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NNSA Thanks JASONs for Technical Review of LEP ProgramsNovember 19, 2009

At the request of the former Chair and former Ranking Member of the HouseArmed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, the National Nuclear SecurityAdministration (NNSA) contracted with the JASONs to conduct a technicalreview of the Lifetime Extension Programs (LEPs) aimed at extending thelifetimes of weapon systems in the U.S. stockpile in the absence of nucleartesting. We thank the JASONs for their efforts to help find a way forward to asustainable nuclear security enterprise.The JASON’s review confirms the challenges associated with addingperformance margin and incorporating modern safety and security features intoaging weapons systems, acknowledges the need to preserve our workforce, andreaffirms our long held belief that the strength of the science, technology andengineering at the laboratories and plants is the key to our success.While we endorse the recommendations and consider them well-aligned withNNSA’s long-term stockpile management strategy, certain findings in theunclassified Executive Summary convey a different perspective on key findingswhen viewed without the context of the full classified report. The full reportaddresses them comprehensively and validates our basic scientific approach towarhead life extension programs, specifically our commitment to evaluatingeach weapon system on a case-by-case basis and applying the best technologicalapproach from a spectrum of options.--- NNSA Spokesman Damien LaVera

JSR-09-3341

1 Executive Summary

1.1 Study charge

This study of the Life Extension Program (LEP) for deployed U.S. nuclear weapons respondsto the following charge.“NNSA requests that JASON study LEP strategies for maintaining the U.S.nuclear deterrent in the absence of underground nuclear testing. This shouldinclude:

•

Study the certification challenges associated with changes, to includeaccumulation of changes, made to a warhead

during its life.

•

Compare the assessment and certification challenges of different LEPstrategies ranging from refurbishment to replacement.

•

Study proposed methods to measure the evolution of risk due to multiplechanges during warhead life and initiated in LEPs.

•

Study how NNSA can mitigate risks while maintaining a safe, secure andreliable nuclear deterrent. Comment on how the overall balance andstructure of science, technology, engineering and production activities canbe made to minimize future risk to the stockpile.

•

Study the accumulated risks and uncertainties of the current LifeExtension Program strategy. As already identified by a previous JASONstudy, risk areas include:

Linkage to UGT data,

Manufacturing changes that may unavoidably result in differencesfrom the as-tested devices,

Increased surety

features, and

Thresholds to failure.”NNSA provided the following definitions:“

Refurbishment

(current implementation of LEP) - Very generally, individualwarhead components are replaced before they degrade with components of(nearly) identical design or that meet the same “form, fit, and function.”

Warhead Component Reuse -

Refers specifically to the use of existing surpluspit and secondary components from other warhead types. Approach maypermit limited warhead surety improvements and some increased margins.

In this study “warhead” refers to the nuclear explosive package and associated non-nuclear components.

Surety encompasses safety, security and use control.

JSR-09-3342

Warhead Replacement

- Some or all of the components of a warhead arereplaced with modern design that are more easily manufacturable, provideincreased warhead margins, forego no longer available or hazardousmaterials, improve safety, security and use control, and offer the potential forfurther overall stockpile reductions.”

1.2

Findings

JASON was asked to assess the impacts of changes to stockpile warheads incurred fromaging and LEPs. In response:

•

JASON finds no evidence that accumulation of changes incurred from aging andLEPs have increased risk to certification of today’s deployed nuclear warheads

This finding is a direct consequence of the excellent work of the people in the USnuclear weapons complex supported and informed by the tools and methodsdeveloped through the Stockpile Stewardship program. Some aging issues havealready been resolved. The others that have been identified can be resolved throughLEP approaches similar to those employed to date. To maintain certification, militaryrequirements for some stockpile warheads have been modified. The modifications arethe result of improved understanding of original weapon performance, not because ofaging or other changes. If desired, all but one of the original major performancerequirements could also be met through LEP approaches similar to those employed todate.

•

Lifetimes of today's nuclear warheads could be extended for decades, with noanticipated loss in confidence, by using approaches similar to those employed inLEPs to date .

The report discusses details and challenges for each stockpile system.For each warhead, decisions must be made about including additional surety features.Findings regarding surety features are

•

Further scientific research and engineering development is required for someproposed surety systems.

•

Implementation of intrinsic

surety features in today's re-entry systems, using thetechnologies proposed to date, would require reuse or replacement LEP options.

•

All proposed surety features for today's air-carried systems could be implementedthrough reuse LEP options.

i.e. inside the nuclear explosive package.