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Princeton University Press
Political Action: The Problem of Dirty HandsAuthor(s): Michael WalzerSource:
Philosophy and Public Affairs,
Vol. 2, No. 2 (Winter, 1973), pp. 160-180Published by: Formerly published by Princeton University PressStable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265139
Accessed: 30/10/2008 11:56
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MICHAELWALZER
PoliticalAction:TheProblemofDirtyHands'
In anearlier issue ofPhilosophy&PublicAffairs there appearedasymposiumonthe rules of warwhich wasactually (oratleastmoreimportantly) a symposiumon another topic.2The actual topicwaswhether ornotamancaneverface,orever hastoface,a moraldilemma,a situationwhere hemust choose betweentwocoursesofactionbothofwhichitwouldbewrongfor him toundertake.ThomasNagelworriedly suggestedthat this couldhappenand thatitdidhap-pen whenever someone wasforcedto choose betweenupholdinganimportantmoral principleand avoiding somelooming disaster.3 R.B.Brandtargued thatitcouldnotpossiblyhappen,for therewereguide-lines wemightfollowandcalculationswemight go throughwhichwouldnecessarily yieldthe conclusion thatoneor theother courseofactionwastherightone toundertakeinthe circumstances(orthat itdidnot matterwhichweundertook).R.M.Hareexplainedhowitwas
i.
An earlier version of this paperwas read at the annual meeting of theConferencefor theStudyofPoliticalThoughtinNew York, April
I97I.
IamindebtedtoCharles Taylor, who servedas commentator at that time and en-couragedmeto think thatitsargumentsmightberight.
2.
Philosophy&PublicAffairs
i,
no.
2
(Winter
I97I/72):
Thomas Nagel,"War andMassacre,"pp.
I23-I44;
R. B.Brandt,"UtilitarianismandtheRulesof War," pp.
I45-I65;
and R.M.Hare,"Rules of War and Moral Reasoning,"
pp. i66-i8i.
3.ForNagel's descriptionofapossible"moralblindalley," see "War andMassacre," pp.
I42-I44.
Bernard Williamshas made a similarsuggestion,thoughwithoutquite acknowledgingit as his own:"many peoplecanrecognizethethoughtthat a certain course of actionis, indeed,the bestthingto do onthe whole in the circumstances, but that doingit involvesdoing somethingwrong" (Morality:An Introductionto Ethics[New York,
I972],
p.93).
 
i6iPoliticalAction:The Problem of DirtyHandsthat someone mightwrongly supposethat he was facedwith a moraldilemma: sometimes,he suggested,the precepts andprinciples of anordinary man, theproducts of hismoral education, comeinto conflictwithinjunctionsdeveloped at a higherlevel of moraldiscourse. Butthis conflict is,or ought to be, resolvedat the higherlevel; there isno real dilemma.Iam not surethat Hare's explanationis at all comforting,but thequestion is importanteven if no suchexplanation is possible,perhapsespecially so ifthis is the case. Theargument relatesnot only to thecoherenceandharmony of the moraluniverse, but alsototherelativeease or difficulty-orimpossibility-ofliving a morallife.Itis not,therefore,merely a philosopher'squestion. If sucha dilemma canarise,whetherfrequentlyor very rarely,any of usmight one day faceit. Indeed, manymen have facedit, or think theyhave, especiallymeninvolvedinpolitical activityor war. The dilemma,exactly asNageldescribesit,isfrequentlydiscussedin the literature ofpoliticalaction-innovelsandplaysdealingwithpolitics andin the work oftheorists too.In moderntimes thedilemmaappearsmost often as theproblemof"dirty hands,"anditistypicallystatedbytheCommunist leaderHoerdererinSartre'splayof that name:"Ihavedirtyhandsright uptotheelbows.I'veplungedthem in filthandblood.Doyouthinkyoucangoverninnocently?"4 Myownanswer isno,Idon'tthinkIcouldgoverninnocently;nordomostofusbelieve thatthose whogovernus areinnocent-asIshallarguebelow-eventhebest of them.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatit isn'tpossibletodotheright thing whilegoverning.Itmeansthat aparticularactofgovernment(inapoliticalpartyorin thestate) maybeexactlytheright thingtodoinutilitarianterms andyetleavethe man whodoesitguiltyof a moralwrong.Theinnocent man,afterwards,isnolongerinnocent. If ontheother handheremains innocent,chooses,thatis,the "absolutist"sideofNagel'sdilemma,henotonlyfails to dotheright thing (inutilitarianterms),hemayalsofail to measureupto thedutiesof his office(whichim-posesonhima considerableresponsibilityforconsequencesand out-comes).Mostoften,ofcourse, politicalleadersaccepttheutilitarian
4. Jean-PaulSartre,DirtyHands,inNoExit andThree Other Plays,trans.LionelAbel(NewYork, n.d.),p.
224.
of 00

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