GOAL 1 – INNOVATIVE RESEARCHChanging the Rules of the Game:Field Experiments in Chicago HeightsThe following briefly summarizes projects that roughly fall into theexpected treatment change of “greater than one standard deviation” categoryand an expected change of “less than one standard deviation” category. We viewa prudent strategy to have representation in each since the latter might be morecost effective, or more scalable in certain cases, whereas the former permits us afirst glimpse of efforts that can truly change the nature of the game. We are of the mind that the best chance to make this sort of impact arises from earlychildhood interventions.“GREATER THAN 1 SD EFFECT CATEGORY”Project 1: Griffin Preschool Labs

There is a renewed focus among policy-makers, academics, and practitioners on theimportanceof early childhood education. As a prime example, the Obama administration named theexpansion of early childhood education as one of its key education reform priorities. Whilenumerous different approaches to early childhood education exist, the research showsmixed results. Some are promising: the HighScope Perry Pre-school longitudinal study thatstarted in the last 1960s, following the control and treatment group to the age of 27, showedpositive results in higher monthly earnings, higher levels of school completion, lowerpercentages of receiving social services and fewer arrests, and higher levels of academicachievement. Economic benefits from Perry Preschool participation are estimated at over$90,000. Some are not: HeadStart, a multi-billion dollar government program that has alsobeen in existence since the late 1960s, has not shown similarly significant positive effects. Infact, the impact on black students has been shown to disappear by age 10.In order to better serve the next generation and guide the enormous resources invested inearly childhood, we must identify what practices and programs have what impact on whatchildren.

We approach the problem as would a typical economist

: consider both the demandand supply side. This is done via 3 simple treatments.

Project 1 - Treatment 1:

Begin a preschool that has R&D as part of its DNA. We will recruitfamilies to sign-up for the preschool through a lottery. Children who “win” the entrancelottery willenter our preschool. Preschool Labs thus creates a randomized trial of major early childhoodintervention models.

Experimental Design:

At a minimum, we would randomly recruit 150 participants through a lottery from a largerpool of students to enter the pre-school (at a maximum we would want 250). We willconstrain ourselves to spend $8,500 per child to plan for scalability. As a benchmark,HeadStart spends an average of $7,200 per child, HighScopes Perry spends an average of $13,000 per child and EduCareCenters spend approximately $20,000.

Key Outcomes Tested:

•

Students level of proficiency on assessment tests

•

Parents’ motivation and capacity to support students in addressing skill gaps whenidentified

•

Physical health through immunizations and regular health screenings

•

Long term: Crime rates, age of first pregnancy, employment and educationalattainment and achievement

Brass Tacks:

•

Where

: Within elementary schools in Chicago Heights or other facilities

•

When

: Launching January 2010

Project 1 - Treatments 2 and 3: Parental Incentives for Pre-School Achievement

The preschool approach described above attempts to address deficits in home environmentsby removing the child from that setting for much of the day. An alternative approach is toenrich the home environment for children through a combination of financial incentives toparents combined with parental training, support, and encouragement.Prior research has shown that parental involvement is strongly

correlated

with studentsuccess, but we do not have confirmation on the causality of this relationship. To build aknowledge-base of what children need in their early years for short- and long-term success,we must better understand the role that parents play. Thus, in our second and third treatments, we propose to study the impact of providing largeincentives to the parents for boosts their child’s cognitive development and schoolreadiness. We will randomly select a group of parents to receive up to $7,000 annually,conditional on parental attendance at monthly meetings, completion of monthly parent-childhomework exercises, and child performance on monthly post-tests. Parents will attendmonthly meetings where they learn\ about best parenting practices, the development of their child, and ways to boost their intellectual and social development. Additionally, parentswill receive materials and instruction at each meeting on what their children need to learn inthe next month. The children will also attend the meetings. During the time the parents are in theirworkshops, we will assess whether the children learned what they were instructed to learnthe previous month.Parents will be given incentives for attendance at monthly meetings, for demonstratingcompletion of exercises with their child, and for their child’s performance on monthlyassessments. The magnitude of incentives will be calibrated so that we can make directcomparisons between this model of school achievement and the Day Care Labs. The major difference between treatments 2 and 3 is that in treatment 2 the financialincentives go directly, and immediately, to the parent, whereas in treatment 3 the earnedmonies are placed in an account earmarked for the child’s college tuition.

Key Outcomes Tested:

•

Students level of proficiency on assessment tests

•

Parents’ motivation and capacity to support students in addressing skill gaps whenidentified

•

Physical health through immunizations and regular health screenings

•

Long term: Crime rates, age of first pregnancy, employment and educationalattainment and achievement

Brass Tacks:

•

Where

: Facility TBD (church, community center or school auditorium)

•

When

: Launching September 2009

Project 2: Teacher Pay for Performance

(likely a long shot for 1+ SD change)Hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on teacher incentives for performance. Fewof those dollars have been given out in the context of a rigorous evaluation. Those programsthat have been able to randomize involved agreements with the Teachers Union, whichinvariably watered down the incentives for individual teachers (i.e. New York City) and haveshown little or no results.Our third experiment will test the effectiveness of teacher pay-for-performance plans in aresearch design that gives teacher incentives the best chance of succeeding. We willprovide strong individual incentives for teachers to produce results, and we will add a twistat the high school level: a tournament-like model. This experiment will provide the singlemost powerful test ever carried out on pay-for-performance schemes for teachers.

Incentive Design:

In K-8 schools, incentives will take the following form: no incentives for a teacher who has aclass-average value-added equal to or below 0.5 grade equivalents and $2,000 per 0.1grade equivalent increase over that 0.5 baseline. We expect the average amount earned byteachers to be $10,000.In the high schools, we will provide tournament-like incentive structures for teachers. Forevery0.1 grade equivalent of value-added over 0.5, teachers get one ticket for a lottery. Teacherscan get as many tickets as 0.1 increases their students make. The more their students’achievement improves, the higher the teacher’s chance of winning one of three $50,000prizes.As a corollary to these experiments, we would also like to experiment with non-pecuniaryincentives in Chicago Public Schools. Depending on the assumptions one makes about themarginal utility of income for teachers, this might be a more effective motivator than cash.

Key Outcomes Tested:

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Student achievement in individual teacher’s classes

•

School morale measurements

•

Teacher effort measurements

Brass Tacks:

•

Where

: All Chicago Heights Schools

•

When

: Launching September 2009

“LESS THAN 1 SD EFFECT CATEGORY”Project 3: Summer Employment Program vs. Summer Grant

(with resources from theprevious grant)Do employment programs over the summer have any effect on student achievement duringthe school-year? If so, is the effect driven by “being off the street” or by “income effect”.

Project 4: Non-financial Incentives for Students (i.e., cheerleading)

(with resourcesfrom the previous grant)In our

Chicago Heights Miracle

program financial incentives were complement with what we