4182786

Recollection and Philosophical Reflection in Plato's "Phaedo"
Author(s): Lee Franklin

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 50, No. 4 (2005), pp. 289-314
Published by: BRILL
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Recollection and Philosophical
Reflection in Plato's Phaedol
LEE FRANKLIN
ABSTRACT
Interpretations of recollection in the Phaedo are divided between ordinary inter-
pretations, on which recollection explains a kind of learning accomplished by all,
and sophisticated interpretations, which restrict recollection to philosophers. A
sophisticated interpretation is supported by the prominence of philosophical
understanding and reflection in the argument. Recollection is supposed to explain
the advanced understanding displayed by Socrates and Simmias (74b2-4).
Furthermore, it seems to be a necessary condition on recollection that one who
recollects also perform a comparison of sensible particulars to Forms (74a5-7). I
provide a new ordinary interpretation which explains these features of the argu-
ment. First, we must clearly distinguish the philosophical reflection which con-
stitutes the argument for the Theory of Recollection from the ordinary learning
which is its subject. The comparison of sensibles to Forms is the reasoning by
which we see, as philosophers, that we must recollect. At the same time, we must
also appreciate the continuity of ordinary and philosophical learning. Plato wants
to explain the capacity for ordinary discourse, but with an eye to its role as the
origin of philosophical reflection and learning. In the Phaedo, recollection has
ordinary learning as its immediate explanandum, and philosophical learning as
its ultimate explanandum.
The Theory of Recollection is a theory of learning. In order to understand
the theory, or an argument for it, we must say what kind of learning is at
stake. Unfortunately, there is little consensus on this question concerning
recollection in the Phaedo. Socrates claims that we recollect when we
come to have a Form in mind in response to sense perception. Since it is
not obvious what it means to have a Form in mind, it is unclear what kind
of learning recollection is, or who accomplishes it. The context of the
argument favors a reading on which all human beings recollect. Socrates
Acc epted February 2005
'
Versions of this paper have been read at the Pacific meeting of the American
Philosophical Association, at Ohio State University, Brown University, and Stanford
University. I am grateful to the audience in all cases for questions and comments
which improved the paper. I am especially grateful to Allan Silverman, Alan Code,
Chris Bobonich, David Sedley, and the editors of this journal for many helpful
suggestions.
? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2005 Phronesis L14
Also available online - www.brill.nl
290 LEE FRANKLIN
wants to show that all human souls pre-exist their location in a body.
Prima facie, if recollection is restricted to a select class of learners, the
argument will show the soul's pre-existence only for those who recollect.)
For this and other reasons, most scholars believe that recollection in the
Phaedo concerns an ordinary kind of learning, typically related to the
capacity for everyday speech and thought. I'll call this approach to rec-
ollection in the Phaedo the ordinary interpretation.3
There are significant obstacles to the ordinary interpretation. In partic-
ular, the prominence of philosophical sophistication in the discussion sug-
gests that recollection cannot be an act of learning achieved by all, but
must instead be restricted to philosophers. Socrates conducts the discus-
sion with Simmias and Cebes, young philosophers who have studied with
the Pythagorean Philolaus (61d6-7), and who appear to be familiar with
the Theory of Forms (65d6-8, 74bl- 3).4 When Socrates asks whether 'we'
have come to have a Form in mind, his immediate audience is anything
but ordinary. Moreover, within the argument for recollection, Socrates
says that he is interested in the origin of the knowledge - episteme - that
he and Simmias have of Equality (74b2-6). In light of Simmias' intellec-
tual achievement, it is most reasonable to suppose that Socrates wants to
explain the source of advanced grasp of Equality. Finally, in the process
of introducing recollection, Socrates seems to say that the act of compar-
ing sensible particulars to Forms is a necessary condition on recollection
(74a5-7 ff.). This comparison seems to require familiarity with Forms, as
such. Since only philosophers are familiar with Forms in this way, it
seems that only philosophers can compare sensibles to Forms. Consequently,
only philosophers recollect. These considerations support what I will call
2
But see D. Scott, Recollection and Experience, [R&E] (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 69-71.
'
Adherents of the ordinary interpretation include J.L. Ackrill, 'Anamnesis in the
Phaedo: Remarks on 73c-75c' ['Anamnesis'] in E.N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos, and
R. Rorty (edd.), Exegesis and Argument (Assen, 1974) 177-195, D. Bostock, Plato's
Phaedo, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), J. Gosling, 'Similarity in Phaedo
73b. seq.,'
['Similarity']
Phronesis X (1965), 151-161, R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), S. Kelsey, 'Recollection in the Phaedo,'
in J. Cleary (ed.), Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy,
16 (2000), 91-120. There are, of course, important differences between these accounts.
I
All citations from the Phaedo are from C.J. Rowe, Plato: Phaedo, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993). Other dialogues are cited from J. Burnet, Platonis
Opera, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1907). Unless otherwise noted, translations
RECOLLECTION IN PLATO'S PHAEDO 291
the sophisticated interpretation of recollection in the Phaedo, the view that
recollection in the Phaedo is a kind of philosophical learning.'
In this paper I present a new ordinary interpretation. I will argue that
in the Phaedo recollection describes the learning that enables ordinary
human speech and thought.6 Nevertheless, my reading agrees with a
sophisticated interpretation on several key details, including those that
seem to recommend the sophisticated interpretation most. For instance, I
agree that the comparison of sensibles to Forms involves sophisticated philo-
sophical reflection. I will show, however, that this comparison is neces-
sary not for those who are recollecting, but for philosophers who seek to
comprehend the Theory of Recollection. In order to understand recollec-
tion in the Phaedo, we must distinguish the philosophical reasoning that
is the argument for the Theory from the ordinary learning which is its sub-
ject. At the same time, we must also see the continuity of ordinary and
philosophical learning. Plato is interested in the learning by which we
become able to speak and think ordinarily. But he is interested in this
learning because it provides the resources from which philosophical reflection
and learning develop. Thus, it is true that recollection in the Phaedo
explains sophisticated philosophical understanding, in the following way: the
argument for recollection has ordinary learning as its immediate explanan-
dum, and philosophical understanding as its ultimate explanandum.
Altogether, the Theory of Recollection is a synoptic theory of learning,
ranging from the inception of speech and thought to the acquisition of
knowledge. The argument for recollection in the Phaedo is about the
beginning of this unified process.
are from J. Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works, [Complete Works] (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing, 1997).
1
The sophisticated interpretation is most thoroughly argued for by Scott, R&E. It
is also endorsed by C. Bobonich, Plato's Utopia Recast, [Plato's Utopia] (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001). J.T. Bedu-Addo, 'Sense Experience and the Argument
for Recollection in Plato's Phaedo,' ['Sense Experience'] Phronesis, XLVI, (1991)
27-60, is sympathetic with Scott on some points about recollection in the Phaedo, but
not recollection overall. His is what we might call a hybrid account of recollection,
identifying distinct kinds or aspects of recollection in the Phaedo. The same is true of
T. Williams, 'Two Aspects of Platonic Recollection,' ['Two Aspects'] Apeiron, 35
(2002), 131-152.
6 1 do not hold the same view about the Meno. There recollection concerns the
learning we undergo in dialectic. Thus, on my view, there are two distinct stages of
recollection. In this paper, I will use 'recollection' to refer to the stage of learning
examined in the Phaedo. Where I intend the term to apply to the full scope of Plato's
theory of learning, I will make that explicit.
292 LEE FRANKLIN
I. The Introduction of Recollection: 73cl-74a3
In this section, I examine Socrates' introduction of recollection in order
to say what kind of learning it is. Socrates introduces recollection by
appealing to the ordinary experience of remembering. From this broad and
familiar experience, he presents a number of conditions and examples
which serve to characterize a more specific mental activity
(avaijivqai;
tt;,
73el). As we shall see, this strategy has its limitations; by themselves,
Socrates' conditions and examples do not clearly favor either an ordinary
or a sophisticated interpretation. To identify the learning that is recollec-
tion, we must read Socrates' introduction in the light of the broader con-
text of the Phaedo.
Socrates' first condition is this: 'If someone recollects something, it is
necessary for him to have known it before' (73c1-2). This condition comes
easily out of the way we ordinarily think about remembering. We do not
say that someone has remembered something unless what she called to
mind is something she has experienced or thought of before. Another con-
dition is stated in Socrates' general formulation of recollection: knowledge
of the item recollected must be different from that of the item that inspires
recollection (73c7-8). This seems to require that grasp of the item that
inspires recollection does not include grasp of the item we recollect. If we
must think of one item, A, in order to grasp something else, B, then our
coming to think of A from B does not constitute recollection. If we were
thinking about B, we already had A in mind too.7 Read in this way, the
second condition on recollection is also derived from ordinary notions of
what it is to be reminded of one thing by another. Socrates then presents
a few familiar examples of remembering: thinking of a boy from seeing
his cloak or lyre, thinking of Simmias from seeing his brother Cebes,
thinking of Simmias from his picture (73d5-10). Along the way, he adds
that recollection takes place most clearly when we call to mind objects
long forgotten (73el-3), and that recollection can take place from items
both similar and dissimilar to the item recollected (74a2-3).
It is hard to tell from these introductory remarks what Socrates has in
mind. There is little to show decisively that he is thinking of either an ordi-
nary act or a philosophical one. This
ambiguity
is compounded by the ter-
minology; in the span of 20 lines or so (73c I -dl 1I) Socrates employs a variety
I
See Ackrill, 'Anamnesis' 184-5, A. Nehamas, 'Plato on the Imperfection of the
Sensible World,' ['Imperfection'J
in Virtues of Authenticity,
(Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999) 148, Bostock, Plato: Phaedo, 63-64.
of words for mental states and their objects: xTaGOTcyt;
- perception (73c7);
YI'vOCiKrtV
-
to know, be aware of, or perceive (73c7, d7); ?intatwxOaL -
to know, and ?inta1oR -
knowledge (73c2, 4, 8, d3); CvvoCtv - to have
in mind, and 'evvota - conception (73c8, c9); 8tavoia -
thought (73d7);
and finally
80o;
- image or, in Plato's technical use, Form (73d8). The
diversity of terms serves to multiply rather than restrict the possibilities
for what recollection might be. The precise significance of these condi-
tions and terms will come to light only once we have established firmer
grasp on what recollection is.8
At this point, one might object that I have left out the most decisive of
Socrates' introductory remarks: the claim that a person recollecting an
item from things similar to it must also consider whether the latter are
deficient in their similarity to the former (74a5-7). Since this condition is
to be applied to the recollection of Forms from sensible particulars, it appears
to require a comparison of particulars to Forms. Moreover, since such a
comparison requires familiarity with Forms as such, this remark seems to
show by itself that recollection is an act of philosophical learning. I will
address this passage at length in the next section, and argue that it does
not belong to the introduction of recollection, and does not present a nec-
essary condition on recollection of Forms. Instead, Socrates' remark
effects a transition from the introduction of recollection to the core of the
argument. For now, I leave it aside.
Socrates' appeal to the familiar experience of remembering does not
suffice to identify the more specific act he has in mind. For this, we must
read the introduction of recollection against the broader background of the
dialogue. The least ambiguous feature of Socrates' introduction is the fol-
lowing pattern. Socrates consistently uses perceptual terms to describe the
way we grasp the items that inspire recollection. Socrates describes the
inspiration of recollection as a moment in which 'someone seeing, or hear-
ing, or having some other perception is not only aware of that thing. . .'
(73c6-7). Likewise, in each of Socrates' examples, the object that inspires
recollection is grasped perceptually, usually by sight (73d5, e5, 7, 9, 74b5,
d13-el). Not all remembering is inspired by perception, but Socrates' lan-
guage indicates that recollection has such a source.9 In contrast, Socrates
8
For more discussion of Socrates' introduction, see Ackrill, 'Anamnesis,' 181-191,
Gosling, 'Similarity,' 151-157, Hackforth, Plato: Phaedo, 65-68, D. Gallop, Plato:
Phaedo, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) 115-118, Bostock, Plato's Phaedo,
63-66, Scott R&E, 55 ff.
I
Twice, Socrates uses the verb ytyvdmeCtV to describe the grasp we have of items
inspiring recollection (73c7, d7). We could translate this as 'recognizing' to suggest
294 LEE FRANKLIN
uses cognitive terms to describe the way we grasp the item recollected. It
is here that Socrates uses Evvo_iv, to have in mind, think of, or consider
(73c8, 9). Finally, in his examples Socrates says that the recollecting lover
'takes up in thought (Cv Tfn
8tavota) the image (E'Y5o;) of the boy...'
(73d7-8). Whatever recollection is, it begins in perception and ends in
thought. This basic structure is confirmed by Socrates' later remark that
'as long as the sight of one thing makes you think of another, whether it
be similar or dissimilar, this must of necessity be recollection' (74c13-d2).
Socrates has not yet revealed that he is interested specifically in the rec-
ollection of Forms from sensible particulars. For this reason, the pattern I
have just pointed out seems unimportant; the items involved in our famil-
iar experience of remembering are objects of both perception and thought,
ordinarily construed. The pattern takes on greater philosophical significance,
however, in light of Socrates' remarks about the difference between sen-
sibles and Forms elsewhere in the Phaedo. In the next argument (78b4-
80c 1), Socrates describes two classes of beings (6i5o r'& T6iV Ov Totv, 79a6-7).
One contains perceptible, changing, and unintelligible particulars accessi-
ble to us only through the body (78dl0-e4, 79c4-5, 80b3-6). The other
contains Forms, which are unchanging, imperceptible, intelligible realities,
grasped only by our souls (79al-4, cl-8, 80bl-3). Most striking about this
distinction is that it is mutually exclusive; what is intelligible is imper-
ceptible, and what is perceptible is unintelligible -
avo;TTo;
(80b4). Prima
facie, Socrates' distinction suggests that recollection is a moment in
which, from the mere perception of sensible particulars - perception is the
only apprehension we can have of sensibles - we come to think about
Forms, since Forms are the only items we can think about. But this is too
severe, I think. Given that we do ordinarily think about sensible particu-
lars, and that Socrates appeals to this ordinary experience, we cannot take
Socrates' distinction between the perceptible and intelligible at face value.
It cannot be his view that the only way we can apprehend particulars is
through unthinking perception, and that the only things we can think about
it in any sense are Forms.
that our grasp of the items that inspire recollection is not merely perceptual. Taken
this way, Socrates seems to require that the recollector have some grasp of the item
inspiring recollection as an item of a particular kind. For instance, we recognize the
lyre as a lyre before thinking of the boy to whom it belongs, see Ackrill 'Anamnesis,'
182-183, Scott, R&E, 57, esp. n. 2. But we do not need to take
ytyvcIvIv
to have
this cognitive force.
rtyv6aietv
can mean perceive or be aware of, and Socrates' use
of it here should be taken along these lines, especially in light of his statement at
74c 1 3-d2.
Instead, the distinction between perception and thought aims to tease
apart distinct aspects of ordinary human experience. Near the end of the
argument for recollection, Socrates says that recollection explains our abil-
ity to refer sensibles to Forms (75b6-7, 76d 9-e2). These remarks show
that Socrates is not concerned with our ability to think about Forms apart
from sensible particulars, but to invoke Forms in thinking about particu-
lars. This may happen ordinarily when, perceiving a particular, we become
aware of the kind of thing it is, and predicate a property of it in either
speech or thought. In strictly distinguishing perception from thought, Plato
demarcates perception as an aspect or level of our ordinary experience which
is pre-cognitive. Perception may trigger a transition to thought. But when
it does, we come to have in mind an entity distinct from the sensible par-
ticular: the
property we predicate of it. For we could not predicate a prop-
erty of a sensible item if we did not, in some sense, have the property in
mind.'0 According to Plato, Forms are the properties we have in mind in
ordinary predicative speech and thought. Thus, I do not take Socrates to
mean that particulars are unintelligible tout court, but only that they can-
not be thought about by themselves. Sensible particulars can be thought
of only by reference to Forms. This analysis permits a more precise read-
ing of the second condition on recollection, which says that knowledge of
the item inspiring recollection must be distinct from that of the item rec-
ollected (73c7-8). We took this condition to mean that our grasp of the
first item cannot include grasp of the second. In the case of recollecting
Forms from sensible particulars, this condition highlights a way of grasp-
ing particulars which does not involve Forms at all and which, for that
reason, is not yet thinking.
In the argument for recollection in the Phaedo, having a Form in mind
describes the way properties are present to our thinking when we predi-
cate them in ordinary speech and thought. That Forms play this role in
ordinary speech and thought is confirmed first by the terms of Socratic
inquiry. When Socrates asks the 'What is F?' question, he implies that the
item picked out by the answer will be the same as that predicated by the
term 'F' in the interlocutor's ordinary usage. Consider, for instance, what
Socrates says to Meno by way of instructions for defining Shape: 'what
is this which applies as much to the round as to the straight and which
you call Shape?' (Meno, 74d7-8). The item attributed in Meno's ordinary
use of the term 'shape' is the very item that will be picked out by his
1n See Kelsey, 'Recollection in the Phaedo,' 96-97.
296 LEE FRANKLIN
successful answer to Socrates' question. In the Phaedo, Socrates makes
clear
-
within the
argument
for recollection
-
that Forms are the items
picked out by answers to the 'What is F?' question (75c7-d5). It follows
that Forms are the properties we predicate in ordinary speech and thought,
and which we investigate in dialectic.
Further confirmation is found in the Phaedo where Socrates says that
sensible particulars are named after the Forms; they have the homonyms
or eponyms of the Forms (78e2, 102b2). There is no hint that these
remarks apply to a restricted class of speakers; it isn't only philosophers
who call sensibles by the names of the Forms." Rather, properly under-
stood, the descriptive terms we use ordinarily are the names of Forms, and
they derive their content when applied to anything else from this naming
relation.'2 One of Socrates' introductory examples is especially relevant
here, that of remembering Simmias from seeing his picture (73e9-10).'3
On its face, this example calls to mind an instance in which we first iden-
tify Simmias in the picture, and then begin to think about Simmias him-
self, apart from the picture. Another way to read the example, however,
is as an account of how we identify Simmias in the picture in the first
place. We have a sense impression of the picture, it triggers the memory
of Simmias, and as a result we're able to say of the picture, 'That's Simmias.'
We apply Simmias' name to the picture derivatively, in virtue of its resem-
blance to Simmias himself. We could not do this if we were not alread
acquainted with Simmias and if we did not, in some sense, have him in mind.
In like fashion, Plato thinks that the ordinary predication of properties to
sensible particulars invokes the Forms, with similar requirements.'4
We must be careful not to conflate two possible points of emphasis in
this example. One concern we might have is with the ability to identify a
I
Since a sophisticated interpretation restricts Forms to the minds of philosophers,
it must claim that ordinary predications make no reference to Forms. This raises ques-
tions about the possibility of communication between philosophers and ordinary speak-
ers. For responses to this problem, see Scott, R&E, 65 and Bobonich, Plato's Utopia,
309 if.
12 This raises the vexing question of whether all meaningful terms in our language
correspond to Forms. See n. 34.
13This is generally recognized to be the most important of Socrates' examples,
since it is most clearly an example of recollection from similars. See Gosling, 'Similarity,'
154 ff., Ackrill, 'Anamnesis,' 189-90, Kelsey, 'Recollection in the Phaedo,' 110 ff.,
Bostock, Plato's Phaedo, 65.
14
See Kelsey, 'Recollection in the Phaedo,' 96-7, 110-113.
picture as a picture. This ability requires that we be aware of a general
distinction between pictures and their objects, such that we can identify
an item as one or the other. The analogous comprehension with respect
to Forms and particulars is understanding of the metaphysical relation
between them such that one could, on beholding a particular, recognize
that it is merely an image of, or participant in, a Form. Another concern
we might have is with the ability to identify pictures of a certain indi-
vidual as that individual, perhaps without the ability to say that it is
merely an image of him. The analogous ability with respect to Forms and
particulars is the capacity to identify the Forms in particulars, i.e. to clas-
sify particulars by reference to the Forms they instantiate. Plato's view is
that ordinary speech and thought requires the second of these abilities, but
not the first. We are acquainted with the Forms and refer to them in ordi-
nary discourse, without necessarily knowing that we do so.
It has been argued that ordinary predications require implicit awareness
of the distinction between sensibles and Forms.'5 That Plato has this in
mind is purportedly shown by the example of Simmias' picture. In that
case, if we were not aware that what we identified was only a picture of
Simmias, we would have 'mistaken it for Simmias himself."6 Analogously,
if we are not at least implicitly aware of the difference between Forms
and sensible particulars, we will be confusing the latter with the former
in our ordinary predications. But Plato thinks that ordinary speakers make
precisely this mistake. Consider what Socrates says about the lover of
sights and sounds in Republic V. The lover of sights and sounds believes
in and pursues beautiful things, but is unaware of, or does not admit, the
existence of Beauty itself. Socrates asks, 'Don't you think he is living in
a dream rather than a wakened state? Isn't this dreaming: whether asleep
or awake, to think that a likeness is not a likeness but rather the thing
itself that it is like?' (Republic, 476c5-7). Because he takes sensible par-
ticulars to be the most genuinely beautiful entities, the lover of sights and
sounds confuses them with the Form of Beauty. In the Allegory of the
Cave the same mistake is attributed to all non-philosophers who, because
their sight is restricted, believe that they behold what is most real and do
not know that they are looking at mere shadows (Republic, 515a5-d7).
'5 This claim is central to an ordinary interpretation which accepts that comparing
sensibles to Forms is a necessary condition on recollection. See Kelsey, 'Recollection
in the Phaedo,' 117-118, and Williams, 'Two Aspects,' 145.
16
Kelsey, 'Recollection in the Phaedo,' 117-118. Cf. Gosling, 'Similarity,' 159-160.
298 LEE FRANKLIN
Most people have no idea that the items of the sensible world are images
of Forms. This is an awareness granted only by philosophical reflection.
Nevertheless, what all people can do is classify sensible particulars by ref-
erence, in most cases unknowing reference, to the Forms. According to
Plato, our
ability to do this requires that we are acquainted with the Form
itself, and that we have it in mind whenever we predicate it.
In this way, Forms play a role akin to that of concepts.'7 Just as chil-
dren and non-philosophers can possess a concept without giving any
thought to concepts as such, so Plato thinks we can have a Form in mind
without knowing it. Plato's aim in the argument for recollection is to
explain our capacity to have Forms in mind in this way. Importantly,
although we have a Form in mind whenever we predicate it, this does not
mean that we recollect the Form anew every time we predicate it. In the
argument for recollection, Plato is interested in the way we first come to
have Forms in mind in this life (75a5-8, 75b4). Thus, Plato is interested
in what we might call concept acquisition.'8
II. A Necessary Consideration: 74a5-7
Near the end of his introductory remarks, Socrates makes a distinction
between recollection from items similar to the item recollected, and items
dissimilar to it (74a2-3). This distinction leads to the following remark:
'But whenever someone recollects something from the similar items, isn't
it necessary (ouKc ivayKaiov) for him to experience this in addition
(npoair6oXriv):
to consider whether it falls short in any way of that which
he recollects, with respect to their likeness?' (74a5-7, my translation). I
will call the consideration described in this remark the Necessary Con-
sideration, or NC. Two questions are most pressing about NC. First,
exactly what kind of comparison is it? As the reader is about to learn, the
kind of recollection Socrates has in mind is the recollection of Forms from
sensible particulars (74c7-9). Moreover, since this may be conceived of
as recalling the Form from items similar to it (74d4-e4), Socrates' remark
seems to require a comparison of sensible particulars to Forms. Is this a
philosophical comparison, or one performed more ordinarily? Second, is
it genuinely a necessary condition on the act of recollection?
17
Akin to, but not identical, since Forms are not merely mental entities, and have
metaphysical roles beyond those typically assigned to concepts.
IS
This description of recollection will be qualified somewhat below, p. 309.
Before proceeding, let me briefly address the impression that, at least
with respect to the second question, the answer is obvious: Socrates' com-
ment clearly presents a necessary condition on remembering one thing
from items similar to it. Indeed, Socrates' wording - Otav YE
- emphasizes
that one must make the comparison at the moment, or immediately after,
one recollects. The worry is that it is hard to see why such a comparison
would necessarily accompany our remembering in ordinary circum-
stances."9 If I call a Michelangelo sculpture to mind from seeing a Rodin
similar to it, it is not necessary for me to reflect on the superiority of the
former. Nor does the condition make more sense when applied to philo-
sophical realizations. If a philosopher, upon witnessing a virtuous act,
calls Virtue Itself to mind, why must she also note the deficiency of the
act? Why can't she simply contemplate the Form? Indeed, there is a prob-
lem with taking NC to be a necessary condition on recollection and a
philosophical consideration at the same time. Since recollection is inspired
by perception, it would turn out to be a kind of philosophical learning in
which the senses play an integral role. This conflicts with Socrates' stead-
fast assertion that perception has no role in philosophical inquiry (66a5-
6, 79c2-8). For these reasons, before we accept NC as a necessary condition
on recollection, let us more look carefully at the way it is introduced.
There is a subtle break in Socrates' introductory remarks. After pre-
senting the initial conditions on recollection and a few examples, Simmias
appears to understand what Socrates has in mind, responding confidently
(iauv, uThv oUv) when Socrates asks whether he has described 'a kind of
recollection' (73el-4, my translation). Socrates then signals that he is
making a new point (ti &), and presents another series of examples (73e5-
10). These examples differ from the earlier ones, however, in that they all
involve remembering something from a picture
(yEypa%tgu,vov).
Socrates
then makes the further points that we can recollect from both similars and
dissimilars, and that in the former case we must perform NC. It is crucial
to see that these two points are restricted to the narrow class of remem-
bering something from a picture. In the first, Socrates prefaces his remark
with the phrase 'in all of these cases' (vxat\ larvTQa Tabra) meaning
specifically cases of remembering something from a picture (74a2). In the
second, he addresses remembering 'from the similars' (&no6 T&ov o'ofocov),
"
See Gosling, 'Similarity,' 152 ff., Ackrill, 'Anamnesis,' 190-191, Bostock,
Plato's Phaedo, 65-66, Nehamas, 'Imperfection,' 149. Even Scott, who relies so heav-
ily on this reading, acknowledges its implausibility, R&E, 63 n. 12.
300 LEE FRANKLIN
i.e. not just any items similar to what is recollected, but similar pictures
(74a5). Thus, Socrates is not characterizing recollection generally; since
Simmias already seems to understand what Socrates has in mind, further
clarification of what recollection is appears to be unnecessary. Rather,
Socrates is making the following narrow points. First, we can remember
something either from a picture that depicts it, or one that does not.
Second, when we recall an item from a picture that depicts it, we must
compare the picture to the original.
To discern Socrates' purpose, let's examine what he does with the com-
parison he has introduced. Here is what Socrates says immediately after
Simmias agrees with the statement introducing NC: 'Look then ((@IC6lt
8') if these things hold in this way (otox). We say, I suppose, that the
Equal is something' (74a9, my translation). Typically, the adverb OiVT();
looks backward to something that has already been presented.20 Thus,
Socrates is instructing Simmias to undertake the consideration he has just
introduced, NC. But the discussion that follows is an investigation of the
difference between sensible equals and Equality itself (74a9-d3). Accordingly,
Socrates' and Simmias' discussion of Equality and sensible equal partic-
ulars is a special instance of NC applied to sensible particulars and Forms.
Socrates' concluding remark confirms this: 'Well then. .. do we experi-
ence
(n&acXoj.ev)
something like this in the case of equal sticks and the
other equal objects we just mentioned? Do they seem to us to be equal in
the same sense as what is Equal itself? Is there some deficiency in their
being equal such as the Equal, or is there not?' (74d4-e4).3 Simmias
agrees that equal particulars are deficient. After comparing sensible equals
to Equality, Socrates and Simmias have answered precisely the question
NC asks; they have discovered that sensible equals are deficient in their
similarity to Equality. Moreover, in describing this discovery, Socrates
echoes the language from his original presentation of NC. There Socrates
said that one must experience in addition
(ipoona'crXv)
the considera-
tion. At the end of the discussion of equal particulars and Equality,
Socrates notes that he and Simmias are experiencing (nataX1tv) that very
20
The use of
&i
also supports this by framing Socrates' instruction as a natural
result of Simmias' agreement that the consideration is necessary, see H.W. Smyth,
Greek Grammar, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984) ??1245, 2846.
21 See Scott R&E, 60 and Ackrill, 'Anamnesis' 192 on the use of the first person
plural here as a complication for an ordinary interpretation. If NC is part of the argu-
ment for recollection, as I am arguing here, these worries dissolve.
thing (74d4, e6).22 The comparison Socrates and Simmias perform on sen-
sible equals and Equality is NC.
As a result, we may learn about NC, as applied to sensible particulars
and Forms, by investigating the discussion of sensible equals and Equality
from 74a9-e6. But we needn't go into that discussion in detail - as I will
in the next section
-
to see that it
requires philosophical sophistication.
At the start of the discussion, Socrates introduces the Form of Equality:
'there is something that is equal. I do not mean a stick equal to a stick
or a stone to a stone, or anything of that kind, but something else beyond
all these, the Equal Itself' (74a9-12). Simmias' emphatic response shows
that he is familiar with such entities, and recognizes their distinction from
sensible equals (74bl-3).23 Moreover, most interpreters agree that in this
discussion Socrates articulates a central metaphysical or epistemological
difference between sensible particulars and Forms.24 We needn't specify
that difference to see that any discussion in which it is put forward involves
advanced philosophical reflection. Since this discussion is NC, when NC
is applied to sensible particulars and Forms, it is a kind of philosophical
reflection, requiring familiarity with Forms as such.
At the same time, the context indicates that NC may be necessary, but
not as a condition on the act of recollection. It is Simmias who performs
NC, and Simmias is not currently experiencing recollection of the sort at
stake in the discussion.25 Within the comparison of sensible equals and
Equality, Socrates asks Simmias if it is from perceiving sensible equals
that he called Equality to mind (74a4-6, c7-9). Socrates is asking whether
22
The use of
racrXetv
to describe a philosophical consideration is strange. For a
parallel, see 73b7.
23
See 65d6-8, and Scott, R&E, 56. For a contrasting reading see Williams, 'Two
Aspects,' 142-3.
24
Nehamas, 'Imperfection,' 151 ff., A. Silverman, The Dialectic of Essence: Plato's
Metaphysics, [Dialectic of Essence] (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) ch. 3,
especially 51-54, Bostock, Plato's Phaedo, 72-85. Kelsey, 'Recollection in the
Phaedo,' 101- 1 10.
25 This is not to say that Simmias is not recollecting in any way. If philosophical
learning is another kind of recollection, as I think it is, then there is a sense in which
Simmias currently recollects. This is strongly suggested at 73b7. Notice, however, that
if we wish to interpret Simmias' current learning as recollection, then we must dis-
tinguish two kinds of recollection. For Simmias' recollection consists in understand-
ing the proofs for the claim that some other moment of learning is recollection. If we
do not make such a distinction, then we must entertain the absurd claim that there is
some moment of learning which consists in realizing that that very learning depends
on recollection.
302 LEE FRANKLIN
it was from the perception of sensibles that Simmias recollected the Form.
But Socrates employs aorist and perfect verb forms here, indicating that
Simmias has called Equality to mind prior to the comparison he currently
performs. More generally, Socrates' argument aims to explain the way we
first come to have Forms in mind in this life. Simmias' easy familiarity
with Forms at the beginning of the discussion shows that he is beyond
this stage of learning. Instead of experiencing the kind of recollection at
issue, Simmias is inquiring into it as a philosopher. Socrates is giving
the argument for recollection because Simmias asked to see the proofs
(a&co&?itet;)
of the theory (73a4-6). The importance of NC is based on its
contribution to Simmias' philosophical inquiry into recollection. Socrates
has not described a consideration necessarily part of, or subsequent to, the
act of recollection. Instead, NC is a consideration one must take up in
order to reach understanding about the doctrine of recollection; in order
to understand the reasons for the claim that we recollect, Simmias must
compare sensibles to Forms.
NC, and the passage in which it is brought forward, effect a transition
from the introduction of recollection to the argument showing that we
recollect. Socrates introduces familiar examples of remembering some-
thing from its picture, because in these cases a comparison of image to
original comes easily to light. After all, if we did not compare a picture
to its original, and note the deficiency, we would be mistaking it for the
original. Once this comparison has been introduced, Socrates turns imme-
diately to perform it in the specialized case of sensible particulars and
Forms. But, as we noted above,26 there is an important difference between
remembering a person from his picture and recollecting a Form from one
of its participants. For while a comparison of image to original may be
necessary in the former case, Plato does not think such a comparison nec-
essarily accompanies the ordinary recollection or predication of Forms.
Thus, Socrates' attribution of simultaneity and necessity in the introduc-
tion of NC (o5TOv
YE...
&voyicxiov, 74a5-6) applies only to the familiar
examples he has used to introduce the comparison; it does not apply to
the recollection of Forms from sensible particulars.
We do not need to strain to come up with interpretations of what seems
to be an implausible condition on remembering something from items sim-
ilar to it. Socrates' statement at 74a5-7 is a plausible condition on remem-
bering something from its picture, and no more. This reading explains two
other features of the argument as well. The first is the following sequence.
26
Pp. 297-8.
At 74a2-3 Socrates says that recollection can be inspired by items both
similar and dissimilar to the item recollected. NC is then introduced.
Subsequently, near the end of the discussion of sensibles equals and Equality,
Socrates dismisses the distinction between recollection from similars and
dissimilars saying, 'It makes no difference. As long as the sight of one
thing makes you think of another, whether it be similar or dissimilar, this
must of necessity be recollection' (74c13-d2). On a sophisticated reading
of the argument, it is hard to understand why Socrates dismisses the dis-
tinction between recollection from similars and dissimilars, if that distinction
was related to a key condition on recollection. If the distinction between
recollection from similars and dissimilars is needed only for the transition
to the argument, however, it makes sense for Socrates to discard it. The
second feature is that the necessary correlation between recollecting Forms
and comparing them to sensibles, purportedly introduced at 74a5-7, is
never appealed to again. On a sophisticated reading, the claim that recol-
lection of Forms requires a comparison of sensibles to Forms plays a cen-
tral role in the argument. If this were right, then we should expect Socrates
to refer to the simultaneity of recollecting Forms and comparing sensibles
to them explicitly in the argument. But, as I will show in the final sec-
tion of this paper, he does not. Like the distinction between recollection
from similars and dissimilars, this aspect of NC disappears. This is pre-
cisely what we should expect if NC is part of the argument for recollec-
tion, rather than a necessary condition on recollection.
As I have argued, the act of recollection and NC are different mental
acts, diverse in character, and distant in time. Unfortunately, Socrates'
wording makes it difficult to keep this distinction clear. He uses the same
verb for both: ?vvoriv, to have in mind. Nevertheless, there is a consistent
difference in the way Socrates presents the two acts. Recollection is con-
sistently described as having an object in mind; in these cases, the gram-
matical object of ?vvoriv is a noun or pronoun - ?vvo?tv rt (73c8, 74b6,
c8). But the use of ivvociv that describes the comparison of sensibles
to Forms has a proposition or question as its object: Evvoriv r'_Y1C or oI
(74a5-7, d9). This terminological distinction will be crucial in our read-
ing of the argument for recollection from 74d9-b8. Recollection is the
ordinary learning by which we come to have a Form in mind
-
EvvoEiv
-
from the perception of its sensible participants. But it is only by con-
sidering the deficiency of the sensible particulars
-
ivvociv 6'rt xa
a'YYomxa
?v8?t Tl
- that we, as philosophers, recognize that this learning needs
explanation.
304 LEE FRANKLIN
III. The Deficiency of Sensibles: 74a9-d8
Plato wants to explain our ability to have Forms in mind in the way
required for ordinary speech and thought. To see that this learning requires
recollection, he must show that we cannot come to have Forms in mind
on the basis of sense perception alone. This is the role of NC. By show-
ing that sensible equals are deficient compared to Equality, Plato intends
to show that perception cannot bring us, by itself, to have Forms in mind.
The discussion is difficult, and the source of much debate concerning
Plato's metaphysics in the Phaedo. I will not be able to resolve all of the
controversies concerning the text, much less Plato's middle-period meta-
physics.27 Nevertheless, by showing how the discussion provides the rea-
sons why we cannot call Forms to mind from sense perception alone, I
hope to shed light on the metaphysical grounds of the Theory of Recollection,
and its scope as a theory of learning.
Socrates begins by asking whether Simmias admits the existence of the
Equal, not some particular things equal to one another, but above and
beyond these, 'the Equal itself' (74a9-12). Simmias agrees that he and
Socrates know what the Equal is (Fi'lct6lasr8a arbo 6o Tiv; 74b2-3). Next,
Socrates asks whether they have acquired their knowledge of the Equal
from sensible equals, whether 'from these things (sensible equals) we have
called it (the Equal itself) to mind' (74b4-6). Before Simmias answers,
though, Socrates backtracks to re-examine the question whether the Equal
itself is genuinely distinct from sensible equals. The argument is highly
compressed. Socrates argues that there is a characteristic possessed by sen-
sible equals that is not possessed by the Equal itself. Sensible equals
'appear to be equal to one thing and unequal to another' (74b7-9). The
Equal Itself, in contrast, never appears to be unequal, or Inequality (74c 1-2).
From this difference, Socrates infers that sensible equals are not the same
as the Equal itself (74c4-5).
This brief argument is meant to articulate a difference between two
ways of being equal. This is indicated later by Socrates' recap of his con-
clusion: 'Do [equal sticks]
seem to us to be equal in the same sense
(11O?p) as what is
Equal
itself?' (74d5-7). The difference is between being
an equal thing, i.e., being characterized by equality, and being the Equal
27
The reading I present here has been greatly influenced by Silverman, Dialectic
of Essence, especially ch. 3. For opposing views, see Nehamas, 'Imperfection,' Kelsey
'Recollection in the Phaedo,' and T. Irwin, 'The Theory of Forms,' in G. Fine (ed.),
Plato, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 145-172.
itself, the property or relation common to and responsible for equal
things.28 Both equal things and Equality can be said to be equal, but not
at all in the same sense. Equal things are equal to some one thing or other,
in a specific respect, and in a specific magnitude. For instance, one stick
is equal to another by having the same length, 14 inches. But the very
same stick will also be unequal in length to many other things, and prob-
ably unequal to the other stick in other respects. Indeed, the very dimen-
sions that make the stick equal to one thing will make it unequal to something
else. For this reason, being characterized by equality to one thing neces-
sarily involves inequality to others. The fact that equal sticks and stones
are also unequal highlights the fact that they are merely characterized by
equality.
The Form, however, is not characterized by equality; it is not equal to
anything, in any specific respect, or magnitude. Rather, it is equality itself,
the single property or relation which is common to and responsible for all
equal pairs. That the Equal has this status is bound up with its role as the
entity picked out by the answer to the question 'What is Equal?' Socrates
emphasizes this role first by asking whether Simmias knows the Equal
'what it is' (74b2, my translation), and then more subtly in the shift from
asking whether the Equal ever appears unequal, to the question whether
it ever appears to be Inequality (74c1-2). Finally, at the end of the argu-
ment, Socrates explicitly extends the argument to concern, 'all those things
to which we can attach the word 'itself,' both when we are putting ques-
tions and answering them' (75dl-3). The Equal's failure to be unequal in
any way signals the fact that it is not characterized by equality, but is
equality itself.29 Thus, in this argument, Socrates uses the compresence of
opposites to point to a deeper difference between being characterized by
a property and being that property.
Once we grasp this difference, we can see why the perception of equal
particulars is insufficient to bring us to have Equality in mind. A stick
manifests one way of being equal, but it does not manifest Equality itself,
the property or relation common to absolutely all equal things. Coming to
28
See Silverman, Dialectic of Essence, 90 ff.
29
One question that comes up in accounts of Plato's metaphysics is whether self-
predication statements like 'The Equal itself is equal,' should be read as identity state-
ments, or whether the copula expresses some other predication relation. Since the
considerations that distinguish these accounts do not arise within the argument for
recollection, I take no stand on such questions here. See Silverman, Dialectic of
Essence, 93 ff.
306 LEE FRANKLIN
behold the Form, F-ness, is coming to grasp what-it-is-to-be-F. No single
act of perception could ever communicate this essence to us. Indeed, on
Plato's account, no collection of perceptions could bring us to grasp this
essence. Thus, the deficiency of sensible particulars has the result that sen-
sible particulars are epistemologically impoverished: we can't grasp what
Forms are from particulars alone. The argument is very compact, and for
that reason somewhat unsatisfying. We would like to hear Plato's thoughts
about the insufficiency of abstraction, or problems of underdetermination.
Still, the emphasis on the Forms' role as the objects of the 'What is F?'
shows that Plato is interested in the difference between what we grasp
through the senses and what we come to know through dialectic. The for-
mer cannot bring us to grasp the latter.
We may reconstruct the argument in two steps. First, Plato makes us
aware that sensible equals and the Form of Equality are equal in differ-
ent ways. That is, he calls our attention to the metaphysical difference
between being an equal thing and being the Equal itself. Then, having
brought this difference to our attention, he enjoins us to consider what we
apprehend when we grasp sensible equals in comparison to grasp of
Equality
itself. This is why Socrates focuses not just on whether sticks
and stones are both equal and unequal, but whether they appear to be so
(74b8, ci ). The former would be sufficient if Socrates were concerned only
with the metaphysical difference. But Socrates is ultimately interested in
the epistemological consequences of the metaphysical difference. Once we
grasp the kinds of being that distinguish sensible equals and Forms, we
are in a position to see that perception of the former could never bring us
to grasp the latter.
As further evidence, here is what Socrates says immediately after Simmias
agrees that sensible equals are distinct from the Form of Equality: 'But it
is definitely from the equal things, though they are different from that
Equal, that you have derived and grasped the knowledge of equality?'
(74c4-9). Immediately after articulating the difference between sensibles
equals and Equality, Socrates reminds Simmias that we come to have
Equality in mind in response to sensible equals. Socrates prefaces his
question with the strongly adversative expression akka
lv
... . yr (74c6).
In this way, Socrates expresses the conundrum that even though sensible
equals are different from Equality in such a way that one could not come
to have Equality in mind from them alone, we nevertheless do come to
have Equality in mind in response to the perception of sensible equals.
Socrates moves directly from the difference between sensible equals
and
Equality, to query how, in light of this difference, sensible equals can
serve as the source or trigger for our grasp of Forms.
Generalized to apply to all Forms (cf. 75c10-d2), Socrates' question
expresses the puzzle that recollection aims to solve: even though sensible
particulars are deficient compared to Forms, it is nevertheless in response
to them that we come to have Forms in mind. The difference between
Forms and sensible particulars shows that sensible perception, by itself, is
insufficient to bring us to have Forms in mind. Thus, by comparing sen-
sible equals to Equality itself, Socrates and Simmias come to see that sen-
sory experience alone cannot bring us to have Forms in mind. If we
nevertheless do come to have Forms in mind in response to perception,
we must be relying on resources already in us when we began to sense;
we must be recollecting. In the argument to come, the comparison of sen-
sibles to Forms
-
NC
-
plays precisely
this role. It
provides philosophi-
cal reasons for concluding that we recollect when we come to have a Form
in mind in response to sensory experience.
Before taking up the argument, we must consider a potential challenge
to my reading. On my view, recollection explains the grasp involved in
predicating a Form in ordinary speech and thought. In explicating the
deficiency of sensibles, however, I have appealed to the role of Forms as
the objects specified by answers to the 'What is F?' question, and grasped
through dialectical inquiry. It is because we cannot grasp what a Form is
from perception that recollection is necessary. On my account, then, it
seems that recollection is needed because we cannot develop knowledge
from perception alone. Prima facie, this has no bearing on whether we
can develop ordinary concepts from perception. On my interpretation, Plato's
argument for recollection seems to involve a fatal confusion between the
grasp involved in ordinary speech and thought and the understanding
developed through philosophical inquiry.
In fact, this is not a confusion, but a central feature of Plato's theory
of learning. In arguing for recollection, Plato is motivated by views con-
cerning the relationship between the content of ordinary speech and
thought, and the objects of philosophical inquiry. Briefly put, Plato
believes that what we predicate and have in mind in ordinary speech and
thought must be the same as what we come to grasp fully through philo-
sophical inquiry. As I have already pointed out, the terms of Socratic
inquiry indicate that Forms are the properties we predicate in ordinary
speech and thought.30 Thus, in order to predicate a property in ordinary
speech and thought, we must have that very property
-
what it is
-
in
.
Pp. 295-6.
308 LEE FRANKLIN
mind, if only in an inchoate way.3' This view is a result of two commit-
ments. The first is optimism about inquiry; Plato is confident that dialec-
tic can generate real learning and knowledge. This confidence is captured
in Cebes' description of another argument for recollection, according to
which 'when men are interrogated in the right manner, they always give
the right answer of their own accord...' (73a7-9).
Cebes' account is almost certainly an allusion to the argument for rec-
ollection in the Meno, which concerns the possibility of philosophical
progress through inquiry into the 'What is F?' question. Plato wants to
explain how philosophical understanding can develop from the resources
available at the beginning of inquiry, when we do not yet have knowl-
edge. Meno's Paradox asks how we could develop knowledge from such
impoverished resources (Meno 80dS-e5). Socrates' interrogation of
Meno's slave-boy is supposed to show how it is possible (Meno 82a7 ff.).
Accordingly, it is worth pointing out the entirely ordinary comprehension
Meno's slave brings to the interrogation, a level of grasp attributed more
or less to the boy's ability to speak Greek (Meno 82b4). This leads to the
second commitment, which is Plato's view of the role played by ordinary
discourse in philosophical inquiry. In another paper, I have argued that
the sole prerequisite for participation in dialectic is ordinary linguistic
competence with the name of the property one investigates. This ordinary
competence is the resource from which philosophical understanding devel-
ops. In dialectic, we improve our grasp of a property by reflection on ordi-
nary statements and beliefs about that property and its bearers.3' In order
for such reflection to promote genuine learning and eventually knowledge,
Plato thinks ordinary linguistic competence must embed grasp of the very
entities we come to know through dialectic.33 That is, we could not achieve
31
An alternative to saying that we grasp Forms completely but inchoately is that
we grasp them partially. There are two main problems with this alternative. First, in
the Phaedo we're told that Forms are uniform,
govoei6rn;,
(78d5, 80b2), and non com-
posite, aouvOFetov (78c3), i.e. that they do not have parts at all. Second, if our grasp
of a Form enables us to predicate it in speech and thought, then what we grasp must
be the Form entire, if we are to predicate it entire, and not just a part of it.
32 L. Franklin, 'The Structure of Dialectic in the Meno,' Phronesis XLVI (2001),
41 3-439.
3' This issue contains a very serious problem for a sophisticated interpretation,
according to which ordinary concepts and beliefs have no basis in Forms. (See Scott,
R&E, 18-23, 38-52, 68-69.) For, if genuine learning is an improvement in our under-
standing of Forms, reflection on our ordinary statements and beliefs could never pro-
mote genuine learning. It then becomes hard to see how, on such a view, a non-philosopher
learning and knowledge through dialectic, if ordinary linguistic compe-
tence were not grounded in Forms. Or, as Cebes puts it, 'they could not
do this if they did not possess knowledge and the right account inside
them' (73a9-10).
Thus, we may say that the argument for recollection in the Phaedo
explains concept acquisition, but we must be careful to add that these are
concepts of an extraordinary kind. Plato believes that reflection on our
ordinary concepts will, under the right conditions, yield philosophical
understanding of explanatory essences.34 Recollection in the Phaedo aims
to explain ordinary speech and thought, but with an eye to the role of
ordinary discourse as the resource from which we develop philosophical
learning and knowledge. If this is right, then the presence of philosophi-
cal understanding within the argument for Recollection does not require a
sophisticated interpretation. Simmias and Cebes are both familiar with
Forms, and Simmias is said to have knowledge -
episteme
-
of Equality.
The argument for recollection is supposed to explain the origin of
Simmias' knowledge (74b2-4, c7-9). This does not mean, however, that
recollection in the Phaedo is directly responsible for the kind of knowl-
edge Simmias has achieved. Rather, it means that recollection in the
Phaedo is a stage at the beginning of a learning process which may even-
tually result in the kind of understanding enjoyed by Simmias. From our
ordinary capacity for speech and thought we may develop philosophical
understanding of properties and relations such as Equality. Indeed, from
this origin, we may develop higher level insights such as the Theory of
Forms and the Theory of Recollection. The argument for recollection in
the Phaedo explains how this process begins.
could ever begin to engage in inquiry that promotes understanding of Forms. What
are the terms in which this inquiry is conducted, and how are they introduced to our
discourse?
3 This naturally raises the question whether Plato also believes that we have a Form
in mind for every ordinary concept. On one hand, it seems he must if he intends the
Theory of Recollection to provide a general account of ordinary concepts and ordi-
nary discourse. On the other, it would be foolish to suppose that every ordinary con-
cept will yield a successful philosophical inquiry. There is tension, then, between the
role of Forms as the objects of the 'What is F?' question and philosophical under-
standing, and their role as the grounding for ordinary speech and thought. In the mid-
dle period, Plato displays little awareness of this problem. I believe that when he
recognizes this problem in his later writings (Phaedrus 265el-266c5, Statesman
262clO-263bl 1) he abandons the Theory of Recollection as a model of learning, even
as he retains the insights about philosophical reflection that inspire it.
310 LEE FRANKLIN
IV. The Argument for Recollecition: 74d9-75b8
We come, finally, to the argument for recollection itself. Since the argu-
ment is dense, it will be useful to state the results of the discussion so far.
Recollection takes place when, upon perceiving one or more sensible
items, we come to have a Form in mind. This learning enables us to pred-
icate the Form of sensible particulars in ordinary speech and thought. This
activity is described as coming to have a Form in mind - ?VVo06V Ti - in
response to sense perception. There is a second mental activity at work in
the argument, described as thinking that sensible particulars fall short of
the Form - Evvoeiv 0X1i Ta ciXna tL v& tl. This mental activity is the
conclusion of NC, a philosophical comparison of sensible particulars to
Forms, but it is not part of recollecting. Rather, it is the philosophical
reflection by which we see that we must recollect. In addition, Plato thinks
of the first act, recollection, as the distant origin of the understanding of
Equality which enables us to perform the second act, the philosophical
comparison. Socrates' argument represents both the distinction and the
continuity between these acts.
Socrates and Simmias agree that what they are currently experiencing
is the consideration that sensible particulars are deficient compared to
Forms (74d4-7). Socrates then asks whether he and Simmias agree that
someone entertaining this line of thought must have known the Form
beforehand. Simmias agrees that this is the case (74d9-e4). As a result, it
is necessary for Socrates and Simmias 'to have known the Equal prior to
that time when we first, seeing equal things, thought that all these desire
to be such as the Equal, but are deficient' (74e9-75a2, my translation).
Socrates here asserts that prior to the time he and Simmias considered
whether sensible equals are deficient compared to the Form, they must
have known the Equal itself. Socrates goes on to add 'But we also agree
to this, that we have not called it to mind (wowt ?vvevo0iFvua) from any
other place, nor is it possible to call it to mind (lnh& &vvaoOv rivat Evvoilcoai)
except from seeing or touching or from some other perception. I mean the
same thing by all these' (75a5-8, my translation).
It is easy to suppose that Socrates is talking about the same mental
activity in these passages, or at least two closely related mental activities.
On such a reading, the first instance of thinking that sensible equals are
deficient compared to the Form is identical to, or necessarily correlated
with, the moment when we first came to think of the Equal itself from
our perception of sensible equals. The repeated use of ?vvo6iv, and the
similar references to perceiving in both passages strongly suggest such an
interpretation. On the other hand, the first passage has a proposition as
the object of consideration (?VVOriv 0X-r), namely the claim that sensible
equals are deficient, whereas in the second passage a Form is the object
(a&6
evvevorpcevat). Thus, two very different points are being made here.
The first is that we came to know the Equal Itself prior to performing NC,
i.e. prior to engaging in philosophical reflection on the character of Forms
in comparison to that of sensible particulars. This is seen in the way
Socrates and Simmias undertake NC; they know the Equal Itself at the
beginning, and rely on this understanding in their comparison (74b2 ff.).
This naturally raises the question of how we came to have the Equal in
mind in the first place. This question is answered in the second passage,
which reiterates that our initial grasp of the Equal came from our per-
ception of sensible equals. In fact, Socrates makes the much stronger claim
that this is the only possible inspiration
(gii
'aXkko0ev...
grn&
6uva-r6v
rlvat, 75a5-6) for our original grasp of the Equal.
Socrates is working backwards from the philosophical position he and
Simmias now occupy. By performing NC, he and Simmias have realized
that sensible equals are deficient compared to the Form. In order to make
such a discovery, they must have had grasp of the Equal as a Form prior
to their investigation. But they have also agreed that their initial grasp of
the Equal came from nowhere other than the perception of equal things.
Socrates traverses quickly back through a learning process that includes
dialectical reflection on what Equality is. This reflection developed out of
our ordinary statements and beliefs about equal things. Socrates is inter-
ested in the beginning of this long and differentiated process: how did we
develop the ordinary grasp of Equality that enabled us to speak and think
about equal things in the first place? It is in response to sensible equals
that we first came to have Equality in mind.
Having located the original grasp of Equality in an earlier act of learn-
ing, Socrates can employ the conclusion of NC to analyze that act,
inspired by sense perception. Socrates' next statement is this: 'But cer-
tainly from perceptions (eisic xxv ai9aG eawov) it is necessary to think that
(ivvo6iv 6rt) all these items in the perceptions desire that which is what
is Equal but fall short of it' (75a1 1-b2, my translation). Once again, the
reference to perceptions and the use of cvvoEv might lead us to think that
Socrates is describing the act of recollection. But the object of iVVOEiV iS
a proposition: the claim that sensibles are deficient with respect to Forms.
Socrates thus reiterates the conclusion of NC, the comparison of sensible
equals to the Equal itself. In that discussion, sensible equals were shown
to be deficient compared to the Equal because of the way each appeared.
312 LEE FRANKLIN
It is because of the way sensible equals appear to be both equal and
unequal that we know them to be different from and deficient in compar-
ison to the Equal itself. It is in this sense that the realization comes from
the senses (Es,K
ye
TCv
aiatijaNav).35
Socrates is not describing recollec-
tion, but reminding Simmias of the metaphysical deficiency of sensibles.
This deficiency entails that although it is in response to perception that
we come to grasp the Equal itself, our perceptions are not sufficient for
that grasp to come about. This requires that something more than per-
ception is taking place when we become able to perform ordinary predi-
cations in speech and thought; we must be recollecting. This is exactly
the conclusion Socrates draws: 'Then, before we began to see and to hear
and to have the other perceptions, somehow we took up the knowledge of
it, the Equal, what it is, if we were going to refer the equals from per-
ception to it, since all such things desire to be such as it, but are deficient
compared to it' (75b4-8, my translation).36 The crucial inference is made
explicitly here. Since sensibles are deficient compared to Forms, our com-
ing to have Forms in mind in response to sensibles requires that we were
acquainted with them prior to perception. Socrates' conclusion captures
the different roles of the two mental acts distinguished earlier. The first,
coming to have Forms in mind, requires recollection to be explained. The
second, NC, provides the philosophical reason for this conclusion. This is
expressed by the fact that the conclusion of NC is the content of a oTI
clause: since sensibles are deficient, we must have known Forms before
we began to sense.
My translation is unorthodox. In the passages previous to this, 0lt has
always been preceded by Evvoe6v, indicating that it introduces the propo-
sitional content of a thought. For this reason, presumably, nearly all inter-
preters and translators have read the OtI in Socrates' conclusion as a
recurrence of this use, as follows: 'Then it is necessary that, before we
began to see and to hear and to have the other perceptions, somehow we
took up the knowledge of it, the Equal, what it is, if we were going to
refer the equals from perception to it, thinking that all such things desire
to be such as it, but are deficient compared to it.'37 As my italics high-
light, this translation suggests that the moment of recollection is also a
moment in which we see that sensibles are deficient compared to Forms.
Such a translation is essential for a sophisticated interpretation of the argu-
1s Socrates attributes a similar realization to the senses at Republic 523b9-524a4.
36
Adapted from G.M.A. Grube in J. Cooper (ed.), Complete Works.
3 Grube's translation from J. Cooper (ed.), 'Complete Works,' 66.
ment. On that interpretation, Plato appeals to recollection because the
moment we call Forms to mind is also a moment in which we compare
them to sensibles. Since sensibles alone cannot bring us to see their own
deficiency compared to Forms, we must be recollecting.38 But Socrates'
remark at 75b4-8 is the only part of the argument that could be construed
to assert the simultaneity of recollection and a comparison of sensibles to
Forms.39 And this passage can be read to make such an assertion only if
o6t introduces the content of a thought concurrent with recollection. If it
does not, a key premise is missing from the argument, as interpreted by
the sophisticated interpretation.
The text does not support the sophisticated interpretation however.
Typically, in order to introduce a propositional clause, ott must be intro-
duced by a verb of thinking or saying. The use of OtI in 75b7 lacks any
such verb. Instead, translators and editors of Plato's text have supplied
one in their translations.' But there is no need to emend the text in this
way. We can read it as it stands if we take 6lt to introduce a causal clause,
a clause stating the reason for what has just been asserted.4' What is stated
in the 6-ri. clause is the conclusion of NC, the philosophical discussion in
which Socrates and Simmias compared sensible equals and Equality. Its
role here is to provide the reasons for the thesis that we recollect.
The argument for recollection is a model of philosophical economy. It
is also, for that reason, a source of much controversy. Plato's argument
requires us to be clear about the difference between the act of recollec-
tion and philosophical reflection about that act. At the same time, the argu-
ment requires us to see the connections between ordinary learning and
38
Scott, R&E, 62-63, Rowe, Plato: Phaedo 172-73. For similar reasons, it is also
essential for any ordinary interpretation which takes a comparison of sensibles to
Forms to be implicit in ordinary predications, such as Williams, 'Two Aspects,' and
Kelsey, 'Platonic Recollection.'
31
Indeed, 74d9-e4 contradicts such a claim.
I
See Rowe, Plato: Phaedo, 173, Hackforth Phaedo, 70, J. Burnet, Plato: Phaedo,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1911) 75, Gallop, Plato: Phaedo, 22, 229-30. Only
R.S. Bluck, Plato: Phaedo, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1955) translates
in a way that might assign a causal role to the o-n clause: 'on the ground that they
all do their best to be like [the Equal] although they are inferior,' 69. Bluck's com-
mentary, however, indicates that he does not confront the possibility of my reading, 63.
4' See H.W. Smyth, Greek Grammar, ?2240. This is not the most common use of
OTI for Plato, but a survey limited to Platonis Opera I discovers numerous parallels:
Phaedo 102c4, 7, Euthyphro 10c2-4, 11 (note the proximity here to another 6oit intro-
ducing a 'that' clause), Theaetetus 185b2, Sophist 252d.
314 LEE FRANKLIN
philosophical reflection, since Plato's reasons for the Theory of Recollec-
tion are based on the role of ordinary discourse as the origin of philo-
sophical reflection, learning, and knowledge. Ultimately, the latter point
is more important for our understanding of Recollection as a coherent the-
ory of learning. Recollection explains both ordinary and philosophical
learning, not because Plato saw a way to solve two unrelated problems
with one theory, but because he saw that an explanation of philosophical
understanding must also explain the ordinary resources from which it springs.
Department of Philosophy
The University at Albany
State University of New York

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Recollection and Philosophical Reflection in Plato's "Phaedo"

Author(s): Lee Franklin

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