Equal Opposites: Wyndham Lewis, Henri Bergson, and Their Philosophies of Space and Time

Author(s): SueEllen Campbell

Source: Twentieth Century Literature, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Autumn, 1983), pp. 351-369
Published by: Hofstra University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/441471
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E q u a l Opposites: Wyndha m
L ew is,
H enr i
B er g son,
a nd T heir
Phil osophies
of
S pa c e
a nd T ime
S UE E L L E N CAMPB E L L
In 1927 the B r itish
novel ist,
pa inter ,
a nd c r itic
Wyndha m
L ew is
pu bl ished
T ime a nd Wester n
Ma n,
a ma ssive hostil e
a na l ysis
of w ha t he
c a l l ed the time-c u l t-the netw or k of simil a r ities a nd inf l u enc es domi-
na ting
his c u l tu r e. In its B ook
I,
"T he
Revol u tiona r y S impl eton, "
he
f inds in moder n a r t
(espec ia l l y
the w or k of
S tein, Pou nd,
a nd
Joyc e)
the
c onc r ete evidenc e of a time-obsessed
Zeitg eist.
In its
l ong er ,
mor e
theor etic a l B ook
II,
"An
Ana l ysis
of the
Phil osophy
of
T ime, "
he tr a c es
pa r a l l el
c ha r a c ter istic s in
histor y, psyc hol og y,
a nd
phil osophy.
Under -
l ying
these
r esembl a nc es,
he
a r g u es,
is a f u nda menta l
a f f inity
betw een
r el a tivity physic s
a nd moder n
phil osophy. B eg inning
w ith H enr i
B er g son
a nd
c ontinu ing
w ith Al f r ed Nor th
Whitehea d,
S a mu el Al ex-
a nder ,
a nd
other s,
phil osopher s
ha ve f oc u sed on the
new l y per c eived
pr obl em
of
time,
a nd in
doing
so ha ve a ba ndoned or
destr oyed ma ny
of the tr a ditiona l
c onc epts
a nd va l u es L ew is c onsider s essentia l .
T hey
ha ve obsc u r ed the onc e c l ea r l ines betw een
objec ts
a nd
su bjec ts,
ma tter
a nd
mind;
they
ha ve sha tter ed the or der a nd
sta bil ity
a ssoc ia ted w ith
spa c e by seeing ever ything
a s time a nd
motion;
they
ha ve su bstitu ted
the
va g u eness
of emotion f or the
c l a r ity
of intel l ec t.
T hr ou g h
his
c r itic ism of this
"time-phil osophy"
in T ime a nd Wester n
Ma n,
L ew is
ou tl ines a n
opposing "spa c e-phil osophy"
tha t w ou l d r einsta te these
tr a ditiona l va l u es-the ones he bel ieves a r e most su ited to ou r
c ommon-sense,
ever yda y
l ives
a nd,
mor e
impor ta nt,
most
pr odu c tive
f or the a r ts.
L ew is ma kes it c l ea r tha t he
r eg a r ds B er g son
a s c entr a l to the
351
T WE NT IE T H CE NT URY L IT E RAT URE
time-c u l t he
opposes.
As he
expl a ins, "B er g son's
doc tr ine of T ime is the
c r ea tive sou r c e of the
time-phil osophy.
It is he mor e tha n
a ny
other
sing l e f ig u r e
w ho is
r esponsibl e
f or the ma in intel l ec tu a l c ha r a c ter istic s
of the w or l d w e l ive
in,
a nd the
impl ic it
debt of a l most a l l
c ontempor a r y
phil osophy
to him is immense."' Yet
despite
su c h
sta tements,
L ew is
ma inta ins a c u r iou s dista nc e f r om this
phil osopher .
In T ime a nd Wester n
Ma n,
he
r a r el y
tu r ns his f or mida bl e c r itic a l a ttention
dir ec tl y u pon
B er g son;
most of the
time,
he dea l s instea d w ith other
thinker s,
pr ima r il y
Al exa nder a nd
Whitehea d,
w ho ow e their c entr a l
c onc ept
to
him. Ra ther tha n
expl a in B er g son's
view s
himsel f ,
L ew is is
l ikel y
to
r epr odu c e
the c omments of one of these
"disc ipl es"-a nd
a l l ow the
q u ota tion
both to
pr esent B er g son's
idea a nd to
su g g est
his ow n
oppos-
ing
idea . T hu s he
q u otes
Al exa nder :
"We
a r e,
a s it
w er e,
to think ou r sel ves into T ime. I c a l l this
ta king
T ime
ser iou sl y.
Ou r
g u ides
of the seventeenth
c entu r y
deser t u s
her e. B esides the
inf inite,
tw o
thing s
entr a nc ed their intel l ec ts.
One w a s
S pa c e
or
extension;
the other w a s Mind.
B u t,
entr a nc ed
by
mind or
thou g ht, they neg l ec ted
T ime.
Per ha ps
it is Pr of essor
B er g son
in ou r
da y
w ho ha s been the f ir st
phil osopher
to ta ke
T ime
ser iou sl y."2
S u c h a sta tement il l u str a tes L ew is'
a r g u ment
tha t the
pr obl em
of time
a nd the inf l u enc e of
B er g son
a r e ba sic to moder n
phil osophy;
a nd it
nea tl y
endor ses his
opposition
betw een time on the one ha nd a nd
spa c e
a nd mind on the other . B u t this kind of
q u ota tion
f u nc tions
onl y ver y
indir ec tl y
a s
pa r t
of a
c r itiq u e
of
B er g son
himsel f .
Wher e L ew is
u su a l l y q u otes a bu nda ntl y
f r om the w or ks he c r it-
ic izes, mor eover ,
he
q u otes B er g son onl y
a ha ndf u l of times.3 L a te in
the
book,
in the
c ha pter
entitl ed
"S pa c e
a nd
T ime, "
he does devote a
shor t sec tion to
B er g son's "time-theor y"
a nd
expl a ins
in
g ener a l
ter ms
w ha t
B er g son
u nder sta nds
by spa c e
a nd du r a tion. T his sec tion is u n-
r ema r ka bl e insof a r a s it f ol l ow s the
pa tter n
of most of L ew is'
c r itic ism,
mixing
of ten
a c c u r a te,
r ea sona bl e
a na l yses
w ith a
str ong
a nd
u su a l l y
u nr ea sona bl e
pol emic a l
bia s. Wha t is u nu su a l in this
su mma r y
is tha t
L ew is f a il s to
identif y
his sou r c e. H er e a s
el sew her e,
his ma in exhibits
c ome f r om Cr ea tive
E vol u tion; bu t L ew is never tel l s u s so.
Indeed,
tha t
titl e
a ppea r s
in T ime a nd Wester n Ma n
onl y
onc e a nd then
mer el y
to
g l oss
a r ema r k ma de
by
Wil l ia m
Ja mes.
In a
c ou pl e
of
pl a c es,
L ew is
sepa r a tes
himsel f f r om
B er g son
even
mor e
expl ic itl y.
H e
expl a ins:
T he inf l u enc e of
B er g son
w ent dow n benea th the w a ve of f or -
ma l enthu sia sm tha t
immedia tel y pr ec eded
the Wa r . In the a r ts
352
WYNDH AM L E WIS AND H E NRI B E RGS ON
tha t movement
br ou g ht ima g ina tion
ba c k onc e
mor e,
ba nishing
the na tu r a l ist
dog ma s
tha t ha d obta ined f or
f if ty
or
sixty yea r s.
Impr essionism
w a s dr iven ou t a nd the
g r ea t
idea l s of str u c tu r e
a nd of f or ma l
sig nif ic a nc e
w er e
r estor ed,
to
pa inting
a nd
sc u l ptu r e,
a t a l l events.... T her e w a s a
ver y pow er f u l
r ea c tion
in Fr a nc e
a g a inst
a l l tha t
B er g son r epr esented.
B u t the Wa r a nd
einsteinia n
physic s
ha ve tu r ned the sc a l es onc e mor e. T her e is
na tu r a l l y
no
q u estion
of
r einsta ting B er g son;
ther e a r e
pl enty
of
other s of the sa me
sor t,
bu t w ith a mor e
u p-to-da te eq u ipment,
w ithou t
ha ving
r ec ou r se to him.
(p. 156)
H er e L ew is r eminds u s tha t he is a
pa inter ,
a nd tha t a s one of the
l ea der s of this f or ma l r ea c tion
a w a y
f r om
impr essionism
a nd tow a r d
ima g ina tion,
he
ju dg es
w ith
a u thor ity.
In the c ontext of the
a r ts,
B er g son
bec omes a
f ig u r e
f r om the
pa st,
a dea d
f ig u r e
w ho is "na tu -
r a l l y"
not to be
br ou g ht
ba c k to l if e. B u t even a s a
phil osopher ,
L ew is
tel l s u s a f ew
pa g es
l a ter ,
B er g son
is dea d:
"B y
stu dents of
phil osophy
B er g son
is stil l
r ea d,
bu t
by
no one el se. E ven
by
these he is r ea d a s
l ittl e a s
possibl e,
I shou l d
ima g ine.
Until I
beg a n my sc r u tiny
of the
c ontempor a r y time-phil osophy
I knew him
ver y
l ittl e"
(p. 167).
T his
sta tement-w hic h intr odu c es a disc u ssion of
B er g son's
inf l u enc e on
Whitehea d a nd other s-is even mor e
per sona l
tha n the l a st. L ew is
u na mbig u ou sl y
l a bel s
B er g son
a s a w r iter w ho is of l imited a nd
pu r el y
histor ic a l inter est.
B u t if w ith these r ema r ks L ew is dismisses
B er g son
a s
insig nif ic a nt,
a t the sa me time he a ssa il s him w ith invec tive a t
ever y oppor tu nity.
In
his
a na l yses
of other
phil osopher s,
L ew is
g ener a l l y a dopts
a ser iou s
tone,
moving onl y oc c a siona l l y
into mil d sa r c a sm. When he r ef er s to
B er g son, thou g h,
w e hea r the u nr estr a ined voic e of the
E nemy,
the
f l a mboya nt
sa tir ic
per sona
L ew is
a dopted du r ing
the l a te 1920s a nd
ea r l y
1930s to dr a ma tize his a tta c ks on his
c ontempor a r ies. B er g son,
sa ys
the
E nemy,
"is the
per f ec t phil osophic
r u f f ia n,
of the da r kest a nd
most
f or bidding desc r iption:
a nd he
pu l l s ever y
emotiona l l ever on
w hic h he c a n
l a y
his ha nds"
(p. 174).
"H e disc over ed
nothing ;
he
inter pr eted
sc ienc e;
a nd he
g a ve
it a n
extr emel y
bia sed
inter pr eta tion,
to
sa y
the l ea st"
(p. 161);
his
meta physic
is
"pr etentiou s" (p. 27)
a nd
insinc er el y optimistic (p. 344). B er g son
w a s a
"popu l a r pu r veyor
to the
enl ig htened E ver yma n" (p. 309).
"Until the
c oming
of
B er g son,
[the
vu l g a r
mer c a ntil e
c l a ss]
c ou l d not ha ve f ou nd a
phil osophic a l
intel l i-
g enc e su f f ic ientl y deg r a ded
to ta ke their
money
a nd
do,
phil osoph-
ic a l l y,
their
dir ty
w or k. T he
u niq u e
distinc tion of tha t
per sona g e
is tha t
he w a s the f ir st ser va nt of the
g r ea t
indu str ia l c a ste-mind
a r r iving
on
the
g ol den
c r est of the w a ve of sc ientif ic
pr og r ess" (p. 214).4
And this is
353
T WE NT IE T H CE NT URY L IT E RAT URE
ju st
a
sa mpl e.
Whenever L ew is'
a na l ysis
dr a w s nea r to
B er g son
or the
"sic kl y
ec sta sies of el a n vita l "
(p. 216),
the
E nemy emer g es
to kic k w ha t
L ew is ha s tol d u s is a dea d hor se.
Now w e c a n
onl y
w onder w ha t it is a bou t
B er g son
tha t ha s
pr o-
voked su c h beha vior . Of a l l the
impor ta nt phil osopher s
he
c r itic izes,
B er g son
is the
onl y
one w hose
ser iou sness,
sinc er ity,
a nd oc c a siona l
vir tu es L ew is r ef u ses to
r ec og nize.
We f ind a c l u e to w ha t is
g oing
on,
I
think,
in a r ema r k I ha ve
a l r ea dy q u oted,
w her e L ew is
sa ys,
"Until I
beg a n my sc r u tiny
of the
c ontempor a r y time-phil osophy
I knew him
ver y
l ittl e." For this is
c er ta inl y
u ntr u e.
E a r l y
in those
pr ew a r yea r s
w hen
B er g son's
inf l u enc e w a s
g iving w a y
to a new
spir it
of
f or ma l ism,
L ew is l ived in Pa r is a nd a ttended
B er g son's
l ec tu r es. In a l etter w r itten
over
tw enty yea r s
a f ter T ime a nd Wester n
Ma n,
L ew is desc r ibes this
per iod:
Pa r is,
w her e I w ent soon a f ter
Ru g by,
w a s
my Univer sity.
T her e
I f ol l ow ed
B er g son's
l ec tu r es a t the
Col l eg e
de
Fr a nc e,
a nd
sha r ed the
phil osophic a l
stu dies of f r iends of mine then a t the
E c ol e Nor ma l e....
B er g son
w a s a n exc el l ent
l ec tu r er ,
dr y
a nd
imper sona l .
I
beg a n by embr a c ing
his
evol u tiona r y system.
Fr om
tha t I
pa ssed
to Renou vier a nd thu s to Ka nt. When one is
you ng
on
f a it
des
betises,
q u oi
!5
L ew is w r ote this l etter to
expl a in
his
q u a l if ic a tions
to tea c h a
phil osophy
c ou r se ba sed on T ime a nd Wester n
Ma n;
a s he
r ec og nizes,
su c h f ir stha nd
exper ienc e
does inc r ea se his
a u thor ity
a s a c r itic of
phil osophy.
B u t in
T ime a nd Wester n Ma n
itsel f ,
a s w e ha ve
seen,
L ew is ma kes no su c h
c l a im.
It ha s
l ong
been
r ec og nized
tha t L ew is'
theor y
of sa tir e c omes
dir ec tl y
ou t of
B er g son's
w or k on
c omedy.6
B u t it ha s
onl y r ec entl y
been notic ed tha t
B er g son's
inf l u enc e on L ew is
g oes
stil l f u r ther . And
no one ha s
yet
demonstr a ted
q u ite
how mu c h-a nd in w ha t
w a ys-
L ew is'
spa c e-phil osophy
ow es to this
"per f ec t phil osophic
r u f f ia n."7
When w e l ook a t
B er g son
w ith L ew is in
mind,
Cr ea tive E vol u tion
emer g es
a s a hidden model -a model L ew is
mir r or s, inver ts,
a nd tr ies
to c onc ea l
thr ou g hou t
the
phil osophic a l a r g u ments
of T ime a nd Wester n
Ma n. As I ha ve
sa id,
a side f r om the
su mma r y
in
"S pa c e
a nd
T ime, "
L ew is
spends
l ittl e time
dir ec tl y sc r u tinizing B er g son,
bu t he does do so
in thr ee
sig nif ic a nt pa ssa g es:
thr ee
pl a c es
w her e L ew is a l l ow s u s to
pa ss
thr ou g h
his
a r g u ment
into
B er g son's
a nd thu s
beg in
to see the r el a tion-
ship
betw een the tw o. H e ha ndl es ea c h one
dif f er entl y;
the l ess he ha s
to hide f r om
u s,
the mor e
openl y
he
eng a g es
his
opponent. T hou g h
ea c h seems a t f ir st
g l a nc e simpl y
to be a n
a pt
il l u str a tion f or L ew is'
354
WYNDH AM L E WIS AND H E NRI B E RGS ON
point,
these
pa ssa g es
tu r n ou t on c l oser exa mina tion to be tr a c es of a n
a nxiou sl y
obsc u r ed inf l u enc e.
T hey
show u s w her e the tw o texts
tou c h,
w her e the model br ea ks
thr ou g h
the su r f a c e of the
E nemy's a ppa r entl y
a u tonomou s
a nta g onism,
a nd
B er g son
is r evea l ed a s the
opposite
a g a inst
w hom L ew is ha s def ined himsel f .
T he f ir st of these
pa ssa g es (f ir st
in or der of
c ompl exity, thou g h
l a st
in the
book)
ha s to do w ith the na tu r e of a r t. L ew is is
a na l yzing
the
a esthetic s of the time-c u l t
thr ou g h
the
exa mpl e
of H enr i B r emond's L a
Poesie
pu r e.
B r emond
q u otes B er g son
a s his
a u thor ity,
so L ew is
r epr o-
du c es f or u s tw o of the
pa ssa g es
B r emond u ses. T hese c ome f r om T ime
a nd Fr ee
Wil l ,
not Cr ea tive
E vol u tion,
a nd their sou r c e is
identif ied,
so
tha t w hil e L ew is does dista nc e himsel f f r om
B er g son by w or king
thr ou g h
B r emond,
he a l so c onf r onts him
openl y.
L ew is dissec ts these
tw o
pa ssa g es
in
exa c tl y
the sa me
w a y
a s he does his
spec imens
f r om
other time-minds. H er e is the f ir st
pa ssa g e:
T he w or d w hic h is
sha r pl y
ou tl ined,
the br u ta l
w or d,
w hic h is the
r ec epta c l e
of a l l tha t is
sta bl e,
a l l tha t is
c ommon,
a nd
c onseq u entl y
imper sona l ,
in hu ma n
exper ienc e,
c r u shes or a t a l l events c over s
over the mor e del ic a te a nd f u g itive
impr essions
of ou r individu a l
c onsc ienc e.
(p.
190,
empha sis L ew is')
And the sec ond:
[T he
objec t
of
a r t]
is to send to
sl eep
the a c tive or r a ther the
r ec a l c itr a nt f or c es of ou r
per sona l ity,
a nd
ther eby
to indu c e in u s
a c ondition of
per f ec t doc il ity,
in w hic h w e r ea l ize the idea
su g g ested
to
u s,
in w hic h w e
sympa thize
w ith the sentiment
expr essed.
In the methods
empl oyed by
the a r tist
you
w il l dis-
c over ,
in a n a ttenu a ted
f or m,
r ef ined a nd in some
w a y spir -
itu a l ized,
the methods
by
w hic h in a
g ener a l w a y
the
hypnotic
tr a nc e is indu c ed.
(p.
191)8
For
B er g son,
L ew is
points
ou t,
the
c l ea r l y
def ined w or d is
br u ta l ,
"a nd
w hether
you
a r e a ma n or a
w or d,
to be c a l l ed 'br u ta l ' is not the nic est
thing
tha t c a n
ha ppen
to
you ;
a nd it is
q u ite
c er ta in tha t
B er g son
is
a w a r e of
tha t,
a nd tha t he u ses it to
pr eju dic e
u s
a g a inst
the w or d he is
a tta c king " (p. 192). Mor eover ,
L ew is
objec ts
tha t
B er g son
c ontr a dic ts
himsel f on the r ol e of
per sona l ity:
in the f ir st
pa ssa g e
he seems to w ish
to r esc u e the
per sona l ity
f r om the
br u ta l ,
sta bl e
w or d;
in the sec ond
pa ssa g e
he w a nts to
pu t
tha t
per sona l ity
to
sl eep
in the inter ests of
mor e intense
exper ienc e.
L ew is a ssu mes tha t the "mor e del ic a te a nd
f u g itive impr essions
of ou r individu a l c onsc ienc e" c a n
onl y
be the sa me
a s "the r ec a l c itr a nt f or c es of ou r
per sona l ity, "
f or
su r el y,
he
sa ys,
the
"essenc e of a
per sona l ity,
or of a n 'individu a l
c onsc iou sness, '
is tha t it
355
T WE NT IE T H CE NT URY L IT E RAT URE
shou l d be sta bl e"
(p. 192).
And in
a ny
c a se,
L ew is
a r g u es,
to send tha t
sta bl e f or c e to
sl eep
c a n
ha r dl y
enha nc e ou r
"individu a l ity":
If it is r edu c ed to "a c ondition of
per f ec t doc il ity, "
in w hic h
a nything
tha t is
"su g g ested"
to it it
a c c ommoda tes,
in w hic h it
sympa thizes ec sta tic a l l y
w ith its dea r
hypnotist-tha t ma y
or
ma y
not be
ver y a g r eea bl e
f or
it;
bu t w e
c er ta inl y
c a nnot
c l a im,
exc ept
w ith ou r
tong u e
in ou r
c heek, tha t,
if w e a r e the
hypnotist,
w e a r e
l iber a ting
it f r om
oppr ession,
or tha t w e a r e
enha nc ing
its
"individu a l ity." (p. 192)
T hese
pa ssa g es,
L ew is
c onc l u des,
ha ve ena bl ed him to
g ive
u s "a
sidel ig ht
on the
pa r tic u l a r system
of intel l ec tu a l f r a u d
pr a c tic ed by
B er g son" (p. 193).
In this
a r g u ment,
w e see L ew is' c ha r a c ter istic mixtu r e of
misr epr e-
senta tion of deta il s
(f or B er g son,
the "individu a l c onsc ienc e" is not the
sa me a s the
per sona l ity9)
a nd
ju stic e
to the tota l
a r g u ment.
Wha t w e
mu st notic e
now ,
thou g h,
is how f a r L ew is
g oes
in
a g r eeing
w ith
B er g son
in this insta nc e. For
onc e,
L ew is himsel f a dmits the simil a r ities
in their view s: "It is a r t tha t r el ieves this
oppr ession
of the
c r u shing
w eig ht
of the 'sta bl e'
w or l d;
br ea ks it
u p
a nd u nc over s the intense
r ea l ity.
T ha t is M.
B er g son's
a c c ou nt of
a r t,
a nd it w ou l d a l so in ef f ec t
be mine. B u t he
g oes
on to
expl a in
tha t its f u nc tion is to 'send to
sl eep'
the r esista nc e of the a c tive
per sona l ity. Ag a in
I think he is
q u ite r ig ht
. ."
(pp.
191-92).
E ven this
deg r ee
of
a g r eement
is a l ittl e
su r pr ising
in
l ig ht
of L ew is'
u su a l l y
vitr iol ic tr ea tment of
B er g son,
bu t then in this
ma tter L ew is is in his home
ter r itor y:
a s a novel ist a nd a
pa inter ,
he
know s mor e a bou t a r t tha n
B er g son
does,
so he c a n
c onf identl y
show
u s w her e
B er g son
is
r ig ht
a nd w her e he
g oes w r ong .
B u t their
a g r eement g oes
even
f u r ther ,
a s the
l a ng u a g e
of
B er g son's pa ssa g es
ma kes c l ea r . T hese sta tements ma ke
g ood exa mpl es
f or L ew is
pr ec isel y
bec a u se his ow n ter ms a r e so
nea r l y
the sa me a s
B er g son's.
For
L ew is, too,
l a ng u a g e
is sta bl e a nd
imper sona l
a nd be-
l ong s
to "ou r c ommon w or l d in w hic h w e a l l meet a nd c ommu nic a te"
(p. 191).
It is not
br u ta l ,
of
c ou r se;
in L ew is'
eyes,
a s he tel l s u s
a g a in
a nd
a g a in,
these
q u a l ities
a r e vir tu es. Aside f r om the
disa g r eement
impl ied by
this va l u e ter m a nd their dif f er ent a ttitu des tow a r d
per son-
a l ity,
then,
L ew is c omes c l ose to
ec hoing
his f or mer tea c her .
Cer ta inl y
he ha s
a dopted B er g son's a ssu mption
tha t
l a ng u a g e, sta bil ity, imper -
sona l ity
or
objec tivity,
a nd the individu a l
per sona l ity
f or m a na tu r a l
f a mil y bel ong ing
to the w or l d of c ommon sense. T heir dif f er enc e her e
is
simpl y
tha t L ew is embr a c es w ha t
B er g son
ha s
r ejec ted.
We see the sa me kind of
r el a tionship
even mor e
c l ea r l y
in the
356
WYNDH AM L E WIS AND H E NRI B E RGS ON
sec ond
pa ssa g e (the
f ir st in L ew is'
text),
w hic h
a ppea r s immedia tel y
a f ter L ew is ha s c a l l ed
B er g son
the c hief sou r c e of the
time-phil osophy
a nd
expl a ined
tha t u ntil
r ec entl y
he ha d know n him
ver y
l ittl e. Men-
tioning
tha t it is indexed a s "the
a pog ee
of the sensibl e
objec t, "
L ew is
q u otes
a
l ong pa ssa g e
of
B er g son's
w hic h,
he
sa ys,
"w il l
g ive
a hint a t
l ea st of w ha t
my a r g u ment sig nif ies
w her e it r el a tes to him":
"For the
a nc ients, indeed,
time is
theor etic a l l y neg l ig ibl e,
bec a u se the du r a tion of a
thing onl y
ma nif ests the
deg r a da tion
of its
essenc e;
it is w ith this motionl ess essenc e tha t sc ienc e ha s to
dea l .
Cha ng e being onl y
the ef f or t of a f or m tow a r d its ow n
r ea l iza tion,
the r ea l iza tion is a l l tha t it c onc er ns u s to know . No
dou bt the r ea l iza tion is never
c ompl ete;
it is this tha t a nc ient
phil osophy expr esses by sa ying
tha t w e do not
per c eive
f or m
w ithou t ma tter . B u t if w e c onsider the
c ha ng ing objec t
a t a
c er ta in essentia l
moment,
a t its
a pog ee,
w e
ma y sa y
tha t ther e it
ju st
tou c hes its
intel l ig ibl e
f or m. T his
intel l ig ibl e
f or m,
this
idea l ,
a nd,
so to
spea k, l imiting
f or m,
ou r sc ienc e seizes
u pon.
And
possessing
in this the
g ol d-piec e,
it hol ds
eminentl y
the sma l l
money,
w hic h w e c a l l
bec oming
or
c ha ng e.
T his
c ha ng e
is l ess
tha n
being .
T he
know l edg e
tha t w ou l d ta ke it f or
objec t, su p-
posing
su c h
know l edg e
w er e
possibl e,
w ou l d be l ess tha n sc ienc e.
"B u t,
f or a sc ienc e tha t
pl a c es
a l l the moments of time in the
sa me
r a nk,
tha t a dmits no essentia l
moment,
no
c u l mina ting
point,
no
a pog ee, c ha ng e
is no
l ong er
a diminu tion of
essenc e,
du r a tion is not a dil u tion of
eter nity." (p. 167)10
T his
pa ssa g e
c omes f r om Cr ea tive
E vol u tion,
bu t
sig nif ic a ntl y,
L ew is
neg l ec ts
to tel l u s so. H e is
f r eq u entl y
c a r el ess a bou t his
c ita tions,
bu t
this is the
onl y
time he f a il s to
identif y
one of his
ma jor
exhibits w ith
mor e tha n a r ema r k a bou t how it is indexed. S u c h a
l a pse
is indeed "a
hint a t l ea st" of the
r el a tionship
betw een L ew is a nd
B er g son.
Wha t this
pa ssa g e sig nif ies
a s it r el a tes to L ew is'
a r g u ment
is tha t
onc e
a g a in
L ew is ha s ta ken over
B er g son's c a teg or ies, a c c epting
w ha t
B er g son
disc a r ds,
r ejec ting
w ha t
B er g son
endor ses. T his time the issu es
a r e
c ha ng e
a nd
sta bil ity, su bjec t
a nd
objec t.
L ew is f ol l ow s
B er g son
in
r eg a r ding
a s c entr a l this
opposition
betw een the moder n a nd the
c l a ssic a l w or l d view s ba sed on their sc ientif ic a nd
meta physic a l
a ttitu des
tow a r d time a nd
c ha ng e.
L ike "the
a nc ients, "
L ew is
r eg a r ds c ha ng e
a s
neg l ig ibl e;
his "r ou nded
thing
of c ommon-sense" is the
"a pog ee
or
per f ec tion"
of "c l a ssic a l sc ienc e"
(p. 168).11 B er g son's desc r iption
il -
l u mina tes f or u s w ha t L ew is mea ns w hen he c l a ims to sta nd f or the
c l a ssic a l w or l d: if L ew is insists a t times tha t this kind of
opposition
is
ina c c u r a te,
tha t "the
a g e
of Pl a to sw a r med w ith
empir ic a l ,
sensa tiona l ist
phil osopher s,
f r om
Pr ota g or a s
dow nw a r ds"
(p. 158),
he stil l c onsis-
357
T WE NT IE T H CE NT URY L IT E RAT URE
tentl y a dopts B er g son's g ener a l iza tion
a s his
w or king
def inition. At one
point,
f or
exa mpl e,
L ew is
a r g u es
tha t "T he w or l d of c l a ssic a l
'c ommon-sense'-the w or l d of the
Gr eek,
the w or l d of the
S c hool ma n-is the w or l d of
na tu r e, too,
a nd is a
ver y
a nc ient one"
(p.
186). Mor eover ,
B er g son's desc r iption su g g ests
tha t w ha t L ew is mea ns
by spa c e
a nd
sta bil ity
is mu c h the sa me
thing
a s w ha t
B er g son
mea ns
by
the c l a ssic a l
idea l ;
if time a nd
c ha ng e
sta nd
a g a inst
this
idea l ,
spa c e
a nd
sta bil ity
sta nd f or it.
When w e l ook f u r ther in Cr ea tive E vol u tion to see how
B er g son
w ou l d
pr ef er
tha t this c l a ssic a l
"objec t"
be
desc r ibed,
w e f ind him
of f er ing
w ha t tu r ns ou t to be a
ver y r evea l ing meta phor -r evea l ing
not
onl y
bec a u se of w ha t it show s u s a bou t
B er g son,
bu t a l so bec a u se both
Al exa nder a nd L ew is u se simil a r bu t
sig nif ic a ntl y
dif f er ent
meta phor s.
Ac c or ding
to
B er g son,
the na tu r a l "mec ha nism of ou r
or dina r y
know l edg e"-of "per c eption,
intel l ec tion,
l a ng u a g e"-"is
of a
c inema tog r a phic a l
kind." "S u f f ic e it to
sa y
tha t the intel l ec t
r epr esents
bec oming
a s a ser ies of
sta tes,
ea c h of w hic h is
homog eneou s
w ith itsel f
a nd
c onseq u entl y
does not
c ha ng e." Or dina r il y,
he
bel ieves,
w e c on-
c eive of movement
by br ea king
it into individu a l sta tic sta tes: "We ta ke
sna pshots,
a s it
w er e,
of the
pa ssing r ea l ity."
In this
tendenc y,
w e a r e
l ike the
Gr eeks, w ho,
B er g son expl a ins,
"tr u sted to
na tu r e,
tr u sted the
na tu r a l
pr opensity
of the
mind,
tr u sted
l a ng u a g e
a bove
a l l "; a nd,
l ike
them,
"w e end in the
phil osophy
of Idea s w hen w e
a ppl y
the
c inema tog r a phic a l
mec ha nism of the intel l ec t to the
a na l ysis
of the
r ea l ."
Fina l l y,
he
a r g u es,
the dif f er enc e betw een a nc ient
phil osophy
a nd the
pr oc edu r es
of moder n sc ienc e
(r emember
tha t f or
B er g son
moder n sc ienc e is stil l
nineteenth-c entu r y mec ha nism)
is one of
deg r ee,
not kind:
It is the sa me
c inema tog r a phic a l
mec ha nism in both
c a ses,
bu t it
r ea c hes a
pr ec ision
in the sec ond tha t it c a nnot ha ve in the f ir st.
Of the
g a l l op
of a hor se ou r
eye per c eives c hief l y
a
c ha r a c ter istic ,
essentia l or r a ther sc hema tic
a ttitu de,
a f or m tha t
a ppea r s
to
r a dia te over a w hol e
per iod
a nd so f il l
u p
a time of
g a l l op.
It is
this a ttitu de tha t
sc u l ptu r e
ha s f ixed on the f r ieze of the Pa r the-
non. B u t insta nta neou s
photog r a phy
isol a tes
a ny
moment;
it
pu ts
them a l l in the sa me
r a nk,
a nd thu s the
g a l l op
of a hor se
spr ea ds
ou t f r om it into a s
ma ny
su c c essive a ttitu des a s it
w ishes,
instea d of
ma ssing
itsel f into a
sing l e
a ttitu de,
w hic h is
su pposed
to f l a sh ou t in a
pr ivil eg ed
moment a nd to il l u mina te a w hol e
per iod. (empha sis mine)
B u t even the c inema does not
r ec og nize
the f l u x betw een
f r a mes,
a nd
f or
B er g son,
this l imita tion is the f a il u r e sha r ed
by
the
intel l ec t,
or di-
358
WYNDH AM L E WIS AND H E NRI B E RGS ON
na r y per c eption,
moder n
sc ienc e,
a nd c l a ssic a l
meta physic s.
Neither the
sc u l ptu r ed ima g e
of c l a ssic a l a r t nor the su c c ession of
ima g es
in f il m is
f or him a n
a deq u a te
vision of the tr u e na tu r e of
c ha ng e.
Instea d,
he
bel ieves,
w e mu st
pl a c e
ou r sel ves inside the
moving r ea l ity
to
g r a sp
its
essenc e.12
In a dif f er ent c ontext
(desc r ibing
the
"sing u l a r u niver sa l "),
Al ex-
a nder of f er s a
meta phor
simil a r
enou g h
to
point
to the bl ind
spot
in
B er g son's a na l og y.
Wher e
B er g son
tr ea ts the
sna pshot
a nd the
sc u l ptu r e
a s
ima g es
of the sa me
kind,
Al exa nder
empha sizes
the dif -
f er enc e betw een a
photog r a ph
a nd a
pa inting :
We
ma y
next ta ke a mor e
hig hl y or g a nized
individu a l ,
sa y
a
per son
w hose l if e
ma y
be
r eg a r ded
a s
a r r a ng ed
on a c er ta in
pl a n.
. .It is su c h a
pl a n
of a ma n's
per sona l ity
w hic h a n a r tistic
por tr a it
endea vou r s to
expr ess,
w her ea s a
photog r a ph g ives onl y
a
pic tu r e
of the ma n a t a
pa ssing
moment,
u nl ess
by a r tistr y
of
tec hniq u e
the ha r dness of the
momenta r y
ou tl ines
ma y
be sof t-
ened a nd the
photog r a ph a ppr oxima te
to a
por tr a it.'3
T o
por tr a y
the essenc e of a
per sona l ity,
a
pa inter
c ombines a l l
c ha ng -
ing
moments into a
sing l e u nmoving ima g e.
T he a r t
ima g e,
the
sc u l ptu r ed
hor se,
is not the sa me a s a f il m or a f r a me of
f il m;
both
ma y
r emove time f r om their
objec t,
bu t
they
do so in
sig nif ic a ntl y
dif f er ent
w a ys.
B oth of these
meta phor s
l ea d
str a ig ht
into L ew is'
str ong est
su it,
sinc e he w ishes to ma inta in tha t his
phil osophy
is tha t of a visu a l a r tist.
T hr ou g h
their c hoic e of
ima g es, B er g son
a nd Al exa nder
impl ic itl y
c onf ir m L ew is' view tha t the a r t
ima g e
a nd the a r tist's vision a r e na tu r a l
meta phor s
f or
per sona l ity,
timel essness,
the c l a ssic a l
essenc e,
a nd the
na tu r a l
tendenc y
of the hu ma n
per c eption
a nd intel l ec t-a l l the
thing s
L ew is sees himsel f a s
def ending .14
In this
ma tter ,
a g a in,
L ew is c hooses
not to
q u ote B er g son
or Al exa nder
dir ec tl y;
instea d,
he
sil entl y a dopts
their
ima g es
a nd r evises them to ma ke his ow n
meta phor ic a l
c omments
on the
time-phil osopher s'
vision.
A
c ou pl e
of
exa mpl es
w il l il l u str a te L ew is'
per spec tive.
For in-
sta nc e,
he desc r ibes how
B er g son's
view w ou l d
c ha ng e
the c l a ssic a l
sc u l ptu r e
of the Pa r thenon
by a ssoc ia ting B er g son
w ith the Ita l ia n
Fu tu r ists. Af ter
noting
tha t his
l ong -time enemy
"Ma r inetti ... w a s a
pu r -sa ng ber g sonia n" (p. 213),
he tel l s u s tha t "one of the ta sks he set
[f or
the
Fu tu r ists]
w a s to sta r t
ma king
sta tu es tha t c ou l d
open
a nd shu t
their
eyes,
a nd even move their l imbs a nd tr u nks
a bou t,
or
w a g
their
hea ds"
(p. 216).
E l sew her e,
desc r ibing
the
phil osophic a l impl ic a tions
of
the
time-c u l t,
L ew is
w r ites,
"the notion of the tr a nsf or med
'objec t'
359
T WE NT IE T H CE NT URY L IT E RAT URE
of f er ed u s
by
this doc tr ine is
pl a inl y
in the na tu r e of a 'f u tu r ist'
pic tu r e,
l ike a
r u nning dog
w ith a hu ndr ed
l eg s
a nd a dozen ba c ks a nd hea ds.
In
pl a c e
of the c ha r a c ter istic sta tic 'f or m' of Gr eek
Phil osophy, you
ha ve
a
ser ies,
a
g r ou p,
or ,
a s Pr of essor Whitehea d
sa ys,
a r eiter a tion"
(p.
181).15
T his
meta phor
is
pa r tic u l a r l y
c l ever ,
I
think,
bec a u se it
per -
ver sel y c ol l a pses
the su c c essive
ima g es
of a f il m into a
sing l e ima g e.
S u c h a n
a na l og y spa tia l izes
movement even mor e
empha tic a l l y
tha n
does
B er g son's
c inema .
Mor eover ,
L ew is
impl ic itl y
r eminds u s her e tha t
w ith a f ew histor ic a l
exc eptions
l ike the
Fu tu r ists,
the
g r a phic
a r ts ha ve
a l w a ys por tr a yed
movement
by su g g estion
r a ther tha n
by a ttempting
to
spel l
it ou t w ith
mu l tipl e
a nd
su per imposed ima g es.
L ew is a l so r ec a sts
B er g son's desc r iption
of the
"c inema tog r a phic a l
mec ha nism." H e
expl a ins:
T he tr a ditiona l bel ief of
c ommon-sense,
embodied in the "na if "
view of the
physic a l
w or l d,
is
r ea l l y
a
pic tu r e
[inf or med
by
w ha t
w e know f r om
exper ienc e]....
And it is this
pic tu r e
f or w hic h
the
c inema tog r a ph
of the
physic s
of "events" is to be su bsti-
tu ted....
peopl e
a r e to be tr a ined f r om
inf a nc y
to
r eg a r d
the
w or l d a s a
moving pic tu r e.
In this no
"objec t"
w ou l d
a ppea r ,
bu t
onl y
the sta tes of a n
objec t. (p. 408).16
If f or
B er g son
the
c inema tog r a phic per c eption
of
r ea l ity
ha s too l ittl e
movement,
f or L ew is it ha s f a r too mu c h. L ew is inver ts
B er g son's
bl indness: in
B er g son's eyes,
the sta tic
ima g e
of c l a ssic a l a r t a nd the
su c c essive
ima g es
of f il m a r e
essentia l l y
the
sa me;
in
L ew is',
the f il m
a nd
B er g son's
vision of
c ontinu a l ,
u nbr oken f l u x a r e
indisting u isha bl e.
T he
meta phor
of the c inema
su g g ests
to
B er g son
a l l tha t ha s been l ef t
ou t of the
r ea l ity.
B u t to L ew is it
su g g ests onl y
the
disinteg r a tion
of the
sta bl e
ima g e
of
r ea l ity:
"With the thou sa nd su c c essive
pic tu r es
w e thu s
obta in, "
he
a r g u es,
"w e sha l l
ha ve-onl y su c c essivel y, nothing
a l l a t
onc e,
exc ept
a
pu nc tu a l pic tu r e
a nd
momenta r y
sensa tion-the
per c eptu a l
pic tu r e
of c ommon-sense"
(p. 409).
Onc e
a g a in,
the
spa c e-phil osopher
a dopts
the
time-phil osopher 's desc r iption
of the
meta physic a l
a l ter na -
tives a nd a l ter s it to
a r g u e
the
opposing
view .
T his
exa mpl e
of a sha r ed
meta phor
a nd the tw o
l ong pa ssa g es
L ew is
q u otes
f r om
B er g son
a bou t a r t a nd the c l a ssic a l w or l d view a r e
not isol a ted r esembl a nc es bu t
pa r ts
of a
l a r g er pa tter n
of
r el a tionships.
T he
key
to this
pa tter n
l ies in a c a su a l r ema r k a bou t
B er g son
L ew is
ma kes w hen he is
intr odu c ing
Whitehea d. T his is the thir d
pa ssa g e
I
ha ve c a l l ed
espec ia l l y sig nif ic a nt;
it is the l ea st dir ec t a nd most
r evea l ing
of the thr ee.
Ag a in,
L ew is does not
identif y
the sou r c e a s Cr ea tive
E vol u tion
(or a ny
other of
B er g son's books),
a nd
a g a in,
he dista nc es
360
WYNDH AM L E WIS AND H E NRI B E RGS ON
himsel f
by w or king thr ou g h
a nother
phil osopher .
In this
c a se,
he does
not even
q u ote B er g son's
w or ds. H e w r ites:
T he
g r ea ter pa r t
of Pr of essor Whitehea d's
a na l ysis,
in his S c ienc e
a nd the Moder n
Wor l d,
tu r ns on
w ha t,
a s he sta r ts
by a nnou nc ing ,
w a s the ma in
objec tive
of
B er g son's
c r itic ism.
B er g son
ha d sa id
tha t the intel l ec t
"spa tia l ized" thing s.
It w a s tha t
"spa tia l iza tion"
tha t the doc tr ina ir e of motion a nd of menta l "time" a tta c ked. It
is
tha t, too,
tha t Whitehea d is
bu sy c onf u ting ; onl y
he
a c q u its
the
intel l ec t of this
vil l a iny,
w her e
B er g son pu r su es
it w ith his ha tr ed
a nd a bu se.
(p. 168)
T hr ou g hou t
his
a r g u ment,
L ew is c ontinu es to r ef er
oc c a siona l l y
to this
idea of
B er g son's, a l w a ys sepa r a ting
himsel f f r om it
by enc l osing
"spa tia l izing "
in
q u ota tion
ma r ks. B u t he never
stops
to exa mine this
a spec t
of
B er g son's a r g u ment-the a spec t
Whitehea d
r eg a r ded
a s its
"ma in
objec tive."
E ven in the
c ha pter
on
"S pa c e
a nd T ime" he does not
c l ea r l y expl a in
w ha t
B er g son
mea ns
by
the intel l ec t or its
spa tia l izing
tendenc ies. Wha t w e f ind w hen w e l ook a t Cr ea tive
E vol u tion,
thou g h,
is
tha t in this ma tter L ew is' dista nc e f r om his f or mer tea c her is
a g a in
mor e
a ppa r ent
tha n r ea l . H is
q u ota tion
ma r ks
impl y
tha t he
q u estions
B er g son's
view of the
intel l ec t,
bu t in
f a c t,
tha t view is ba sic to L ew is'
ow n
phil osophy.
When
B er g son sa ys
tha t the Gr eek "f r a mew or k ma r ks ou t the
ma in l ines of a
meta physic
w hic h
is,
w e
bel ieve,
the na tu r a l
meta physic
of the hu ma n
intel l ec t, "
he mea ns no
c ompl iment. Ac c or ding
to
him,
the intel l ec t is
onl y
ha l f of c onsc iou sness-a nd the l ess
inter esting
ha l f
a t tha t. H e
expl a ins:
"Intu ition a nd intel l ec t
r epr esent
tw o
opposite
dir ec tions of the w or k of c onsc iou sness: intu ition
g oes
in the
ver y
dir ec tion of
l if e,
intel l ec t
g oes
in the inver se
dir ec tion,
a nd thu s f inds
itsel f
na tu r a l l y
in a c c or da nc e w ith the movement of ma tter ."
Intu ition,
or
instinc t,
is the "na tu r a l dir ec tion" of the
mind,
a nd l ea ds to
"pr og -
r ess" in the f or m of
"tension,
c ontinu ou s
c r ea tion,
f r ee
a c tivity."
T he
na tu r a l
spher e
of intu ition is du r ee or l ived time.
Intel l ec t,
on the other
ha nd,
inver ts this na tu r a l
dir ec tion,
a nd l ea ds to
"extension,
to the
nec essa r y r ec ipr oc a l
deter mina tion of el ements exter na l ized ea c h
by
r el a tion to the
other s,
in
shor t,
to
g eometr ic a l
mec ha nism."17 Intel l ec t is
a t home in
spa c e.
In
shor t,
w e c ou l d
sa y,
f or
B er g son
intu ition is to
intel l ec t a s time is to
spa c e;
a nd his "ma in
objec tive"
in Cr ea tive E vol u -
tion is to
per su a de
u s tha t intu ition a nd time or du r a tion a r e not
onl y
mor e na tu r a l bu t a l so mor e
pr odu c tive
a nd
l if e-enha nc ing
tha n their
a ntitheses.
Conseq u entl y, B er g son
is mor e inter ested in
expl or ing
the
poten-
361
T WE NT IE T H CE NT URY L IT E RAT URE
tia l of intu ition tha n in
def ining
the l imita tions of intel l ec t.
S til l ,
he does
f u l l y
desc r ibe both sides of this c entr a l
opposition.
Wha t is
inter esting
to a r ea der of L ew is is the ter ms
B er g son
a ssoc ia tes w ith intel l ec t a nd
spa c e.
A sel ec tion of
q u ota tions
w il l indic a te their c ha r a c ter .
Fir st,
he
l inks
intel l ec t,
spa c e,
a nd ma tter :
T hu s,
c onc entr a ted on tha t w hic h
r epea ts, sol el y pr eoc c u pied
in
w el ding
the sa me to the
sa me,
intel l ec t tu r ns
a w a y
f r om the
vision of time. It disl ikes w ha t is
f l u id,
a nd sol idif ies
ever ything
it
tou c hes. We do not think r ea l time. B u t w e l ive
it,
bec a u se l if e
tr a nsc ends intel l ec t.
...
intel l ig enc e
is,
bef or e
a nything
el se,
the
f a c u l ty
of
r el a ting
one
point
of
spa c e
to
a nother ,
one ma ter ia l
objec t
to a nother . . .
T he mor e c onsc iou sness is
intel l ec tu a l ized,
the mor e is ma tter
spa tia l ized.18
S ec ond,
he a ssoc ia tes intel l ec t w ith
l a ng u a g e, per c eption,
a nd the
senses:
We ta ke
sna pshots,
a s it
w er e,
of the
pa ssing r ea l ity
. . .
Per c ep-
tion, intel l ec tion,
l a ng u a g e
so
pr oc eed
in
g ener a l .
T he
a spec t
of l if e tha t is a c c essibl e to ou r intel l ec t-a s indeed to
ou r
senses,
of w hic h ou r intel l ec t is the extension-is tha t w hic h
of f er s a hol d to ou r a c tion.19
And
f ina l l y,
he a dds to these ter ms
distinc tness, c l a r ity,
a nd
sta bil ity:
S o
intel l ig enc e,
even w hen it no
l ong er oper a tes u pon
its ow n
objec t,
f ol l ow s ha bits it ha s c ontr a c ted in tha t
oper a tion:
it
a ppl ies
f or ms tha t a r e indeed those of
u nor g a nized
ma tter . It is
ma de f or this kind of w or k. With this kind of w or k a l one is it
f u l l y
sa tisf ied. And tha t is w ha t
intel l ig enc e expr esses by sa ying
tha t thu s
onl y
it a r r ives a t distinc tiveness a nd c l ea r ness.
It
mu st, ther ef or e,
in or der to think itsel f
c l ea r l y
a nd dis-
tinc tl y, per c eive
itsel f u nder the f or m of
disc ontinu ity. Conc epts,
in
f a c t,
a r e ou tside ea c h
other ,
l ike
objec ts
in
spa c e;
a nd
they
ha ve the sa me
sta bil ity
a s su c h
objec ts,
on w hic h
they
ha ve been
model ed. T a ken
tog ether , they
c onstitu te a n
"intel l ig ibl e
w or l d, "
tha t r esembl es the w or l d of sol ids in its essentia l
c ha r a c ter s,
bu t
w hose el ements a r e
l ig hter ,
mor e
dia pha nou s,
ea sier f or the
intel l ec t to dea l w ith tha n the
ima g e
of c onc r ete
thing s: they
a r e
not, indeed,
the
per c eption
itsel f of
thing s,
bu t the
r epr esenta -
tion of the a c t
by
w hic h the intel l ec t is f ixed on them.20
In a l l its
ma jor
c ha r a c ter istic s,
B er g son's
w or l d of
spa c e
a nd intel l ec t is
L ew is'-the
sensibl e,
intel l ig ibl e
w or l d of
c l ea r , distinc t,
sta bl e
objec ts
a nd idea s. And the w or l d of time w hic h L ew is himsel f
pu r su es
w ith his
ha tr ed a nd a bu se is
B er g son's pr ef er r ed
intu itive,
instinc tu a l w or l d of
inter penetr a tion
a nd c onsta nt f l u x.21
362
WYNDH AM L E WIS AND H E NRI B E RGS ON
Disg u ising
these f u nda menta l
r esembl a nc es,
not
su r pr ising l y,
L ew is a nd
B er g son
ha ve dif f er ent u ses a nd
inter pr eta tions
f or c er ta in
va l u e ter ms.
B oth,
f or
exa mpl e,
c l a im to
pr eser ve c ontinu ity a g a inst
disc ontinu ity. B er g son,
to w hom
c ha ng e
is
essentia l ,
bel ieves tha t the
intel l ec t sees
r ea l ity
a s disc ontinu ou s bec a u se it is bl ind to
f l u x; L ew is,
to w hom the essenc e of
r ea l ity
is
sta bil ity,
bel ieves tha t
B er g son's
vision
of
c ha ng e
bl inds him to
c ontinu ity.
L ew is w ou l d
a g r ee
w ith the a c c u sa -
tion tha t he sees
objec ts
a nd idea s a s disc ontinu ou s in
spa c e,
bu t he
w ou l d c a l l them c l ea r a nd distinc t a nd insist tha t he
pr eser ves
the mor e
impor ta nt c ontinu ity
of sta bl e
sel f -identity.
In this
c a se,
L ew is a nd
B er g son simpl y
mea n dif f er ent
thing s by
the sa me
w or d;
ea c h c hooses
to
empha size
a dif f er ent kind of
c ontinu ity.
S imil a r l y,
both L ew is a nd
B er g son
c l a im to desc r ibe the na tu r a l
hu ma n
tendenc y. B er g son a r g u es
tha t the intel l ec t inver ts the na tu r a l
dir ec tion of c onsc iou sness a nd tha t intu ition f ol l ow s
it;
L ew is
a r g u es
tha t the c ommon-sense view he
su ppor ts
is the na tu r a l view of the
w or l d. In this
c a se,
B er g son a c tu a l l y su ppl ies
L ew is w ith
ju stif ic a tion
f or his c l a im. If a t one moment he c a l l s the intel l ec t
"u nna tu r a l , "
a t
a nother ,
a s w e ha ve
seen,
he
expl a ins
tha t the c l a ssic a l w or l d of u n-
c ha ng ing
essenc es is the na tu r a l w or l d: "T he Gr eeks tr u sted to
na tu r e,
tr u sted the na tu r a l
pr opensity
of the
mind,
tr u sted
l a ng u a g e
a bove
a l l ,
in so f a r a s it
na tu r a l l y
exter na l izes
thou g ht.-..
In
spa tia l
movement
a nd in
c ha ng e
in
g ener a l they
sa w
onl y pu r e
il l u sion."22 With this
desc r iption
L ew is
a g r ees:
if his w or l d-view is na tu r a l to the
senses,
the
intel l ec t,
a nd
l a ng u a g e,
it is better tha n
a ny
a l ter na tive
B er g son
c ou l d
of f er .
Ag a in,
ea c h
a ppea l s
to one
a spec t
of hu ma n na tu r e a nd
r ejec ts
a nother .
A thir d dif f er enc e betw een L ew is' a nd
B er g son's oppositions
is a
l ittl e mor e
c ompl ex.
T his is the va l u e ea c h
pu ts
on the ter ms "a c tion"
a nd "l if e." In
g ener a l , B er g son
sees himsel f a s
opposing
a c tion,
by
w hic h he mea ns
pr a c tic a l
a c tion,
a nd
endor sing
l if e. "T he essentia l
f u nc tion of ou r
intel l ec t,
a s the evol u tion of l if e ha s f a shioned
it, "
he
expl a ins,
"is to be a
l ig ht
f or ou r
c ondu c t,
to ma ke
r ea dy
f or ou r a c tion
on
thing s
..." Or
a g a in:
"Ou r intel l ec t ha s been c a st in the mol d of
a c tion.
S pec u l a tion
is a
l u xu r y,
w hil e a c tion is a
nec essity." Ag a inst
this
l imited f u nc tion he
pl a c es
the u nl imited
potentia l
of intu ition to c r ea te.
Intel l ec t mea ns
w or k,
bu t "the mor e w e
stu dy
the na tu r e of
time,
the
mor e w e sha l l
c ompr ehend
tha t du r a tion mea ns
invention,
the c r ea tion
of
f or ms,
the c ontinu a l el a bor a tion of the
a bsol u tel y
new ."23 In other
w or ds,
B er g son
deva l u es
intel l ig enc e by a ssoc ia ting
it w ith
a c tion,
a nd
pr a ises
intu ition
by a ssoc ia ting
it w ith l if e. B u t
a c c or ding
to
L ew is,
363
T WE NT IE T H CE NT URY L IT E RAT URE
B er g son's
c l a ims f or intu ition a r e f r a u du l ent: "ther e is no ser iou s
q u es-
tion a t a l l tha t on the sc or e of
l if e-va l u e,
a nd a s f a r a s the a dver tisement
of this
pa r tic u l a r
w a r m
a nd,
w ith
B er g son,
ec sta tic ,
a ppea l
is c onc er ned,
the boot shou l d be on the other
l eg " (p. 174).
T his a sser tion c omes in
the sa me
pa r a g r a ph
w her e L ew is c a l l s
B er g son
a
"per f ec t phil osophic
r u f f ia n" w ho
"pu l l s ever y
emotiona l l ever on w hic h he c a n
l a y
his
ha nds."
For
L ew is,
a s f or
B er g son,
"a c tion" is a ter m of
disa ppr ova l ,
bu t
L ew is
a r g u es
f u r ther tha t the
time-phil osopher 's
"l if e" mea ns
nothing
other tha n a c tion f or its ow n
sa ke,
despite
its
pr etense
of
c r ea tivity.
In a
c ha pter
entitl ed "T he
Popu l a r
Cou nter s,
'Ac tion' a nd
L if e, "
he c on-
tends
(w ith su ppor ting
evidenc e f r om B er tr a nd
Ru ssel l 24)
tha t
B er g son's phil osophy
w a s
pr ima r il y
a
pr a c tic a l
one,
su ited to the
"ma n-of -a c tion, "
not the
"ma n-of -pea c e":
An immense
snobber y c enter ing
a r ou nd the c ou nter "l if e" ha d
been bu il t
u p
to the
bu r sting point
w hen the Wa r
beg a n;
a nd a t
the end of f ou r
yea r s
of tha t f ew
peopl e
c ou l d ha ve been f ou nd
to exc l a im
a ny
mor e a bou t "l if e" f or the moment. For it w a s then
pl a in
to the mea nest
intel l ig enc e
f or a month or
tw o,
tha t w ha t
tha t sor t of "l if e"
sig nif ied
w a s dea th. Al l the
sic kl y
ec sta sies of
el a n vita l w er e
dr u g s
on the ma r ket. It w a s on the ec sta tic "l if e"
c r y
tha t
B er g son
w a s a l l ow ed
f or mer l y
to
pr ovide
the f ir st
(c on-
tinenta l )
w a ve of the
H ig h-B ohemia
w ith a n
a ppr opr ia te
phil osophy, show ing
it
pl a inl y
tha t it w a s the r oof a nd c r ow n of
thing s,
a nd tha t the
c ontemptibl e
"intel l ec t" w a s l ess tha n the
du st benea th its c ha r iot-w heel s.
(p. 216)
L ew is is
r ig ht,
I
think,
tha t
B er g son's
doc tr ine does
impl y
tha t
a c tivity
is
mor e a l ive-a nd henc e mor e desir a bl e-tha n
c ontempl a tion.
Mor eover ,
L ew is'
c or ol l a r y a r g u ment
tha t this doc tr ine
su g g ests
a n
enthu sia sm f or even viol ent
a c tivity
is not a s extr eme a s it
mig ht initia l l y
seem.
B er g son
does u se
meta phor s
of viol enc e w ith
distu r bing
f r e-
q u enc y
in
spea king
of the l if e-f or c e. For
exa mpl e,
this is how he
c ha r a c ter izes the
impl ic a tions
of his w or l d-view :
... a l l
or g a nized being s,
f r om the hu mbl est to the
hig hest,
f r om
the f ir st
or ig ins
of l if e to the time in w hic h w e
a r e,
a nd in a l l
pl a c es
a s in a l l
times,
do bu t evidenc e a
sing l e impu l sion,
the
inver se of the movement of
ma tter ,
a nd in itsel f indivisibl e. Al l
the
l iving
hol d
tog ether ,
a nd a l l
yiel d
to the sa me tr emendou s
pu sh.
T he a nima l ta kes its sta nd on the
pl a nt,
ma n bestr ides
a nima l ity,
a nd the w hol e of
hu ma nity,
in
spa c e
a nd in
time,
is
one immense
a r my g a l l oping
beside a nd bef or e a nd behind ea c h
of u s in a n
over w hel ming c ha r g e
a bl e to bea t dow n
ever y
r esist-
364
WYNDH AM L E WIS AND H E NRI B E RGS ON
a nc e a nd c l ea r the most f or mida bl e
obsta c l es,
per ha ps
even
dea th.25
In the c ontext of L ew is'
va l u es,
su c h a
desc r iption
da mns itsel f . An
"immense
a r my"
is not a
ha ppy meta phor
f or the l if e f or c e. S o
a l l ow ing
B er g son
his c l a im tha t intu ition mea ns
l if e,
bu t
insisting
tha t "w ha t tha t
sor t of 'l if e'
sig nif ied
w a s dea th, " L ew is
a g a in
inver ts
B er g son's position,
tr a nsf or ming
a ter m of
pr a ise
into a n insu l t.
T he one
impor ta nt
va l u e ter m w hic h both
B er g son
a nd L ew is w ish
to
a ppr opr ia te
f or their side of the
opposition
betw een intel l ec t a nd
intu ition is
c r ea tivity.
B oth see themsel ves a s
opposing
the
ster il ity
of
nineteenth-c entu r y mec ha nism;
bu t ea c h bel ieves tha t his view best
r evea l s the sou r c es of tr u e
c r ea tivity
a nd tha t the other su bver ts those
sou r c es.
B er g son
w il l
sa y,
f or
insta nc e,
tha t "the intention of l if e ... is
ju st
w ha t the a r tist tr ies to
r eg a in,
in
pl a c ing
himsel f ba c k w ithin the
objec t by
a kind of
sympa thy,
in
br ea king
dow n,
by
a n ef f or t of
intu ition,
the ba r r ier tha t
spa c e pu ts u p
betw een him a nd his model ."26
B u t onc e
a g a in,
he a l so
su ppl ies
the ter ms w ith w hic h L ew is c a n r ef u te
him.
B er g son
w r ites,
"su ppose
w e l et ou r sel ves
g o
a nd,
instea d of
a c ting ,
dr ea m. At onc e the sel f is
sc a tter ed;
ou r
pa st,
w hic h til l then w a s
g a ther ed tog ether
into the indivisibl e
impu l sion
it c ommu nic a ted to
u s,
is br oken
u p
into a thou sa nd r ec ol l ec tions ma de exter na l to one a nother .
T hey g ive u p inter penetr a ting
in the
deg r ee
tha t
they
bec ome f ixed.
Ou r
per sona l ity
thu s desc ends in the dir ec tion of
spa c e."27
L ew is
q u otes
this
pa ssa g e, 28
a nd
c ommenting onl y
tha t f or the
time-phil osopher ,
"T his
'dr ea ming '
is to be
ver y
mu c h
r epr ehended" (p. 436),
he a l l ow s
the r ea der to
r ec og nize
how
B er g son's a ppa r ent
sel f -c ontr a dic tions
u nder mine his
a r g u ment-a nd
so,
indir ec tl y, su ppor t
L ew is'.
Ag a inst
B er g son's
c l a im L ew is w ou l d insist tha t w e c r ea te
onl y
w hen w e dr ea m
r a ther tha n a c t. "T he
pr odu c tion
of a w or k of a r t
is,
I
bel ieve,
str ic tl y
the w or k of a
visiona r y" (p. 198),
he
expl a ins.
Fu r ther mor e,
su c h
c r ea tion c a n
onl y
ta ke
pl a c e
in the kind of
intel l ec tu a l ,
spa tia l
w or l d
B er g son
sees a s r estr ic tive:
And I
su ppose
tha t no one w ou l d
deny
tha t f or the
g r ea test
a c hievements of the
intel l ec t,
w hether in a r t or in
sc ienc e,
tr a nq u il ity
a nd a sta bl e or der of
thing s
is
r eq u ir ed
... if
you sa y
the
c ontr a r y, you
a r e
mer el y a sser ting ,
l ike a
g ood
l ittl e
eg a l ita r -
ia n,
tha t
peopl e
shou l d not be
phil osopher s, men-of -sc ienc e,
or
a r tists-tha t
they
shou l d
g ive u p
a l l those va in
thing s,
a nd
pl u ng e
into the c entr e of the f l u x of l if e-l ive a nd not
think....
(p. 164)29
Of c ou r se this a vow a l is a l ittl e
dising enu ou s,
if
onl y
bec a u se L ew is
365
T WE NT IE T H CE NT URY L IT E RAT URE
know s f u l l w el l tha t not
ever yone
w ou l d
a g r ee
tha t
a r t,
l ike
sc ienc e,
is
a n a c hievement of the
intel l ec t;
bu t a t the sa me
time,
B er g son
is
eq u a l l y
dising enu ou s
in his
a ppa r ent
c onvic tion tha t
intel l ig enc e a l w a ys
moves
in the
opposite
dir ec tion f r om a r t. H er e
a g a in,
w e see L ew is a nd
B er g son a g r ee
on
ever ything
bu t a va l u e ter m. For
ea c h,
this
time,
c r ea tivity
mu st be
r eg a r ded
a s
bel ong ing
to his
position
a l one.
E ver yw her e,
L ew is'
phil osophic a l position
is a sor t of mir r or
ima g e
of
B er g son's.
Cr ea tive E vol u tion
a r g u es
tha t intel l ec t inver ts the mor e
na tu r a l
intu ition;
T ime a nd Wester n Ma n
impl ies
tha t
B er g son
a nd his
f ol l ow er s inver t-a nd
per ver t-ever ything
tha t is va l u a bl e to ou r
hu ma n
exper ienc e, ever ything
tha t r esu l ts f r om ou r
senses,
ou r
thou g hts,
a nd ou r dr ea ms.
Noisil y,
L ew is r ever ses
B er g son's
va l u es.
S il entl y,
a t the sa me
time,
he
a ppr opr ia tes B er g son's c a teg or ies,
c on-
str u c ting
his c entr a l
dic hotomy
of time a nd
spa c e
to
a g r ee
in a l most
ever y r espec t
w ith tha t of his f or mer tea c her .
Now L ew is' c onc ea l ment of his c onsider a bl e debt to this
opponent
c a n in
pa r t
be
ju stif ied, pr ima r il y
bec a u se
c ontr a dic tor y
va l u es a r e in
themsel ves a c r u c ia l
dif f er enc e-c er ta inl y
one tha t L ew is sees a s mor e
sig nif ic a nt
tha n
a ny
str u c tu r a l
simil a r ity
c ou l d be.
And, too,
his
sec r ec y
ha s a
f a ir l y
obviou s
str a teg ic
f u nc tion. L ew is
mig ht
w el l ha ve r ea soned
tha t his r ea der s w ou l d ta ke his
a r g u ment
l ess
ser iou sl y
if he a c know l -
edg ed
this
inf l u enc e,
sinc e a n a u tonomou s
spa c e-phil osophy
c ou l d ea s-
il y
l ook mor e a u thor ita tive tha n one def ined so
l a r g el y by neg a ting
the
time-phil osophy
it a tta c ks. In T ime a nd Wester n Ma n he
a r g u es
r e-
pea tedl y
tha t one of the time-c u l t's c hief
f a il ing s
is its
u na nimity,
tha t
moder n
phil osopher s a g r ee
w ith ea c h other f a r mor e tha n
they ou g ht,
a nd tha t it is
B er g son
"mor e tha n
a ny
other
sing l e f ig u r e
tha t is
r esponsibl e
f or the ma in intel l ec tu a l c ha r a c ter istic s of the w or l d w e l ive
in,
a nd the
impl ic it
debt of a l most a l l
c ontempor a r y phil osophy
to him
is immense." L ew is w ou l d
c onseq u entl y
ha ve a c onsider a bl e vested
inter est in
disg u ising
his ow n
impl ic it
debts to this
"per f ec t phil osophic
r u f f ia n." Yet this a c tion is
c l ea r l y
a t odds w ith his
f r eq u ent
c l a ims tha t
a s a c r itic he is
u nu su a l l y
honest a bou t his
per sona l
bia ses-so mu c h a t
odds a s to
su g g est
tha t
per ha ps
in these c l a ims he
ma y pr otest
too
mu c h.
Ju xta posed a g a inst
this a dver tised
honesty,
L ew is' tr ea tment of
B er g son
l ooks l ike a c a se of
a g g r essivel y
sel f -c onf ident ba d f a ith. H e
ma y
su c c eed in
exposing
w ha t he c a l l s "the
pa r tic u l a r system
of in-
tel l ec tu a l f r a u d
pr a c tic ed by B er g son, "
bu t in
doing
so he
exposes
himsel f to the sa me kind of
u nma sking .
None of
u s,
of
c ou r se,
c a n be
entir el y
f r ee of ou r
pr ec u r sor s,
a nd
366
WYNDH AM L E WIS AND H E NRI B E RGS ON
no one w ou l d
expec t a ny
of u s to be
entir el y
honest a bou t ou r debts. As
c r itic s ha ve
inc r ea sing l y
r ea l ized
(l a r g el y f ol l ow ing
the
impetu s
of
H a r ol d B l oom's stu dies of
l iter a r y inf l u enc e), ever y
w r iter ha s
spec ia l
str a teg ies
f or
c onc ea l ing
a nd
r evea l ing
these c r u c ia l inf l u enc es-
str a teg ies
f r om w hic h w e in tu r n
ma y
l ea r n
impor ta nt thing s
a bou t the
w a ys
these w r iter s think. In L ew is'
c a se,
w e f ind tha t the
w a y
he dea l s
w ith
B er g son
is
by
no mea ns a n isol a ted
phenomenon.
Instea d,
simil a r
pa tter ns
of
str ong l y su g g estive
simil a r ities,
vig or ou sl y
denied or dis-
g u ised,
c a n be disc over ed
thr ou g hou t
his
books,
in w ha t he
sa ys
a bou t E zr a
Pou nd,
f or
exa mpl e,
or
Ja mes Joyc e,
or Osw a l d
S peng l er .
T o some
extent, indeed,
r el a tionships
l ike this one a r e bu il t into L ew is'
pr ojec t
a s
a c r itic : in
c r ea ting
his r ol e a s the
E nemy,
he
openl y
def ines himsel f a s
a n
opposite
to other w r iter s of his c u l tu r e. For r ea der s of
Wyndha m
L ew is,
w ha t to ma ke of this
str a teg y
is a
ma jor inter pr etive
a nd
ju dg menta l c ha l l eng e.
1
Wyndha m L ew is,
T ime a nd Wester n Ma n
(L ondon:
Cha tto a nd
Windu s,
1927), p.
166. Al l f u r ther r ef er enc es a r e to this edition a nd a r e
g iven
in the text
or c ited bel ow a s T WM.
2
T WM,
p.
220. S a mu el
Al exa nder , S pa c e,
T ime a nd
Deity (L ondon:
Ma c -
mil l a n, 1920,
r ev.
1927), I,
44.
E mpha sis or ig ina l .
3
L ew is does devote a
ver y
shor t
c ha pter
to
B er g son
in T he Ar t
of B eing
Ru l ed
(L ondon:
Cha tto a nd
Windu s, 1926), pp.
387-91; (New
Yor k:
H a r per ,
1926), pp.
399-403. T her e he mentions
B er g son's
Intr odu c tion to
Meta physic s
a nd E ssa i su r l es donnees immedia tes de l a c onsc ienc e
(tr a nsl a ted
a s T ime a nd Fr ee
Wil l ),
bu t not Cr ea tive E vol u tion.
4
B u t,
L ew is c onc edes-in a s
positive
a sta tement a s he ever ma kes a bou t
this
w r iter -"per ha ps
tha t is u nf a ir to
B er g son,
a f ter a l l : the tr u th a bou t him
ma y
be tha t he is in
r ea l ity simpl y
a
ver y
c ommon bu t a stu te
intel l ig enc e-
na tu r a l l y,
a nd w ithou t other
indu c ement,
on the side of su c h a
soc iety,
instinc -
tivel y endor sing
its idea l s"
(T WM, p. 214).
5 T he L etter s
of Wyndha m L ew is,
ed. W. K. Rose
(Nor f ol k,
Conn.: New Dir ec -
tions, 1963), pp.
488-89,
w r itten in 1949.
6
S ee,
f or
exa mpl e, Geof f r ey Wa g ner , Wyndha m
L ew is: A Por tr a it
of
the Ar tist
a s the
E nemy (New
H a ven: Ya l e Univ.
Pr ess, 1957), pp.
215-16,
222-25.
7
T homa s Ku sh's
Wyndha m
L ew is's Pic tor ia l
Integ er (Ann Ar bor ,
Mic h.: UMI
Resea r c h
Pr ess, 1981),
so f a r a s I
know ,
c onta ins the
onl y
extended disc u ssion
of
B er g son's phil osophic
inf l u enc e on L ew is.
Ku sh,
w hose ma in inter est is in
the c onnec tions betw een L ew is's f ic tion a nd his
pa inting s
a nd
dr a w ing s, a r g u es
tha t "L ew is l ea r ned f r om
B er g son's
Cr ea tive E vol u tion tha t the f or m of the
body
deter mines the c ondition of a n
or g a nism's psyc he.
H e u sed this
pr inc ipl e
a s a
r hetor ic a l str u c tu r e-L ew is's a r t is
pr eoc c u pied
w ith 'the
exter na l s, '
bu t it stil l
su g g ests
the
psyc hol og ic a l impu l ses
benea th the enc r u sted su r f a c e"
(p. 5).
Ku sh's
a r g u ment
is simil a r to mine w ith
r espec t
to the f a c t of
B er g son's
inf l u enc e,
bu t his c ontext a nd
per spec tive
a r e dif f er ent. S ee
pp.
5-6 a nd
24-33. A f ew other c r itic s ha ve
ver y br ief l y
noted L ew is's
r el a tionship
w ith
367
T WE NT IE T H CE NT URY L IT E RAT URE
B er g son:
see
Wa g ner , Wyndha m L ew is,
p.
186;
E . W. F.
T oml in,
"T he Phil o-
sophic a l
Inf l u enc es, "
in
Wyndha m
L ew is: A
Reva l u a tion,
ed.
Jef f r ey Meyer s
(Montr ea l : Mc Gil l -Qu een's
Univ.
Pr ess, 1980), pp.
29-30, 34-35;
a nd
Meyer s,
T he
E nemy (L ondon: Rou tl edg e
&
Keg a n
Pa u l , 1980), p.
137.
8
S ee H enr i
B er g son,
T ime a nd Fr ee Wil l : An
E ssa y
on the Immedia te Da ta
of
Consc iou sness,
tr a ns. F. L .
Pog son (L ondon: Geor g e
Al l en & Unw in
L td., 1910),
pp. 132,
14. L ew is mu st ha ve ma de his ow n
tr a nsl a tions;
he does not u se the
E ng l ish
titl e,
a nd his
w or ding
dif f er s
sl ig htl y
f r om this, the
onl y pu bl ished
tr a nsl a tion a va il a bl e to him.
9
B er g son disting u ishes
tw o kinds of
sel f ,
expl a ining
tha t "ou r
per c eptions,
sensa tions,
emotions a nd idea s oc c u r u nder tw o
a spec ts:
the one c l ea r a nd
pr ec ise,
bu t
imper sona l ;
the other
c onf u sed,
ever
c ha ng ing ,
a nd
inexpr essibl e
bec a u se
l a ng u a g e
c a nnot
g et
hol d of it w ithou t
a r r esting
its
mobil ity
or f it it
into its
c ommon-pl a c e
f or ms w ithou t
ma king
it into
pu bl ic pr oper ty."
S ee T ime
a nd Fr ee
Wil l ,
p.
129.
10
B er g son,
Cr ea tive
E vol u tion,
tr a ns. Ar thu r Mitc hel l
(New
Yor k:
H ol t,
1911), pp.
343-44. Fu r ther r ef er enc es a r e c ited bel ow a s CE .
11
E a r l ier in
T WM,
L ew is ha s
su g g ested
the sa me
meta phor
a nd
pu n:
"T ime f or the
ber g sonia n
or r el a tivist ... is the
g l or if ic a tion
of the l if e-of -the-
moment,
w ith no r ef er enc e
beyond
itsel f a nd no a bsol u te or u niver sa l
va l u e;
onl y
so mu c h va l u e a s is
c onveyed
in the f a mou s
pr over b,
T ime is
money.
It is the
a r g ent c ompta nt
of l iter a l
l if e,
in a n
inf l exibl y
f l u id T ime"
(p. 27).
12
CE ,
pp.
306, 163, 306, 314, 315, 332,
308.
13
Al exa nder , S pa c e, T ime,
a nd
Deity, I,
209-10.
14
In T ime a nd Fr ee
Wil l ,
immedia tel y f ol l ow ing
the
pa ssa g e
L ew is
q u otes
a bou t a r t
pu tting
the
per sona l ity
to
sl eep, B er g son
w r ites,
"T he
pl a stic
a r ts
obta in a n ef f ec t of the sa me kind
by
the
f ixity
w hic h
they su ddenl y impose
u pon
l if e,
a nd w hic h a
physic a l c onta g ion
c a r r ies over to the a ttention of the
spec ta tor .
Whil e the w or ks of a nc ient
sc u l ptu r e
expr ess
f a int emotions w hic h
pl a y u pon
them l ike a
pa ssing
br ea th,
the
pa l e immobil ity
of the stone c a u ses
the
f eel ing expr essed
or the movement
ju st beg u n
to
a ppea r
a s if
they
w er e
f ixed f or
ever ,
a bsor bing
ou r
thou g ht
a nd ou r w il l in their ow n
eter nity" (p.
15).
H er e
a g a in B er g son
a nd L ew is
a ppea r
to
a g r ee
on a ma tter of a esthetic s.
15
Al so see
Wa g ner , Wyndha m L ew is, p.
133,
on the c onnec tions
a mong
B er g son,
L ew is,
the
c inema ,
a nd f u tu r ism. L ew is'
hostil ity
to the Fu tu r ists'
inter est in movement w a s not new . In
B l a sting
a nd
B omba r dier ing (L ondon: E yr e
a nd
S pottisw oode, 1937),
he tel l s of
ha ving a r g u ed
w ith Ma r inetti in 1914
by
q u oting
B a u del a ir e:
'Je
ha is l e mou vement
q u i
depl a c e
l es
l ig nes!"
16
T he br a c keted
phr a se
c omes f r om the
pr ec eding pa r a g r a ph
in L ew is'
disc u ssion.
17
CE , pp. 326, 267, 223,
223.
B er g son u su a l l y, thou g h
not
a l w a ys,
u ses
"mind" f or the c ombined intel l ec t a nd intu ition.
Mind,
f or
him,
"over f l ow s" the
intel l ec t,
a s L ew is notes
(T WM, p. 436).
18
CE ,
pp.
46, 175,
189
(ita l ic ized
in
or ig ina l ).
19Ibid.,
pp.
306,
162.
20Ibid.,
pp.
160-61
(empha sis or ig ina l ).
21
S ee,
f or
insta nc e,
Pa l ef a c e:
T he
Phil osophy of
the
"Mel ting -Pot" (L ondon:
Cha tto &
Windu s,
1929),
w her e L ew is a tta c ks D. H . L a w r enc e's
pr imitivism by
a ssoc ia ting
it w ith
B er g son's
bel ief tha t intu ition is
su per ior
to intel l ec t
(c f . pp.
368
WYNDH AM L E WIS AND H E NRI B E RGS ON
159-60, 176-77, 241).
H er e L ew is does mention CE
by
na me,
a l thou g h onl y
in
pa ssing :
"For if B eha vior c omes ou t of
E vol u tion,
do not a l so Cr ea tive E vol u -
tion a nd
B er g son
c ome ou t of E vol u tion?"
(p. 158).
22
CE ,
p.
314.
23Ibid., pp. 29, 44,
11.
24
L ew is c ites Ru ssel l a s a n a u thor ita tive c r itic of
B er g son
sever a l times.
Ru ssel l 's ea r l ier a tta c k on
B er g son
is
ver y
simil a r to L ew is' in its disl ike of
B er g son's
a nti-intel l ec tu a l ism a nd its insistenc e tha t his theor ies w er e
ma inl y
a imed a t
pr a c tic a l
a c tion: a s Ru ssel l
sa ys,
"T her e is no r oom in this
phil osophy
f or the moment of
c ontempl a tive insig ht
w hen,
r ising
a bove the a nima l
l if e,
w e
bec ome c onsc iou s of the
g r ea ter
ends tha t r edeem ma n f r om the l if e of the
br u tes." Unl ike
L ew is,
thou g h,
Ru ssel l a l so a tta c ks
B er g son's
distinc tions be-
tw een
spa c e
a nd
time,
su bjec t
a nd
objec t,
intel l ec t a nd
instinc t,
a nd mind a nd
ma tter . S ee A
H istor y of
Wester n
Phil osophy (New
Yor k: S imon a nd
S c hu ster ,
1945), pp.
791-810;
Ru ssel l notes her e tha t this
c ha pter
w a s f ir st
pu bl ished
in
T he Monist in 1912.
25
CE , pp.
270-71.
26
Ibid.,
p.
177. T . E . H u l me
r epea ts
this
pa ssa g e
a l most ver ba tim
(w ithou t
q u ota tion ma r ks)
in his
essa y "B er g son's T heor y
of
Ar t, "
inc l u ded in
S pec u l a tions: E ssa ys
on H u ma nism a nd the
Phil osophy of
Ar t
(L ondon: Keg a n Pa u l ,
T r enc h,
T r u bner &
Co., 1924, 1936), p.
144. L ew is w ou l d
pr oba bl y
ha ve seen
this
essa y.
H u l me a l so
pu bl ished
sever a l
piec es
on
B er g son
in the New
Ag e
in
1911-12 a nd a tr a nsl a tion of An Intr odu c tion to
Meta physic s
in
1912,
not
l ong
bef or e H u l me's a nd L ew is'
yea r s
of c l ose a ssoc ia tion. T he c ontr a dic tion be-
tw een H u l me's enthu sia sm f or
B er g son's
r oma ntic theor ies a nd his other w ise
vehement disl ike of r oma ntic ism a nd
pr omotion
of c l a ssic ism is a n odd
per -
mu ta tion of -a nd
per ha ps
inf l u enc e on-L ew is's
pa r a doxic a l
a ttitu des. S ee
Al u n R.
Jones,
T he
L if e
a nd
Opinions of
T . E . H u l me
(B oston:
B ea c on
Pr ess,
1960), pp.
57-67;
Mu r r a y Kr ieg er ,
"T he
Ambig u ou s
Anti-Roma ntic ism of T .
E .
H u l me, " E L H ,
XX
(Dec . 1953), 300-14;
a nd
Wa g ner , Wyndha m L ew is,
pp.
194-96.
27CE , p.
201.
28
When he
q u otes
this
pa ssa g e,
L ew is omits the
phr a se
a bou t the sc a tter ed
sel f ,
sinc e he w ou l d
a r g u e
tha t the tr u e sel f c oher es even in the dr ea m-sta te.
29
In T ime a nd Fr ee Wil l
B er g son
c omes
c u r iou sl y
c l ose to
sa ying
the sa me
thing
a s L ew is does in this
pa ssa g e, ma king
the sa me tr a nsition f r om
psyc ho-
l og ic a l
a nd
phil osophic a l sta bil ity
to soc ia l
sta bil ity:
"And,
in
tr u th,
f or the sa ke
of
l a ng u a g e,
the sel f ha s
ever ything
to
g a in by
not
br ing ing
ba c k c onf u sion
w her e or der
r eig ns,
a nd in not
u psetting
this
ing eniou s a r r a ng ement
of a l most
imper sona l
sta tes
by
w hic h it ha s c ea sed to f or m 'a
king dom
w ithin a
king dom.'
An inner l if e w ith w el l
disting u ished
moments a nd w ith
c l ea r l y
c ha r a c ter ized
sta tes w il l a nsw er better the
r eq u ir ements
of soc ia l l if e"
(p. 139).
369