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THREATS OLD AND NEW
A signicant development in Arica over thepast decade has been the generalized lessening o violent confict. Revitalized, expanded internationalpeacekeeping, bolstered by a newly launched Ari-can Union (AU) determination to tackle securitychallenges, has reinorced this trend.In most cases, however, progress made inpeacemaking remains ragile and tentative. Moreoten, rebellions and insurgencies have been con-tained by negotiated agreements that have notbeen ollowed by meaningul political accommoda-tions and other orms o compliance. It is thus artoo soon to assume that Arican states have oundpermanent solutions to the political rivalries andgovernance problems that lie at the root o mostrecent conficts. A reminder o the diculties ac-ing peacekeeping operations can be seen in the on-going disintegration o Somalia, which now rates
AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF
U.S. Security Engagement in Arica
B
y
W
illiam
m. B
ellamy
A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
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Despite signicant recent gains, Arica’s security environment remains ragile with a wide array oongoing and emerging threats placing great strains on already overburdened governments.
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United Nations peacekeeping operations in Arica have realized some success in recent years, especiallywhen they have involved direct support rom members o the Security Council.
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Much more cohesive interagency coordination under strong White House direction is required i theUnited States is to contribute to Arica’s sustained stability given the region’s persistent conditionso poverty, inequality, and weak governance.
H I G H L I G H T S
NO. 1 / JUNE 2009
as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, the rebel-lion and repression in Darur that continue to gen-erate international outrage, and the prospect o arenewed north-south civil war in Sudan, where areerendum on secession is scheduled or 2011.The 9/11 attacks also awakened U.S. ocialsto Arica’s broader vulnerabilities. With its porousborders, ungoverned spaces, societal tensions, andlaw enorcement shortcomings, Arica appeared tooer ideal territory in which terrorist or criminal or-ganizations could seek reuge, acquire and stockpileweapons, recruit members, conduct training, andplan operations without much ear o ocial inter-erence. Many observers also consider Arica poten-tially vulnerable to Islamist extremism. More Mus-lims live in Arica than in the Middle East. Wherethey live in communities undermined by poverty,unemployment, and a sense o exclusion and ocial
 
2neglect (a situation that applies to many non-Mus-lim communities in Arica as well), it is arguablethat they are prey to extremist messages and eventu-ally to terrorist recruitment.Thus, chronic weaknesses that had previouslyattracted the attention mainly o humanitariansand development experts—poverty, joblessness,disease, illiteracy, corruption, and weak gover-nance—were discovered to have new strategic im-portance. This situation ed a tendency to confateall orms o U.S. assistance to Arica—security, de-velopmental, and humanitarian—with overridingcounterterrorism objectives.Less spectacular but equally important will bea host o new and less conventional security chal-lenges. Piracy is dramatically up in Arican waters,threatening commerce and disrupting humanitarianassistance operations. A growing number o Aricanstates are becoming important transit points or nar-cotics serving European markets, though the drugbosses and networks controlling this trade are rarelyArican. Other criminal activities, including illegalshing, human tracking, and grand scale thet o oilin the Niger Delta, have expanded markedly, threat-ening to destabilize already ragile governments.Ocial corruption remains an important con-tributing actor to the spread o criminal activities inArica. Yet even when governments are determinedto combat criminal infuences, proound institution-al deciencies oten prevent eective action. Aricahas the lowest percentage o police ocers (180 per100,000 population) and judges per capita o anyglobal region. And the eects o these problems donot remain localized: the United Nations (UN) O-ce o Drugs and Crime estimates that 58 percent o raudulent insurance claims in the United States aremade by Nigerians.Adding to this litany is the uncharted dangerthat the worsening global nancial crisis will re-verse the strong economic growth that Arica hasrealized in recent years. Shortages o aordable oodand uel, intensied competition or diminishingnatural resources such as water, and dislocationscaused by environmental stress and climate changeseem certain to bring more pressure to bear on al-ready overburdened Arican governments.
PEACEKEEPING SUCCESSES
In recent years, the United Nations has quietlyimproved the eectiveness o its conventional peace-keeping operations in Arica. The rst turnaroundwas in Sierra Leone where, despite initial humiliationat the hands o rag-tag Revolutionary United Frontmilitias, a credible UN orce was deployed to con-tested areas o the country by mid-2001. Large UNpeacekeeping operations also scaled up in the Demo-cratic Republic o Congo in 2001, in Liberia in 2003,and in Côte d’Ivoire in 2004. All were Chapter VIImissions authorizing the use o orce. All were gener-ally “successul” in that they either checked violence,helped establish conditions in which confict could becontained, or contributed to postconfict stabilization.UN operations were most successul where theywere eectively “sponsored” by members o the Se-curity Council willing to unilaterally deploy resourc-es in support o them. Thus, the United Kingdommilitary presence in Sierra Leone, French militaryactivities in Côte d’Ivoire, and strong U.S. backingor the UN operation in Liberia all appear to haveworked to create a more permissive operating envi-ronment or international peacekeeping orces.This was also a period in which the newlyormed Arican Union legitimized or the rst timethe principle o collective armed intervention un-der AU auspices to restore peace or rectiy egregiousviolations o human rights or humanitarian law. Anew Peace and Security Council was establishedto oversee peace support operations, institute sanc-tions, and acilitate humanitarian action. Armed in-tervention capabilities were to be provided by ve
Ambassador William M. Bellamy (Ret.) is the Directoro the Arica Center or Strategic Studies. He was U.S.Ambassador to Kenya rom 2003 to 2006 during whichtime he directed U.S. security programs in the Horn oArica. He served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secre-tary o State or Arican Aairs (2001–2003).
“this situation ed atendency to confate all ormso U.S. assistance to Arica—security, developmental, andhumanitarian—with overridingcounterterrorism objectives”
 
3standby brigades, one in each Arican subregion,supplemented by a continent-wide reserve orce o observers, police, and civilian personnel.Consistent with this new regional thinking, theAU launched several peace support operations ater2000. A small, 1-year deployment to Burundi pro-vided some measure o security ollowing a ceaserein 2003, although it ailed to achieve its main ob-jective o disarming rebels and acilitating politicaldialogue. AU missions to embattled Darur and So-malia were ar more ambitious and less successul.While security gains are visible and encourag-ing across Arica, they are ragile. In many places,the underlying causes and drivers o confict have notchanged. Improvements in UN peacekeeping are en-couraging, as is AU willingness to shoulder more re-sponsibility. But a decit o real Arican peacekeepingcapacity remains. UN peace operations appear at theirupper limit in Arica, and globally: close to 90,000 UNpeacekeeping personnel are today committed to 16 UNoperations worldwide. Some 70 percent o those per-sonnel are in Arica or seven operations. Serious un-certainty persists regarding Arica’s capacity to respondto the next big crisis. The growing gap between expec-tations and demands placed on peace operations arguesstrongly or a broad reassessment o UN peacekeepingin Arica and a new strategy or easing current excesscommitments. It also argues or renewed multilateralthinking on how to assist the Arican Union to sustaincondence and enthusiasm or playing an active opera-tional role in ending conficts on the continent.
U.S. SECURITY ENGAGEMENT
The United States has signicantly enlargedits security engagement in Arica in recent years.This includes a U.S. military base in Djibouti, ac-tive counterterror programs, support or a massiveexpansion o UN peace operations, and the launcho the U.S. Arica Command (USAFRICOM). Byexplicitly designating security resources to Arica andconsistently meeting its assessed obligations to UNpeacekeeping, the United States has helped put Ari-can peacekeeping on more solid ooting than at anytime in the recent past. Yet this security enlargementhas not been eectively integrated with U.S. diplo-matic and long-term developmental aims. Indeed,stark tensions persist across these three domains.Traditional security assistance and counterterror-ism programs do not adequately address many o A-rica’s emerging security challenges. Lawlessness andescalating crime, or example, are not security trendsthat U.S. or Arican militaries can be expected toresolve. Nor are there traditional security assistancesolutions to the chronic instability that aects manyparts o Arica due to persistent conditions o pov-erty, inequality, and governance ailures. Within theU.S. Government, the State Department’s Bureau o International Narcotics Control and Law Enorce-ment (INL) is charged with combating internationaldrug tracking and organized crime, money launder-ing, human tracking, and building the capacity o partner nation law enorcement and criminal justicesystems. However, the $34 million that INL commitsto Arica annually is clearly too little to qualiy as acoherent program o nonmilitary capacity-building.More vigorous, better resourced diplomacy willbe essential to an eective U.S. response to Arica’ssecurity challenges. Well-targeted and sustained assis-tance programs are likewise needed. But the UnitedStates will be called upon to move beyond traditionalremedies. Too oten, U.S. interventions have beenreactive and compartmentalized, a weakness typiedby post-9/11 counterterrorism programs in Arica andby almost all orms o nonmilitary security assistance.To adequately address increasingly complex securitychallenges in Arica, the United States will need to bemore anticipatory in its actions and more coherent inbringing civilian and military resources to bear. With-out improvement in interagency planning and execu-tion, stronger State Department leadership, and moreorceul and eective White House oversight, the im-pact o greater U.S. engagement on Arican securityissues will likely be limited.
SIX U.S. PRIORITIES FOR AFRICA
Create an Updated, Baseline Assessmento U.S. Security Interests in Arica.
During the
“traditional security assistanceand counterterrorism programsdo not adequately addressmany o Arica’s emergingsecurity challenges”
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