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The Meaning of Difference

Gender Theory, Postmodernism, and Psychology

Rachel T. Hare-MustinJeanne Marecek

Villanova UniversitySwarthmore CollegeABSTRACT: Two recent postmodern movements, con-structivism and deconstruction, challenge the idea of asingle meaning of reality and suggest that meanings resultfrom social experience. We show how these postmodernapproaches can be applied to the psychology of gender.Examining gender theories from a constructivist stand-point, we note that the primary meaning of gender in psy-chology has been difference. The exaggeration of differ-ences, which we call alpha bias, can be seen in approachesthat focus on the contrasting experiences of men andwomen. The minimizing of differences, beta bias, can beseen in approaches that stress the similarity or equalityof men and women. From a deconstructivist position, weexamine previously hidden meanings in the discourse oftherapy that reveal cultural assumptions about gender re-lations. Paradoxes in contemporary constructions of gen-der impel us to go beyond these constructions.

Conventional meanings of gender typically focus on dif-ference. They emphasize how women differ from menand use these differences to support the norm of malesuperiority. The overlooking of gender differences occursas well. Until recently, psychology accepted the culturalmeaning of gender as difference, and psychological re-search offered scientific justification for gender inequality(Lott, 1985a; Morawski, 1985; Shields, 1975; Weisstein,1971). Theories of psychotherapy similarly supported thecultural meanings of gender (Hare-Mustin, 1983).The connection between meaning and power hasbeen a focus of postmodernist thinkers (Foucault, 1973;Jameson, 1981). Their inquiry into meaning focuses es-pecially on language and the process of representation.Our concern here is with language as the medium of cog-nitive life and communication, rather than as the rulesby which sentences are strung together. Language is notsimply a mirror of reality or a neutral tool (Bruner, 1986;Taggart, 1985; Wittgenstein, 1960; 1953/1967). Languagehighlights certain features of the objects it represents, cer-tain meanings of the situations it describes. Once desig-nations in language become accepted, one is constrainedby them. Language inevitably structures one's own ex-perience of reality as well as the experience of those towhom one communicates.Language and meaning making are important re-sources held by those in power. Indeed, Barthes (1957/1972) has called language a sign system used by the pow-erful to label, define, and rank. Throughout history, menhave had greater influence over language than women.This is not to say that women do not also influence lan-guage, but within social groups, males have had privilegedaccess to education and thus have had higher rates ofliteracy; this remains true in developing countries today(Newland, 1979). In addition, more men are published,and men control the print and electronic media (Strain-champs, 1974). The arbiters of language usage are pri-marily men, from Samuel Johnson and Noah Webster toH. L. Mencken and Strunk and White. Although not allmen have influence over language, for those who do, suchauthority confers the power to create the world from theirpoint of view, in the image of their desires. This power isobscured when language is regarded simply as description.Two recent postmodernist movements, constructiv-ism and deconstruction, challenge the idea of a singlemeaning of reality and concern themselves with the waymeaning is represented. The current interest in construc-tivism and deconstruction is part of a widespread skep-ticism about the positivist tradition in science and essen-tialist theories of truth and meaning (Rorty, 1979). Bothconstructivism and deconstruction assert that meaningsare historically situated and constructed and recon-structed through the medium of language.In this article, we apply postmodernist thought tothe psychology of gender. We first take up constructivism.We examine various constructions of gender, and theproblems associated with the predominant meaning ofgendermthat of male-female difference. We then turn todeconstruction. We show how a deconstructive approachto therapeutic discourse can reframe clients' understand-ing of reality by revealing alternative meanings and thuscan promote change. We do not propose a new theory ofgender; rather, we shift to a metatheoretical perspectiveon gender theorizing. Our purpose is not to answer thequestion of what is the meaning of gender but rather toexamine the question.

The Construction of Reality

Constructivism asserts that we do not discover reality, weinvent it (Watzlawick, 1984). Our experience does notdirectly reflect what is "out there" but is an ordering andorganizing of it. Knowing is a search for "fitting" waysof behaving and thinking (Von Glaserfeld, 1984). Ratherthan passively observing reality, we actively construct themeanings that frame and organize our perceptions andexperience. Thus, our understanding of reality is a rep-resentation, that is, a "re-presentation," not a replica, ofJune 1988

9

American Psychologist

0003-066X/88/$00.75

Vol. 43, No. 6, 455-464

455

what is "out there." Representations of reality are sharedmeanings that derive from language, history, and culture.Rorty (1979) suggests that the notion of "accurate rep-resentation" is a compliment we pay to those beliefs thatare successful in helping us do what we want to do.Constructivism challenges the scientific tradition ofpositivism, which holds that reality is fixed and can beobserved directly, uninfluenced by the observer (Gergen,1985; Sampson, 1985; Segal, 1986). As Heisenberg (1952)has pointed out, a truly objective world, devoid of allsubjectivity, would be unobservable. Constructivism alsochallenges the positivist presumption that it is possibleto distinguish facts and values; for constructivists, valuesand attitudes determine what are taken to be facts (How-ard, 1985). It is not that formal laws and theories in psy-chology are wrong or useless, but rather, as Kuhn (1962)asserted, that they are explanations based on a set of socialconventions. Thus, whereas positivism asks what are thefacts, constructivism asks what are the assumptions;whereas positivism asks what are the answers, construc-tivism asks what are the questions.The positivist tradition holds that science is the ex-emplar of the right use of reason, neutral in its methods,socially beneficial in its results (Flax, 1987). Constructiv-ism, and postmodernism more generally, hold that sci-entific knowledge, like all other knowledge, cannot bedisinterested or politically neutral. In psychology, con-structivism, drawing on the ideas of Bateson and Matur-ana, has influenced epistemological developments in sys-tems theories of the family (Dell, 1985). Constructivistviews have also been put forth in developmental psy-chology (Bronfenbrenner, Kessel, Kessen, & White, 1986;Scarr, 1985), in the psychology of women (Unger, 1983),and in the study of human sexuality (Tiefer, 1987). Con-structivist views also form the basis of the social con-structionism movement in social psychology, which drawsinspiration from symbolic anthropology, ethnomethod-ology, and related movements in sociology and anthro-pology (Gergen, 1985).Theories of gender, like other scientific theories, arerepresentations of reality organized by particular as-sumptive frameworks and reflecting certain interests. Inthe next section, we examine gender theorizing in psy-chology and indicate some of the issues that a construc-tivist approach makes apparent.

The Construction of Gender as Difference

From a constructivist standpoint, the "real" nature ofmale and female cannot be determined. Constructivismfocuses our attention on representations of gender, ratherthan on gender itself. The very term

gender

illustrates thepower of linguistic categories to determine what we knowof the world. The use of gender in contexts other thandiscussions of grammar is quite recent. Gender was ap-propriated by American feminists to refer to the socialA portion of this article was presented at the meetingof the AmericanPsychologicalAssociation,New York, August 1987.Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed toRachel T. Hare-Mustin, VillanovaUniversity,Villanova,PA 19085. quality of distinctions between the sexes (Scott, 1985).Gender is used in contrast to terms like

sex

and

sexualdifference

for the explicit purpose of creating a space inwhich socially mediated differences can be explored apartfrom biological differences (Unger, 1979). We still lackan adequate term for speaking of each gender.

Male-fe-male

has the advantage of including the entire life spanbut implies biological characteristics and fails to distin-guish humans from other species.

Men-women

is morerestrictive, referring specifically to human adults butomitting childhood and adolescence. We use male-fe-male, as well as men-women, especially when we wishto suggest the entire life span.Just what constitutes "differentness" is a vexingquestion for the study of sex and gender. Research thatfocuses on mean differences may produce one conclusion,whereas research that focuses on range and overlap ofdistributions may produce another (Luria, 1986). More-over, the size and direction of gender differences in anyparticular behavior, such as aggression or helping, willvary according to the norms and expectations for menand women made salient by the setting (Eagly & Crowley,1986; Eagly & Steffen, 1986). Even more troubling, thevery criteria for deciding what should constitute a differ-ence as opposed to a similarity are disputed. How muchdifference makes a difference? Even anatomical differ-ences between men and women can seem trivial whenhumans are compared with daffodils or ducks.Psychological inquiry into gender has held to theconstruction of gender as difference. One recent line ofinquiry reexamines gender with the goal ofdeemphasizingdifference by sorting out "genuine" male-female differ-ences from stereotypes. Some examples include Hyde's(1981) meta-analyses of cognitive differences, Maccobyand Jacklin's (1975) review of sex differences, and Eccles'swork on math achievement (Eccles & Jacobs, 1986). Theresults of this work dispute that male-female differencesare as universal, as dramatic, or as enduring as has beenasserted (Deaux, 1984). Moreover, this line of inquirysees the origins of difference as largely social and cultural,rather than biological. Thus, most differences betweenmales and females are seen as culturally and historicallyfluid.Another line of inquiry, exemplified in recent fem-inist psychodynamic theories (e.g., Chodorow, 1978;Eichenbaum & Orbach, 1983; Miller, 1976), takes as itsgoal establishing and reaffirming differences. Althoughthese theories provide varying accounts of the origins ofdifference, they all emphasize deep-seated and enduringdifferences between women and men in "core self-struc-ture," identity, and relational capacities. Other theoristshave suggested that gender differences in psychic structuregive rise to cognitive differences, for example, differencesin moral reasoning and in acquiring and organizingknowledge (cf. Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule,1986; Gilligan, 1982; Keller, 1985). All these theoristsrepresent differences between men and women as essen-tial, universal (at least within contemporary Western cul-ture), highly dichotomized, and enduring.456 June 1988 9 American Psychologist

These two lines of inquiry have led to two widelyheld but incompatible representations of gender, one thatsees few differences between males and females and an-other that sees profound differences. Both groups of the-orists have offered empirical evidence, primarily quan-titative in the first case and qualitative in the second.Rather than debating which representation of gender is"true," we shift to a meta-level, that provided by con-structivism.From the vantage point of constructivism, theoriesof gender are representations based on conventional dis-tinctions. Such theories embody one or the other of twocontrasting biases, alpha bias and beta bias (Hare-Mustin,1987). Alpha bias is the tendency to exaggerate differ-ences; beta bias is the tendency to minimize or ignoredifferences.The alpha-beta schema is in some ways analogousto that in hypothesis testing. In hypothesis testing, alphaor Type I error involves reporting a significant differencewhen one does not exist; beta or Type II error involvesoverlooking a significant difference when one does exist.In our formulation, the term

bias

refers not to the prob-ability of"error" (which would imply that there is a "cor-rect" position), but rather to a systematic inclination toemphasize certain aspects of experience and overlookother aspects. This formulation of bias relates to the ideathat all knowledge is influenced by the standpoint of theknower. "Taking a standpoint" has been seen by somefeminist theorists as a positive strategy for generating newknowledge (Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1985). Our use ofthe term bias underscores our contention that all ideasabout difference are social constructs that can never per-fectly mirror reality. Alpha and beta bias can be seen inrepresentations of gender, race, class, age, and the like.Here we use the alpha-beta schema to examine recentefforts to theorize about gender.

Alpha Bias

Alpha bias is the exaggeration of differences. The view ofmale and female as different and opposite and thus ashaving mutually exclusive qualities transcends Westernculture and has deep historical roots. Ideas of male-fe-male opposition are present in Eastern philosophy andin the works of Western philosophers from Aristotle,Aquinas, Bacon, and Descartes to the liberal theory ofLocke and the romanticism of Rousseau (Grimshaw,1986). Women have been regarded as the repository ofnonmasculine traits, an "otherness" men assign towomen. Alpha bias has been the prevailing view in ourculture and one that has also attracted many feministtheorists.The scientific model developed by Bacon was basedon the distinction between "male" reason and its "female"opposites--passion, lust, and emotion (Keller, 1985). Be-cause women were restricted to the private sphere, theydid not have knowledge available in the public realm.When women had knowledge, as in witchcraft, theirknowledge was disparaged or repudiated. As Keller pointsout, women's knowledge was associated with insatiablelust; men's knowledge was assumed to be chaste. In Ba-con's model of science, nature was cast in the image ofthe female, to be subdued, subjected to the penetratingmale gaze, and forced to yield up her secrets. Our purposehere is not to provide a critique of gender and science,which has been done elsewhere (cf. Keller, 1985; Mer-chant, 1980), but to draw attention to the long-standingassociation of women with nature and emotion, and menwith their opposites, reason, technology, and civilization(Ortner, 1974).In psychology, alpha bias can be seen most readilyin psychodynamic theories. Freudian theory takes mas-culinity and male anatomy as the human standard; fem-ininity and female anatomy are deviations from thatstandard. The Jungian idea of the animus and the animaplaces the masculine and the feminine in opposition.More recent psychodynamic theories also depict femaleexperience as sharply divergent from male experience.For example, Erikson (1964) holds that female identityis predicated on "inner space," a somatic design that"harbors . . . a biological, psychological, and ethicalcommitment to take care of human infancy" (p. 586)and a sensitive indwelling. Male identity is associated with"outer space," which involves intrusiveness, excitement,and mobility, leading to achievement, political domina-tion, and adventure-seeking. In Lacan's (1985) poststruc-turalist view, women are "outside" language, public dis-course, culture, and the law. The female is defined notby what is, but by the absence or lack of the phallus asthe prime signifier. These theories all overlook similaritiesbetween males and females and emphasize differences.Parsons's sex role theory, which dominated the socialtheories of the 1950s and 1960s, also exaggerates male-female differences (Parsons & Bales, 1955). The very lan-guage of sex role theory powerfully conveys the sense thatroles are fixed and dichotomous, as well as separate andreciprocal (Thorne, 1982). Parsons asserted that men wereinstrumental and women were expressive, that is, menwere task-oriented and women were oriented toward feel-ings and relationships. Parsons's sex role theory was hailedas providing a scientific basis for separate spheres for menand women. Men's nature suited them for paid work andpublic life; women became first in "goodness" by makingtheir own needs secondary to those of the family andaltruistically donating their services to others (Lipman-Blumen, 1984). Parsons believed that separate spheresfor men and women were functional in reducing com-petition and conflict in the family and thus preservingharmony. The role definitions that Parsons put forwardbecame criteria for distinguishing normal individuals andfamilies from those who were pathological or even patho-genic (cf. Broverman, Broverman, Clarkson, Rosenkrantz,& Vogel, 1970).Alpha bias, or the inclination to emphasize differ-ences, can also be seen in feminist psychodynamic the-ories such as those of Chodorow (1978), Eichenbaum andOrbach (1983), Gilligan (1982), and Miller (1976). Theiremphasis on women's special nature and the richness ofwomen's inner experience has been an important resourceJune 1988 9 American Psychologist 457

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