Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Download
Standard view
Full view
of .
Save to My Library
Look up keyword
Like this
0Activity
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
04. Arroyo vs. de Venecia

04. Arroyo vs. de Venecia

Ratings: (0)|Views: 1 |Likes:
Published by Rommel Rosas
c
c

More info:

Published by: Rommel Rosas on Jun 20, 2014
Copyright:Traditional Copyright: All rights reserved

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

06/20/2014

pdf

text

original

 
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.* JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents. Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review; Legislative Rules of Procedure; The cases, both in the Philippines and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.
 — 
It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively  prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Petitioners contend that the House rules
were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that “each Hou
se may determine the rules
of its proceedings” and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this
contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases, the constitutional provision that
“each House may determine the
rules of its proceed-
ings” was invoked by parties, although not
successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its  business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite  purpose of invoking judicial review. But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. 269 VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 269 Arroyo vs. De Venecia
 
Same; Same; Same; Same; The prevailing view is that Rules of Proceedings are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are  primarily procedural.
 — 
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote: Rules are hardly permanent in character. The  prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over the shoulders of the justices, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
 — 
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown. Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power. Same; Same; Same; Political Questions; While Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations.
 — 
Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion’s sponsorship in
 270 270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Arroyo vs. De Venecia
 
the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, §1, “nothing involving abuse of
discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
is beyond judicial review.” Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an
acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, §5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. Same; Same; Same; Same; If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has
“gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction” so as to call for the exercise of the Court’s Art. VIII, §1 power.—As we have already held, under Art. VIII, §1, this Court’s function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that
such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has “gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction” so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, §1
 power. Same; Same; Same; Legislative Rules of Procedure; Bicameral Conference Committee Reports;  No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases involving the approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.
 — 
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of
the House, Rep. Albano’s motion for the approval of the conference committee report should
have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members should have been taken. They say that the method used in 271 VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 271 Arroyo vs. De Venecia

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->