Anthony Gambino
, Author of “
Congo: Securing Peace, Sustaining Progress
,”
Gerard Prunier,
Author of 
 Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Makingof the Continental Catastrophe
”
Willet Weeks
, DAI, Special Advisor to USAID for peace building and stabilization
Joseph Siegle
, Moderator, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies
On October 29, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies convened three leading experts onthe Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for a panel discussion to examine practicalstrategies to reform the DRC’s security sector.
The Need for Reform
The security sector in the DRC confronts one of the most complex series of securitythreats on the African continent. It faces multiple, non-state armed groups with varyingagendas, longstanding ethnic animosities, competition for the Congo’s rich bounty of natural resources, and a legacy of weak state institutions. Most distinctively, militariesfrom at least eight different countries have intervened in the DRC over the last 12 years –with many retaining significant influence inside the Congo. In short, the security sector inthe DRC has repeatedly failed to protect the territorial integrity and citizens of thecountry from either domestic or international threats.The costs of this instability have been high. An estimated 5.4 million Congolese havedied directly or indirectly since the conflict began in 1997 making it the world’s singlemost deadly conflict since World War II (and claiming just under 10 percent of the entirepopulation). The economic devastation of the conflict has been estimated at more than$250 billion. Given its location in the heart of Africa, the ongoing instability in the DRChas security and development implications throughout the continent.Violence in the North and South Kivus is particularly heinous and persistent. Since theKimia II security operation was launched in January 2009 in North and South Kivu, morethan 1,000 civilians have been killed, and more than 1.2 million have been displaced.Most disturbingly, the Congolese security sector is regularly a source of insecurity for
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This is a synthesis of the panel presentations and discussion. The views summarized here do not representthe positions of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the Department of Defense, or the United Statesgovernment.
 
Congo’s citizens – persistently charged by the United Nations and human rights groupswith human rights abuses, including the escalating and systematic use of gender- andsexually-based violence. Since January, more than 7,000 women have been raped in theKivus. The UN Human Rights Office alleges that the vast majority of these have beencommitted by the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (known by itsFrench acronym FARDC) and the Congolese National Police (PNC).Military effectiveness and respect for the population go hand in hand from theperspective of counterinsurgency operations, where the trust, support, and informationsharing of the population are indispensible. Accordingly, any realistic scenario forachieving sustainable stability in the DRC will require significant rehabilitation of thesecurity sector.
Challenges to Reform
Integration of former rebels within the FARDC as part of earlier peace agreements hasdramatically weakened the caliber of the Congolese armed forces. The haphazard andswift integration process has contributed to an unprofessional military lacking loyalty,pride and morale. It has also banded together warlords and killers who have little regardfor the civilian authorities and non-combatants they have been empowered to protect.Indeed, some analysts suggest that the spike in abuses attributed to the FARDC is, in fact,the work of former militiamen.Reform efforts cannot assume that protecting the population is a priority objective for thearmed forces. Rather, given the many years of neglect of the Congolese security sector
 
dating back to the era of long-time president Mobutu Sese Seko, the military has adopteda predatory posture toward the population. Accordingly, in the current conflict, when theFARDC or the militias occupy territory, the impulse is not to provide protection andservices but to reap the spoils offered by their position. The majority of destruction thatoccurs during this conflict, therefore, typically occurs after sporadic clashes between rivalarmed groups have concluded. Under these circumstances, the population has learned tofear all sides.There has historically been limited commitment among Congolese political leaders toreform the security sector. This is attributed to Mobutu not wanting to build a securityapparatus that could threaten his hold on power. Certain politicians and commandershave also profited financially from the control of the armed forces through exploitationand engagement in illicit business enterprises.Ongoing strategic and natural resource interests of neighboring countries, primarilyRwanda, the LRA and Sudan maintain significant influence within the DRC and with theCongolese security sector. While the governments of Rwanda and the DRC have recentlybeen cooperating out of shared security interests, this relationship is very tenuous.Though lacking natural resource interests, Angola has trained units of the FARDC, manyof which rely on Portuguese as the lingua franca. Moreover, due to heavy migrationduring Angola’s civil war, many Angolans have links in the Congo. Navigating theseactive international influences makes the task for reform in the DRC particularlycomplicated.
Recommendations for the Way Forward
 
There are two overarching priorities moving forward – immediately stabilizingthe insecurity in the east and rehabilitating the Congolese security sector over themedium term. To advance the first, the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC,MONUC, should fully embrace its mandate, renewed and expanded in December2008, to “ensure the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel,under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular, violence emanatingfrom any of the parties engaged in the conflict.” This would require MONUC toconfront any armed groups that threaten civilians rather than limiting itself primarily to a peacekeeping role. The space created by this stability would, inturn, enable greater focus on the reform effort.
 
As part of fulfilling its mandate, MONUC would engage more vigorously withthe FARDC in establishing security and preventing the abuses of the civilianpopulation by the Congolese armed forces. In doing so, MONUC would, in fact,only be enforcing a “zero-tolerance” policy the FARDC command announced inJuly for commanders of units that perpetrate criminal acts, specifically, “rapes,subjection of civilians to forced labour, theft, extortion, torture, looting,destruction of agricultural fields or livestock, murder or any other reprehensibleact.”
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