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Pending Cases to Be Digested

Pending Cases to Be Digested

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Published by Loren Vicedo
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Published by: Loren Vicedo on Jun 07, 2014
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In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim
 
GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
 
FACTS:
 Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
HELD:
 Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses  jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority.
The use of the word “shall” signifies that
 joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552.
The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.
BONIFACIA MATEO vs. GERVACIO LAGUA
 xxx FACTS: Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on May 15, 1917 and thereaf 
ter the couple took possession of the lots, but the certificates of title remained in the donor’s
name. In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant daughter, who lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn undertook to farm on the donated lots. At first,
 
Cipriano gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots’ harvests, but in 1926 he refused to deliver to
petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action and won for her possession of the lots plus damages. On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his younger son, herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when Cipriano stopped giving to petitioner her share to the harvest.
A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under respondent’s
name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan. The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and ordered cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner. In 1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two lots. While the case was pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed for prescription, having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by 494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have freely given by will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime
of Cipriano’s
other heir, Gervacio. The donation was thus declared inofficious and herein petitioners were ordered to reconvey to Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq. m. from any convenient part of the lots. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter nuptias for being inofficious. HELD:
Decision of CA based on unsupported assumptions set aside; trial court’s
order of dismissal sustained. Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof
that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee’s
share as legitime in the properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be seen that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.
 Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.
To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.
 
Manongsong vs. Estimo
G. R. No. 136773. June 25, 2003 We likewise find no b
asis for the trial court’s declaration that the sale embodied in
the
Kasulatan
deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition
inter vivos
by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration. Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent. The presence of these elements is apparent on the face of the
Kasulatan
 itself. The Property was sold in 1957 for P250.00. If Navarro were not the mother of
Guevarra, it would only further undermine petitioners’ case.
 Absent any hereditary relationship between Guevarra and Navarro, the Property would not have passed from Navarro to
Guevarra, and then to the latter’s children, including petitioners, by succession.
 There would
then be no basis for petitioners’ claim of co
-ownership by virtue of inheritance from Guevarra. On the other hand, this would not undermin
e respondents’ position since they anchor their claim on the sale
under the
Kasulatan
 and not on inheritance from Guevarra. Since the notarized
Kasulatan
 is evidence of greater weight which petitioners failed to refute by clear and convincing evidence, this Court holds that petitioners were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that the Property belonged to
Guevarra’s
 estate. There is therefore no legal basis for
petitioners’ complaint for partition of the Property.
 
Maglasang vs. Heirs of Cabatingan
G.R. No. 131953. June 5, 2002 On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner
NicolasCabatingan, a “Deed of Conditional of Donation (
sic
) Inter Vivos
for House and Lot” covering one
-half (½) portion of the form
er’s
 house and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu. Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowing upon: (a) petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land
 –
 one located in Cogon, Cebu (307 sq. m.) and the other, a portion of a parcel of land in Masbate (50,232 sq. m.); (b) petitioner NicolasCabatingan, a portion of a parcel of land located in Masbate (80,000 sq. m.); and (c) petitioner Merly S.Cabatingan, a portion of the Masbate property (80,000 sq. m.). These deeds of donation contain similar provisions, to wit:
“That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x
 x x the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should

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