THEM109 Text Comment

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Text Comment Thomas Aquinas
Summa contra Gentiles iv.32-33

Introduction: the author and his method
St Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274) was a friar member of the Order of Preachers, a
university teacher, and a theologian of incomparable depth. His work has influenced
greatly the theological, philosophical, and ethical thought of Western Christianity well
beyond the reaches of the Dominican order or Roman Catholicism.
Aquinas authorship encompasses a vast number of works on a wide range of topics
including commentaries on various Biblical texts and on the works of Aristotle; however,
his three most important works remain the Commentary on Peter Lombards Sentences
or Scriptum super Sententiis, the Summa contra Gentiles or De Veritate Catholic
Fidei contra Gentiles, and the most studied of all, the Summa Theologi.
Aquinas works are representative of the Scholastic method the method of the
schools, or universities. Scholasticism was the result of class disputations; a method of
teaching largely abandoned nowadays, but very common in mediaeval universities.
Indeed, Aquinas himself used this method as a teacher and some of his works are the
product of his class disputations. Scholastic works were written in and organised in very
formal structures, with material grouped under broad topics or questions
1
.



1
Cf. Norman KRETZMANN, Eleonore STUMP (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, Cambridge
University Press (Cambridge, 1993) 5
THEM109 Text Comment
2

The Summa contra Gentiles
Thomas began to compose the Summa contra Gentiles (SCG) towards the end of his
second Parisian period when he was Master of Theology (c. 1259); however, there is
some disagreement on whether or not this was a direct product of his university
teaching.
St Raymund of Peafort, Thomas biographer, indicates that the intended readers of the
SCG were Dominican missionaries in Spain and North Africa engaged in preaching
against unbelievers, typically Jews and Muslims; but the validity of this claim which
may have been inferred by St Raymund because of Thomas own forewords in SGC i.2.iii
has been the subject of some debate in the twentieth century
2
. Nevertheless, the
apologetic tone of the SCG, and its systematic approach and literary genre suggest very
distinctly that the work may have been composed as a manual in which the truth that
the Catholic faith professes, and []the errors that are opposed to it
3
are examined in
detail and systematised for the benefit of students, and probably also preachers.
The SCG is composed of four volumes in which Aquinas expounds the Catholic faith by
means of using natural reason something that all people are bound to give their assent
to
4
. The first three books focus on natural revelation, meaning that truth that the human
reason is naturally endowed to know
5
about God and creation. The fourth book
illustrates the Christians revelation as those realities which necessarily transcend the
capacity of natural reason
6
. Notably however, even in this last volume Thomas relies
heavily on the use of philosophy in order to demonstrate that the Christian revelation,
though transcendent, is not opposed to natural reason
7
.

2
Cf. Brian DAVIES, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1992) 6
3
SCG i.2.ii
4
Cf. SGC i.2.iii
5
SCG i.7.i
6
Cf. SCG i.7.i
7
Cf. SGC iv.1.x
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Chapter Thirty Two and Thirty Three considered below are extracts from the fourth
volume. Here Aquinas employs the philosophical language of matter, form, essence, and
species to support Christian belief about the existence of a soul in Jesus Christ.
Chapter Thirty Two: Did Christ have a soul? and what kind of soul was it?
Aquinas begins this chapter by reminding the reader about the Apollinarian error with
regards to Christ human body; namely that the Word of God was changed (conversum
8
)
into flesh at the incarnation, rather than assuming flesh. He then moves to consider
the Apollinarian heresy with regards to the rational soul of Christ and its resultant
rejection of any moral development in the person of Jesus.
However, the first consideration Thomas wants to make is whether or not Christ had a
soul and so he brings Arius into the argument
9
to for this purpose. Aquinas does not
rehearse completely the Arian doctrine which denied the equality of the Son to the
Father, as this is outlined and refuted earlier in the book; rather Aquinas chooses to
focus his attention on the philosophical consequences of Arianism, on the existence of a
soul in Christ. Arianism held that Christ did not have a soul because the Word of God
itself was the animating force (anima) in him.
Thus, perhaps surprisingly, Aquinas groups together Arius and Apollinarius even
though the latter affirmed the fullness of divinity of Christ remaining a strong opponent
of the Arianism. Nevertheless, Thomas affirms that whether one holds that the Word of
God is equal with God or created by Him, it remains impossible for God or a
supercelestial spirit to be the form of a human being, due to their essential differences
10
.
Aquinas therefore, concludes that Christ must have had a soul.


8
Cf. SCG iv.31.vi
9
Cf. SCG iv.32.ii
10
Cf. SCG iv.32.iii-iv
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Thomas then illustrates three further points. In doing so, he wants to affirm that Christ
necessarily had a soul that made him fully human. First, Aquinas affirms that the soul
constitutes the form of the human essence
11
. Thus, if one were to deny its existence in
Christ as both Arius and Apollinarius did to different degrees his humanity would
not have been complete, and if humanity had not been complete, Christ could not be
described as human (homo, 1Tim 2:5)
12
.
Secondly, Thomas affirms that the presence of the soul provides meaning to the whole
body. With the soul gone, he holds, the body parts of a dead person lose their value
13
. If
Christ had not had a soul, the divine nature could not take its place, and his physical
presence would not have had the same significance; it would just have been a body.
Thirdly, Aquinas affirms that whatever is generated from another
14
, has to be of the
same specie of the one from whom it originates in order to be its proper offspring.
Therefore, if Christ had not had a soul he would not have been a true human being and,
consequently, of a different species to the Virgin Mary whom Scripture calls his
mother.

Having established philosophically that Christ must have assumed a soul, Aquinas
considers briefly what Scripture suggests about the type of soul this is; namely, Thomas
observes that Jesus feared, ate and drunk in response to the appetites and passions of
the sensitive soul
15
and that this soul had no divine attributes
16
.
In the next chapter Aquinas moves on to consider whether or not a merely sensitive soul
is the type of soul most fitting to Christ.

11
SCG iv.32.v
12
Cf. SCG iv.32.v
13
Cf. SCG iv.32.vi
14
SCG iv.32.vii
15
SCG iv.32.x
16
Cf. SCG iv.32.viii-xi
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Chapter Thirty Three: sensitive vs. rational soul
Apollinarianism conceded that the soul of Christ had a soul that was sensitive and
responsive to the appetites such as hunger or thirst, but it denied that any higher
function was performed by a rational soul. The divine nature would be the source of the
intellect and of the reason, as well as being the seat of self-consciousness in the
Messiah
17
. However, Aquinas wants to illustrate that the soul of Christ can be thought
rational as well.
First, he goes back to the language of species upon which he touched earlier in SCG
iv.32.vii broadening the argument and asserting that because all humans are endowed
with a rational soul, the Christ must have had a rational soul too in order to be of the
same species as us
18
.
Secondly, Aquinas considers whether or not Jesus could be one of a kind among the
species endowed only with sensitive soul, or a genus apart from the rest. However
Thomas observes that, due to the intimate correlation between matter and form,
between the essence of something and its physicality, if Christ had soul that differed in
type from ours, than Christ body would not have been like ours. Again, both of these
suppositions would make Christ different from human beings
19
.
Thirdly, Aquinas considers Christ sense of wonder as manifested in Scripture through
the lens of philosophy. The sense of wonder is proper the human soul alone and it
involves a necessary yearning for knowledge. It is neither fit for divine nature being
omniscient precludes wondering at the cause of things, nor it is fit for the sensitive soul
whose cares are concerned only with the appetites and lower passions. Thus, if Christ
did wonder, than he must have had a human soul
20
.

17
Cf. SCG iv.33.i
18
Cf. SCG iv.33.ii
19
Cf. SCG iv.33.iii-iv
20
Cf. SCG iv.33.v
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Lastly, Aquinas turns to the field of Biblical exegesis. After comparing the words flesh
(caro) and soul (anima) with other recurrences of it in Scripture. Thomas affirms that
both flesh and soul are used in the Bible to mean the whole man
21
and thus the correct
interpretation of John 1:14 is that at the incarnation the Word of God wasnt converted
into flesh, rather he assumed all those characteristics that typically define being human,
namely a body and a rational soul.
As a coda to this chapter, Thomas refutes Origen stance that the soul of Christ was
created and united to the Word before the Incarnation, on the ground that a pre-existing
of the soul wold not be fit for the human species
22
. Once again, if the soul of Christ had
differed on this point, Christ would not have come to share humanity in its fullness.

Conclusion
For Aquinas the soul is the animating force of a creature
23
; it is also the essence of its
form and linked to the physicality of the creature. The soul and the body cannot be
successfully considered separately, as each separately forms an incomplete substance
24

which, as in SCG iv.32.vi, cannot be termed a person. In the case of human beings their
soul is a rational one, capable of wonder and reason as well as of performing the roles of
the sensitive soul.
Did Christ then have a soul or was his body animated by the divine nature alone? Was
that soul sensitive or rational? Why was it rational? These are some of the questions
behind the text considered in this paper. Aquinas addresses them whilst defending the
Catholic faith against three types of heresies. The first affirmed that Christ had no soul

21
SCG iv.33.vi
22
Cf. SCG iv.33.vii
23
Cf. Brian DAVIES, (1992) 209
24
THOMAS AQUINAS in F.C. COPLESTON, Aquinas, Penguin Books (Aylesbury, 1970) 160
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(Arianism), the second that he had a sensitive soul only (Apollinarianism), and the third
that his soul had been created before his conception (Origenism).
To these Thomas answers that Christ assumed a rational soul equal to any other human
soul in every respect. If this were not so, Christ would have been essentially different
from us and the fullness of his humanity, as affirmed in Scripture, would have been
compromised.
Moreover, these chapters also show how Aquinas chooses to expound the faith in a way
which could make it more intelligible to non-believers. Aquinas could have relied solely
on the authority of Scripture and Tradition as these heresies had been tackled by the
Church long before his time, but he chooses to employ a variety of reasonable
philosophical arguments, as far as these did not contrast with the Christian faith. Thus,
here Aristotle provides the basis for Aquinas claims about the nature of souls, and the
essentially human desire for knowledge.









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Bibliography
THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa contra Gentiles, Joseph KENNY (ed.), Hanover House
(New York, 1957)
E-text, dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles.htm (Last accessed Jan. 2014)

F.C. COPLESTON, Aquinas, Penguin Books (Aylesbury, 1970)
Brian DAVIES, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, Oxford University Press
(Oxford, 1992)
Norman KRETZMANN, Eleonore STUMP (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to
Aquinas, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 1993)
Joseph RICKABY, Of God and His Creatures: An Annotated Translation (with
some abridgement) of the Summa contra gentiles of Saint Thomas Aquinas,
Burns & Oates (London, 1905)
E-text, nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc.htm (Last accessed Jan. 2014)
Eleonore STUMP, Aquinas, Routledge (Abingdon, 2005)










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Appendix
Extract from http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles4.htm (June 14)
Caput 32
De errore Arii et Apollinaris circa animam
Christi
Chapter 32
ON THE ERROR OF ARIUS AND
APOLLINARIS ABOUT THE SOUL OF
CHRIST
Non solum autem circa corpus Christi, sed
etiam circa eius animam aliqui male sensisse
inveniuntur.
[1] It is, however, not only about the body of
Christ but also about His soul that one finds
some bad opinions.
Posuit enim Arius quod in Christo non fuit
anima, sed quod solam carnem assumpsit, cui
divinitas loco animae fuit. Et ad hoc ponendum
necessitate quadam videtur fuisse inductus.
Cum enim vellet asserere quod filius Dei sit
creatura et minor patre, ad hoc probandum illa
Scripturarum assumpsit testimonia quae,
infirmitatem humanam ostendunt in Christo. Et
ne aliquis eius probationem refelleret, dicendo
assumpta ab eo testimonia Christo non
secundum divinam naturam, sed humanam
convenire, nequiter animam removit a Christo,
ut, cum quaedam corpori humano convenire non
possint, sicut quod miratus est, quod timuit,
quod oravit, necessarium fiat huiusmodi in
ipsum filium Dei minorationem inferre.
Assumpsit autem in suae positionis assertionem
praemissum verbum Ioannis dicentis, verbum
caro factum est: ex quo accipere volebat quod
solam carnem verbum assumpserit, non autem
animam. Et in hac positione etiam Apollinaris
eum secutus est.
[2] For Arius held that in Christ there was no
soul, but that He assumed only flesh, and that
divinity stood to this as soul. And he seems to
have been led to this position by a certain
necessity. For he wanted to maintain that the Son
of God was a creature and less than the Father,
and so for his proof he picked up those Scriptural
passages which show human infirmity in Christ.
And to keep anyone from refuting him by saying
that the passages he picked referred to Christ not
in His divine, but in His human, nature, he evilly
removed the soul from Christ to this purpose:
since some things are not harmonious with a
human body, that He wondered, for example,
that He feared, that He prayedall such must
necessarily imply the inferiority of the Son of
God Himself. Of course, he picked up for the
assertion of his position the words of John just
mentioned, The Word was made flesh, and
from this he wanted to gather that the Word only
assumed flesh, not a soul. And in this position
even Apollinaris followed him.
Manifestum est autem ex praemissis hanc
positionem impossibilem esse. Ostensum est
enim supra quod Deus forma corporis esse non
potest. Cum igitur verbum Dei sit Deus, ut
ostensum est, impossibile est quod verbum Dei
sit forma corporis, ut sic carni pro anima esse
possit.
[3] But it is clear from what has been said that
this position is impossible. For it was shown
Ames that God cannot be the form of a body.
Since, therefore, the Word of God is God, as was
shown, it is impossible that the Word of God be
the form of a body, so as to be able to stand as a
soul to flesh.
Utilis autem est haec ratio contra Apollinarem,
qui verbum Dei verum Deum esse confitebatur:
et licet hoc Arius negaret, tamen etiam contra
eum praedicta ratio procedit. Quia non solum
Deus non potest esse forma corporis, sed nec
etiam aliquis supercaelestium spirituum, inter
quos supremum filium Dei Arius ponebat:- nisi
forte secundum positionem Origenis, qui posuit
[4] This argument, of course, is useful against
Apollinaris, who confessed the Word of God to
be true God; and granted Arius would deny this
last, the argument just given goes against him,
also. For it is not God alone who cannot be the
form of a body, neither can any of the
supercelestial spirits among whom Arius held the
Son of God supreme. Exception might be made
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humanas animas eiusdem speciei et naturae cum
supercaelestibus spiritibus esse. Cuius opinionis
falsitatem supra ostendimus.
for the position of Origen, who held that human
souls were of the very same species and nature as
the supercelestial spirits. The falsity of this
opinion was explained above.
Item. Subtracto eo quod est de ratione hominis,
verus homo esse non potest. Manifestum est
autem animam principaliter de ratione hominis
esse: cum sit eius forma. Si igitur Christus
animam non habuit, verus homo non fuit: cum
tamen apostolus eum hominem asserat, dicens, I
ad Tim. 2-5: unus est mediator Dei et hominum,
homo Christus Iesus.
[5] Take away, moreover, what is of the essence
of man, and no true man can be. Clearly, of
course, the soul is chiefly of the essence of man,
since it is his form. Therefore, if Christ had no
soul He was not true man, whereas the Apostle
does call Him man: There is one mediator of
God and men, the man Christ Jesus (1 Tim.
2:5).
Adhuc. Ex anima non solum ratio hominis, sed
et singularium partium eius dependet: unde,
remota anima, oculus, caro et os hominis mortui
aequivoce dicuntur, sicut oculus pictus aut
lapideus. Si igitur in Christo non fuit anima,
necesse est quod nec vera caro in eo fuerit, nec
aliqua alia partium hominis: cum tamen
dominus haec in se esse perhibeat, dicens,
Lucae, ult.: spiritus carnem et ossa non habet,
sicut me videtis habere.
[6] It is on the soul, furthermore, that not only
mans essence, but that of his single parts,
depends; and so, with the soul gone, the eye, the
flesh, and the bone of a dead man are
equivocally named, like a painted or a stone
eye. Therefore, if in Christ there was no soul, of
necessity there was neither true flesh in Him nor
any of the other parts of man, whereas our Lord
says that He has these in Himself: A spirit has
not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have (Luke
24:39).
Amplius. Quod generatur ex aliquo vivente,
filius eius dici non potest nisi in eandem
speciem procedat: non enim vermis dicitur filius
animalis ex quo generatur. Sed si Christus
animam non habuit, non fuit eiusdem speciei
cum aliis hominibus: quae enim secundum
formam differunt, eiusdem speciei esse non
possunt. Non igitur dici poterit quod Christus sit
filius Mariae virginis, aut quod illa sit mater
eius. Quod tamen in evangelica Scriptura
asseritur.
[7] Further, what is generated from another
cannot be called his son unless he comes forth in
the same species; the maggot is not called the
son of the animal from which it is generated.
But, if Christ had no soul, He was not of the
same species as other men, for things which
differ in form cannot be identical in species.
Therefore, one will not be able to say that Christ
is the Son of the Virgin Mary or that she is His
Mother. Nonetheless, Scripture asserts this in the
Gospels (Mat. 1:18; Luke 7:7).
Praeterea. In Evangelio expresse dicitur quod
Christus animam habuit: sicut est illud Matth.
26-38, tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem; et
Ioan. 12-27, nunc anima mea turbata est.
[8] There is mo re. The Gospel expressly says
that Christ had a soul; Matthew (26:38) for
instance: My soul is sorrowful even unto
death, and John (17:2.7): Now is My soul
troubled.
Et ne forte dicant ipsum filium Dei animam
dici, eo quod, secundum eorum positionem,
loco animae carni sit: sumendum est quod
dominus dicit, Ioan. 10-18, potestatem habeo
ponendi animam meam, et iterum sumendi eam;
ex quo intelligitur aliud esse quam animam in
Christo, quod habuit potestatem ponendi
[9] And lest they say perhaps that the very Son
of God is called soul because in their position He
stands to the flesh as soul, one must take our
Lords own saying: I have power to lay My soul
down: and I have power to take it up again
(John 10:18). From this one understands that
there is another than the soul in Christ, which
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animam suam et sumendi. Non autem fuit in
potestate corporis quod uniretur filio Dei vel
separaretur ab eo: cum hoc etiam naturae
potestatem excedat. Oportet igitur intelligi in
Christo aliud fuisse animam, et aliud
divinitatem filii Dei, cui merito talis potestas
tribuitur.
had the power of laying the soul down and taking
it up again. It was, of course, not in the power of
the body to be united to the Son of God or be
separated from Him, since this, too, exceeds the
power of nature. One must, then, understand that
in Christ the soul was one thing and the divinity
of the Son of God another, to whom such power
justly is attributed.
Item. Tristitia, ira et huiusmodi passiones sunt
animae sensitivae: ut patet per philosophum in
VII Phys. Haec autem in Christo fuisse ex
Evangeliis comprobatur. Oportet igitur in
Christo fuisse animam sensitivam: de qua
planum est quod differt a natura divina filii Dei.
[10] Another reason: Sorrow, anger and the like
are passions of the sensitive soul; the
Philosopher makes this plain. [Therefore Christ
must have had a sensitive soul: This is plainly
different from the divine nature of the Son of
God.]
Sed quia potest dici humana in Evangeliis
metaphorice dici de Christo, sicut et de Deo in
plerisque locis sacrae Scripturae loquuntur,
accipiendum est aliquid quod necesse sit ut
proprie dictum intelligatur. Sicut enim alia
corporalia quae de Christo Evangelistae narrant,
proprie intelliguntur et non metaphorice, ita
oportet non metaphorice de ipso intelligi quod
manducaverit et esurierit. Esurire autem non est
nisi habentis animam sensitivam: cum esuries
sit appetitus cibi. Oportet igitur quod Christus
habuit animam sensitivam.
[11] But, since one can say that the human things
in the Gospels are said of Christ metaphorically,
just as the sacred Scriptures speak of God in
many places, one must take something which is
understood properly of necessity. For, just as
other bodily things which the Evangelists relate
of Christ are understood properly and not
metaphorically, so it must not be understood of
Christ metaphorically that He ate and that He
hungered. Only he who has a sensitive soul
hungers, since hunger is the appetite for food.
Necessarily, then, Christ had a sensitive soul.

Caput 33
De errore Apollinaris dicentis animam
rationalem non fuisse in Christo, et de errore
Origenis dicentis animam Christi ante
mundum fuisse creatam
Chapter 33
ON THE ERROR OF APOLLINARIS, WHO
SAYS THERE WAS NO RATIONAL SOUL
IN CHRIST; AND THE ERROR OF
ORIGEN, WHO SAYS THE SOUL OF
CHRIST WAS CREATED BEFORE THE
WORLD
His autem testimoniis evangelicis Apollinaris
convictus, confessus est in Christo animam
sensitivam fuisse: tamen sine mente et
intellectu, ita quod verbum Dei fuerit illi
animae loco intellectus et mentis.
[1] Won over, however, by this Gospel
testimony, Apollinaris confessed that there was a
sensitive soul in Christ; nonetheless, it was
without mind and intellect, so that the Word of
God was in that soul in place of intellect and
mind.
Sed nec hoc sufficit ad inconvenientia praedicta
vitanda. Homo enim speciem sortitur humanam
ex hoc quod mentem humanam et rationem
habet. Si igitur Christus haec non habuit, verus
homo non fuit, nec eiusdem speciei nobiscum.
Anima autem ratione carens ad aliam speciem
[2.] But even this is not sufficient to avoid the
awkward consequences described, for man gets
his human species from his having a human mind
and reason. Therefore, if Christ did not have
these, He was not true man, nor was He of the
same species with us. For a soul which lacks
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pertinet quam anima rationem habens. Est enim
secundum philosophum, VIII Metaphys., quod
in definitionibus et speciebus quaelibet
differentia essentialis addita vel subtracta variat
speciem, sicut in numeris unitas. Rationale
autem est differentia specifica. Si igitur in
Christo fuit anima sensitiva sine ratione, non
fuit eiusdem speciei cum anima nostra, quae est
rationem habens. Nec ipse igitur Christus fuit
eiusdem speciei nobiscum.
reason belongs to a species other than that of the
soul which has reason. For, according to the
Philosopher [Metaphysics VIII, 3], in definitions
and species any essential difference which is
added or subtracted varies the species, just as
unity does in numbers. But rational is the specific
difference. Therefore, if in Christ there was a
sensitive soul without reason, it was not of the
same species with our soul, which does have
reason. Neither, then, was Christ Himself of the
same species with us.
Adhuc. Inter ipsas animas sensitivas ratione
carentes diversitas secundum speciem existit:
quod patet ex animalibus irrationalibus, quae ab
invicem specie differunt, quorum tamen
unumquodque secundum propriam animam
speciem habet. Sic igitur anima sensitiva
ratione carens est quasi unum genus sub se
plures species comprehendens. Nihil autem est
in genere quod non sit in aliqua eius specie. Si
igitur anima Christi fuit in genere animae
sensitivae ratione carentis, oportet quod
contineretur sub aliqua specierum eius: utpote
quod fuerit in specie animae leonis aut alicuius
alterius belluae. Quod est omnino absurdum.
[3] Again, among the sensible souls themselves
which lack reason there exists diversity by reason
of species. This appears from consideration of
the irrational animals which differ from one
another in species; nonetheless, each of them has
its species according to its proper soul. Thus,
then, the sensitive soul lacking reason is, so to
say, one genus including within itself many
species. But nothing is in a genus which is not in
one of its species. If, then, the soul of Christ was
in the genus of sensitive soul lacking reason, it
must have been included in one of its species; for
example, it was in the species of lion soul, or
some other beast. And this is entirely absurd.
Amplius. Corpus comparatur ad animam sicut
materia ad formam, et sicut instrumentum ad
principale agens. Oportet autem materiam
proportionatam esse formae, et instrumentum
principali agenti. Ergo secundum diversitatem
animarum oportet et corporum diversitatem
esse. Quod et secundum sensum apparet: nam
in diversis animalibus inveniuntur diversae
dispositiones membrorum, secundum quod
conveniunt diversis dispositionibus animarum.
Si ergo in Christo non fuit anima qualis est
anima nostra, nec etiam membra habuisset sicut
sunt membra humana.
[4] The body, moreover, is compared to the soul
as matter to form, and as instrument to principal
agent. But the matter must be proportionate to the
form, and the instrument to the principal agent.
Therefore, consequent on the diversity of souls,
there must be a diversity of bodies. And this is
sensibly evident, for in diverse animals one finds
diverse dispositions of the members, in which
they concord with the diverse dispositions of the
souls. Therefore, if in Christ there was not a soul
such as our soul is, neither would He have had
members like the human members.
Praeterea. Cum secundum Apollinarem verbum
Dei sit verus Deus, ei admiratio competere non
potest: nam ea admiramur quorum causam
ignoramus. Similiter autem nec admiratio
animae sensitivae competere potest: cum ad
animam sensitivam non pertineat sollicitari de
cognitione causarum. In Christo autem
admiratio fuit, sicut ex Evangeliis probatur:
dicitur enim Matth. 8-10, quod audiens Iesus
verba centurionis miratus est. Oportet igitur,
praeter divinitatem verbi et animam sensitivam,
in Christo aliquid ponere secundum quod
[5] There is more. Since, according to
Apollinaris, the Word of God is true God.
wonder cannot be seemly in Him, for we wonder
at those things whose cause we ignore. But, in
the same way, wonder cannot be fitting for the
sensitive soul, since solicitude for the knowledge
of causes does not belong to the sensitive soul.
But there was wonder in Christ; so one proves
from the Gospels. It says in Matthew (8:10) that
Jesus heard the words of the centurion and
marveled. One must, then, in addition to the
divinity of the Word and His sensitive soul put in
THEM109 Text Comment
13

admiratio ei competere possit, scilicet mentem
humanam.
Christ that which can make wonder seemly in
Him; namely, a human mind.
Manifestum est igitur ex praedictis quod in
Christo verum corpus humanum et vera anima
humana fuit. Sic igitur quod Ioannes dicit,
verbum caro factum est, non sic intelligitur
quasi verbum sit in carnem conversum; neque
sic quod verbum carnem solam assumpserit; aut
cum anima sensitiva, sine mente; sed secundum
consuetum modum Scripturae, ponitur pars pro
toto, ut sic dictum sit, verbum caro factum est,
ac si diceretur, verbum homo factum est; nam et
anima interdum pro homine ponitur in
Scriptura, dicitur enim Exod. 1-5, erant omnes
animae quae egressae sunt de femore Iacob
septuaginta, similiter etiam caro pro toto
homine ponitur, dicitur enim Isaiae 40-5,
videbit omnis caro pariter quod os domini
locutum est. Sic igitur et hic caro pro toto
homine ponitur, ad exprimendam humanae
naturae infirmitatem, quam verbum Dei
assumpsit.
[6] Manifestly, therefore, from the aforesaid
there was in Christ a human body and a true
human soul. Thus, therefore, Johns saying
(1:14), The Word was made flesh, is not thus to
be understood, as though the Word has been
converted into flesh; or as though the Word has
assumed the flesh only; or with a sensitive soul
without a mind; but after Scriptures usual
manner the part is put for the whole, so that one
says: The Word was made man. Soul is
sometimes used in place of man in Scripture;
Exodus (1:5) says: And all the souls that came
out of Jacobs thigh were seventy; in the same
way, also, flesh is used for the whole man;
Isaiah (40:5) says: All flesh together shall see
that the mouth of the Lord has spoken. Thus,
then, flesh is here used for the whole man,
also, to express the weakness of the human
nature which the Word of God assumed.
Si autem Christus humanam carnem et
humanam animam habuit, ut ostensum est,
manifestum est animam Christi non fuisse ante
corporis eius conceptionem. Ostensum est enim
quod humanae animae propriis corporibus non
praeexistunt. Unde patet falsum esse Origenis
dogma, dicentis animam Christi ab initio, ante
corporales creaturas, cum omnibus aliis
spiritualibus creaturis creatam et a verbo Dei
assumptam, et demum, circa fines saeculorum,
pro salute hominum carne fuisse indutam.
[7] But, if Christ had human flesh and a human
soul, as was shown, it is plain that there was no
soul of Christ before His bodys conception. For
it was shown that human souls do not pre-exist
their proper bodies. Hence is clear the falsity of
that tenet of Origen, who said that in the
beginning, before all bodily creatures, the soul of
Christ was created with all other spiritual
creatures and assumed by the Word of God, and
that finally, toward the end of the ages, for mens
salvation it was endowed with flesh.