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MEXIDATA . INFO
Column 101209 Brewer 
Monday, October 12, 2009
Latin Americans Need Professionalized Spy AgenciesBy Jerry Brewer 
Espionage operations throughout Latin America, althoughoverwhelmingly massive in nature, are inundated with clear andpresent dilemmas. Coherent and fluid intelligence agencystructures for achieving the mainstay of intelligence, which isorganizing evidence for sound hypotheses, eludes manygovernments. These failures, among others, do not ensureterritorial integrity. The vast world of intelligence communities and their domains isreminiscent of the universe in perspective, an always changingand all encompassing, yet disconnected, apparatus of self-interest—the elusive nature and subjugation of which is miredby politics, public opinion and, sometimes, corruption. Colombia is one of many within the intelligence black hole thatis contemplating elimination versus restructuring; in this case itis the DAS (Colombian Administrative Department of Intelligence Services). The importance of the DAS originallyvested with the awesome responsibility of external and internalintelligence within the framework of the state, handling issues of security, intelligence, and constitutional enforcement. Thisdecision could have disastrous implications for the hemisphere,insofar as the DAS has worked valiantly beside the U.S. DrugEnforcement Administration (DEA) against narcotraffickers andthe influences of other transnational criminals. Microscopic looks at the DAS recently revealed what arebelieved to be scandals of illegal spying on the politicalopposition, critics and journalists, as well as “interacting withleft-wing guerillas, right-wing paramilitary, and smugglers.”President Alvaro Uribe has said that he is in favor of eliminatingthe organization and having a police institution handleintelligence tasks and responsibilities.The potential of almost certain failure of such a transition, froma covert intelligence organization into a tactical enforcement
 
arm of police procedure, is anticlimactic, archaic and lackssound reasoning, absent mere frustration with the wholeprocess. What is needed with the DAS, as is the case with other democratic nations’ intelligence apparatus, is an intelligencemodel of sound oversight, quality control, and basic protocols of coherent and sound intelligence analysis. Too, an intense focuson sophisticated technology beyond satellite, signals, andimagery, dealing with human intelligence collection to facilitateverification protocols, source reliability, and content validity.This disciplined process would show reductions in seriousduplication of effort, as well as enhance the oversight process. Intelligence organizations throughout Latin America are facing anumber of other rogue leftist regime intelligence services thatare clearly intent on disrupting and infiltrating democraticgovernments. The counterintelligence tasks required to interdictthis onslaught by these sinister spies is monumental, butcritically necessary. Responding to the sophistication, mobility,and superior weaponry of transnational criminals, organizednarcotraffickers, and related insurgents is another major intelligence challenge that not only necessitates soundintelligence analysis, but tactical resistance. Force protection (whether military or police) responsibilitieshave risen to new heights due to the bold and relentless attackson enforcement-oriented personnel and related logistics. Again,the intelligence need throughout the hemisphere has beengraphically demonstrated in the massive death and violencethat has also been directed at police, governments, and themilitary. Cuba’s DGI intelligence apparatus is estimated to be at over 20,000 officials. A communist nation with sympathizersdecrying normalization of relations and a relaxing of sanctionsfrom their human rights abuses and iron-fisted rule continues tofoster major intelligence operational acts and collection effortsagainst their Caribbean, Central, South and North Americanneighbors. The DGI currently has a very substantial presencein Venezuela. The cold war presented an environment essentially devoid of technology such as ground-based surveillance radar,“relocatable over the horizon radar (ROTHR),” and other non-manned aerial reconnaissance and imagery related devices.The human intelligence (HUMINT) operational acts becametraining curriculum models given to Cuban and other rogueintelligence regimes by the Soviet KGB. President HugoChavez of Venezuela has adopted the DGI’s model and it isbelieved that there are around 50,000 Cuban nationals inVenezuela serving in “various official missions” in government,intelligence, security services and the armed forces. Throughout Colombia, as leftist presidential regimes in LatinAmerica protest the U.S. presence and potential use of military
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