OCTOBER TERM, 2013 Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See
Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,
200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 13–193. Argued April 22, 2014—Decided June 16, 2014 Respondent Driehaus, a former Congressman, filed a complaint withthe Ohio Elections Commission alleging that petitioner Susan B. An-thony List (SBA) violated an Ohio law that criminalizes certain falsestatements made during the course of a political campaign. Specifi-cally, Driehaus alleged that SBA violated the law when it stated that his vote for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)was a vote in favor of “taxpayer funded abortion.” After Driehaus lost his re-election bid, the complaint was dismissed, but SBA contin-ued to pursue a separate suit in Federal District Court challenging the law on First Amendment grounds. Petitioner Coalition Opposed to Additional Spending and Taxes (COAST) also filed a First Amendment challenge to the Ohio law, alleging that it had planned to disseminate materials presenting a similar message but refrained due to the proceedings against SBA. The District Court consolidated the two lawsuits and dismissed them as nonjusticiable, concluding that neither suit presented a sufficiently concrete injury for purposesof standing or ripeness. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on ripeness grounds.
: Petitioners have alleged a sufficiently imminent injury for ArticleIII purposes. Pp. 7–18.(a) To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show,
, an “injury in fact,” which must be “concrete and particularized”and “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ”
Defenders of Wildlife
, 504 U. S. 555, 560. When challenging a law prior to its enforcement, a plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact re-quirement where he alleges “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but pro-scribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution