Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Download
Standard view
Full view
of .
Look up keyword
Like this
1Activity
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
Lids Conf 2006 Talk

Lids Conf 2006 Talk

Ratings: (0)|Views: 4 |Likes:
Published by John Brown

More info:

Published by: John Brown on Nov 25, 2009
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

11/24/2009

pdf

text

original

 
Computation of 
ǫ
-equilibria in SeparableGames
Noah SteinJanuary 31, 2006
 
Games
Set
of interacting agents (
=
{
1
,
2
}
throughout)
Set
i
of strategies for each player
i
.
Utility function
u
i
:
1
×
2
R
.
Each player wants as much utility as possible.
Utilities capture all strategic interactions.
MIT Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems 1
 
Equilibrium
A
Nash Equilibrium
is a choice of strategy foreach player, so that if only one player deviates, hecannot expect to improve his utility.
An
ǫ
-equilibrium
is weaker – no player canimprove his payoff by more than
ǫ
.
MIT Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems 2

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
scribd
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->