Part1

1. LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO
YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990
FERNAN, C.J.:
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the decision of the Fourth Civil Cases
Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 31, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No. 56626 entitled
"Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo Siason et al." affirming the decision dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental insofar as it ordered the petitioners to pay jointly and severally the
private respondents the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B
of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental and reversing the subject decision insofar as it
awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and
attorney's fees, respectively and (b) the resolution of said appellate court dated May 30, 1984, denying
the motion for reconsideration of its decision.
The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B which were
originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with an area
of 156,549 square meters, was registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original
Certificate of Title No. RO-4858 (8804) issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental
Negros (Exh. A).
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents,
Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private
respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child,
Jovita (Jovito) Alib.
1
It is not clear why the latter is not included as a party in this case.
Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she could
not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares.
The record does not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots but it
is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the
outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not
visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their
share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella
(Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773.
2

It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. RF
2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818 square meters.
3
TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot
773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered under OCT
No. 8804.
The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also registered in the name of
Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ).
4
Said transfer certificate
of title also contains a certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No.
8804.
On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration of
the sum of P7,000.00.
5
Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued
in Fuentebella's name.
6

After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia R.
Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B.
7
By virtue of a court
order granting said motion,
8
on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for
P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez.
9
Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots
773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez.
10

Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely,
Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against
Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental
for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an
accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be made by the
defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the share or money equivalent due the
plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in
the form of attorney's fees.
11

During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and
another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason.
12
Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920 were issued
to Siason,
13
who thereafter, declared the two lots in his name for assessment purposes.
14

Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other plaintiffs,
and assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the therein
plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or otherwise, against the defendant
Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the above-entitled case."
15

On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil
Case No. 5022, which ordered Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey the land. the dispositive portion of which
reads:
It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not mentioned in the
aforesaid decision.
However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In his return of service
dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots
773-A and 773-B; that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from
Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of
execution."
17

The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance, herein private respondents
(the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the
issuance of a new certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166
issued to Rosendo Alvarez.
18
Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to produce the certificates of
title covering Lots 773 and 823.
Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots
773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any knowledge of any lien or
encumbrances against said properties"; that the decision in the cadastral proceeding
19
could not be
enforced against him as he was not a party thereto; and that the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could
neither be enforced against him not only because he was not a party-litigant therein but also because it
had long become final and executory.
20
Finding said manifestation to be well-founded, the cadastral
court, in its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its previous order requiring Siason to surrender the
certificates of title mentioned therein.
21

In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil Case
No. 5022. Siason opposed it.
22
In its order of September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court,
noting that the Yaneses had instituted another action for the recovery of the land in question, ruled that
at the judgment therein could not be enforced against Siason as he was not a party in the case.
23

The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property with
damages.
24
Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez, Raymundo
Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the cancellation of TCT
Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the issuance of a new certificate of
title in the name of the Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriffs return of service dated October 20,
1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of Lot 773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be
effected, or, if the issuance of a new title could not be made, that the Alvarez and Siason jointly and
severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00. They also prayed that Siason render an accounting of
the fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961 until the filing of the complaint; and that the defendants
jointly and severally pay the Yaneses moral damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of
P10,000.00 plus attorney's fees of P4, 000.00.
25

In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots 773-A and 773-B,
having been passed upon by the court in its order of September 4, 1965, had become res judicata and
the Yaneses were estopped from questioning said order.
26
On their part, the Alvarez stated in their
answer that the Yaneses' cause of action had been "barred by res judicata, statute of limitation and
estoppel."
27

In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the properties
in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in
good faith for a valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a
notice of lis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to protect their rights
over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded that they recover the actual
value of the land because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court
approval.
The case against Siason was dismissed but it ordered the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez to pay jointly and
severally the Yanese party.
The petitioners appealed to the IAC(court of Appeals) which in turn affirmed the judgment in the lower
court and decided in favor of the Yaneses.
Petitioners then appealed their case to the Supreme Court where they asked the court whether they as
heirs can inherit their fathers debt and in turn be liable to the Yaneses.
Issue:
Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and
773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally passed or
transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process
Held:
The court in the affirmative. The debt of Rosendo can be legally transferred to his heir but only up to the
amount of the inheritance.
Judgment of the lower court if upheld.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general
transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus,
the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person
which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except
in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible
by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the
value of the property received from the decedent.
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady vs.
Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
41

The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by
the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated
and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89).
The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a
payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact
diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and
obligations are transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights
and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history of these
institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the
obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony with the persons
occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation
is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its
performance by a specific person and by no other.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of
their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not
inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent
thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary
assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate.
42

It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their
inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other properties
left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents,
we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.







2. BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE, ENRIQUITA and CLAUDIO, all surnamed,
GEVERO,petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEL MONTE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 77029 August 30, 1990
PARAS, J.:
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 20, 1988 decision
1
of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-GR CV No. 69264, entitled Del Monte Development
Corporation vs. Enrique Ababa, et al., etc. affirming the decision
2
of the then Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Misamis Oriental declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and
absolute owner of that portion of Lot 476 of the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450, containing an area of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Eight
(7,878) square meters more or less.
The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the Subdivision Plan Psd-37365 containing an area
of 20,119 square meters and situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Said lot was acquired by purchase
from the late Luis Lancero on September 15, 1964 as per Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of
plaintiff and by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4320 was issued to plaintiff (DELCOR for
brevity). Luis Lancero, in turn acquired the same parcel from Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 per
deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of
Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of
Teodorica Babangha 1/2 share and her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and
Ursula, all surnamed surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122 square
meters.
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by her six children
aforementioned. The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17,1966 executed an Extra-Judicial
Settlement and Partition of the estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was
lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica
Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by
the Land Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who
was then alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement and partition in 1966. Plaintiff (private respondent
herein) filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or annul the
partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it
acquired a portion of lot 2476.
Plaintiff now seeks to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha
insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired, a portion of Lot 2476. Plaintiff proved that
before purchasing Lot 2476-A it first investigated and checked the title of Luis Lancero and found the
same to be intact in the office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City. The same with the
subdivision plan (Exh. "B"), the corresponding technical description (Exh. "P") and the Deed of Sale
executed by Ricardo Gevero all of which were found to be unquestionable. By reason of all these,
plaintiff claims to have bought the land in good faith and for value, occupying the land since the sale and
taking over from Lancero's possession until May 1969, when the defendants Abadas forcibly entered the
property. (Rollo, p. 23)
The case for the quieting of title made by DELCOR was won by DELCOR(respondents herein) and the
IAC(Court of Appeals) affirmed the decision of the trial court in the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners.
Issue:
Was the share of Ricardo in the inheritance from Teodorica included in the sale made by Ricardo to
Luis Lancero, even if the sale happened before the partition of the property but after the death of their
mother Teodorica??
Held:
The Court held in the affirmative. The Court held that the share was included in the sale.
Petition is devoid of merit.
The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of
the death of the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there
is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary share
immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]).
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were transmitted
from the moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the date of
extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share in the lot as inheritance from his mother
Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share which he inherited from Teodorica
was also included unless expressly excluded in the deed of sale.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.





























3. Locsin vs CA G.R. No. 89783, 206 SCRA 383, Feb 19,1992 Ponente: Narvasa, C.J

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a reversal of the decision of the CA affirming with modification
the ruling of the RTC of Albay in favor of Jose Jaucian and petitioners seek an action for recovery of real property
with damages

Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and universal heir of
all his properties including those inherited from his father. The spouses being childless, had agreed that their
properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's
properties would go to his "Locsin relatives", and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives", and this was drawn
up by Catalinas nephew and trusted legal adviser Atty. Salvador Lorayes.

Don Mariano died of lung cancer and his will was probated. Doa Catalina carried out the terms of their compact,
hence, 9 years after his death, Doa Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's
as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews and nieces. She made the sales and donation of
properties which she had received from her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces. Before her death
she made a will affirming and ratifying the transfers she had made.

6 years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already received their
legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City to recover the
properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were
inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were
closest to Doa Catalina did not join the action.

RTC rendered judgement in favor of the Jaucians declaring as null and void ab-initiothe deeds of sale, donations,
reconveyance and exchange of any part of the estate of Catalina. C.A. affirmed.

ISSUE:
WON the nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, are entitled to inherit the properties which she
had already disposed of more than 10 years before her death.

HELD:
No, Petition has merit and should be granted.

They are not entitled since those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession."

The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until
such time.
Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed
part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the
property that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; Even if those transfers
were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the
reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor
the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs.

Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence there were no
legitime that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the
respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate
subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may
not invoke:

Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part thereof, provided he reserves,
in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of
the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the
donation shall be reduced on petition of any person affected. (634a)

There is not the slightest suggestion in record that Catalina was mentally incompetent when she made the
disposition as she was transferring properties to both Jaucians and Locsins. The desistance of her closest Jaucian
relatives persuasively demonstrates that Catalina acted as a free agent. (Note* The SC also held respondents
action from RTC level should have prescribed 4 years from registration as registration is constructive notice as to
the world)
4. Opulencia vs. C.A.
G.R. No. 125835, 293 SCRA 385, July 30,1998
Ponente: Panganiban, J

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the decision of the C.A. declaring the Contract to Sell executed by
Opulencia in favor of Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven, valid and binding.

Petitioner Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed a "CONTRACT TO SELL" Lot 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate, consisting
of 23,766 square meters located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna at P150.00 per square meter which she recently inherited
from her dead father; that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300,000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed
to comply with her obligations under the contract. Private respondents therefore prayed that petitioner be
ordered to perform her contractual obligations and to further pay damages, attorney's fee and litigation expenses.

Petitioner admitted the execution of the contract in favor of plaintiffs and receipt of P300,000.00 as
downpayment. However, she put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property subject of the
contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner's father), in respect of which a petition for
probate was filed with the RTC; that at the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of the
pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not approved by the probate court.

RTC dismissed the complaint and held a decedent's representative (administrator) is not estopped from
questioning the validity of his own void deed (for lack of approval of the probate court) purporting to convey land
and the action to declare the inexistence of contracts do not prescribe.

CA reversed and ruled that contract to sell in question is not covered by Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court since
it was made by appellee in her capacity as an heir, of a property that was devised to her under the will sought to
be probated. Thus, while the document inadvertently stated that appellee executed the contract in her capacity as
"executrix and administratrix" of the estate, a cursory reading of the entire text of the contract would unerringly
show that what she undertook to sell to appellants was one of the "other properties given to her by her late
father," and more importantly, it was not made for the benefit of the estate but for her own needs (Upon reading
the PREAMBLE of the doc. The sale was made for the reasons of "difficulties in her living" conditions and
consequent "need of cash.")

ISSUE:
WON the Contract to Sell an inherited estate without the requisite probate court approval is valid

HELD:
YES, The petition has no merit

Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in
her capacity as an heiress. Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent's
death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack
of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell
the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.

In Jakosalem vs. Rafols, the Court resolved an identical issue under the old Civil Code and held:
Art. 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the
heir without interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted."
And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs "becomes the undivided owner
of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of
ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate while it remains undivided."

Under article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common property, and
the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the
partition upon the dissolution of the community. Hence, where some of the heirs, without the concurrence of the
others, sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court, speaking thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano
Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which may be allotted
to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.

There is no basis for petitioner's apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and
distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that "the sale made by an heir of his share in an
inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration." (Note: SC
held that Petitioner is also estopped from backing out of her representations)

5. EMNACE v. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001; 370scra431]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business
concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to dissolve
their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties
among them, consequent to Jacinto Divinagracias withdrawal from the partnership. Among the assets
to be distributed were five (5) fishing boats, six (6) vehicles, two (2) parcels of land located at Sto. Nio
and Talisay, Negros Occidental, and cash deposits in the local branches of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands and Prudential Bank.
Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanaos untimely demise in
1994, petitioner failed to submit to Tabanaos heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the
partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnerships finances. Petitioner also reneged on his
promise to turn over to Tabanaos heirs the deceaseds 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership,
amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the sum of P10,000,000.00, despite formal demand for payment
thereof.
Private respondents demands were not availed and so they filed a complaint against herein petitioner.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that the case should be dismissed because the estate of
Tabanao cannot sue and the private respondents were not in the capacity to do so because they
werent assigned as the administrator of the Tabanaos estate.
The trial court held that the heirs of Tabanao had a right to sue in their own names, in view of the
provision of Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was dismissed
ISSUE:
Whether or not the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has the legal capacity to sue even if she was
never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate.

HELD:
YES. Petitioners objection in this regard is misplaced.The surviving spouse does not need to be
appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her
children are complainants in their own right assuccessors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment
of Vicente Tabanaos death, his rights in so far as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to
his heirs because rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were
transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of
acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted. WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED.






6. Tanedo v Ca
[G.R. No. 104482. January 22, 1996]

Facts
This is a Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside and
reverse the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
October 1862 Lazardo Taedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor of his eldest brother,
Ricardo Taedo, and the latters wife, Teresita Barera, private respondents herein, whereby he
conveyed to the latter in consideration of P1,500.00, one hectare of whatever share I shall have over
Lot No. 191, said property being his future inheritance from his parents. Later upon the death of his
father Lazaro executed an Affidavit of Conformity dated February 28, 1980 (Exh. 3) to re-affirm,
respect. acknowledge and validate the sale I made in 1962.
On 1981 Lozardo again executed another notarized deed of sale in favor of private respondents
involving the same parcel of land Lot no. 191
After sometime Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children, petitioners herein,
through a deed of sale dated December 29, 1980. On June 7, 1982, private respondents recorded the
Deed of Sale in their favor in the Registry of Deeds and the corresponding entry was made in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 166451.
Petitioners on July 16, 1982 filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of sale executed
by Lazaro in favor of private respondents covering the property inherited by Lazaro from his father.
Petitioner presented in evidence: (1) a private writing purportedly prepared and signed by Matias dated
December 28, 1978, stating that it was his desire that whatever inheritance Lazaro would receive from
him should be given to his (Lazaros) children (2) a typewritten document dated March 10, 1979 signed
by Lazaro in the presence of two witnesses, wherein he confirmed that he would voluntarily abide by
the wishes of his father, Matias, to give to his (Lazaros) children all the property he would inherit from
the latter and (3) a letter dated January 1, 1980 of Lazaro to his daughter, Carmela, stating that his share
in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of his father was intended for his children, petitioners
herein.
The trial court decided in favor of private respondents, holding that petitioners failed to adduce a
preponderance of evidence to support (their) claim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court, ruling that the Deed of Sale dated January 13, 1981 (Exh. 9) was valid and that
its registration in good faith vested title in said respondents.


Issue
1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid?
2. Was the subsequent execution on January 13, 1981 (and registration with the Registry of
Property) of a deed of sale covering the same property to the same buyers valid?


Ruling

1.No. pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, (n)o contract may be entered into upon a future
inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.
Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the
creator of any obligation between the parties.
Hence, the affidavit of conformity dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or
ratify the 1962 sale, is also useless and, in the words of the respondent Court, suffers from the same
infirmity. Even private respondents in their memorandum concede this.

2. Yes.
The deed of sale of January 13, 1981 in favor of private respondents covering Lazaros
undivided inheritance of one-twelfth (1/12) share in Lot No. 191, which was subsequently registered on
June 7, 1982; and (b) the deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners covering the
same property. These two documents were executed after the death of Matias (and his spouse) and
after a deed of extrajudicial settlement of his (Matias) estate was executed, thus vesting in Lazaro
actual title over said property. In other words, these dispositions, though conflicting, were no longer
infected with the infirmities of the 1962 sale.
The question now is which of these two should be diven effect
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there
is good faith.
The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted law, ownership
shall belong to the buyer who in good faith registers it first in the registry of property. Thus, although
the deed of sale in favor of private respondents was later than the one in favor of petitioners,
ownership would vest in the former because of the undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand,
petitioners have not registered the sale to them at all.