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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-33964 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO LANSANG
RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine
Constabulary, respondent.
G.R. No. L-33965 December 11, 1971
ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, and CHIEF, PHIL.
CONSTABULARY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-33973 December 11, 1971
LUZVIMINDA DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine Constabulary, COL. N.
C. CAMELLO, in his capacity as Chief of Staff, Philippine Constabulary and HON.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE in his capacity as Secretary, Department of National
defense, respondents.
G.R. No. L-33982 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NEMESIO E.
PRUDENTE FELICIDAD G. PRUDENTE, petitioners,
vs.
GENERAL MANUEL YAN, GEN. EDU GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-34004 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF OF
GERARDO TOMAS, ALSO KNOWN AS "GERRY TOMAS" AND FOR RETURN OF
DOCUMENTS ILLEGALLY SEIZED. DOMINGO E. DE LARA, in his capacity as
Chairman, Committee on Legal Assistance, Philippine Bar Association,petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, respondent.
G.R. No. L-34013 December 11, 1971
REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, respondent.
G.R. No. L-34039 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF OF SGT.
FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO AND HIS WIFE, MRS. BARCELISA C. DE CASTRO.
CARLOS C. RABAGO, in his capacity as President of the Conference Delegates
Association of the Philippines (CONDA),petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary, respondent.
G.R. No. L-34265 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTOLIN ORETA, JR.
ANTOLIN ORETA, JR.,petitioner,
vs.
GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA and COL. PROSPERO OLIVAS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-34339 December 11, 1971
GARY B. OLIVAR, assisted by his father, GEORGE OLIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine Constabulary, et
al., respondents.
Ignacio P. Lacsina for petitioners Teodosio Lansang, et al.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner Rogelio V. Arienda.
E. Voltaire Garcia II for petitioner Luzvimindo David.
Verzola, Africa and Atencio, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Wigberto E. Taada, Fortunato de Leon,
R. G. Suntay and Juan T. David for petitioner Felicidad G. Prudente.
Ruben L. Roxas for petitioner Reynaldo Rimando.
Nuez, Acob, Del Rosario and Ramos for petitioner Carlos Rabago, etc.
E. Voltaire Garcia II and M. P. Vivo for petitioner Gary Olivar, etc., et al.
Jose W. Diokno and Juanito R. Remulla for petitioner Antolin Oreta, Jr.
Domingo E. de Lara for and in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo P.
Pardo for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J .:
In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines
was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its
candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two (2) hand
grenades were thrown, one after the other, at the platform where said candidates and other
persons were. As a consequence, eight (8) persons were killed and many more injured,
including practically all of the aforementioned candidates, some of whom sustained
extensive, as well as serious, injuries which could have been fatal had it not been for the
timely medical assistance given to them.
On August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines announced the
issuance of Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971, reading as follows:
WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is definitely
established that lawless elements in the country, which are moved by
common or similar ideological conviction, design and goal and enjoying the
active moral and material support of a foreign power and being guided and
directed by a well trained, determined and ruthless group of men and taking
advantage of our constitutional liberties to promote and attain their ends,
have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their
forces together for the avowed purpose of actually staging, undertaking and
waging an armed insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political
power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government, and
supplant our existing political social, economic and legal order with an entirely
new one whose form of government, whose system of laws, whose
conception of God and religion, whose notion of individual rights and family
relations, and whose political, social and economic precepts are based on the
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist teachings and beliefs;
WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front
organizations that are seemingly innocent and harmless, have continuously
and systematically strengthened and broadened their memberships through
sustained and careful recruiting and enlistment of new adherents from among
our peasantry, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass
media personnel, and through such sustained and careful recruitment and
enlistment have succeeded in infiltrating almost every segment of our society
in their ceaseless determination to erode and weaken the political, social,
economic and moral foundations of our existing government and to influence
many peasant, labor, professional, intellectual, student and mass media
organizations to commit acts of violence and depredations against our duly
constituted authorities, against the members of our law enforcement
agencies, and worst of all, against the peaceful members of our society;
WHEREAS, these lawless elements have created a state of lawlessness and
disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State, the latest
manifestation of which has been the dastardly attack on the Liberal Party rally
in Manila on August 21, 1971, which has resulted in the death and serious
injury of scores of persons;
WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be
taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people
and preserve the authority of the State;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10,
Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, for the persons presently detained, as well as others who
may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith.
Presently, petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed, in the above-entitled cases, by the
following persons, who, having been arrested without a warrant therefor and then detained,
upon the authority of said proclamation, assail its validity, as well as that of their detention,
namely:
1. TEDORO LANSANG, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO and BAYANI ALCALA, the petitioners
in Case No. L-33964 filed on August 24, 1971 who, on August 22, 1971, between 8
a.m. and 6 p.m., were "invited" by agents of the Philippine Constabulary which is under
the command of respondent Brig. Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia to go and did go to the
headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for
interrogation, and thereafter, detained;
2. ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, the petitioner in Case No. L-33965 filed, also, on August 24,
1971 who was picked up in his residence, at No. 55 Road, 3, Urduja Village, Quezon
City, by members of the Metrocom and then detained;
3. Soon after the filing of the petition in Case No. L-33965 or on August 28, 1971 the
same was amended to include VICENTE ILAO and JUAN CARANDANG, as petitioners
therein, although, apart from stating that these additional petitioners are temporarily residing
with the original petitioner, Rogelio V. Arienda, the amended petition alleged nothing
whatsoever as regards the circumstances under which said Vicente Ilao and Juan
Carandang are said to be illegally deprived of their liberty;
4. LUZVIMINDO DAVID, petitioner in Case No. L-33973 filed on August 25, 1971 who
was similarly arrested in his residence, at No. 131-B Kamias Road, Quezon City, and
detained by the Constabulary;
5. Felicidad G. Prudente, who filed the petition in Case No. L-33982 on August 27, 1971
upon the ground that her father, Dr. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, had, on August 22, 1971,
at about 8 p.m., been apprehended by Constabulary agents in his house, at St. Ignatius
Village, Quezon City, and then detained at the Camp Crame stockade, Quezon City;
6. ANGELO DE LOS REYES, who was allowed on August 30, 1971 to intervene as
one of the petitioners in Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, he having been
arrested by members of the Constabulary on August 22, 1971, between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m.,
in his residence, at 86 Don Manuel Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and brought to
Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained and restrained of liberty;
7. VICTOR FELIPE, who was similarly allowed to intervene as one of the petitioners in said
three (3) cases, upon the ground that, on August 23, 1971, at about 8 a.m., he was,
likewise, apprehended at Sta. Rosa, Laguna, by members of the Philippine Constabulary
and brought, first to the Constabulary headquarters at Canlubang, Laguna, and, then, to
Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained and restrained of liberty;
8. TERESITO SISON, who was, also, allowed to intervene as one of the petitioners in the
same three (3) cases, he having been arrested in his residence, at 318 Lakandula St.,
Angeles City, on August 22, 1971, between 6 and 7 p.m., and taken to the PC offices at
Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, then to Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, and
eventually to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is restrained and deprived of liberty;
9. GERARDO TOMAS, alias Gerry Tomas, a 17-year old second year college students of
St. Louis University, Baguio City, on whose behalf, Domingo E. de Lara in his capacity as
Chairman, Committee on Legal Assistance, Philippine Bar Association filed on
September 3, 1971, the petition in Case No. L-34004, upon the ground that said Gerardo
Tomas had, on August 23, 1971, at about 6 a.m., been arrested by Constabulary agents,
while on his way to school in the City of Baguio, then brought to the Constabulary premises
therein at Camp Holmes, and, thereafter, taken, on August 24, 1971, to Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, and thence, on August 25, 1971, to the Constabulary headquarters at Camp
Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained;
10. REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner in Case No. L-34013 filed on September 7, 1971
a 19-year old student of the U.P. College in Baguio city who, while allegedly on his
way home, at Lukban Road, Baguio, on August 23, 1971, at about 1 a.m., was joined by
three (3) men who brought him to the Burnham Park, thence, to Camp Olivas at San
Fernando, Pampanga, and, thereafter, to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained;
11. Sgt. FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO and his wife, Mrs. BARCELISA C. DE CASTRO, on
whose behalf Carlos C. Rabago as President of the Conference Delegates Association
of the Philippines (CONDA) filed the petition in Case No. L-34039 on September 14,
1971 against Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia, alleging that, on August 27, 1971, at about 3
p.m., Mrs. De Castro was arrested, while at Liamzon Subdivision, Rosario, Pasig, Rizal, by
agents of the Constabulary, and taken to the PC headquarters at Camp Crame, where,
later, that same afternoon, her husband was brought, also, by PC agents and both are
detained;
12. ANTOLIN ORETA, JR., who filed the petition in Case No. L-34265 on October 26,
1971 against said Gen. Garcia, as Chief of the Constabulary, and Col. Prospero Olivas,
Chief of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS), Philippine Constabulary, alleging that, upon
invitation from said CIS, he went, on October 20, 1971, to Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, to
see Gen. Manuel Yan, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, who referred
petitioner to Col. Laroya of the CIS; that the latter, in turn, referred him to CIS Investigator
Atty. Berlin Castillo and another CIS against, whose name is unknown to the petitioner; and
that, after being interrogated by the two (2), petitioner was detained illegally; and
13. GARY OLIVAR, petitioner in Case No. L-34339 filed on November 10, 1971 who
was apprehended, by agents of the Constabulary, in the evening of November 8, 1941, in
Quezon City, and then detained at Camp Crame, in the same City.
Upon the filing of the aforementioned cases, the respondents were forthwith required to
answer the petitions therein, which they did. The return and answer in L-33964 which
was, mutatis mutandis, reproduced substantially or by reference in the other cases, except
L-34265 alleges, inter alia, that the petitioners had been apprehended and detained "on
reasonable belief" that they had "participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion;" that
"their continued detention is justified due to the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to Proclamation No. 889 of the President of the Philippines;" that
there is "a state of insurrection or rebellion" in this country, and that "public safety and the
security of the State required the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,"
as "declared by the President of the Philippines in Proclamation No. 889; that in making
said declaration, the "President of the Philippines acted on relevant facts gathered thru the
coordinated efforts of the various intelligence agents of our government but (of) which the
Chief Executive could not at the moment give a full account and disclosure without risking
revelation of highly classified state secrets vital to its safely and security"; that the
determination thus made by the President is "final and conclusive upon the court and upon
all other persons" and "partake(s) of the nature of political question(s) which cannot be the
subject of judicial inquiry," pursuant to Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87, and Montenegro v.
Castaeda, 91 Phil. 882; that petitioners "are under detention pending investigation and
evaluation of culpabilities on the reasonable belief" that they "have committed, and are still
committing, individually or in conspiracy with others, engaged in armed struggle, insurgency
and other subversive activities for the overthrow of the Government; that petitioners cannot
raise, in these proceedings for habeas corpus, "the question of their guilt or innocence"; that
the "Chief of Constabulary had petitioners taken into custody on the basis of the existence
of evidence sufficient to afford a reasonable ground to believe that petitioners come within
the coverage of persons to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been
suspended"; that the "continuing detention of the petitioners as an urgent bona fide
precautionary and preventive measure demanded by the necessities of public safety, public
welfare and public interest"; that the President of the Philippines has "undertaken concrete
and abundant steps to insure that the constitutional rights and privileges of the petitioners
as well as of the other persons in current confinement pursuant to Proclamation 889 remain
unimpaired and unhampered"; and that "opportunities or occasions for abuses by peace
officers in the implementation of the proclamation have been greatly minimized, if not
completely curtailed, by various safeguards contained in directives issued by proper
authority."
These safeguards are set forth in:
1. A letter of the President to the Secretary of National Defense, dated August 21, 1971,
directing, inter alia, in connection with the arrest or detention of suspects pursuant to
Proclamation No. 889, that, except when caught inflagrante delicto, no arrest shall be made
without warrant authorized in writing by the Secretary of National Defense; that such
authority shall not be granted unless, "on the basis of records and other evidences," it
appears satisfactorily, in accordance with Rule 113, section 6(b), of the Rules of Court, that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty of the acts mentioned in the proclamation; that,
if such person will be charged with a crime subject to an afflictive penalty under the Anti-
Subversion Act, the authorization for his arrest shall not be issued unless supported by
signed intelligence reports citing at least one reliable witness to the same overt act; that no
unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in effecting arrests; and that arrested
persons shall not be subject to greater restraint than is necessary for their detention;
2. Communications of the Chief of the Constabulary, dated August 23, 27, and 30, 1971, to
all units of his command, stating that the privilege of the writ is suspended for no other
persons than those specified in the proclamation; that the same does not involve material
law; that precautionary measures should be taken to forestall violence that may be
precipitated by improper behavior of military personnel; that authority to cause arrest under
the proclamation will be exercised only by the Metrocom, CMA, CIS, and "officers
occupying position in the provinces down to provincial commanders"; that there shall be no
indiscriminate or mass arrests; that arrested persons shall not be harmed and shall be
accorded fair and humane treatment; and that members of the detainee's immediate family
shall be allowed to visit him twice a week;
3. A memorandum of the Department of National Defense, dated September 2, 1971,
directing the Chief of the Constabulary to establish appropriate Complaints and Action
Bodies/Groups to prevent and/or check any abuses in connection with the suspension of
the privilege of the writ; and
4. Executive Order No. 333, dated August 26, 1971, creating a Presidential Administrative
Assistance Committee to hear complaints regarding abuses committed in connection with
the implementation of Proclamation No. 889.
Respondents in L-33965 further alleged that therein petitioners Vicente Ilao and Juan
Carandang had been released from custody on August 31, 1971, "after it had been found
that the evidence against them was insufficient."
In L-34265, the "Answer and Return" filed by respondents therein traversed some
allegations of fact and conclusions of law made in the petition therein and averred that
Antolin Oreta, Jr., the petitioner therein, had been and is detained "on the basis of a
reasonable ground to believe that he has committed overt acts in furtherance of rebellion or
insurrection against the government" and, accordingly, "comes within the class of persons
as to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended by Proclamation
No. 889, as amended," the validity of which is not contested by him.
On August 30, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-A, amending Proclamation
No. 889, so as to read as follows:
WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is definitely
established that lawless elements in the country, which are moved by
common or similar ideological conviction, design and goal and enjoying the
active moral and material support of a foreign power and being guided and
directed by a well-trained, determined and ruthless group of men and taking
advantage of our constitutional liberties to promote and attain their ends,
have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their
forces together for the avowed purpose of [actually] staging, undertaking,
[and] wagging and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and
rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the
duly constituted government, and supplant our existing political, social,
economic and legal order with an entirely new one whose form of
government, whose system of laws, whose conception of God and religion,
whose notion of individual rights and family relations, and whose political,
social and economic precepts are based on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist
teaching and beliefs;
WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front
organizations that are seemingly innocent and harmless, have continuously
and systematically strengthened and broadened their memberships through
sustained and careful recruiting and enlistment of new adherents from among
our peasantly, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass
media personnel, and through such sustained and careful recruitment and
enlistment have succeeded in infiltrating almost every segment of our society
in their ceaseless determination to erode and weaken the political, social,
economic and moral foundations of our existing government and influence
many peasant, labor, professional, intellectual, student and mass media
organizations to commit acts of violence and depredations against our duly
constituted authorities, against the members of our law enforcement
agencies, and worst of all, against the peaceful members of our society;
WHEREAS, these lawless elements, by their acts of rebellion and
insurrection, have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public
safety and security of the State, the latest manifestation of which has been
the dastardly attack on the Liberal Party rally in Manila on August 21, 1971,
which has resulted in the death and serious injury of scores of persons;
WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be
taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people
and preserve the authority of the State;
NOW THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10,
Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus for the persons presently detained, as well as all others
who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or
rebellion [,] and [all] other [crimes and offenses] overt acts committed by them
in furtherance [or on the occasion] thereof[,]. [or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith.]
1

On September 1, 1971, Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982 were jointly
heard and then the parties therein were allowed to file memoranda, which were submitted
from September 3 to September 9, 1971.
Soon thereafter, or on September 18, 1971, Proclamation No. 889 was further amended by
Proclamation No. 889-B, lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the following provinces, sub-provinces and cities of the Philippine, namely:
A. PROVINCES:
1. Batanes 15. Negros Occ.
2. Ilocos Norte 16. Negros Or.
3. Ilocos Sur 17. Cebu
4. Abra 18. Bohol
5. Abra 19. Capiz
6. Pangasinan 20. Aklan
7. Batangas 21. Antique
8. Catanduanes 22. Iloilo
9. Masbate 23. Leyte
10. Romblon 24. Leyte del Sur
11. Marinduque 25. Northern Samar
12. Or. Mindoro 26. Eastern Samar
13. Occ. Mindoro 27. Western Samar
14. Palawan.
B. SUB-PROVINCES:
1. Guimaras 3. Siquior
2. Biliran
C. CITIES:
1. Laog 10. Bacolod
2. Dagupan 11. Bago
3. San Carlos 12. Canlaon
4. Batangas 13. La Carlota
5. Lipa 14. Bais
6. Puerto Princesa 15. Dumaguete
7. San Carlos (Negros 16. Iloilo
Occ.) 17. Roxas
8. Cadiz 18. Tagbilaran
9. Silay 19. Lapu-lapu

20. Cebu 24. Tacloban
21. Mandaue 25. Ormoc
22. Danao 26. Calbayog
23. Toledo
On September 25, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-C, restoring the
privilege of the writ in the following provinces and cities:
A. PROVINCES:
1. Surigao del Norte 8. Agusan del Sur
2. Surigao del Sur 9. Misamis Or.
3. Davao del Norte 10. Misamis Occ.
4. Davao del Sur 11. Zamboanga del Norte
5. Davao Oriental 12. Basilan
6. Bukidnon 13. Pagadian
7. Agusan del Norte
B. CITIES:
1. Surigao 8. Tangub
2. Davao 9. Dapitan
3. Butuan 10. Dipolog
4. Cagayan 11. Zamboanga
5. Gingoong 12. Basilan
6. Ozamiz 13. Pagadian.
7. Oroquieta
On October 4, 1971, the suspension of the privilege was further lifted by Proclamation No.
889-D, in the following places:
A. PROVINCES:
1. Cagayan 5. Camarines
2. Cavite 6. Albay
3. Mountain Province 7. Sorsogon
4. Kalinga-Apayao
B. CITIES:
1. Cavite City 3. Trece Martires
2. Tagaytay 4. Legaspi
As a consequences, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is still suspended in the
following eighteen (18) provinces, two (2) sub-provinces and eighteen (18) cities, to wit:
A. PROVINCE:
1. Bataan 10. North Cotabato
2. Benguet 11. Nueva Ecija
3. Bulacan 13. Pampanga
4. Camarines Sur 14. Quezon
5. Ifugao 15. Rizal
6. Isabela 16. South Cotabato
7. Laguna 17. Tarlac
8. Lanao del Norte 18. Zambales
9. Lanao del Norte
B. SUB-PROVINCES:
1. Aurora 2. Quirino
C. CITIES:
1. Angeles 10. Manila
2. Baguio 11. Marawi
3. Cabanatuan 12. Naga
4. Caloocan 13. Olongapo
5. Cotabato 14. Palayan
6. General Santos 15. Pasay
7. Iligan 16. Quezon
8 Iriga 17. San Jose
9 Lucena 18. San Pablo
The first major question that the Court had to consider was whether it would adhere to the
view taken in Barcelon v. Baker,
2
and reiterated in Montenegro v. Castaeda,
3
pursuant to which,
"the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon the courts and
upon all other persons." Indeed, had said question been decided in the affirmative the main issue in all of
these cases, except
L-34339, would have been settled, and, since the other issues were relatively of minor importance, said
cases could have been readily disposed of. Upon mature deliberation, a majority of the Members of the
Court had, however, reached, although tentatively, a consensus to the contrary, and decided that the
Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the
Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ; but before proceeding to do so, the Court
deemed it necessary to hear the parties on the nature and extent of the inquiry to be undertaken, none of
them having previously expressed their views thereof. Accordingly, on October 5, 1971, the Court issued,
in L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982, a resolution stating in part that
... a majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may
inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the
issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A (suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for all persons detained or to be
detained for the crimes of rebellion or insurrection throughout the Philippines,
which area has lately been reduced to some eighteen provinces, two
subprovinces and eighteen cities with the partial lifting of the suspension of
the privilege effected by Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889-B, 889-C and
889-D) and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the
light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10,
par. 2, of the Philippine Constitution; and considering that the members of the
Court are not agreed on the precise scope and nature of the inquiry to be
made in the premises, even as all of them are agreed that the Presidential
findings are entitled to great respect, the Court RESOLVED that these cases
be set for rehearing on October 8, 1971 at 9:30 A.M.
xxx xxx xxx
On October 8, 1971, said four cases were, therefore, heard, once again, but, this time jointly
with cases Nos. L-34004, L-34013, and L-34039, and the parties were then granted a
period to file memoranda, in amplification of their respective oral arguments, which
memoranda were submitted from October 12 to October 21, 1971.
Respondents having expressed, during the oral arguments, on September 1 and October 8,
1971, their willingness to impart to the Court classified information relevant to these cases,
subject to appropriate security measures, the Court met at closed doors, on October 28 and
29, 1971, and, in the presence of three (3) attorneys for the petitioners, chosen by the latter,
namely, Senator Jose W. Diokno, Senator Salvador H. Laurel, and Atty. Leopoldo Africa, as
well as of the Solicitor General and two (2) members of his staff, was briefed, by Gen.
Manuel Yan, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Gen. Fidel Ramos,
Deputy Chief of Staff, Gen. Felizardo Tanabe, Col. Tagumpay Nanadiego, Judge Advocate
General, JAGS (GSC), and other ranking officers of said Armed Forces, on said classified
information, most of which was contained in reports and other documents already attached
to the records. During the proceedings, the members of the Court, and, occassionally,
counsel for the petitioners, propounded pertinent questions to said officers of the Armed
Forces. Both parties were then granted a period of time within which to submit their
respective observations, which were filed on November 3, 1971, and complemented by
some documents attached to the records on November 6, 1971, and a summary, submitted
on November 15, 1971, of the aforesaid classified information.
In the meantime, cases Nos. L-34265 (Oreta) and L-34339 (Olivar) had been filed and the
parties therein were heard in oral argument on November 4, and 16, 1971, respectively.
On November 15, 1971, the Solicitor General filed manifestations motions stating that on
November 13, 1971, the following petitioners were:
(a) released from custody:
(1) Teodosio Lansang -- G.R. No. L-33964
(2) Bayani Alcala -- " " L-33964
(3) Rogelio Arienda -- " " L-33965
(4) Nemesio Prudente -- " " L-33982
(5) Gerardo Tomas -- " " L-34004
(6) Reynaldo Rimando -- " " L-34013
(7) Filomeno M. de Castro -- " " L-34039
(8) Barcelisa de Castro -- " " L-34039
(9) Antolin Oreta, Jr. -- " " L-34264.
(b) charged, together with other persons named in the criminal complaint filed therefor, with
a violation of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the City Fiscal's Office of
Quezon City:
(1) Angelo de los Reyes -- G.R. No. L-22982 *
(2) Teresito Sison -- " " L-33982 *
(c) accused, together with many others named in the criminal complaint filed therefor, of a
violation of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal:
(1) Rodolfo del Rosario -- G.R. No. L-33969 **
(2) Luzvimindo David -- " " L-33973
(3) Victor Felipe -- " " L-33982 *
and continue under detention pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, as amended, and praying
that the petitions in G.R. Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013 and L-34039
be dismissed, without prejudice to the resolution of the remaining cases. Copy of the
criminal complaint filed, as above stated, with the Court of First Instance of Rizal and
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. Q-1623 of said court which was appended to said
manifestations-motions of the respondent as Annex 2 thereof shows that Gary Olivar, the
petitioner in L-34339, is one of the defendants in said case.
Required to comment on said manifestations-motions, Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-
33973, in his comment dated November 23, 1971, urged the Court to rule on the merits of
the petitions in all of these cases, particularly on the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation No. 889, as amended, upon the ground that he is still detained and that the
main issue is one of public interest involving as it does the civil liberties of the people.
Angelo de los Reyes, one of the petitioners in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, Nemesio E.
Prudente and Gerardo Tomas, for whose respective benefit the petitions in L-33982 and L-
34004 have been filed, maintained that the issue in these cases is not moot, not even for
the detainees who have been released, for, as long as the privilege of the writ remains
suspended, they are in danger of being arrested and detained again without just cause or
valid reason. In his reply, dated and filed on November 29, 1971, the Solicitor General
insisted that the release of the above-named petitioners rendered their respective petitions
moot and academic.
I
Petitioners herein, except Antolin Oreta, Jr. in L-34265, question the formal validity of the
proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In this connection, it
should be noted that, as originally formulated, Proclamation No. 889 was contested upon
the ground that it did not comply with the pertinent constitutional provisions, namely,
paragraph (14) of section 1, Article III of our Constitution, reading:
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in
cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it,
in any way of which events the same may be suspended wherever during
such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.
and paragraph (2), section 10, Article VII of the same instrument, which provides that:
The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines, and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger
thereof when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of
the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law.
Regardless of whether or not the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in case of "imminent danger" of invasion, insurrection or rebellion which is one of
the grounds stated in said paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution, but not
mentioned in paragraph (14), section 1 of its Bill of Rights petitioners maintained that
Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or
rebellion or imminent danger thereof," and that, consequently, said Proclamation was
invalid. This contention was predicated upon the fact that, although the first "whereas" in
Proclamation No. 889 stated that "lawless elements" had "entered into a conspiracy and
have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of actually
staging, undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and rebellion," the actuality so
alleged refers to the existence, not of an uprising that constitutes the essence of a rebellion
or insurrection, but of the conspiracyand the intent to rise in arms.
Whatever may be the merit of this claim, the same has been rendered moot and academic
by Proclamation No. 889-A, issued nine (9) days after the promulgation of the original
proclamation, or on August 30, 1971. Indeed, said Proclamation No. 889-A amended, inter
alia, the first "whereas" of the original proclamation by postulating the said lawless elements
"have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for
the avowed purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in an armed
insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow
the duly constituted government, and supplant our existing political, social, economic and
legal order with an entirely new one ...." Moreover, the third "whereas" in the original
proclamation was, likewise, amended by alleging therein that said lawless elements, "by
their acts of rebellion and insurrection," have created a state of lawlessness and disorder
affecting public safety and the security of the State. In other words, apart from adverting to
the existence of actual conspiracy and of theintent to rise in arms to overthrow the
government, Proclamation No. 889-A asserts that the lawless elements "areactually
engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion" to accomplish their purpose.
It may not be amiss to note, at this juncture, that the very tenor of the original proclamation
and particularly, the circumstances under which it had been issued, clearly suggest the
intent to aver that there was and is, actually, a state of rebellion in the Philippines, although
the language of said proclamation was hardly a felicitous one, it having in effect, stressed
the actuality of the intent to rise in arms, rather than of the factual existence of the rebellion
itself. The pleadings, the oral arguments and the memoranda of respondents herein have
consistently and abundantly emphasized to justify the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus the acts of violence and subversion committed prior to August 21,
1971, by the lawless elements above referred to, and the conditions obtaining at the time of
the issuance of the original proclamation. In short, We hold that Proclamation No. 889-A
has superseded the original proclamation and that the flaws attributed thereto are purely
formal in nature.
II
Let us now consider the substantive validity of the proclamation, as amended. Pursuant to
the above-quoted provisions of the Constitution, two (2) conditions must concur for the valid
exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ, to wit: (a) there must be
"invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of
the Constitution "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the
suspension of the privilege. The Presidential Proclamation under consideration declares
that there has been and there is actually a state of rebellion and
that
4
"public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to maintain peace and
order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State."
Are these findings conclusive upon the Court? Respondents maintain that they are, upon
the authority of Barcelon v. Baker
5
and Montenegro v. Castaeda.
6
Upon the other hand, petitioners
press the negative view and urge a reexamination of the position taken in said two (2) cases, as well as a
reversal thereof.
The weight of Barcelon v. Baker, as a precedent, is diluted by two (2) factors, namely: (a) it
relied heavily upon Martin v. Mott
7
involving the U.S. President's power to call out the militia, which
he being the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces may be exercised to suppress or prevent
any lawless violence, even without invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, and is,
accordingly, much broader than his authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
jeopardizing as the latter does individual liberty; and (b) the privilege had been suspended by the
American Governor-General, whose act, as representative of the Sovereign, affecting the freedom of
its subjects, can hardly be equated with that of the President of the Philippines dealing with the freedom
of the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty resides, andfrom whom all government authority emanates.
The pertinent ruling in the Montenegro case was based mainly upon the Barcelon case, and hence,
cannot have more weight than the same. Moreover, in the Barcelon case, the Court held that it could
go into the question: "Did the Governor-General" acting under the authority vested in him by the
Congress of the United States, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under certain
conditions "act in conformance with such authority?" In other words, it did determine whether or not the
Chief Executive had acted in accordance with law. Similarly, in the Montenegro case, the Court held that
petitioner therein had "failed to overcome the presumption of correctness which the judiciary accords to
acts of the Executive ...." In short, the Court considered the question whether or not there really was are
rebellion, as stated in the proclamation therein contested.
Incidentally, even the American jurisprudence is neither explicit nor clear on the point under
consideration. Although some cases
8
purport to deny the judicial power to "review" the findings
made in the proclamations assailed in said cases, the tenor of the opinions therein given, considered as a
whole, strongly suggests the court's conviction that the conditions essential for the validity of said
proclamations or orders were, in fact, present therein, just as the opposite view taken in other cases
9
had
a backdrop permeated or characterized by the belief that said conditions were absent. Hence, the dictum
of Chief Justice Taney to the effect that "(e)very case must depend on its own circumstances."
10
One of
the important, if not dominant, factors, in connection therewith, was intimated in Sterling v.
Constantin,
11
in which the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes,
declared that:
.... When there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has
overridden private rightssecured by that Constitution, the subject
is necessarily one for judicial inquiry in an appropriate proceeding directed
against the individuals charged with the transgression. To such a case the
Federal judicial power extends
(Art. 3, sec. 2) and, so extending, the court has all the authority appropriate to
its
exercise. ....
12

In our resolution of October 5, 1971, We stated that "a majority of the Court" had
"tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the
existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and
889-A ... and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such basesin the light of the
requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par 2, of the Philippine
Constitution...." Upon further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in
the conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in
order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.
Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The
authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the
Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights
establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the
former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance, by providing that "(t)he privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended ...." It is only by way of exception that it
permits the suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion"
or, under Art VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" "when the public safety
requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such
period the necessity for such suspension shall exist."
13
For from being full and plenary, the
authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the
prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the
place where it may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark,
establish and define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist.
And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative
department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by
courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely,
the framers of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility.
Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that our political
system is essentially democratic and republican in character and that the suspension of the
privilege affects the most fundamental element of that system, namely, individual freedom.
Indeed, such freedom includes and connotes, as well as demands, the right of every single
member of our citizenry to freely discuss and dissent from, as well as criticize and
denounce, the views, the policies and the practices of the government and the party in
power that he deems unwise, improper or inimical to the commonwealth, regardless of
whether his own opinion is objectively correct or not. The untrammelled enjoyment and
exercise of such right which, under certain conditions, may be a civic duty of the highest
order is vital to the democratic system and essential to its successful operation and
wholesome growth and development.
Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is one enjoyed
and exercised, not in derogation thereof, but consistently therewith, and, hence, within the
framework of the social order established by the Constitution and the context of the Rule of
Law. Accordingly, when individual freedom is used to destroy that social order, by means of
force and violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law such as by rising publicly and taking
arms against the government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of
rebellion there emerges a circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the
aforementioned guarantee or protection, by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, when public safety requires it. Although we must be forewarned against mistaking
mere dissent no matter how emphatic or intemperate it may be for dissidence
amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse when
the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly established or cannot
reasonably be denied to uphold the finding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect,
encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land and depriving
him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore, without violating the Constitution and
jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is called upon to epitomize.
As heretofore adverted to, for the valid suspension of the privilege of the writ: (a) there must
be "invasion, insurrection or rebellion" or pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII
of the Constitution "imminent danger thereof"; and (b) public safety must require the
aforementioned suspension. The President declared in Proclamation No. 889, as amended,
that both conditions are present.
As regards the first condition, our jurisprudence
14
attests abundantly to the Communist activities
in the Philippines, especially in Manila, from the late twenties to the early thirties, then aimed principally at
incitement to sedition or rebellion, as the immediate objective. Upon the establishment of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, the movement seemed to have waned notably; but, the outbreak of
World War II in the Pacific and the miseries, the devastation and havoc, and the proliferation of
unlicensed firearms concomitant with the military occupation of the Philippines and its subsequent
liberation, brought about, in the late forties, a resurgence of the Communist threat, with such vigor as to
be able to organize and operate in Central Luzon an army called HUKBALAHAP, during the
occupation, and renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMP) after liberation which clashed
several times with the armed forces of the Republic. This prompted then President Quirino to issue
Proclamation No. 210, dated October 22, 1950, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
validity of which was upheld in Montenegro v. Castaeda.
15
Days before the promulgation of said
Proclamation, or on October 18, 1950, members of the Communist Politburo in the Philippines were
apprehended in Manila. Subsequently accused and convicted of the crime of rebellion, they served their
respective sentences.
16

The fifties saw a comparative lull in Communist activities, insofar as peace and order were
concerned. Still, on June 20, 1957, Rep. Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-
Subversion Act, was approved, upon the ground stated in the very preamble of said
statute that.
... the Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly a political
party, is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, not only by force and violence but also by deceit,
subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the
Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control;
... the continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the
Philippines constitutes a clear, present and grave danger to the security of
the Philippines;
17
and
... in the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national
in scope but international in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the
Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to
cope with this continuing menace to the freedom and security of the
country....
In the language of the Report on Central Luzon, submitted, on September 4, 1971, by the
Senate Ad Hoc Committee of Seven copy of which Report was filed in these cases by
the petitioners herein
The years following 1963 saw the successive emergence in the country of
several mass organizations, notably the Lapiang Manggagawa (now the
Socialist Party of the Philippines) among the workers; the Malayang
Samahan ng mga Magsasaka (MASAKA) among the peasantry; the
Kabataang Makabayan (KM) among the youth/students; and the Movement
for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) among the
intellectuals/professionals. The PKP has exerted all-out effort to infiltrate,
influence and utilize these organizations in promoting its radical brand of
nationalism.
18

Meanwhile, the Communist leaders in the Philippines had been split into two (2) groups,
one of which composed mainly of young radicals, constituting the Maoist faction
reorganized the Communist Party of the Philippines early in 1969 and established a New
People's Army. This faction adheres to the Maoist concept of the "Protracted People's War"
or "War of National Liberation." Its "Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution"
states, inter alia:
The Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to implement its
general programme for a people's democratic revolution. All Filipino
communists are ready to sacrifice their lives for the worthy cause of achieving
the new type of democracy, of building a new Philippines that is genuinely
and completely independent, democratic, united, just and prosperous ...
xxx xxx xxx
The central task of any revolutionary movement is to seize political
power. The Communist Party of the Philippines assumes this task at a time
that both the international and national situations are favorable of asking the
road of armed
revolution ...
19

In the year 1969, the NPA had according to the records of the Department of National
Defense conducted raids, resorted to kidnappings and taken part in other violent
incidents numbering over 230, in which it inflicted 404 casualties, and, in turn, suffered 243
losses. In 1970, its records of violent incidents was about the same, but the NPA casualties
more than doubled.
At any rate, two (2) facts are undeniable: (a) all Communists, whether they belong to the
traditional group or to the Maoist faction, believe that force and violence are indispensable
to the attainment of their main and ultimate objective, and act in accordance with such
belief, although they may disagree on the means to be used at a given time and in a
particular place; and (b) there is a New People's Army, other, of course, that the arm forces
of the Republic and antagonistic thereto. Such New People's Army is per se proof of
the existence of a rebellion, especially considering that its establishment was announced
publicly by the reorganized CPP. Such announcement is in the nature of a public challenge
to the duly constituted authorities and may be likened to a declaration of war, sufficient to
establish a war status or a condition of belligerency, even before the actual commencement
of hostilities.
We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who
have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are
engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
In fact, the thrust of petitioners' argument is that the New People's Army proper is too small,
compared with the size of the armed forces of the Government, that the Communist
rebellion or insurrection cannot so endanger public safety as to require the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This argument does not negate, however, the
existence of a rebellion, which, from the constitutional and statutory viewpoint, need not be
widespread or attain the magnitude of a civil war. This is apparent from the very provision of
the Revised Penal Code defining the crime of rebellion,
20
which may be limited in its scope to
"any part" of the Philippines, and, also, from paragraph (14) of section 1, Article III of the Constitution,
authorizing the suspension of the privilege of the writ "wherever" in case of rebellion "the necessity
for such suspension shall exist." In fact, the case of Barcelon v. Baker referred to a proclamation
suspending the privilege in the provinces of Cavite and Batangas only. The case of In re Boyle
21
involved
a valid proclamation suspending the privilege in a smaller area a country of the state of Idaho.
The magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing on the second condition essential to the
validity of the suspension of the privilege namely, that the suspension be required by
public safety. Before delving, however, into the factual bases of the presidential findings
thereon, let us consider the precise nature of the Court's function in passing upon the
validity of Proclamation No. 889, as amended.
Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpusunder specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation
of powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own
sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is
more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the
Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he
acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine
whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect,
is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.
In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check not
to supplant
22
the Executive,or to ascertain merely whether he had gone beyond the constitutional
limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. To
be sure, the power of the Court to determine the validity of the contested proclamation is far from being
identical to, or even comparable with, its power over ordinary civil or criminal cases elevated thereto by
ordinary appeal from inferior courts, in which cases the appellate court has all of the powers of the court
of origin.
Under the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, the
judicial authority to review decisions of administrative bodies or agencies is much more
limited, as regards findings of fact made in said decisions. Under the English law, the
reviewing court determines only whether there is some evidentiary basis for the contested
administrative findings; no quantitative examination of the supporting evidence is
undertaken. The administrative findings can be interfered with only if there is no evidence
whatsoever in support thereof, and said finding is, accordingly, arbitrary, capricious and
obviously unauthorized. This view has been adopted by some American courts. It has,
likewise, been adhered to in a number of Philippine cases. Other cases, in bothjurisdictions,
have applied the "substantial evidence" rule, which has been construed to mean "more than
a mere scintilla" or "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion,"
23
even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.
Manifestly, however, this approach refers to the review of administrative determinations
involving the exercise of quasi-judicial functions calling for or entailing the reception of
evidence. It does not and cannot be applied, in its aforesaid form, in testing the validity of an
act of Congress or of the Executive, such as the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, for, as a general rule, neither body takes evidence in the sense in
which the term is used in judicial proceedings before enacting a legislation or suspending
the writ. Referring to the test of the validity of a statute, the Supreme Court of the United
States, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, expressed, in the leading case of Nebbia v.
New York,
24
the view that:
... If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose, and areneither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that
effect renders a court functus officio ... With the wisdom of the policy adopted,
with the adequacy or practically of the law enacted to forward it, the courts
are both incompetent andunauthorized to deal ...
Relying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General
... that judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no
further than to satisfy the Court not that the President's decision is correct and
that public safety was endanger by the rebellion and justified the suspension
of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.
No cogent reason has been submitted to warrant the rejection of such test. Indeed, the co-
equality of coordinate branches of the Government, under our constitutional system, seems
to demand that the test of the validity of acts of Congress and of those of the Executive
be, mutatis mutandis, fundamentally the same. Hence, counsel for petitioner Rogelio
Arienda admits that the proper standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
Did public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889, as amended? Petitioners submit a negative
answer upon the ground: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the
suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts;
(c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually
taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because
of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the
Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
As above indicated, however, the existence of a rebellion is obvious, so much so that
counsel for several petitioners herein have admitted it.
With respect to the normal operation of government, including courts, prior to and at the
time of the suspension of the privilege, suffice it to say that, if the conditions were such that
courts of justice no longer functioned, a suspension of the privilege would have been
unnecessary, there being no courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, petitioners'
reference to the normal operation of courts as a factor indicative of the illegality of the
contested act of the Executive stems, perhaps, from the fact that this circumstance was
adverted to in some American cases to justify the invalidation therein decreed of said act of
the Executive. Said cases involved, however, the conviction by military courts of members
of the civilian population charged with common crimes. It was manifestly, illegal for military
courts to assume jurisdiction over civilians so charged, when civil courts were functioning
normally.
Then, too, the alleged absence of any untoward incident after August 21, 1971, does not
necessarily bear out petitioners' view. What is more, it may have been due precisely to the
suspension of the privilege. To be sure, one of its logical effects is to compel those
connected with the insurrection or rebellion to go into hiding. In fact, most of them could not
be located by the authorities, after August 21, 1971.
The alleged July-August Plan to terrorize Manila is branded as incredible, upon the theory
that, according to Professor Egbal Ahman of Cornell University, "guerrilla use of terror ... is
sociological and psychologically selective," and that the indiscriminate resort to terrorism is
bound to boomerang, for it tends to alienate the people's symphaty and to deprive the
dissidents of much needed mass support. The fact, however, is that the violence used is
some demonstrations held in Manila in 1970 and 1971 tended to terrorize the bulk of its
inhabitants. It would have been highly imprudent, therefore, for the Executive to discard the
possibility of a resort to terrorism, on a much bigger scale, under the July-August Plan.
We will now address our attention to petitioners' theory to the effect that the New People's
Army of the Communist Party of the Philippines is too small to pose a danger to public
safety of such magnitude as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. The flaw in petitioners' stand becomes apparent when we consider that it assumes
that the Armed Forces of the Philippines have no other task than to fight the New People's
Army, and that the latter is the only threat and a minor one to our security. Such
assumption is manifestly erroneous.
The records before Us show that, on or before August 21, 1971, the Executive had
information and reports subsequently confirmed, in many respects, by the
abovementioned Report of the Senate Ad-Hoc Committee of Seven
25
to the effect that the
Communist Party of the Philippines does not merely adhere to Lenin's idea of a swift armed uprising; that
it has, also, adopted Ho Chi Minh's terrorist tactics and resorted to the assassination of uncooperative
local official; that, in line with this policy, the insurgents have killed 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3
chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in
1970; that the Constitutional Convention Hall was bombed on June 12, 1971; that, soon after the Plaza
Miranda incident, the NAWASA main pipe, at the Quezon City-San Juan boundary, was bombed; that this
was followed closely by the bombing of the Manila City Hall, the COMELEC building, the Congress
Building and the MERALCO substation at Cubao, Quezon City; and that the respective residences of
Senator Jose J. Roy and Congressman Eduardo Cojuangco were, likewise, bombed, as were the
MERALCO main office premises, along Ortigas Avenue, and the Doctor's Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Building,
in Caloocan City.
Petitioners, similarly, fail to take into account that as per said information and reports
the reorganized Communist Party of the Philippines has, moreover, adopted Mao's concept
of protracted people's war, aimed at the paralyzation of the will to resist of the government,
of the political, economic and intellectual leadership, and of the people themselves; that
conformably to such concept, the Party has placed special emphasis upon a most extensive
and intensive program of subversion by the establishment of front organizations in urban
centers, the organization of armed city partisans and the infiltration in student groups, labor
unions, and farmer and professional groups; that the CPP has managed to infiltrate or
establish and control nine (9) major labor organizations; that it has exploited the youth
movement and succeeded in making Communist fronts of eleven (11) major student or
youth organizations; that there are, accordingly, about thirty (30) mass organizations
actively advancing the CPP interests, among which are the Malayang Samahan ng
Magsasaka (MASAKA), the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the Movement for the
Advancement of Nationalism (MAN), the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK), the
Samahang Molave (SM) and the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino(MPKP); that,
as of August, 1971, the KM had two hundred forty-five (245) operational chapters
throughout the Philippines, of which seventy-three (73) were in the Greater Manila Area,
sixty (60) in Northern Luzon, forty-nine (49) in Central Luzon, forty-two (42) in the Visayas
and twenty-one (21) in Mindanao and Sulu; that in 1970, the Party had recorded two
hundred fifty-eight (258) major demonstrations, of which about thirty-three (33) ended in
violence, resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over five hundred (500) injured; that most of
these actions were organized, coordinated or led by the aforementioned front organizations;
that the violent demonstrations were generally instigated by a small, but well-trained group
of armed agitators; that the number of demonstrations heretofore staged in 1971 has
already exceeded those of 1970; and that twenty-four (24) of these demonstrations were
violent, and resulted in the death of fifteen (15) persons and the injury of many more.
Subsequent events as reported have also proven that petitioners' counsel have
underestimated the threat to public safety posed by the New People's Army. Indeed, it
appears that, since August 21, 1971, it had in Northern Luzon six (6) encounters and staged
one (1) raid, in consequence of which seven (7) soldiers lost their lives and two (2)others
were wounded, whereas the insurgents suffered five (5) casualties; that on August 26,
1971, a well-armed group of NPA, trained by defector Lt. Victor Corpus, attacked the very
command port of TF LAWIN in Isabela, destroying two (2) helicopters and one (1) plane,
and wounding one (1) soldier; that the NPA had in Central Luzon a total of four (4)
encounters, with two (2) killed and three (3) wounded on the side of the Government, one
(1) BSDU killed and three (3) NPA casualties; that in an encounter at Botolan, Zambales,
one (1) KM-SDK leader, an unidentified dissident, and Commander Panchito, leader of the
dissident group were killed; that on August 26, 1971, there was an encounter in the barrio of
San Pedro. Iriga City, Camarines Sur, between the PC and the NPA, in which a PC and two
(2) KM members were killed; that the current disturbances in Cotabato and the Lanao
provinces have been rendered more complex by the involvement of the CPP/NPA, for, in
mid-1971, a KM group, headed by Jovencio Esparagoza, contacted the Higa-onan tribes, in
their settlement in Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, and offered them books, pamphlets and
brochures of Mao Tse Tung, as well as conducted teach-ins in the reservation; that
Esparagoza an operation of the PC in said reservation; and that there are now two (2) NPA
cadres in Mindanao.
It should, also, be noted that adherents of the CPP and its front organizations are,
according to intelligence findings, definitely capable of preparing powerful explosives out of
locally available materials; that the bomb used in the Constitutional Convention Hall was a
"clay-more" mine, a powerful explosive device used by the U.S. Army, believed to have
been one of many pilfered from the Subic Naval Base a few days before; that the President
had received intelligence information to the effect that there was a July-August Plan
involving a wave of assassinations, kidnappings, terrorism and mass destruction of property
and that an extraordinary occurence would signal the beginning of said event; that the
rather serious condition of peace and order in Mindanao, particularly in Cotabato and
Lanao, demanded the presence therein of forces sufficient to cope with the situation; that a
sizeable part of our armed forces discharge other functions; and that the expansion of the
CPP activities from Central Luzon to other parts of the country, particularly Manila and its
suburbs, the Cagayan Valley, Ifugao, Zambales, Laguna, Quezon and Bicol Region,
required that the rest of our armed forces be spread thin over a wide area.
Considering that the President was in possession of the above data except those related
to events that happened after August 21, 1971 when the Plaza Miranda bombing took
place, the Court is not prepared to hold that the Executive had acted arbitrarily or gravely
abused his discretion when he then concluded that public safety and national security
required the suspension of the privilege of the writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike
simultaneously with violent demonstrations staged by the two hundred forty-five (245) KM
chapters, all over the Philippines, with the assistance and cooperation of the dozens of CPP
front organizations, and the bombing or water mains and conduits, as well as electric power
plants and installations a possibility which, no matter how remote, he was bound to
forestall, and a danger he was under obligation to anticipate and arrest.
He had consulted his advisers and sought their views. He had reason to feel that the
situation was critical as, indeed, it was and demanded immediate action. This he took
believing in good faith that public safety required it. And, in the light of the circumstances
adverted to above, he had substantial grounds to entertain such belief.
Petitioners insist that, nevertheless, the President had no authority to suspend the privilege
in the entire Philippines, even if he may have been justified in doing so in some provinces or
cities thereof. At the time of the issuance of Proclamation No. 889, he could not be
reasonably certain, however, about the placed to be excluded from the operation of the
proclamation. He needed some time to find out how it worked, and as he did so, he caused
the suspension to be gradually lifted, first, on September 18, 1971, in twenty-seven (27)
provinces, three (3) sub-provinces and twenty six (26) cities; then, on September 25, 1971,
in order fourteen (14) provinces and thirteen (13) cities; and, still later, on October 4, 1971,
in seven (7) additional provinces and four (4) cities, or a total of forty-eight (48) provinces,
three (3) sub-provinces and forth-three (43) cities, within a period of forty-five (45) days from
August 21, 1971.
Neither should We overlook the significance of another fact. The President could have
declared a generalsuspension of the privilege. Instead, Proclamation No. 889 limited the
suspension to persons detained "for crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes
and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident
thereto, or in connection therewith." Even this was further limited by Proclamation No. 889-
A, which withdrew from the coverage of the suspension persons detained for other crimes
and offenses committed "on the occasion" of the insurrection or rebellion, or "incident
thereto, in or connection therewith." In fact, the petitioners in L-33964, L-33982 and L-34004
concede that the President had acted in good faith.
In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the President has,
under the Constitution, three (3) courses of action open to him, namely: (a) to call out the
armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed
forces, which measure, however, proved inadequate to attain the desired result. Of the two
(2)other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.
In view of the foregoing, it does not appear that the President has acted arbitrary in issuing
Proclamation No. 889, as amended, nor that the same is unconstitutional.
III
The next question for determination is whether petitioners herein are covered by said
Proclamation, as amended. In other words, do petitioners herein belong to the class of
persons as to whom privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended?
In this connection, it appears that Bayani Alcala, one of the petitioners in L-33964, Gerardo
Tomas, petitioner in L-34004, and Reynaldo Rimando, petitioner in L-34013, were, on
November 13, 1971, released "permanently" meaning, perhaps, without any intention to
prosecute them upon the ground that, although there was reasonable ground to believe
that they had committed an offense related to subversion, the evidence against them is
insufficient to warrant their prosecution; that Teodosio Lansang, one of the petitioners in L-
33964, Rogelio Arienda, petitioner in L-33965, Nemesio Prudente, petitioner in L-33982,
Filomeno de Castro and Barcelisa C. de Castro, for whose benefit the petition in L-34039
was filed, and Antolin Oreta, Jr., petitioner in L-34265, were, on said date, "temporarily
released"; that Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the petitioners in
L-33964, Victor Felipe, an intervenor in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, as well as
Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, and Gary Olivar, petitioner in L-34339, are still
under detention and, hence, deprived of their liberty, they together with over forty (40)
other persons, who are at large having been accused, in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, of a violation of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act); and that
Angelo delos Reyes and Teresito Sison, intervenors in said L-33964, L-33965 and
L-33973, are, likewise, still detained and have been charged together with over fifteen
(15) other persons, who are, also, at large with another violation of said Act, in a criminal
complaint filed with the City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City.
With respect to Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang petitioners in L-33965 who were
released as early as August 31, 1971, as well as to petitioners Nemesio Prudente, Teodosio
Lansang, Rogelio Arienda, Antolin Oreta, Jr., Filomeno de Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro,
Reynaldo Rimando, Gerardo Tomas and Bayani Alcala, who were released on November
13, 1971, and are no longer deprived of their liberty, their respective petitions have, thereby,
become moot and academic, as far as their prayer for release is concerned, and should,
accordingly, be dismissed, despite the opposition thereto of counsel for Nemesio Prudente
and Gerardo Tomas who maintain that, as long as the privilege of the writ remains
suspended, these petitioners might be arrested and detained again, without just cause, and
that, accordingly, the issue raised in their respective petitions is not moot. In any event, the
common constitutional and legal issues raised in these cases have, in fact, been decided in
this joint decision.
Must we order the release of Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the petitioners in
L-33964, Angelo de los Reyes, Victor Felipe and Teresito Sison, intervenors in L-33964, L-
33965 and L-33973, Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, and Gary Olivar, petitioner in
L-34339, who are still detained? The suspension of the privilege of the writ was decreed by
Proclamation No. 889, as amended, for persons detained "for the crimes of insurrection or
rebellion and other overt acts committed by them in furtherance thereof."
The records shows that petitioners Luzvimindo David, Rodolfo del Rosario, Victor Felipe,
Angelo de los Reyes, Teresito Sison and Gary Olivar are accused in Criminal Case No. Q-
1623 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal with a violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and
that the similar charge against petitioners Angelo de los Reyes and Teresito Sison in a
criminal complaint, originally filed with the City Fiscal of Quezon City, has, also, been filed
with said court. Do the offenses so charged constitute one of the crimes or overt acts
mentioned in Proclamation No. 889, as amended?
In the complaint in said Criminal Case No. 1623, it is alleged:
That in or about the year 1968 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter
up to and including August 21, 1971, in the city of Quezon, Philippines, and
elsewhere in the Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts became
officers and/or ranking leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines, a
subversive association as defined by Republic Act No. 1700, which is an
organized conspiracy to overthrow the government of the Republic of the
Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for
the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a communist totalitarian regime
subject to alien domination and control;
That all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of
the Communist Party of the Philippines conspiring, confederating and mutual
helping one another, did then and there knowingly, wilfully, and feloniously
and by overt acts committed subversive acts all intended to overthrow the
government of the Republic of the Philippines, as follows:
1. By rising publicly and taking arms against the forces of the
government, engaging in war against the forces of the
government, destroying property or committing serious
violence, exacting contributions or diverting public lands or
property from the law purposes for which they have been
appropriated;
2. By engaging by subversion thru expansion and requirement
activities not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but
also of the united front organizations of the Communist Party of
the Philippines as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), Movement
for the Democratic Philippines (MDP), Samahang
Demokratikong Kabataan (SDK), Students' Alliance for National
Democracy (STAND), MASAKA Olalia-faction, Student Cultural
Association of the University of the Philippines (SCAUP),
KASAMA, Pagkakaisa ng Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (PMP) and
many others; thru agitation promoted by rallies, demonstration
and strikes some of them violent in nature, intended to create
social discontent, discredit those in power and weaken the
people's confidence in the government; thru consistent
propaganda by publications, writing, posters, leaflets of similar
means; speeches, teach-ins, messages, lectures or other
similar means; or thru the media as the TV, radio or
newspapers, all intended to promote the Communist pattern of
subversion;
3. Thru urban guerilla warfare characterized by assassinations,
bombings, sabotage, kidnapping and arson, intended to
advertise the movement, build up its morale and prestige,
discredit and demoralize the authorities to use harsh and
repressive measures, demoralize the people and weaken their
confidence in the government and to weaken the will of the
government to resist.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
offense:
a. That the offense was committed in contempt of and with insult to the public
authorities;
b. That some of the overt acts were committed in the Palace of the Chief
Executive;
c. That craft, fraud, or disguise was employed;
d. That the offense was committed with the aid of armed men;
e. That the offense was committed with the aid of persons under fifteen(15)
years old.
Identical allegations are made in the complaint filed with the City Fiscal of Quezon City,
except that the second paragraph thereof is slightly more elaborate than that of the
complaint filed with the CFI, although substantially the same.
26

In both complaints, the acts imputed to the defendants herein constitute rebellion and
subversion, of in the language of the proclamation "other overt acts committed ... in
furtherance" of said rebellion, both of which are covered by the proclamation suspending
the privilege of the writ. It is clear, therefore, that the crime for which the detained petitioners
are held and deprived of their liberty are among those for which the privilege of the writ
ofhabeas corpus has been suspended.
Up to this point, the Members of the Court are unanimous on the legal principles
enunciated.
After finding that Proclamation No. 889, as amended, is not invalid and that petitioners
Luzvimindo David, Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and
Teresito Sison are detained for and actually accused of an offense for which the privilege of
the writ has been suspended by said proclamation, our next step would have been the
following: The Court, or a commissioner designated by it, would have received evidence on
whether as stated in respondents' "Answer and Return" said petitioners had been
apprehended and detained "on reasonable belief" that they had "participated in the crime of
insurrection or rebellion."
It is so happened, however, that on November 13, 1971 or two (2) days before the
proceedings relative to the briefing held on October 28 and 29, 1971, had been completed
by the filing
27
of the summary of the matters then taken up the aforementioned criminal complaints
were filed against said petitioners. What is more, the preliminary examination and/or investigation of the
charges contained in said complaints has already begun. The next question, therefore, is: Shall We now
order, in the cases at hand, the release of said petitioners herein, despite the formal and substantial
validity of the proclamation suspending the privilege, despite the fact that they are actually charged with
offenses covered by said proclamation and despite the aforementioned criminal complaints against them
and the preliminary examination and/or investigations being conducted therein?
The Members of the Court, with the exception of Mr. Justice Fernando, are of the opinion,
and, so hold, that, instead of this Court or its Commissioner taking the evidence adverted to
above, it is best to let said preliminary examination and/or investigation to be completed, so
that petitioners' released could be ordered by the court of first instance, should it find that
there is no probable cause against them, or a warrant for their arrest could be issued,
should a probable cause be established against them. Such course of action is more
favorable to the petitioners, inasmuch as the preliminary examination or investigation
requires a greater quantum of proof than that needed to establish that the Executive had not
acted arbitrary in causing the petitioners to be apprehended and detained upon the ground
that they had participated in the commission of the crime of insurrection or rebellion. And, it
is mainly for the reason that the Court has opted to allow the Court of First Instance of Rizal
to proceed with the determination of the existence of probable cause, although ordinarily the
Court would have merely determined the existence of the substantial evidence of
petitioners' connection with the crime of rebellion. Besides, the latter alternative would
require the reception of evidence by this Court and thus duplicate the proceedings now
taking place in the court of first instance. What is more, since the evidence involved in the
same proceedings would be substantially the same and the presentation of such evidence
cannot be made simultaneously, each proceeding would tend to delay the other.
Mr. Justice Fernando is of the opinion in line with the view of Mr. Justice Tuason, in Nava
v. Gatmaitan,
28
to the effect that "... if and when formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and
the executive steps out. The detention ceases to be an executive and becomes a judicial concern ..."
that the filing of the above-mentioned complaint against the six (6) detained petitioners herein, has the
effect of the Executive giving up his authority to continue holding them pursuant to Proclamation No. 889,
as amended, even if he did not so intend, and to place them fully under the authority of courts of justice,
just like any other person, who, as such, cannot be deprived of his liberty without lawful warrant, which
has not, as yet, been issued against anyone of them, and that, accordingly, We should order their
immediate release. Despite the humanitarian and libertarian spirit with which this view had been
espoused, the other Members of the Court are unable to accept it because:
(a) If the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is valid and
We so hold it to be and the detainee is covered by the proclamation, the filing of a
complaint or information against him does not affect the suspension of said privilege, and,
consequently, his release may not be ordered by Us;
(b) Inasmuch as the filing of a formal complaint or information does not detract from the
validity and efficacy of the suspension of the privilege, it would be more reasonable to
construe the filing of said formal charges with the court of first instance as an expression of
the President's belief that there are sufficient evidence to convict the petitioners so charged
and that hey should not be released, therefore, unless and until said court after
conducting the corresponding preliminary examination and/or investigation shall find that
the prosecution has not established the existence of a probable cause. Otherwise, the
Executive would have released said accused, as were the other petitioners herein;
(c) From a long-range viewpoint, this interpretation of the act of the President in having
said formal charges filed is, We believe, more beneficial to the detainees than that
favored by Mr. Justice Fernando. His view particularly the theory that the detainees
should be released immediately, without bail, even before the completion of said preliminary
examination and/or investigation would tend to induce the Executive to refrain from filing
formal charges as long as it may be possible. Manifestly, We should encourage the early
filing of said charges, so that courts of justice could assume jurisdiction over the detainees
and extend to them effective protection.
Although some of the petitioners in these cases pray that the Court decide whether the
constitutional right to bail is affected by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, We do not deem it proper to pass upon such question, the same not having been
sufficiently discussed by the parties herein. Besides, there is no point in settling said
question with respect to petitioners herein who have been released. Neither is necessary to
express our view thereon, as regards those still detained, inasmuch as their release without
bail might still be decreed by the court of first instance, should it hold that there is no
probable cause against them. At any rate, should an actual issue on the right to bail arise
later, the same may be brought up in appropriate proceedings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as
amended, and that, accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional;
2. Dismissing the petitions in L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-34039 and
L-34265, insofar as petitioners Teodosio Lansang, Bayani Alcala, Rogelio Arienda,
Vicentellao, Juan Carandang, Nemesio E. Prudente, Gerardo Tomas, Reynaldo Rimando,
Filomeno M. de Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro and Antolin Oreta, Jr. are concerned;
3. The Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby directed to act with utmost dispatch in
conducting the preliminary examination and/or investigation of the charges for violation of
the Anti-Subversion Act filed against herein petitioners Luzvimindo David, Victor Felipe,
Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito Sison, and to issue the
corresponding warrants of arrest, if probable cause is found to exist against them, or,
otherwise, to order their release; and
4. Should there be undue delay, for any reason whatsoever, either in the completion of the
aforementioned preliminary examination and/or investigation, or in the issuance of the
proper orders or resolution in connection therewith, the parties may by motion seek in these
proceedings the proper relief.
5. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.



Separate Opinions

CASTRO and BARREDO, J J ., concurring:
While concurring fully in the opinion of the Court, we nevertheless write separately to
answer, from our own perspective, a point which Mr. Justice Fernando makes in his dissent.
His view, as we understand it, is that while an individual may be detained beyond the
maximum detention period fixed by law when the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus is
suspended, such individual is nevertheless entitled to be released from the very moment a
formal complaint is filed in court against him. The theory seems to be that from the time the
charge is filed, the court acquires, because the executive officials abdicate, jurisdiction.
This view is based on the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason in Nava vs.
Gatmaitan.
1
Justice Tuason, in part, said:
All persons detained for investigation by the executive department are under
executive control. It is here where the Constitution tells the court to keep their
hands off unless the cause of the detention be for an offense other than
rebellion or insurrection, which is another matter.
By the same token, if and when a formal complaint is presented, the court
steps in and the executive steps out. The detention ceases to be an executive
and becomes a judicial concern...
But the issue to which the Supreme Court Justices in Nava individually addressed
themselves is radically disparate from that raised in these cases. There the question was
whether after the detainees had been formally charged in court and an order for their arrest
had been issued, they were entitled to bail. It was on that question that the Court was split 5
to 4, and it was the opinion of Justice Tuason, one of the five, that after the detainees had
been accused in court, the question of release on bail was a matter that the court should
decide.
Upon the other hand, the question here presented is whether the detainees should be
released forthwith upon the filing of charges against them in court and cannot thereafter be
re-arrested except only by court order. This is a totally different question. It is our
submission that they are not entitled to be released. The dissent is, we believe, based on
the fallacy that when a formal charge is filed against a person he is thereby surrendered to
the court and the arresting officer is thereby divested of custody over him. Except in a
metaphorical sense, the detainee is not delivered or surrendered at all to the judicial
authorities. What the phrase "delivered to the court" simply means is that from the time a
person is indicted in court, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
2
The
detainee remains in the custody of the detaining officer, under the same authority invoked for the
detention, until the court decides whether there is probable cause to order his arrest.
Under ordinary circumstances, when a person is arrested without a warrant and is charged
in court, he is not released. He is held until the judicial authority orders either his release or
his confinement. It is no argument to say that under Article III, section 1 (3) of the
Constitution only a court can order the arrest of an individual. Arrests without warrant are
familiar occurrences, and they have been upheld as constitutional.
3

What is more, the privilege of the writ was suspended precisely to authorize the detention of
persons believed to be plotting against the security of the State until the courts can act on
their respective cases. To require their peremptory release upon the mere filing of charges
against them, without giving the proper court opportunity and time to decide the question of
probable cause, would obviously be to defeat the very basic purpose of the suspension. We
think our role as judges in the cases at bar is clear. After finding that the Presidential decree
was validly issued, we should give it effect. To uphold its validity and then try to dilute its
efficacy in the name of personal liberty is, we believe, actually to doubt the constitutionality
of the exercise of the Presidential prerogative.
Not only that. If the rule were that the detainees must be released upon the mere filing of
charges against them in court, it is unlikely that the executive officials would have filed the
charges because of their awareness of the continuing danger which in the first place
impelled the arrest of the detainees, and the end result would be to inflict on the latter a
much longer period of deprivation of personal liberty than is warranted.
Whatever our personal views may be of the power to suspend, the fact remains that the
power is there, writ large and indubitable in the Constitution. It is far too easy to write
anthologies on the side of civil liberties or on the side of governmental order, depending on
one's inclination or commitment. But that is not our function. Constitutional issues, it has
been said, do not take the form of right versus wrong, but of right versus right. And the
Court's function, as we see it, is, fundamentally to moderate the clash of values, and not to
inflate them into constitutional dimensions.
Where it is possible, we should avoid passing on a constitutional question. But where there
is no escape from the duty of abstention, our further duty is to decide the question of
constitutional validity on a less heroic plane.
And that is what we have tried to do in pointing out that the ordinary rules of criminal
procedure provide an adequate answer to Mr. Justice Fernando's problem. That solution is
for the arresting officer to hold the person detained until the court can act, with the only
difference that where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is available, the arresting
officer must release the detainee upon the expiration of the maximum detention time
allowed by law, if he has not delivered the detainee to the court within that period.
To insist on the procedural aspect of a constitutional problem as a manner of solving it is,
after all, no less to be libertarian. Insistence on it is, to us, and in point of fact, one of the
cornerstone of liberalism.
FERNANDO, J ., concurring and dissenting:
The decision of the Court penned by the Chief Justice easily ranks with his many landmark
opinions in Constitutional Law and is in the tradition of the great judicial pronouncements
from this Tribunal. Skillful in its analysis, impressive as to its learning, comprehensive in its
scope, and compelling in its logic, it exerts considerable persuasive force. There is much in
it therefore to which concurrence is easily yielded. I find it difficult however to accept the
conclusion that the six petitioners still under detention should not be set free. It is for me a
source of deep regret that having gone quite far in manifesting the utmost sympathy for and
conformity with the claims of civil liberties, it did not go farther. Candor induces the
admission though that the situation realistically viewed may not justify going all the way.
Nonetheless the deeply-rooted conviction as to the undoubted primacy of constitutional
rights, even under circumstances the least propitious, precludes me from joining my
brethren in that portion of the decision reached. Nor should I let this opportunity pass
without acknowledging the fairness, even the generosity, in the appraisal of my position in
the position of the Chief Justice.
1. The function of judicial review fitly characterized as both delicate and awesome is never
more so than when the judiciary is called upon to pass on the validity of an act of the
President arising from the exercise of a power granted admittedly to cope with an
emergency or crisis situation. More specifically, with reference to the petitions before us, the
question that calls for prior consideration is whether the suspension of the privilege of the
writ ofhabeas corpus is tainted by constitutional infirmity. What the President did attested to
an executive determination of the existence of the conditions that warranted such a move.
For one of the mandatory provisions of the Bill of Rights
1
is that no such suspension is allowable,
except in cases of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, when the public safety requires, and, even, then,
only in such places and for such period of time as may be necessary.
2
There is the further provision that
the constitutional official so empowered to take such a step is the President.
3
The exceptional character
of the situation is thus underscored. The presumption would seem to be that if such a step were taken,
there must have been a conviction on the part of the Executive that he could not, in the fulfillment of the
responsibility entrusted to him, avoid doing so. That decision is his to make; it is not for the judiciary. It is
therefore encased in the armor of what must have been a careful study on his part, in the light of relevant
information which as Commander-in-Chief he is furnished, ordinarily beyond the ken of the courts. When
it is considered further that the Constitution does admit that the sphere of individual freedom contracts
and the scope of governmental authority expands during times of emergency, it becomes manifest why
an even greater degree of caution and circumspection must be exercised by the judiciary when, on this
matter, it is called upon to discharge the function of judicial review.
2. Not that the judiciary has any choice on the matter. That view would indict itself for
unorthodoxy if it maintains that the existence of rebellion suffices to call for the disregard of
the applicable constitutional guarantees. Its implication would be that the Constitution
ceases to be operative in times of danger to national safety and security. Well has the
American Supreme Court in the leading case of Ex-parte Milligan
4
stated: "The Constitution is a
law for rulers and for people equally in war and in peace and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men at all times and under all circumstances." This ringing affirmation should at the very least
give pause to those troubled by the continuing respect that must be accorded civil liberties under crisis
conditions. The fact that the Constitution provides for only one situation where a provision of the Bill of
Rights may be suspended, emphasizes the holding in the above-cited Milligan case that the framers of
the Constitution "limited the suspension to one great right and left the rest to remain forever inviolable."
While perhaps at times likely to give rise to difficulties in the disposition of cases during a troubled era
where a suspension has been decreed, such a view is to be taken into careful consideration.
3. For it is a truism that he Constitution is paramount, and the Supreme Court has no choice
but to apply its provisions in the determination of actual cases and controversies before it.
Nor is this all. The protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is
one of the highest duties and privileges of the judiciary.
5
The exercise thereof according to Justice
Laurel requires that it gives effect to the supreme law to the extent in clear cases of setting aside
legislative and executive action.
6
The supreme mandates of the Constitution are not to be loosely
brushed aside.
7
Otherwise, the Bill or Rights might be emasculated into mere expressions of
sentiment.
8
Speaking of this Court, Justice Abad Santos once pertinently observed: "This court owes its
own existence to that great instrument and derives all its powers therefrom. In the exercise of its powers
and jurisdiction, this court is bound by the provisions of the Constitution."
9
Justice Tuason would thus
apply the constitutional rights with undeviating rigidity: "To the plea that the security of the State would be
jeopardized by the release of the defendants on bail, the answer is that the existence of danger is never a
justification for courts to tamper with the fundamental rights expressly granted by the Constitution. These
rights are immutable, inflexible, yielding to no pressure of convenience, expediency, or the so-called
'judicial statesmanship.' The Legislature itself can not infringe them, and no court conscious of its
responsibilities and limitations would do so. If the Bill of Rights are incompatible with stable government
and a menace to the Nation, let the Constitution be amended, or abolished. It is trite to say that, while the
Constitution stands, the courts of justice as the repository of civil liberty are bound to protect and maintain
undiluted individual rights."
10

It is in that context, to my mind, that the petitions before us should be appraised, for in terms
of physical, as distinguished from intellectual, liberty, the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus occupies a place second to none. As was stressed in Gumabon v. Director of
Prisons:
11
"Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ 'as the most important human rights provision' in
the fundamental law." Care is to be taken then lest in the inquiry that must be undertaken to determine
whether the constitutional requisites justifying a suspension are present, the effects thereof as to the
other civil liberties are not fully taken into account. It affords no justification to say that such a move was
prompted by the best motives and loftiest of intentions. Much less can there be acceptance of the view,
as contended by one of the counsel for respondents, that between the safety of the overwhelming
majority of Filipinos and the claims of the petitioners to liberty, the former must prevail. That is to indulge
in the vice of over simplification. Our fundamental postulate is that the state exists to assure individual
rights, to protect which governments are instituted deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed. "The cardinal article of faith of our civilization," according to Frank further, "is the inviolable
character of the individual."
12

4. With all the admitted difficulty then that the function of judicial review presents in passing
upon the executive determination of suspending the privilege of the writ, there is still no way
of evading such a responsibility, except on the pain of judicial abdication. It may not admit of
doubt that on this matter this Court, unlike the President, cannot lay claim to the experience
and the requisite knowledge that would instill confidence in its decisions. That is no warrant
for an unquestioning and uncritical acceptance of what was done. It cannot simply fold its
hands and evince an attitude of unconcern. It has to decide the case. This it does by
applying the law to the facts as found, as it would in ordinary cases. If petitioners then can
make out a case of an unlawful deprivation of liberty, they are entitled to the writ prayed for.
If the suspension of the privilege be the justification, they could, as they did, challenge its
validity. To repeat, this Court, even if denied the fullness of information and the conceded
grasp of the Executive still must adjudicate the matter as best it can. It has to act not by
virtue of its competence but by the force of its commission a function authenticated by
history.
13
That would be to live up to its solemn trust, to paraphrase Cardozo, of preserving the great
ideals of liberty and equally against the erosion of possible encroachments, whether minute or
extensive.
14
Even if there be no showing then of constitutional infirmity, at least one other branch of the
government, that to which such an awesome duty had been conferred has had the opportunity of
reflecting on the matter with detachment, with objectivity, and with full awareness of the commands of the
Constitution as well as the realities of the situation.
5. Nor is the power of the judiciary to so inquire, negated as contended by respondents, by
reliance on the doctrine of political questions. The term has been made applicable to
controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue
involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a
prior legislative or executive determination to which deference must be paid.
15
It has likewise
been employed loosely to characterize a suit where the party proceeded against is the President or
Congress, or any branch thereof.
16
If to be de-limited with accuracy, "political questions" should refer to
such as would under the Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to
which full discretionary authority is vested either in the Presidency or Congress. It is thus beyond the
competence of the judiciary to pass upon.
17
Unless, clearly falling within the above formulation, the
decision reached by the political branches whether in the form of a congressional act or an executive
order could be tested in court. Where private rights are affected, the judiciary has no choice but to look
into its validity. It is not to be lost sight of that such a power comes into play if there is an appropriate
proceeding that may be filed only after either coordinate branch has acted. Even when the Presidency or
Congress possesses plenary power, its improvidence exercise or the abuse thereof, if shown, may give
rise to a justiciable controversy.
18
For the constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted.
There are limits to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished. Necessarily then, the courts in
the proper exercise of judicial review could inquire into the question of whether or not either of the two
coordinate branches has adhered to what is laid down by the Constitution. The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. So it is in the matter before us so clearly explained in the opinion of the Chief
Justice.
6. The doctrine announced in Montenegro v. Castaeda
19
that such a question is political has
thus been laid to rest. It is about time too. It owed its existence to the compulsion exerted by Barcelon v.
Baker, a 1905 decision.
20
This Court was partly misled by an undue reliance in the latter case on what it
considered to be authoritative pronouncements from such illustrious American jurists as Marshall, Story,
and Taney. That is to misread what was said by them. This is most evidence in the case of Chief Justice
Marshall, whose epochal Marbury v. Madison
21
was cited. Why that was so is difficult to understand. For
it speaks to the contrary. It was by virtue of this decision that the function of judicial review owes its origin
notwithstanding the absence of any explicit provision in the American Constitution empowering the courts
to do so. Thus: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two
laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition
to the constitution: if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must
either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the
case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, the, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the
constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act,
must govern the case to which they both apply."
22

Nor is the excerpt from Justice Story, speaking for the United States Supreme Court, in
Martin v. Mott,
23
as made clear in the opinion of the Chief Justice, an authority directly in point. There,
a militiaman had been convicted of failing to respond to a call, made under the Act of 1795, to serve
during the War of 1812. His property was taken to satisfy the judgment. He brought an action of replevin.
The American Constitution empowers its Congress "to provide for calling forth the Militia" in certain cases,
and Congress did provide that in those cases the President should have authority to make the call. All
that Justice Story did in construing the statute in the light of the language and purpose of her Constitution
was to recognize the authority of the American President to decide whether the exigency has arisen. In
stating that such power was exclusive and thus had a conclusive effect, he relied on the language
employed, impressed with such a character. The constitutional provision on the suspension of the
privilege of the writ is, as shown, anything but that.
24
Chief Justice Taney, in Luther v. Borden,
25
likewise
had to deal with a situation involving the calling out of the militia. As a matter of fact, an eminent
commentator speaking of the two above decisions had this apt observation: "The common element in
these opinions would seem to be a genuine judicial reluctance to speak in a situation where the voice of
the Court, even if heard, could not have any effect. More than this, both Story and Taney seem to share
the suspicion, unusual in them, that under a popular form of government there are certain questions that
the political branches must be trusted to answer with finality."
26
What was said next is even more
pertinent. Thus: "It would be dangerous and misleading to push the principles of these cases too far,
especially the doctrine of 'political questions' as implied in Luther v. Borden. Given the opportunity to
afford a grievously injured citizen relief from a palpably unwarranted use of presidential or military power,
especially when the question at issue falls in the penumbra between the 'political' and the 'justiciable', the
Court will act as if it had never heard of this doctrine and its underlying assumption that there are some
powers against which the judiciary simply cannot be expected to act as the last line of defense."
27
It
would thus seem evidence that support for the hitherto prevailing Montenegro ruling was rather frail.
Happily, with our decision, it is no longer capable of the mischief to which it does lend itself of an undue
diminution of judicial power to the prejudice of constitutional rights.
7. With such presidential determination of the existence of the conditions required by the
Constitution to justify a suspension of the privilege of the writ no longer conclusive on the
other branches, this Court may thus legitimately inquire into its validity. The question before
us, it bears repeating, is whether or not Proclamation No. 889 as it now stands, not as it
was originally issued, is valid. The starting point must be a recognition that the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ belongs to the Executive, subject to limitations. So the
Constitution provides, and it is to be respected. The range of permissible inquiry to be
conducted by this Tribunal is necessarily limited then to the ascertainment of whether or not
such a suspension, in the light of the credible information furnished the President, was
arbitrary. Such a test met with the approval of the chief counsel for petitioners, Senator Jose
W. Diokno. To paraphrase Frankfurter, the question before the judiciary is not the
correctness but the reasonableness of the action taken. One who is not the Executive but
equally knowledgeable may entertain a different view, but the decision rests with the
occupant of the office. As would be immediately apparent even from a cursory perusal of
the data furnished the President, so impressively summarized in the opinion of the Chief
Justice, the imputation of arbitrariness would be difficult to sustain. Moreover, the steps
taken by him to limit the area where the suspension operates as well as his instructions
attested to a firm resolve on his part to keep strictly within the bounds of his authority. Under
the circumstances, the decision reached by the Court that no finding of unconstitutionality is
warranted commends itself for approval. The most that can be said is that there was a
manifestation of presidential power well-nigh touching the extreme border of his conceded
competence, beyond which a forbidden domain lies. The requisite showing of either
improvidence or abuse has not been made.
8. Why the dissent then. My basic premise is that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
partakes of an executive action which if valid binds all who are within its operations. The
function of enacting a legal norm general in character appertains to either Congress or the
President. Its specific application to particular individuals, like petitioners here, is however a
task incumbent on the judiciary. What is more, as had just been explained, its validity
maybe tested in courts. Even if valid, any one may seek judicial determination as to whether
he is embraced within its terms. After our declaration of the validity of the Proclamation No.
889 as amended, the next question is its applicability to petitioners. I am the first to
recognize the meticulous care with which the Chief Justice, after reaching the conclusion
that petitioners are covered by the suspension, saw to it that their constitutional rights are
duly safeguarded in whatever proceedings they would have thereafter to face. There is thus
as assurance that as far as human foresight can anticipate matters, the possibility of abuse
is minimized.
The matter, for me, could be viewed independently of whether or not petitioners, by the
conduct imputed to them, could be detained further by virtue of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ. For admittedly, a supervening fact, the Executive's determination to
have them charged according to the ordinary procedural rules, did present itself. There was
thus introduced an element decisive in its consequences. They are entitled to treatment no
different from that accorded any other individual facing possible criminal charges. The
opinion of the Chief Justice is correct in pointing out that such an approach follows the
dictum of Justice Tuason, speaking for himself in Nava v. Gatmaitan,
28
where a majority of
five, lacking just one vote to enable this Court to reach a binding decision, did arrive at the conclusion that
the suspension of the privilege of the writ does not suspend the right to bail. Thus: "By the same token, if
and when formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and the executive steps out. The detention
ceases to be an executive and becomes a judicial concern. Thereupon the corresponding court assumes
its role and the judicial process takes its course to the exclusion of the executive or the legislative
departments. Hence forward, the accused is entitled to demand all the constitutional safeguards and
privileges essential to due process."
29
Parenthetically, it may be observed that the above view reflects
the stand taken by Justice Recto, fortified by Justice Laurel, drawing heavily on continental juristic
thought, both of whom, having retired from the bench and thereafter having been elected to the Senate,
were invited to appear as amici curiae in the Nava case.
It would follow to my way of thinking then that the petitioners still detained ought not to be
further deprived of their liberty in the absence of a warrant of arrest for whatever offense
they may be held to answer, to be issued by a judge after a finding of probable cause. That
is to comply with the constitutional requirement against unreasonable search and
seizure.
30
Moreover, to keep them in confinement after the ordinary processes of the law are to be
availed of, as thereafter decreed by the Executive itself is to ignore the safeguard in the Bill of Rights that
no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
31
That would explain
why with full recognition of the sense of realism that infuses the opinion of the Court, I cannot, from the
above standpoint, reach the same conclusion they did. These six petitioners, Rodolfo del Rosario, Victor
Felipe, Luzvimindo, David, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes and Teresito Sison, have, for me, become
immune from the operation of the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusand
are thus entitled to their liberty. I am reinforced in my conviction by the well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that if there are two possible modes of interpretation, that one which raises the
least constitutional doubt should be preferred. Certainly, to my way of thinking, the choice is obvious. That
interpretation which would throw the full mantle of protection afforded by the Constitution to those
unfortunate enough to be caught in the meshes of criminal law is more in keeping with the high estate
accorded constitutional rights.
There is another consideration that strengthens my conviction on the matter. The language
of the Constitution would seem to imply at the most that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ renders it unavailable for the time being. Still there are authorities sustaining the
view that preventive detention subject to the test of good faith is allowable.
32
Such a doctrine
is no doubt partly traceable to Anglo-American legal history where as pointed out by Maine: "Substantive
law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure."
33
The writ of habeas
corpus then is more than just an efficacius device or the most speedy means of obtaining one's liberty. It
has become a most valuable substantive right. It would thus serve the cause of constitutional rights better
if the Tuason dictum as to the judicial process supplanting executive rule the moment charges are filed be
accorded acceptance. Thereby the number of individuals who would have to submit to further detention,
that may well turn out to be unjustified, would be reduced. What is more, greater fidelity is manifested to
the principle that liberty is the rule and restraint the exception.
I am not of course insensible to the observation in the opinion of the Court that this concept
could be an obstacle to the early resumption of the ordinary judicial process as the
Executive might be minded to postpone resort to it, considering that there would necessarily
be an end to the detention at that early stage of individuals who continue to pose risk to the
safety of the government. It does occur to me, however, that the presumption should be that
the high executive dignitaries can be trusted to act in accordance with the dictates of good
faith and the command of the Constitution. At least, such seems to be the case now. The
opinion of the Court is quite explicit as to the measures taken to minimize the possibility of
abuse from officials in the lower category, who in their zeal or even from less worthy
motives might make a mockey of the other constitutional rights. That is as it should be. It
should continue to be so even if there be acceptance of the doctrine enunciated by Justice
Tuason. There is, for me at least, no undue cause for pessimism.
These is to my mind another reinforcement to this approach to the question before us,
perhaps one based more on policy rather than strictly legal considerations. The petitioners
who have not been released are youth leaders, who for motives best known to them,
perhaps excess of idealism, impatience with existing conditions, even overweening
ambition, clamor for change, apparently oblivious at times that it could be accomplished
through means of which the law does not disapprove. It would be premature at this stage to
say whether or not their activities have incurred for them a penal sanction, which certainly
would be appropriate if their conduct is beyond the pale. Even they should recognize that
the existing order has the right to defendant itself against those who would destroy it.
Nonetheless as a constitutional democracy can justifiably pride itself on its allegiance to
ways of persuasion rather than coercion, the most meticulous observance of the free way of
life seems to me, even at this stage, not without its beneficent influence on their future
course of conduct. This is not by any means to intimate that my brethren view matters
differently. Far from it. Any difference if at all in the positions taken is a question of
emphasis. Rightly, the opinion of the Chief Justice stresses the importance of the rule of
law. It is to be hoped that with a proper understanding of what has been decided by the
Court today, there would be a diminution of the wholesale condemnation of the present
system of government by some sectors of the youth and perhaps even lead to much-
needed refinement in the volume and quality of their utterances. It could even conceivably,
not only for them but for others of a less radical cast of mind, but equally suffering from
disenchantment and disillusion, induce a reassessment and reappraisal of their position,
even if from all appearances their commitment and dedication are plain for all to see. More
than that, such a response will go a long way towards a keener appreciation of the merits of
a constitutional democracy. For thereby, it demonstrates that it lives up to its ideas; it strives
to act in accordance with what it professes. Its appeal for all sectors or society becomes
strengthened and vitalized. Nor do I close my eyes to the risk that such an attitude towards
those who constitute a source of danger entails. That for me is not conclusive. With nations,
as with ordinary mortals, that is unavoidable. Repose, in the often-quoted aphorism of
Holmes, is not the destiny of man.
9. One last observation. It would appear to me that if there is really a resolve to maintain
inviolate constitutional rights for all, more especially so for those inclined and disposed to
differ and to be vocal, perhaps even intemperate, in their criticism, that serious thought
should be given to the desirability of removing from the President his power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as well as the power to declare martial law. Nor would
the government be lacking in authority to cope with the crisis of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion or lawless violence, as the President as commander-in-chief can summon the aid
of the armed forces to meet the danger posed to public safety. If the privilege of the writ
cannot be suspended and martial law beyond the power of the President to declare, there is
a greater likelihood as far as the rights of the individual are concerned, of the Constitution
remaining at all times supreme, as it ought to be, whether it be in peace or in war or under
other crisis conditions. As long, however, as such a presidential prerogative exists, it would
not be proper for the courts not to accord recognition to its exercise, if there be observance
of the limitations imposed by the Constitution. At the most, they can only through
construction nullify what would amount to an unconstitutional application. How desirable it
would be then, to my way of thinking, if the Constitution would strip the President of such
power. That would be constitutionalism triumphant. In terms of Lincoln's memorable
dilemma, the government would be neither too strong for the liberties of the people nor too
weak to maintain its existence. This is a matter though appropriately addressed to the
Constitutional Convention.
On the purely legal aspect, however, let me reiterate that my acceptance of the Tuason
dictum in the Nava case did result in my inability to concur fully with the opinion of the Chief
Justice, which, as pointed out at the outset, is possessed of a high degree of merit.


Separate Opinions
CASTRO and BARREDO, J J ., concurring:
While concurring fully in the opinion of the Court, we nevertheless write separately to
answer, from our own perspective, a point which Mr. Justice Fernando makes in his dissent.
His view, as we understand it, is that while an individual may be detained beyond the
maximum detention period fixed by law when the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus is
suspended, such individual is nevertheless entitled to be released from the very moment a
formal complaint is filed in court against him. The theory seems to be that from the time the
charge is filed, the court acquires, because the executive officials abdicate, jurisdiction.
This view is based on the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason in Nava vs.
Gatmaitan.
1
Justice Tuason, in part, said:
All persons detained for investigation by the executive department are under
executive control. It is here where the Constitution tells the court to keep their
hands off unless the cause of the detention be for an offense other than
rebellion or insurrection, which is another matter.
By the same token, if and when a formal complaint is presented, the court
steps in and the executive steps out. The detention ceases to be an executive
and becomes a judicial concern...
But the issue to which the Supreme Court Justices in Nava individually addressed
themselves is radically disparate from that raised in these cases. There the question was
whether after the detainees had been formally charged in court and an order for their arrest
had been issued, they were entitled to bail. It was on that question that the Court was split 5
to 4, and it was the opinion of Justice Tuason, one of the five, that after the detainees had
been accused in court, the question of release on bail was a matter that the court should
decide.
Upon the other hand, the question here presented is whether the detainees should be
released forthwith upon the filing of charges against them in court and cannot thereafter be
re-arrested except only by court order. This is a totally different question. It is our
submission that they are not entitled to be released. The dissent is, we believe, based on
the fallacy that when a formal charge is filed against a person he is thereby surrendered to
the court and the arresting officer is thereby divested of custody over him. Except in a
metaphorical sense, the detainee is not delivered or surrendered at all to the judicial
authorities. What the phrase "delivered to the court" simply means is that from the time a
person is indicted in court, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
2
The
detainee remains in the custody of the detaining officer, under the same authority invoked for the
detention, until the court decides whether there is probable cause to order his arrest.
Under ordinary circumstances, when a person is arrested without a warrant and is charged
in court, he is not released. He is held until the judicial authority orders either his release or
his confinement. It is no argument to say that under Article III, section 1 (3) of the
Constitution only a court can order the arrest of an individual. Arrests without warrant are
familiar occurrences, and they have been upheld as constitutional.
3

What is more, the privilege of the writ was suspended precisely to authorize the detention of
persons believed to be plotting against the security of the State until the courts can act on
their respective cases. To require their peremptory release upon the mere filing of charges
against them, without giving the proper court opportunity and time to decide the question of
probable cause, would obviously be to defeat the very basic purpose of the suspension. We
think our role as judges in the cases at bar is clear. After finding that the Presidential decree
was validly issued, we should give it effect. To uphold its validity and then try to dilute its
efficacy in the name of personal liberty is, we believe, actually to doubt the constitutionality
of the exercise of the Presidential prerogative.
Not only that. If the rule were that the detainees must be released upon the mere filing of
charges against them in court, it is unlikely that the executive officials would have filed the
charges because of their awareness of the continuing danger which in the first place
impelled the arrest of the detainees, and the end result would be to inflict on the latter a
much longer period of deprivation of personal liberty than is warranted.
Whatever our personal views may be of the power to suspend, the fact remains that the
power is there, writ large and indubitable in the Constitution. It is far too easy to write
anthologies on the side of civil liberties or on the side of governmental order, depending on
one's inclination or commitment. But that is not our function. Constitutional issues, it has
been said, do not take the form of right versus wrong, but of right versus right. And the
Court's function, as we see it, is, fundamentally to moderate the clash of values, and not to
inflate them into constitutional dimensions.
Where it is possible, we should avoid passing on a constitutional question. But where there
is no escape from the duty of abstention, our further duty is to decide the question of
constitutional validity on a less heroic plane.
And that is what we have tried to do in pointing out that the ordinary rules of criminal
procedure provide an adequate answer to Mr. Justice Fernando's problem. That solution is
for the arresting officer to hold the person detained until the court can act, with the only
difference that where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is available, the arresting
officer must release the detainee upon the expiration of the maximum detention time
allowed by law, if he has not delivered the detainee to the court within that period.
To insist on the procedural aspect of a constitutional problem as a manner of solving it is,
after all, no less to be libertarian. Insistence on it is, to us, and in point of fact, one of the
cornerstone of liberalism.
FERNANDO, J ., concurring and dissenting:
The decision of the Court penned by the Chief Justice easily ranks with his many landmark
opinions in Constitutional Law and is in the tradition of the great judicial pronouncements
from this Tribunal. Skillful in its analysis, impressive as to its learning, comprehensive in its
scope, and compelling in its logic, it exerts considerable persuasive force. There is much in
it therefore to which concurrence is easily yielded. I find it difficult however to accept the
conclusion that the six petitioners still under detention should not be set free. It is for me a
source of deep regret that having gone quite far in manifesting the utmost sympathy for and
conformity with the claims of civil liberties, it did not go farther. Candor induces the
admission though that the situation realistically viewed may not justify going all the way.
Nonetheless the deeply-rooted conviction as to the undoubted primacy of constitutional
rights, even under circumstances the least propitious, precludes me from joining my
brethren in that portion of the decision reached. Nor should I let this opportunity pass
without acknowledging the fairness, even the generosity, in the appraisal of my position in
the position of the Chief Justice.
1. The function of judicial review fitly characterized as both delicate and awesome is never
more so than when the judiciary is called upon to pass on the validity of an act of the
President arising from the exercise of a power granted admittedly to cope with an
emergency or crisis situation. More specifically, with reference to the petitions before us, the
question that calls for prior consideration is whether the suspension of the privilege of the
writ ofhabeas corpus is tainted by constitutional infirmity. What the President did attested to
an executive determination of the existence of the conditions that warranted such a move.
For one of the mandatory provisions of the Bill of Rights
1
is that no such suspension is allowable,
except in cases of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, when the public safety requires, and, even, then,
only in such places and for such period of time as may be necessary.
2
There is the further provision that
the constitutional official so empowered to take such a step is the President.
3
The exceptional character
of the situation is thus underscored. The presumption would seem to be that if such a step were taken,
there must have been a conviction on the part of the Executive that he could not, in the fulfillment of the
responsibility entrusted to him, avoid doing so. That decision is his to make; it is not for the judiciary. It is
therefore encased in the armor of what must have been a careful study on his part, in the light of relevant
information which as Commander-in-Chief he is furnished, ordinarily beyond the ken of the courts. When
it is considered further that the Constitution does admit that the sphere of individual freedom contracts
and the scope of governmental authority expands during times of emergency, it becomes manifest why
an even greater degree of caution and circumspection must be exercised by the judiciary when, on this
matter, it is called upon to discharge the function of judicial review.
2. Not that the judiciary has any choice on the matter. That view would indict itself for
unorthodoxy if it maintains that the existence of rebellion suffices to call for the disregard of
the applicable constitutional guarantees. Its implication would be that the Constitution
ceases to be operative in times of danger to national safety and security. Well has the
American Supreme Court in the leading case of Ex-parte Milligan
4
stated: "The Constitution is a
law for rulers and for people equally in war and in peace and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men at all times and under all circumstances." This ringing affirmation should at the very least
give pause to those troubled by the continuing respect that must be accorded civil liberties under crisis
conditions. The fact that the Constitution provides for only one situation where a provision of the Bill of
Rights may be suspended, emphasizes the holding in the above-cited Milligan case that the framers of
the Constitution "limited the suspension to one great right and left the rest to remain forever inviolable."
While perhaps at times likely to give rise to difficulties in the disposition of cases during a troubled era
where a suspension has been decreed, such a view is to be taken into careful consideration.
3. For it is a truism that he Constitution is paramount, and the Supreme Court has no choice
but to apply its provisions in the determination of actual cases and controversies before it.
Nor is this all. The protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is
one of the highest duties and privileges of the judiciary.
5
The exercise thereof according to Justice
Laurel requires that it gives effect to the supreme law to the extent in clear cases of setting aside
legislative and executive action.
6
The supreme mandates of the Constitution are not to be loosely
brushed aside.
7
Otherwise, the Bill or Rights might be emasculated into mere expressions of
sentiment.
8
Speaking of this Court, Justice Abad Santos once pertinently observed: "This court owes its
own existence to that great instrument and derives all its powers therefrom. In the exercise of its powers
and jurisdiction, this court is bound by the provisions of the Constitution."
9
Justice Tuason would thus
apply the constitutional rights with undeviating rigidity: "To the plea that the security of the State would be
jeopardized by the release of the defendants on bail, the answer is that the existence of danger is never a
justification for courts to tamper with the fundamental rights expressly granted by the Constitution. These
rights are immutable, inflexible, yielding to no pressure of convenience, expediency, or the so-called
'judicial statesmanship.' The Legislature itself can not infringe them, and no court conscious of its
responsibilities and limitations would do so. If the Bill of Rights are incompatible with stable government
and a menace to the Nation, let the Constitution be amended, or abolished. It is trite to say that, while the
Constitution stands, the courts of justice as the repository of civil liberty are bound to protect and maintain
undiluted individual rights."
10

It is in that context, to my mind, that the petitions before us should be appraised, for in terms
of physical, as distinguished from intellectual, liberty, the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus occupies a place second to none. As was stressed in Gumabon v. Director of
Prisons:
11
"Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ 'as the most important human rights provision' in
the fundamental law." Care is to be taken then lest in the inquiry that must be undertaken to determine
whether the constitutional requisites justifying a suspension are present, the effects thereof as to the
other civil liberties are not fully taken into account. It affords no justification to say that such a move was
prompted by the best motives and loftiest of intentions. Much less can there be acceptance of the view,
as contended by one of the counsel for respondents, that between the safety of the overwhelming
majority of Filipinos and the claims of the petitioners to liberty, the former must prevail. That is to indulge
in the vice of over simplification. Our fundamental postulate is that the state exists to assure individual
rights, to protect which governments are instituted deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed. "The cardinal article of faith of our civilization," according to Frank further, "is the inviolable
character of the individual."
12

4. With all the admitted difficulty then that the function of judicial review presents in passing
upon the executive determination of suspending the privilege of the writ, there is still no way
of evading such a responsibility, except on the pain of judicial abdication. It may not admit of
doubt that on this matter this Court, unlike the President, cannot lay claim to the experience
and the requisite knowledge that would instill confidence in its decisions. That is no warrant
for an unquestioning and uncritical acceptance of what was done. It cannot simply fold its
hands and evince an attitude of unconcern. It has to decide the case. This it does by
applying the law to the facts as found, as it would in ordinary cases. If petitioners then can
make out a case of an unlawful deprivation of liberty, they are entitled to the writ prayed for.
If the suspension of the privilege be the justification, they could, as they did, challenge its
validity. To repeat, this Court, even if denied the fullness of information and the conceded
grasp of the Executive still must adjudicate the matter as best it can. It has to act not by
virtue of its competence but by the force of its commission a function authenticated by
history.
13
That would be to live up to its solemn trust, to paraphrase Cardozo, of preserving the great
ideals of liberty and equally against the erosion of possible encroachments, whether minute or
extensive.
14
Even if there be no showing then of constitutional infirmity, at least one other branch of the
government, that to which such an awesome duty had been conferred has had the opportunity of
reflecting on the matter with detachment, with objectivity, and with full awareness of the commands of the
Constitution as well as the realities of the situation.
5. Nor is the power of the judiciary to so inquire, negated as contended by respondents, by
reliance on the doctrine of political questions. The term has been made applicable to
controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue
involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a
prior legislative or executive determination to which deference must be paid.
15
It has likewise
been employed loosely to characterize a suit where the party proceeded against is the President or
Congress, or any branch thereof.
16
If to be de-limited with accuracy, "political questions" should refer to
such as would under the Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to
which full discretionary authority is vested either in the Presidency or Congress. It is thus beyond the
competence of the judiciary to pass upon.
17
Unless, clearly falling within the above formulation, the
decision reached by the political branches whether in the form of a congressional act or an executive
order could be tested in court. Where private rights are affected, the judiciary has no choice but to look
into its validity. It is not to be lost sight of that such a power comes into play if there is an appropriate
proceeding that may be filed only after either coordinate branch has acted. Even when the Presidency or
Congress possesses plenary power, its improvidence exercise or the abuse thereof, if shown, may give
rise to a justiciable controversy.
18
For the constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted.
There are limits to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished. Necessarily then, the courts in
the proper exercise of judicial review could inquire into the question of whether or not either of the two
coordinate branches has adhered to what is laid down by the Constitution. The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. So it is in the matter before us so clearly explained in the opinion of the Chief
Justice.
6. The doctrine announced in Montenegro v. Castaeda
19
that such a question is political has
thus been laid to rest. It is about time too. It owed its existence to the compulsion exerted by Barcelon v.
Baker, a 1905 decision.
20
This Court was partly misled by an undue reliance in the latter case on what it
considered to be authoritative pronouncements from such illustrious American jurists as Marshall, Story,
and Taney. That is to misread what was said by them. This is most evidence in the case of Chief Justice
Marshall, whose epochal Marbury v. Madison
21
was cited. Why that was so is difficult to understand. For
it speaks to the contrary. It was by virtue of this decision that the function of judicial review owes its origin
notwithstanding the absence of any explicit provision in the American Constitution empowering the courts
to do so. Thus: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two
laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition
to the constitution: if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must
either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the
case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, the, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the
constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act,
must govern the case to which they both apply."
22

Nor is the excerpt from Justice Story, speaking for the United States Supreme Court, in
Martin v. Mott,
23
as made clear in the opinion of the Chief Justice, an authority directly in point. There,
a militiaman had been convicted of failing to respond to a call, made under the Act of 1795, to serve
during the War of 1812. His property was taken to satisfy the judgment. He brought an action of replevin.
The American Constitution empowers its Congress "to provide for calling forth the Militia" in certain cases,
and Congress did provide that in those cases the President should have authority to make the call. All
that Justice Story did in construing the statute in the light of the language and purpose of her Constitution
was to recognize the authority of the American President to decide whether the exigency has arisen. In
stating that such power was exclusive and thus had a conclusive effect, he relied on the language
employed, impressed with such a character. The constitutional provision on the suspension of the
privilege of the writ is, as shown, anything but that.
24
Chief Justice Taney, in Luther v. Borden,
25
likewise
had to deal with a situation involving the calling out of the militia. As a matter of fact, an eminent
commentator speaking of the two above decisions had this apt observation: "The common element in
these opinions would seem to be a genuine judicial reluctance to speak in a situation where the voice of
the Court, even if heard, could not have any effect. More than this, both Story and Taney seem to share
the suspicion, unusual in them, that under a popular form of government there are certain questions that
the political branches must be trusted to answer with finality."
26
What was said next is even more
pertinent. Thus: "It would be dangerous and misleading to push the principles of these cases too far,
especially the doctrine of 'political questions' as implied in Luther v. Borden. Given the opportunity to
afford a grievously injured citizen relief from a palpably unwarranted use of presidential or military power,
especially when the question at issue falls in the penumbra between the 'political' and the 'justiciable', the
Court will act as if it had never heard of this doctrine and its underlying assumption that there are some
powers against which the judiciary simply cannot be expected to act as the last line of defense."
27
It
would thus seem evidence that support for the hitherto prevailing Montenegro ruling was rather frail.
Happily, with our decision, it is no longer capable of the mischief to which it does lend itself of an undue
diminution of judicial power to the prejudice of constitutional rights.
7. With such presidential determination of the existence of the conditions required by the
Constitution to justify a suspension of the privilege of the writ no longer conclusive on the
other branches, this Court may thus legitimately inquire into its validity. The question before
us, it bears repeating, is whether or not Proclamation No. 889 as it now stands, not as it
was originally issued, is valid. The starting point must be a recognition that the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ belongs to the Executive, subject to limitations. So the
Constitution provides, and it is to be respected. The range of permissible inquiry to be
conducted by this Tribunal is necessarily limited then to the ascertainment of whether or not
such a suspension, in the light of the credible information furnished the President, was
arbitrary. Such a test met with the approval of the chief counsel for petitioners, Senator Jose
W. Diokno. To paraphrase Frankfurter, the question before the judiciary is not the
correctness but the reasonableness of the action taken. One who is not the Executive but
equally knowledgeable may entertain a different view, but the decision rests with the
occupant of the office. As would be immediately apparent even from a cursory perusal of
the data furnished the President, so impressively summarized in the opinion of the Chief
Justice, the imputation of arbitrariness would be difficult to sustain. Moreover, the steps
taken by him to limit the area where the suspension operates as well as his instructions
attested to a firm resolve on his part to keep strictly within the bounds of his authority. Under
the circumstances, the decision reached by the Court that no finding of unconstitutionality is
warranted commends itself for approval. The most that can be said is that there was a
manifestation of presidential power well-nigh touching the extreme border of his conceded
competence, beyond which a forbidden domain lies. The requisite showing of either
improvidence or abuse has not been made.
8. Why the dissent then. My basic premise is that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
partakes of an executive action which if valid binds all who are within its operations. The
function of enacting a legal norm general in character appertains to either Congress or the
President. Its specific application to particular individuals, like petitioners here, is however a
task incumbent on the judiciary. What is more, as had just been explained, its validity
maybe tested in courts. Even if valid, any one may seek judicial determination as to whether
he is embraced within its terms. After our declaration of the validity of the Proclamation No.
889 as amended, the next question is its applicability to petitioners. I am the first to
recognize the meticulous care with which the Chief Justice, after reaching the conclusion
that petitioners are covered by the suspension, saw to it that their constitutional rights are
duly safeguarded in whatever proceedings they would have thereafter to face. There is thus
as assurance that as far as human foresight can anticipate matters, the possibility of abuse
is minimized.
The matter, for me, could be viewed independently of whether or not petitioners, by the
conduct imputed to them, could be detained further by virtue of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ. For admittedly, a supervening fact, the Executive's determination to
have them charged according to the ordinary procedural rules, did present itself. There was
thus introduced an element decisive in its consequences. They are entitled to treatment no
different from that accorded any other individual facing possible criminal charges. The
opinion of the Chief Justice is correct in pointing out that such an approach follows the
dictum of Justice Tuason, speaking for himself in Nava v. Gatmaitan,
28
where a majority of
five, lacking just one vote to enable this Court to reach a binding decision, did arrive at the conclusion that
the suspension of the privilege of the writ does not suspend the right to bail. Thus: "By the same token, if
and when formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and the executive steps out. The detention
ceases to be an executive and becomes a judicial concern. Thereupon the corresponding court assumes
its role and the judicial process takes its course to the exclusion of the executive or the legislative
departments. Hence forward, the accused is entitled to demand all the constitutional safeguards and
privileges essential to due process."
29
Parenthetically, it may be observed that the above view reflects
the stand taken by Justice Recto, fortified by Justice Laurel, drawing heavily on continental juristic
thought, both of whom, having retired from the bench and thereafter having been elected to the Senate,
were invited to appear as amici curiae in the Nava case.
It would follow to my way of thinking then that the petitioners still detained ought not to be
further deprived of their liberty in the absence of a warrant of arrest for whatever offense
they may be held to answer, to be issued by a judge after a finding of probable cause. That
is to comply with the constitutional requirement against unreasonable search and
seizure.
30
Moreover, to keep them in confinement after the ordinary processes of the law are to be
availed of, as thereafter decreed by the Executive itself is to ignore the safeguard in the Bill of Rights that
no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
31
That would explain
why with full recognition of the sense of realism that infuses the opinion of the Court, I cannot, from the
above standpoint, reach the same conclusion they did. These six petitioners, Rodolfo del Rosario, Victor
Felipe, Luzvimindo, David, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes and Teresito Sison, have, for me, become
immune from the operation of the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusand
are thus entitled to their liberty. I am reinforced in my conviction by the well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that if there are two possible modes of interpretation, that one which raises the
least constitutional doubt should be preferred. Certainly, to my way of thinking, the choice is obvious. That
interpretation which would throw the full mantle of protection afforded by the Constitution to those
unfortunate enough to be caught in the meshes of criminal law is more in keeping with the high estate
accorded constitutional rights.
There is another consideration that strengthens my conviction on the matter. The language
of the Constitution would seem to imply at the most that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ renders it unavailable for the time being. Still there are authorities sustaining the
view that preventive detention subject to the test of good faith is allowable.
32
Such a doctrine
is no doubt partly traceable to Anglo-American legal history where as pointed out by Maine: "Substantive
law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure."
33
The writ of habeas
corpus then is more than just an efficacius device or the most speedy means of obtaining one's liberty. It
has become a most valuable substantive right. It would thus serve the cause of constitutional rights better
if the Tuason dictum as to the judicial process supplanting executive rule the moment charges are filed be
accorded acceptance. Thereby the number of individuals who would have to submit to further detention,
that may well turn out to be unjustified, would be reduced. What is more, greater fidelity is manifested to
the principle that liberty is the rule and restraint the exception.
I am not of course insensible to the observation in the opinion of the Court that this concept
could be an obstacle to the early resumption of the ordinary judicial process as the
Executive might be minded to postpone resort to it, considering that there would necessarily
be an end to the detention at that early stage of individuals who continue to pose risk to the
safety of the government. It does occur to me, however, that the presumption should be that
the high executive dignitaries can be trusted to act in accordance with the dictates of good
faith and the command of the Constitution. At least, such seems to be the case now. The
opinion of the Court is quite explicit as to the measures taken to minimize the possibility of
abuse from officials in the lower category, who in their zeal or even from less worthy
motives might make a mockey of the other constitutional rights. That is as it should be. It
should continue to be so even if there be acceptance of the doctrine enunciated by Justice
Tuason. There is, for me at least, no undue cause for pessimism.
These is to my mind another reinforcement to this approach to the question before us,
perhaps one based more on policy rather than strictly legal considerations. The petitioners
who have not been released are youth leaders, who for motives best known to them,
perhaps excess of idealism, impatience with existing conditions, even overweening
ambition, clamor for change, apparently oblivious at times that it could be accomplished
through means of which the law does not disapprove. It would be premature at this stage to
say whether or not their activities have incurred for them a penal sanction, which certainly
would be appropriate if their conduct is beyond the pale. Even they should recognize that
the existing order has the right to defendant itself against those who would destroy it.
Nonetheless as a constitutional democracy can justifiably pride itself on its allegiance to
ways of persuasion rather than coercion, the most meticulous observance of the free way of
life seems to me, even at this stage, not without its beneficent influence on their future
course of conduct. This is not by any means to intimate that my brethren view matters
differently. Far from it. Any difference if at all in the positions taken is a question of
emphasis. Rightly, the opinion of the Chief Justice stresses the importance of the rule of
law. It is to be hoped that with a proper understanding of what has been decided by the
Court today, there would be a diminution of the wholesale condemnation of the present
system of government by some sectors of the youth and perhaps even lead to much-
needed refinement in the volume and quality of their utterances. It could even conceivably,
not only for them but for others of a less radical cast of mind, but equally suffering from
disenchantment and disillusion, induce a reassessment and reappraisal of their position,
even if from all appearances their commitment and dedication are plain for all to see. More
than that, such a response will go a long way towards a keener appreciation of the merits of
a constitutional democracy. For thereby, it demonstrates that it lives up to its ideas; it strives
to act in accordance with what it professes. Its appeal for all sectors or society becomes
strengthened and vitalized. Nor do I close my eyes to the risk that such an attitude towards
those who constitute a source of danger entails. That for me is not conclusive. With nations,
as with ordinary mortals, that is unavoidable. Repose, in the often-quoted aphorism of
Holmes, is not the destiny of man.
9. One last observation. It would appear to me that if there is really a resolve to maintain
inviolate constitutional rights for all, more especially so for those inclined and disposed to
differ and to be vocal, perhaps even intemperate, in their criticism, that serious thought
should be given to the desirability of removing from the President his power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as well as the power to declare martial law. Nor would
the government be lacking in authority to cope with the crisis of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion or lawless violence, as the President as commander-in-chief can summon the aid
of the armed forces to meet the danger posed to public safety. If the privilege of the writ
cannot be suspended and martial law beyond the power of the President to declare, there is
a greater likelihood as far as the rights of the individual are concerned, of the Constitution
remaining at all times supreme, as it ought to be, whether it be in peace or in war or under
other crisis conditions. As long, however, as such a presidential prerogative exists, it would
not be proper for the courts not to accord recognition to its exercise, if there be observance
of the limitations imposed by the Constitution. At the most, they can only through
construction nullify what would amount to an unconstitutional application. How desirable it
would be then, to my way of thinking, if the Constitution would strip the President of such
power. That would be constitutionalism triumphant. In terms of Lincoln's memorable
dilemma, the government would be neither too strong for the liberties of the people nor too
weak to maintain its existence. This is a matter though appropriately addressed to the
Constitutional Convention.
On the purely legal aspect, however, let me reiterate that my acceptance of the Tuason
dictum in the Nava case did result in my inability to concur fully with the opinion of the Chief
Justice, which, as pointed out at the outset, is possessed of a high degree of merit.
Footnotes
1 Words in bracket ([1]) are those appearing in the original Proclamation No.
889, but which were eliminated in the amended Proclamation No. 889-A;
words emphasized (emphasis) have been amended by Proclamation No.
889-A.
2 Phil. 87.
3 91 Phil. 882, 887.
* Should be L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973.
** Should be L-33964.
4 As stated in the proclamation involved in Montenegro v. Castaeda, 91 Phil.
882.
5 5 Phil. 87.
6 91 Phil. 882.
7 6 L. ed. 537.
8 In re Boyle, 57 Pac 706; Moyer v. Peabody 212 US 78; Ex Parte Field, 5
Blatchf. 63, cited in USCA Const. Part. 1, p. 463; Luther v. Borden, 7 How 1,
12 L. ed. 581; In re Kalanianaole, 10 Hawaii 29, cited in California Law
Review, May, 1942, fn. 40, pp. 382-383; Ex parte MacDonald, 143 Pac 947.
9 In re Burrus, 136 US 500; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 US 375; Patten v.
Miller, 8 S.E. (2d) 757; Miller v. Rivera, 31 F. Supp. 540; Hearon v. Calus,
183 S.E. 13; In re Green, 16 Pac (2d) 582; Allen v. Oklahoma City, 52 Pac
(2d) 1054; Joyner v. Browning, 30 F. Supp. 512; U.S. v. Phillips, 33 F. Supp.
261.
10 Mitchell v. Harmony, 14 L. ed. 75, 84. See also, U.S. v. Russell, 20 L. ed.
474, 475.
11 287 U.S. 375, 385.
12 Northern P.R. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585; Merchants' Nat. Bank v.
Richmond, 256 U.S. 635; First Nat. Bank v. Hartford, 273 U.S. 548; Fiske v.
Kansas, 274 U.S. 380.
13 Which were, seemingly, taken from the seventh paragraph of Section 3,
and Section 21 of the Jones Law (Act of Congress of the U.S. of August 29,
1916). The only provision thereon in the U.S. Constitution is found in Section
9(2) of Art. 1 thereof on the Legislative Power which provides that "the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in cases
of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it."
14 People v. Evangelista, 57 Phil. 375; People v. Evangelista, et al., 57 Phil.
354; People v. Capadocia, 57 Phil. 364; People v. Feleo, 57 Phil. 451; People
v. Nabong, 57 Phil. 455.
15 91 Phil. 882. See also, Nava v. Gatmaitan, Hernandez v. Montesa, and
Angeles v. Abaya, 90 Phil. 172.
16 People v. Nava, L-4907, June 29, 1963; In re Jesus Lava v. Gonzales, L-
23048, July 31, 1964; People vs. Nava, L-5796, August 29, 1966; People v.
Lava, L-4974, May 16, 1969.
17 Emphasis ours.
18 See page 22 thereof.
19 Emphasis supplied.
20 "ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection. How committed. The crime of
rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms
against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to
said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part
thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the
Chief Executive or the Legislative, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives."
21 57 Pac. 706.
22 Schwartz, An Introduction to American Administrative Law, 2nd ed., 190-
191.
23 Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197.
24 291 U.S. 502.
25 Although not by some conclusions therein made.
26 Said paragraph reads:
"That all the above named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders
of the Communist Party of the Philippines conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there knowingly, wilfully,
feloniously and by over acts committed subversive acts all intended to
overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines, or the
government of any of its political subdivisions by force, violence, deceit,
subversive or other illegal means, for the purpose of placing such government
or political subdivision under the control and domination of any alien power,
as follows:"
xxx xxx xxx
27 On November 15, 1971.
28 90 Phil. 172, 204. Emphasis ours. Justice Tuason was speaking for
himself only, not for the Court, which was divided.
CASTRO AND BARREDO, JJ., concurring:
1 90 Phil. 172, 204 (1951).
2 Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859 (1948).
3 E.g., People vs. Kagui Malasugui, 63 Phil. 231 (1936).
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
1 Art. III, Constitution.
2 According to the Constitution: "The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same
may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such
suspension shall exist." Art. III, Sec. 1, par. (14).
3 On this point, the Constitution reads: "In case of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he
may suspend the privileges of the writ ofhabeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law." Art. VII, Sec. 10, par.
(2).What is immediately noticeable is that the existence of an imminent
danger of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion was included in the justification
for the suspension.
4 4 Wall. 123 (1866).
5 Alvarez v. Court, 64 Phil. 33 (1937).
6 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 94-95 (1937).
7 Pampanga Bus Co. v. Pambusco Employees Union, 68 Phil. 541 (1939).
8 Angara v. Electoral Tribunal, 63 Phil. 139, 157 (1936).
9 Schneckburger v. Moran, 63 Phil. 249, 251-252 (1936).
10 90 Phil. 172, at p. 209 (1951).
11 L-30026, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 420, 423.
12 American Communications Asso. v. Douds, 339 US 382, 421 (1951).
13 Cf. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 US 624
(1943).
14 Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process, 92-93 (1921).
15 Cf. Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 (1946); Lopez v. Roxas, L-25716, July 28,
1966, 17 SCRA 756; Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, L-28196, No. 9,
1967, 21 SCRA 774.
16 Cf. Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 (1937); Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 (1946).
17 Cf. Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
18 Cf. Morrero v. Bocar, 66 Phil. 429 (1938); Rodriguez v. Quirino, L-19800,
October 28, 1963, 9 SCRA 284.
19 91 Phil. 882 (1952).
20 5 Phil. 87.
21 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
22 Ibid., pp. 177-178.
23 12 Wheaton 19 (1827).
24 Cf. Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency, 55
harvard Law Review, 1253, 1270-1271 (1942).
25 7 Howard 1 (1849).
26 Rossiter, The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief, pp. 16-17
(1951).
27 Ibid., p. 17.
28 90 Phil. 172 (1951).
29 Ibid., p. 204.
30 According to Article III, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the Constitution: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
31 Article III, section 1, paragraph 15, Constitution.
32 Cf. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2 (1866); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 US 78
(1909); Ex parteSimmerman, 132 F2 442(1942). That was likewise
acknowledged in the opinion of Justice Tuason in the Nava case.
33 Cf. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, p. 63 (1941). Holmes and
Maitland entertained a similar view.
















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 139255 November 24, 2003
RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FLORITO S. MACALINO, RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the
reversal of the Decision
1
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 267, in
Special Proceedings No. 10948 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus filed by the
petitioner.
The Antecedents
SPO3 Rodolfo M. Villaceran of the Philippine National Police (PNP) filed an application with
the RTC of Angeles City, Pampanga, for the issuance of a search warrant against petitioner
Raymond M. Jackson, an American citizen, a.k.a. Allen Miller, and Jaime C. Bueta for the
search of the articles listed therein at No. 17-21 Apple Street, Hensonville Homes, Balibago,
Angeles City, and the seizure thereof for violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal
Code.
2
Judge Bernardita G. Erum granted the application and issued Search Warrant No.
97-29 on November 29, 1997.
3
The search was conducted on the said date; articles were
seized and the petitioner and Bueta were apprehended and detained. Among the articles
found in the possession of the petitioner was U.S. Passport No. Z4613110 issued on June
2, 1983 by the U.S. Embassy in Manila to and in the name of Raymond Michael Jackson,
born on October 17, 1951 in South Dakota; and U.S. Passport No. 085238399 issued on
August 15, 1996 by the New Orleans Passport Agency, Louisiana to and under the name of
Steven Bernard Bator, born on August 20, 1949 in Detroit, Michigan.
4

Another application for a search warrant was filed by SPO3 Pedro B. Barsana, Jr. with the
RTC of Makati City for violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code for the search of
the premises at No. 5518 Second Floor, Macodyn Building, South Superhighway (corner
Pasay Road), Makati City under the contract of Raymond Jackson a.k.a. Allen Miller and
Bernard Bator and for the seizure of the articles described therein. Acting on the application
on November 28, 1997, Judge Pedro N. Laggui of Branch 60 of the RTC issued Search
Warrant No. 97-029.
5

On December 2, 1997, an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 97-2078 was filed
with the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City against the petitioner and Bueta for violation
of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code.
6

When apprised of the seizure of the aforementioned passports from the petitioner, U.S. Vice
Consul Raymond Greene of the United States Embassy in the Philippines advised the
Department of Justice on December 10, 1997 that the said passports had been
cancelled.
7
Summary deportation proceedings were initiated at the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against the petitioner docketed as SDO No. BOC 97-46.
On December 11, 1997, the Board of Commissioners (BOC) issued an Order ordering the
summary deportation of the petitioner to his country of origin and directing the Chief of Civil
Security Unit to implement the order within three days from notice thereof, subject to
compliance with the 1997 Deportation Rules of Procedures - Office Memorandum No. ELM-
97-013.
8
In the meantime, the name of the petitioner was included in the blacklist of the
CID.
9

Aside from the aforementioned criminal cases, other criminal cases were filed against
Jackson with the RTC as follows:
Criminal
Case No.
The Accused In What Court Cases
are Pending
1. 98-1155 Raymond Michael
Jackson
alias Allen Miller
Makati RTC
Branch 133
2. 98-903 Raymond Jackson Makati RTC
Branch 135
3. 97-202 Raymond M. Jackson
a.k.a. Allen Miller and
Jaime Bueta
QC RTC
Branch 83
4. 98-1152 Raymond Jackson Makati RTC Branch
135
10

On December 7, 1997, the Quezon City RTC ordered the release of the petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 97-202 after posting a P6,000 bail.
11

On September 18, 1998, the Makati RTC issued an order in Criminal Case No. 98-1155
directing the CID to hold the departure of the petitioner from the Philippines in view of the
pending criminal cases against him.
12
On September 28, 1998, the Makati RTC ordered the
release of the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 98-1152 after he posted bail in the amount
of P40,000.
13

On October 1, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the CID for the
reconsideration of the BOC Order dated December 11, 1997 directing his deportation.
14
He
alleged inter alia that: (a) he was married to Lily Morales by whom he had two children:
Cristina Jackson and Judaline Jackson; (b) his status was converted into that of a
permanent resident on September 30, 1987 under Section 13-A of the Immigration Act, as
amended with Official Passport No. 3121487; (c) his deportation from the Philippines would
deprive him of the opportunity to defend himself in the criminal cases pending against him.
He appended to his motion a copy of his marriage contract with Lily Morales and their
childrens birth certificates. On October 14, 1998, the CID issued an order denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
15

The petitioner could not be deported because he filed a petition to lift the summary order of
deportation with the CID which as of December 15, 1998 had not yet been
resolved,
16
pending the issuance of clearances from the NBI and PNP, travel documents
and an airplane ticket.
On May 18, 1999, Tedd Archabal, Vice Consul of the Anti-Fraud Unit in the U.S. Embassy
in Manila, issued a certification that U.S. Passport No. Z4613110 issued to and under the
name of "Raymond Michael Jackson" and No. 085238399 issued to Steven Bernard Bator
had been cancelled because the persons appearing in the photographs affixed in the said
passports did not match those appearing in the photographs affixed in the original
applications for the issuance of the same.
17
The CID issued Mission Order No. RBR-99-164
on May 21, 1999 for the petitioners arrest for being an undesirable alien under Section
37(a), paragraph 9 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended,
18
based on the
hold departure order in Criminal Case No. 98-1155 and the certification of Vice Consul Tedd
Archabal. The petitioner was arrested by P/C Inspector James B. Mejia of the Foreign
Intelligence and Liaison Office, PNP Intelligence Group, Camp Crame, Quezon City, who
turned him over to the CID on the said date.
19

The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court on June 28, 1999 against the
Commissioner of the CID and John Doe and Jane Doe; and on the same date, the Court
issued a resolution (a) directing the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the
respondents to make a return of the writ on or before July 2, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.; (b) ordering
the Pasig RTC Judge to whom the case would be raffled to conduct a hearing of the
petition, to render judgment and to serve a copy of its decision within two days from its
promulgation.
20

In their return filed with the RTC on July 8, 1999, the respondents alleged inter alia that the
petitioner was arrested and detained at the CID on the basis of the summary deportation
order issued by the BOC on December 11, 1997 and of the hold departure order of the
Makati RTC in Criminal Case No. 98-1155; the petitioners petition for habeas corpus was
premature as there was a pending petition to lift the summary deportation order before the
BOC filed by him.
21
On July 15, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petition
of Jackson and denied his plea for a writ of habeas corpus.
22

The petitioner assails the decision of the RTC and prays for the reversal thereof, contending
that:
A. RODRIGUEZ CANNOT ISSUE WARRANTS OF ARREST SINCE ONLY
JUDGES CAN ISSUE THE SAME.
B. ASSUMING, WITHOUT CONCEDING, THAT RODRIGUEZ CAN ISSUE
WARRANTS OF ARREST, SUCH CAN ONLY BE ISSUED TO ENFORCE A FINAL
ORDER OF DEPORTATION; HOWEVER, IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE IS NO
FINAL ORDER OF DEPORTATION.
C. PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS HAS BEEN VIOLATED.
23

The petitioner avers that under Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution, only
judges are vested with authority to issue warrants for the arrest of persons, including aliens.
Even if it is assumed that the Commissioner of the CID is authorized to issue a warrant of
arrest, this is limited only to those cases where a final order of deportation had already been
issued by the BOC, and only for the purpose of implementing the said order. According to
the petitioner, the order of deportation issued by the BOC on December 11, 1999 is illegal;
hence, null and void. The petitioner was not apprised of any specific charges filed against
him with the CID and was not heard on the said charges as required by law before the order
was issued. The petitioner asserts that there was no probable cause for his arrest by the
CID and that the respondents even violated the Memorandum Circular of the Secretary of
Justice dated June 7, 1999.
24
The petitioner cited the ruling of the Court in Lao Gi v. CA
25
to
fortify his petition.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents averred that the CID is authorized under
Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, to issue warrants for
the arrest of aliens on the CIDs finding of the existence of a ground for deportation. The
petitioner cannot feign lack of due process because he filed a motion for the reconsideration
of the December 11, 1997 Order of the BOC ordering his summary deportation which the
BOC denied on October 14, 1998. When Mission Order RBR-99-164 was issued on May
21, 1999 to effect the arrest of the petitioner, it was on the basis of a final and executory
order of deportation. The RTC, for its part, held that (a) the petition was premature because
the petitioners petition with the CID to lift the summary order of deportation had not yet
been resolved by the BOC of the CID; (b) the petition for habeas corpus was inappropriate
because the petitioner was validly detained under a mission order issued by the
Commissioner based on the order of deportation issued by the BOC on December 11,
1997; (c) the petitioner is estopped from assailing his arrest and detention by the CID.
The petition is dismissed.
Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that "except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The ultimate
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is
essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is
detained.
26
Section 4, Rule 102 of the said Rules provides when the writ of habeas corpus is
not allowed or discharged authorized:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by
a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment; or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall
not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.
Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.
The term "court" includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration.
27

Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge
from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest,
the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its
inception illegal, it may, by reason of same supervening events such as the instances
mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application. Any such supervening events are the issuance of a judicial process preventing
the discharge of the detained person.
28

As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondents rests on the
petitioner who attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets forth process where on its
face shows good ground for the detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege
and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effects of such process.
29

Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that if it appears that
the detained person is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the
return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint:
Sec. 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea. If it appears that the prisoner is
in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be
considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint; but if he is restrained of his liberty
by any alleged private authority, the return shall be considered only as a plea of the facts
therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must prove such facts.
In this case, based on the return of the writ by the respondents, the petitioner was arrested
and detained at the CID detention center at Bicutan, Paraaque City, under Mission Order
No. RBR-99-164 dated May 21, 1999 based on the Order of the BOC dated December 11,
1997 which had become final and executory. The BOC found, after due proceedings, that:
Records show that on 10 December 1997, Vice Consul Raymond Greene of the U.S.
Embassy in Manila advised the Department of Justice that the U.S. passports which were
confiscated from the abovenamed respondent when he was arrested by PNP operatives in
Angeles City on 30 November 1997 and purportedly issued to Raymond Michael Jackson
and Steven Bernard Bator have been determined to have been tampered. As a
consequence, said passports were cancelled by the U.S. Embassy.
In Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 86461, 30 May 1989), the
Supreme Court ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the passport of an alien, or does not
reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of Commissioners hereby orders the
summary deportation of NORMAN LLOYD @ RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON @
STEVEN BERNARD BATOR to his country of origin subject to compliance with the 1997
Deportation Rules of Procedures-Office Memorandum Order No. ELM-97-013.
The Chief of the Civil Security Unit is hereby ordered to implement this Order within three
(03) days from receipt hereof.
Include respondents name on the Blacklist.
Give respondent a copy hereof.
30

The information relayed by U.S. Vice Consul Raymond Greene to the DOJ on December
10, 1997 was reiterated by U.S. Vice Consul Tedd Archabal in his certification forwarded to
the DOJ on May 18, 1999, thus:
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
I, Tedd Archabal, Vice Consul of the United States hereby certify that United States
Passport Number Z4613110 issued June 2, 1983 at the U.S. Embassy, Manila in the name
of RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON, born October 17, 1951 at South Dakota is a genuine
United States Government document that has been altered and photosubstituted.
I also certify that United States Passport Number 085238399 issued August 15, 1996 at the
New Orleans Passport Agency, Louisiana, in the name of STEVEN BERNARD BATOR,
born August 20, 1949 at Detroit, Michigan, is a genuine United States Government
document that has been altered and photosubstituted, as well.
I further certify that a comparison of photographs affixed to U.S. Passports Number
Z4613110 and 085238399 which were seized by Philippine National Police officers on or
about November 29, 1997 from a man claiming to be Raymond Michael Jackson and
photographs affixed to the original applications for passports number Z4613110 and
085238399 in the names of Raymond Michael Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator on file
with the U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, revealed that these are not/not the
same people.
31

The petitioners arrest and detention are in accord with Section 45(d) in relation to Section
37(a)(9) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 which respectively reads:
SEC. 45. (d) being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by the
immigration officials, or obtains entry into the Philippines by willful, false, or misleading
representation or willful concealment of a material fact;

SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:

(9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections Forty-five and Forty-six of
this Act, independent of criminal action which may be brought against him:
In Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez,
32
this Court held that such documents from a foreign
embassy attesting to the cancellation of the passports held by their national on the ground
that the said passports were tampered with; hence, cancelled were sufficient grounds for
the arrest and deportation of aliens from the Philippines:
The above-quoted official letters demonstrate the speciousness of the petitioners
contention that his passport could not have been cancelled in 1995, inasmuch as he was
allowed to enter the country as late as 1998. The letters show that the Philippine
government was informed about the cancellation only in 1998.
Furthermore, the foregoing letters of the official representative of the Taiwanese
government belie the petitioners submission that there was no evidence to prove the
findings of the CA and the Board of Commissioners. Verily, these documents constitute
sufficient justification for his deportation. As the Court held in the landmark case Forbes v.
Chuoco Tiaco, "[t]he mere fact that a citizen or subject is out of the territory of his country
does not relieve him from that allegiance which he owes to his government, and his
government may, under certain conditions, properly and legally request his return."
33

The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the charges against him in the CID and insist on
being deprived by the BOC of his right to due process as prescribed for in Section 37(c) of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, thus:
(c) No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation
nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.
This is so because on October 1, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion with the CID for the
reconsideration of the December 11, 1997 Order of the BOC. The petitioner did not allege
therein that he was not informed of the charges against him. In fact, the petitioner did not
even rebut the claim of the U.S. Vice Consul that the passport he was carrying was
tampered and had been already cancelled. Neither did he allege that he requested for the
reinstatement of his passport with the United States Embassy. Despite the finality of the
deportation order of the BOC, it still entertained the petitioners motion for reconsideration
but denied the same on its findings that there were inconsistencies in his sworn statement
and the documents he presented in support of his motion, thus:
After going over the motion, we find no valid reason to disturb the order of 12 (sic)
December 1997. Likewise, the same had long become final and executory.
Furthermore, the grounds alleged in the motion have no merit and are irrelevant. The
alleged marriage of respondent to a Filipina, a certain Lily Morales, with whom respondent
allegedly begot two (2) children named Cristina and Judaline both surnamed Jackson, and
the supposed conversion of respondents status to permanent resident on 30 September
1987 under Section 13(a) of the Immigration Act (CA No. 613, as amended), does not
change the fact that the two (2) US passports purportedly issued to Raymond Michael
Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator which were used by respondent, were tampered and
subsequently cancelled by the U.S. Embassy. Respondent already lost the privilege to
remain in the country (Schonemann v. Comm. Santiago, G.R. No. 86461, 30 May 1989).
It is also significant to note the evident inconsistencies in the sworn statement of respondent
conducted by Special Prosecutor Henry B. Tubban on 5 December 1997 with the
documents attached in the motion. Hereunder are the said inconsistencies:
1. Annex "A" of the Motion is an alleged Marriage Contract between the respondent
and one Lily H. Morales showing Manila City Hall as the place of marriage and which
was held on 6 September 1984.
In the Sworn Statement, the respondent claimed to have entered the country for the
first time only in 1988(p. 1 of sworn statement), that he married a certain Lily Morales
sometime in 1989 in Angeles City (p. 2 of sworn statement).
2. The motion stated that out of the union of the respondent with Ms. Morales, two
(2) children named Cristina and Judaline both surnamed Jackson, were born. In the
sworn statement of the respondent, he stated that they have five (5) children.
In addition, in the marriage contract (Annex "A" of motion), it was stated that Ms.
Morales is 17 years of age, a minor. However, below the personal circumstances of
the respondent and Mrs. Morales is a statement in bold letters that "BOTH PARTIES
ARE OF LEGAL AGES."
The foregoing creates a serious doubt on the allegations in the motion and on the
authenticity of the documents attached thereto. With more reason that the motion should be
denied.
34

Moreover, the petitioner, in his motion for reconsideration with the CID, offered to post a bail
bond for his provisional release to enable him to secure the necessary documents to
establish the appropriate grounds for his permanent stay in the Philippines. By offering to
post a bail bond, the petitioner thereby admitted that he was under the custody of the CID
and voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of the CID.
35

The present as clearly as the petitioners petition to lift the order of deportation was as yet
unresolved by the BOC when he filed the petition for habeas corpus.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the RTC
in Special Proceedings No. 10948 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.


Footnotes
1
Penned by Judge Florito S. Macalino.
2
Records, p. 164.
3
bid.
4
Id. at 177.
5
Records, pp. 37-38.
6
Records, pp. 43-44.
7
Rollo, p. 187.
8
Ibid.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 152-156.
11
Records, p. 154.
12
Id. at 55.
13
Id. at 36.
14
Rollo, pp. 188-190.
15
Id. at 191-192.
16
Id. at 81.
17
Id. at 186.
18
Records, p. 180.
19
Rollo, p. 80.
20
Records, p. 1.
21
Id. at 172-174.
22
Id. at 99-102.
23
Rollo, p. 9.
24
Id. at 162.
25
180 SCRA 756 (1989).
26
Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 677 (1995).
27
Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, 344 SCRA 519 (2000); Velasco v. Court of Appeals, supra.
28
Velasco v. Court of Appeals, supra at 685.
29
Feria v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 525 (2000).
30
Rollo, p. 187.
31
Id. at 186.
32
356 SCRA 31 (2001).
33
Id. at 42.
34
Rollo, pp. 191-192.
35
Velasco v. Court of Appeals, supra.









Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC January 22, 2008
THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
RESOLUTION
Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson of the Committee on Revision of the
Rules of Court submitting for this Courts consideration and approval the proposed Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
This Resolution shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three (3)
newspapers of general circulation.
January 22, 2008.
(Sgd.)
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
(Sgd.)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
(Sgd.)
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
(Sgd.)
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
(Sgd.)
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
(Sgd.)
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
(Sgd.)
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
(Sgd.)
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
(Sgd.)
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
(Sgd.) (ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
(Sgd.)
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO JR.
Associate Justice
(Sgd.)
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
(Sgd.)
RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J.
Associate Justice
(Sgd.)
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------




THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
SECTION 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
SEC. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data.
However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be
filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse,
children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph; or
SEC. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the
petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data
or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner.
The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the
Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of government offices.
SEC. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the writ is issued by a Regional Trial
Court or any judge thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge.
When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may be
returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the
place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the
place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such
Court or any justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of
its justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent
resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is
gathered, collected or stored.
The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees shall be required from an indigent
petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be docked and acted upon immediately, without
prejudice to subsequent submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15) days
from the filing of the petition.
SEC. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the
right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the
person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression
or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act
complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
SEC. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge
shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of
court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three
(3) days from the issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue
the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not
be later than ten (10) work days from the date of its issuance.
SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of court who refuses to
issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same,
shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other
disciplinary actions.
SEC. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a
judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy
on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the
respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply.
SEC. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a verified written return together
with supporting affidavits within five (5) working days from service of the writ, which period
may be reasonably extended by the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among
other things, contain the following:
(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged
communications, confidentiality of the source of information of media and others;
(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or
information subject of the petition;
(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of
such data or information, and the purpose for its collection;
(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and
confidentiality of the data or information; and,
(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and,
(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.
SEC. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may punish with imprisonment or fine a
respondent who commits contempt by making a false return, or refusing to make a return;
or any person who otherwise disobeys or resist a lawful process or order of the court.
SEC. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. - A hearing in chambers may be
conducted where the respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or
information in question shall compromise national security or state secrets, or when the
data or information cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or privileged character.
Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and motions are
prohibited:
(a) Motion to dismiss;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and
other pleadings;
(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(f) Third-party complaint;
(g) Reply;
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;
(i) Intervention;
(j) Memorandum;
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and
(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.
SEC. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or
judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the
petition may warrant unless the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to submit
evidence.
SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the
court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and
determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
SEC. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time
the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion,
destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data or information and grant other relevant
reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied.
Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officers as may
be designated by the court, justice or judge within five (5) working days.
SEC. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed the final judgment shall, within
three (3) days from its enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The return shall
contain a full statement of the proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the
database or information, or documents and articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted,
with copies served on the petitioner and the respondent.
The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and complied with by
the respondent, as well as all objections of the parties regarding the manner and regularity
of the service of the writ.
SEC. 18. Hearing on Officers Return. - The court shall set the return for hearing with due
notice to the parties and act accordingly.
SEC. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme
Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the judgment
or final order.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo cases.
SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of a petition for the writ of habeas
data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.
SEC. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a
petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a
writ of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of
the reliefs in the petition.
SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When a criminal action has been
commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief under the writ shall be
available to an aggrieved party by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the
writ of habeas data.
SEC. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights.
SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. - The Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.
SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its
publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.
[PUBLISHED IN THE MANILA BULLETIN, THE PHILIPPINE STAR AND THE
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER ON 25 JANUARY 2008]
























Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
(25 September 2007)
THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
SEC. 2. Who May File. The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any
qualified person or entity in the following order:
a. Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of
the aggrieved party;
b. Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph; or
c. Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known
member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other authorized
parties to file similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of the petition by an authorized party on
behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of all others, observing the order
established herein.
SEC. 3. Where to File. The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with the
Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of
its elements occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court, or any justice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines.
When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ shall be returnable
before such court or judge.
When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, it may
be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the
place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such
Court or any justice thereof, or before the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of
their justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission
was committed or any of its elements occurred.
SEC. 4. No Docket Fees. The petitioner shall be exempted from the payment of the
docket and other lawful fees when filing the petition. The court, justice or judge shall docket
the petition and act upon it immediately.
SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege
the following:
a. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
b. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat,
act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be
described by an assumed appellation;
c. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits;
d. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner
and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
e. The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the
threat, act or omission; and
f. The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.
SEC. 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge
shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of
court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the
justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any
officer or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not
be later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance.
SEC. 7. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. A clerk of court who refuses to
issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same,
shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other
disciplinary actions.
SEC. 8. How the Writ is Served. The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a
judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy
on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the
respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply.
SEC. 9. Return; Contents. Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the
respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall,
among other things, contain the following:
a. The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with
violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act
or omission;
b. The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts
of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or
omission;
c. All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat,
act or omission against the aggrieved party; and
d. If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the
actions that have been or will still be taken:
i. to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
ii. to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of
the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the
person or persons responsible;
iii. to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death
or disappearance;
iv. to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance
as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or
disappearance;
v. to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and
vi. to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the
prosecution of the case.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.
SEC. 10. Defenses not Pleaded Deemed Waived. All defenses shall be raised in the
return, otherwise, they shall be deemed waived.
SEC. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. The following pleadings and motions are
prohibited:
a. Motion to dismiss;
b. Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and
other pleadings;
c. Dilatory motion for postponement;
d. Motion for a bill of particulars;
e. Counterclaim or cross-claim;
f. Third-party complaint;
g. Reply;
h. Motion to declare respondent in default;
i. Intervention;
j. Memorandum;
k. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and
l. Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.
SEC. 12. Effect of Failure to File Return. In case the respondent fails to file a return,
the court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte.
SEC. 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However,
the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and
determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
The hearing shall be from day to day until completed and given the same priority as
petitions for habeas corpus.
SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment,
the court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu
proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person
or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is
an organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the
protection may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall
extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member
of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and
conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after
due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or
other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying,
or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be
supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the
enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature
of the information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to
determine the merit of the opposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of
the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the
inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may
prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order
shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable
reasons.
(c) Production Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after
due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain
evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection,
copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged
nature of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a
hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the
constitutional rights of all the parties.
(d) Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu
proprio, may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the
Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No.
6981.
The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government
agencies, or to accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and
securing their safety.
SEC. 15. Availability of Interim Reliefs to Respondent. Upon verified motion of the
respondent and after due hearing, the court, justice or judge may issue an inspection order
or production order under paragraphs (b) and (c) of the preceding section.
A motion for inspection order under this section shall be supported by affidavits or
testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the defenses of the respondent.
SEC. 16. Contempt. The court, justice or judge may order the respondent who refuses to
make a return, or who makes a false return, or any person who otherwise disobeys or
resists a lawful process or order of the court to be punished for contempt. The contemnor
may be imprisoned or imposed a fine.
SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence
as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of
duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability.
SEC. 18. J udgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time
the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may
be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
SEC. 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme
Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the adverse
judgment.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus cases.
SEC. 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. The court shall not dismiss the petition, but
shall archive it, if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the
failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives.
A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo court that shall, motu
proprio or upon motion by any party, order their revival when ready for further proceedings.
The petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon failure to prosecute the case after the
lapse of two (2) years from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the case.
The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a consolidated list of
archived cases under this Rule not later than the first week of January of every year.
SEC. 21. Institution of Separate Actions. This Rule shall not preclude the filing of
separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.
SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been
commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall
be available by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the
writ of amparo.
SEC. 23. Consolidation. When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a
petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a
writ of amparo, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to apply to the disposition
of the reliefs in the petition.
SEC. 24. Substantive Rights. This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights recognized and protected by the Constitution.
SEC. 25. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.
SEC. 26. Applicability to Pending Cases. This Rule shall govern cases involving
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof pending in the trial and
appellate courts.
SEC. 27. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on October 24, 2007, following its
publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.

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