Nationalism as Dialectics Ethnicity, Moralism, and the State in Early Twentieth-Century Japan Kevin M. Doak \NY DISCUSSION ON THE RELATIONSHIP of Zen Buddhism, the Kyoto school, and nationalism must immediately confront the problem that all three subjects involve their own pect dictions and instabi severally or historical analysis of the problem does have several advantages over phil sophical or theological approaches. By framing the question at a particu time in a specific historical context, I hope to avoid the issue of whether or not Zen Buddhism and the ideas raised by the members of the Kyoto school ‘were intrinsically nationalistic and would always be nationalistic. I also intend to show that nationalism as well cannot be simply essentialized, since the discourse on nationalism itself was also Consequently, the historical approach I have taken belo not merely personal interest, but my conviction that if discussions on Zen and the Kyoto school are to avoid simply repeating the beliefs of their advo- cates and actually attempt a Of the social and political c larly with regard to the de advantageous place to begin. 1, might be after all an t, I hope, contribute to an understand- ‘wo particular ways. Fi rely as a transcendental entity not redt state-centered nationalism that privileged State Shinto and oppressed all 174 NATIONALISM AS DIALECTICS ‘other religions. The position of the emperor in religious ideology, the p leged position of State Shinto, and the “emperor-system” nature of the pre- war Japanese state cannot be ignored. However, an overemphasis on these factors, coupled with too simplistic an understanding of the nature of nation- alism in prewar Japan, have all too often led to the conclusion that Buddhism maintained an Asian, if not universal, value-structure in the face of state ‘oppression. This was true, of course, in some cases. Yet, nationalist and ‘gious sentiments were deeply rooted and often subtly intertwined to the degree that no religious group was totally immune fiom nationalist inclina- tions and no national could completely ignore the powerful forms. Liah Greenfeld has helped elu ized societies. On the contrary, she points ‘out that “nationalism emerged in a time of ardent religious sentiment, when questions of | ie less, acute, and faith Tt was able to develop and become established ligion, and, if it later replaced it as the governing ion as part of the national con- enfeld’s insight into the development of national- the case of Japan rests, of course, on the argument I in order to understand how Zen Buddhism came to n apanese, perhaps the Japanese, form of Buddhism, I will begin with the historical struggle over what constituted the Japanese nation, Discussions on nationalism in Japan have often proceeded under the assump. tion that the “nation” was a fairly obvious thing and that the relationship between “nation” and “nationalism” was also a relatively clear one. But, as an ideological project involved in creating identities, ceived not as a spe Hanry Harootunian has noted, “the production ofideology is inevitably rooted in the propensity of groups to make ‘authoritative? the boundaries between real and unreal."? Nati this contestation over which represent ism was itself caught up in ion of Japan was “real” and most “authoritative” as it attempted to assert either what Japan was ot who the Japanese people were. There were opposing groups with opposing represen- tions of the nation in the 1930s. In order to reconceive the field of nation- jam as contested terrain, one might begin with Abe Hirozumi’s revision of + Liah Greenfeld, “Transcending the Ni 1993). 49, Hany Harootunian, “Ideology as Confit,” in Tetsuo Najita and J. Vitor Keschmann, » Conflict in Modem Jepanse Histor (Princeton, N. J: Princeton Univesity Press, 1982), 26. 175KEVIN M. DOAK Maruyama Masao’s chronology of fascism. Abe emphasizes the post-1935, period as the formative period of fas 1935 to 1940 witn to reorganize the st e subsequent success in promoting fas- cism “from above” by the so-called “reform bureaucrats” and elements in army was premised, he writes, on the co-option of the energy of the populist movements.? My argument seeks to revise Abe’s analysis slightly. Whereas ‘Abe focuses on ideologues such as Kita Ikki who had in mind plans for reor- sganizing the “nation-state” (B® kokka), I will suggest that a more radical, if less violent, challenge during these years came from other quarters. In partic- ular, an alternative form of nationalism stemmed from those who drew on spiritual and cultural values to reinterpret the nation as fundamentally an eth- nic-nation (BEBE minsoku), rather than, and often in hostility to, the political structure of the nation: ‘The problem of nationalism and religion in prewar Japan, then, might between alternate visions of the “n: state (EI) or in ethnic people (FEE and response to changes in the modern nat native and foreign. The historical unfolding of the dynamic between these two highly charged fields should help resituate Zen Buddhism within a specific historical context. The trajectory of collision between nationalism has had noticeable peaks and valleys, points at wi converged and diverged, over the course of the last one hundred twenty years tion of “New Buddhism” dur- ing the 1890s, the 1930s and Japanese state, with co-opt Buddhism and ‘as the most Japanese of religious express ‘State Shinto, to Buddhism could NATIONALISM AS DIALECTICS the end “there is no firm sociological mooring to the nation, not in language, igion, and not ity.”* Neither, one might add, was there any ontological prior condition limiting how Zen Buddhism could develop within ‘orical context in twentieth-century Japan, Let me emphasize the interactive character of nationalisms and religions ‘with one final example before concluding this introduction, Sheldon Garon has indicated the limitations of the emperor-system approach to Japanese nationalism that invariably traces all suppression back to the pre-1945 Japanese stare—a state which appears omnipotent and eager to unilaterally define what is orthodox. Historians of Europe and America have recently argued that social control” neglect the input of societal forces. In rival religious organizations and progressive intellectuals were often as likely as bureaucrats to call for the strict regulation of cer- tain sects. T propose that we reexamine relations between the Japanese state and civil society in terms of a more interactive model.* chat a more interactive forces is necessary, but my attempt is to show that elements within civil society negotiated with the state in a manner that ultimately led to a stronger state, I will argue that the powerful social control the state achieved by the 1940s was also the result of a dialectic relationship of contes- tation, co-option, and in some cases cooperation with, forces that were at not hostile, to the state. The result of this dialectic igion and nationalism was gious theology but also a metamorphosis of the state. model ‘THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM IN MODERN JAPAN Before proceeding to a discussion of the c ‘World War in 1918, This is a necessary step in order to grasp both the historical difference between the discourses on nationalism in the Meiji and Showa years, as well as to come to terms with the shift in rela- tionship between religion and nationalism in these two historical moments. * John A. Hall, “Nationalsms: Clasifed and Explained,” Dacdalu Sheldon M. Garon, opaneeSoudies (Summer smmer 1993): -1945," Journal of te and Religion in Imperial Japan, 5): 276, WTKEVIN M. DOAK Concomitant with victory over the loosely confederated bakufie (RAF) in perceived by the imperial government to redefine a that would meet the requirements of a modernizing. \¢ views of the moderniz- ersas they were encoded in the Meiji Cor #1889. The nationalism that followed, whether termed kobéashygi BIRR, kokuminshugt BRS, kokusuishugi BOER, of otherwise, was an attemy ple” (Bt) into the new modern nation-state (BI: legiances beyond regional domai focus on the new nation-state ‘This indoctrination of the values ofthe nation-state often involved, as Carol Gluck has shown, the active participation of many of “the peopl selves.” Gluck’s work has broadened our understanding of the source of nationalist ideology, but it has not challenged the general consensus behind Kenneth Pyle’s conclusion that the essence of Mi process...by which large numbers of people of a logically integrated into act represented the incorporation of the people into with the modern nation-state, one finds a parallel devel- he way Buddhism accommodated the new Meiji nation: the 1860s and 1870s, large numbers of persons within organized Buddhism reorganized themselves as “New Buddhism” to incorporate many of the rational, modern demands This reformation was so successful that when Shaku Zen abbot, journeyed (first class 1893 World’s iament of Religion in Chicago, he delivered hi jons that were characterized by a social Darwi NATIONALISM AS DIALECTICS ilar to the ideas of Kat Hiroyuki, one of the Meiji state’s chief ideologues. In retrospect, this may not seem so surprising given “institutional Buddhism’s active support of involvement in the Sino-Japanese (1894-1895) and, to a lesser extent, the Russo-Japanese (1904-1905) wars,” but the contrast between this Zen Buddhism and that later popularized by D. T. Suzuki is rather striking The late Meiji years have often been seen as a period of withdrawal by a successful “secular” state from religious affairs. For example, Sheldon Garon has pointed out that unlike the ambitious Ministry of Rites and Education (8884) of the 1870s, the succeeding Bureau of Shrines and Temples (1877-1900) and Bureau of Religions (1900-1913) were simply low-ranking divisions within the Home Ministry.... Rather than harnessing the spiritual influence of the religions, the authorities preferred to socialize the people directly through agencies of the secular state. But on closer inspection, the distinction between sacred and secular with respect to the state and Buddhism in late Meiji may not be a fruitful one. A nation-state whose very legitimacy was secured in part by an ideology based on a sacred emperor could never completely distance itself from religious concerns.” And indeed, the reshuflling of bureaucratic agencies responsible for the oversight of religious activity was also a recognition of New Bud- dhism’s incorporation of modern, nationalist values. These New Buddhists had already taken it upon themselves to write a history of their faith that would “accentuate the long and intimate relation between Buddhism and the Japanese national spirit.” Kecclar, Of Heres and Mares, 189-66. The comparison to Kat® is mine, Ketlaar describing the “progress ofthe universe,” Shaku argued ce Darwin's own, is applicable to al beings, the moral ie of| ‘human beings is thereby equaly determined by a logical caleulus of evolation driven forth by the actions of particular indvidnals (16 © Ketelaar, Of Herter aa Maroy, 183 ° Garon, "Sate and Religion in Imperial Japan,” 278. Remar Silberman argues tha the development of rational bureaucracy was designed pre Gel to provide analtemative tothe emperor asthe source of legitimacy ofthe new state Se his “The Bureaucratic State in Japan: The Problem of Authority and Legitimacy,” in Najta and Koschmann, eds, Camfics n Japan, 226-57, But his bi discussion ofthe nie ofthe miliary during the critical 1986-1948 period remains more desriptve than analytical a it does not felt compelled to intervene in parliamentary politics of ate order allowed the military to remain outside of the in direct relationship tothe emperor. 1 Ketelaar, Of Heretics and Maroy, 179