One Tribe at a Time
Te thoughts and I ideas that I will put orward in this paper are mine alone. AlthoughI credit the US Army Special Forces or the training I have received and the trust o its com-manders, nothing in this paper refects the ideas and thinking o any other person ororganization.I am not a proessional writer. Any mistakes in ormatting, spelling, quoting, etc. are minealone.I am not implying by writing this paper that anyone has “got it wrong” or that I have all theright answers. I don’t.I started writing this paper in January o ’09 prior to the “New Aghanistan Plan.” Much haschanged since then. It is an extremely dicult and elusive situation in Aghanistan.Tis paper is about tactical employment o small, well-trained units that, when combinedwith a larger eort, will have positive strategic implications.Te ollowing is a short list o terms you will see in this paper. I will dene others as theyappear:
stands or “ribal Engagement eams.” I will go into detail about them inChapter Eight, but they are reerred to in many places prior to that.
reers to “actical ribal Engagement.”
reers to “ribal Engagement Strategy.”
reers to “ribal Security Force.” I will also employ the word
nextto it, as this is the Aghan term most used to describe the type o tribal elementour Es would “advise, assist, train and lead.”I am not here to imply that I think I could win the war in Aghanistan i put in charge. Orthat I can meet these challenges alone, or that there aren’t soldiers out there who could do itbetter. I just know what I have done and what I could do again, i given the chance.
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