Yates, JS. The Scalar Politics of Governing Adaptation To Climate Change in Nepal. Global Causeway Working Paper

Global Causeway
Working Paper Series

2010-3
Institutional Complexity in Governing the Scalar Politics
of Adaptation to Climate Change in Rural Nepal

Julian S. Yates
(December 2010)

This is an early draft of a paper published in Global Environmental
Change:
Yates, J. S. (2012). Uneven Interventions and the scalar politics of
governing livelihood adaptation in rural Nepal. Global Environmental
Change, 22(2), 537-546.
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.01.007

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Institutional Complexity in Governing the Scalar Politics of Adaptation to Climate
Change in Rural Nepal
By
Julian S. Yates
Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, 1984 West Mall,
Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z2. Canada.
Phone: 1 (604) 822-2663
Fax: 1 (604) 822-6150
julian.yates@geog.ubc.ca
Abstract: Accounts that address the governance of adaptation are increasingly exploring the
ways in which the institutional context can both enable and constrain adaptive capacity. This
paper contributes to such a growing field by providing empirical evidence derived from
participatory field research, which was carried out in the districts of Chitwan and
Nawalparasi in Nepal during the spring of 2010. The results support previous arguments that
emphasise the need to address the multi-scalar context of adaptation as a governance issue
associated with individual and collective deliberative action (or inaction). Institution analysis
identifies the ways in which networks of powerful and well-connected key players are able to
control adaptation projects, flows of knowledge and information, and the ways in which local
institutions and organisations respond to livelihood needs. This control is under-pinned by a
scalar politics that constructs and reproduces particular local adaptation needs at multiple
governance scales at once. Many existing tools and frameworks for assessing the institutional
elements of adaptation are unable to grapple with these factors systematically. Thus, the
paper concludes with a call for further attention to forms of scalar politics in the governance
of adaptation so that we might be able to more effectively theorise up from local complexity
without glossing over inherent power relations and institutional constraints.
Keywords: Adaptation, institutions, governance, power, networks, scalar politics,
livelihoods, Nepal.

Governing adaptation Nepal Julian S. Yates
GCWP: 2010-3 (December) 1

1 Introduction: Uncertainty in adaptive capacity
Exploring adaptation to climate change has been described as a science of explaining how
social and natural systems learn through experimentation (Adger, 2006, p. 269). However,
this science of adaptation has become characterised by the same promise of prediction
that underpins the inherent uncertainty of climate projections (Demeritt, 2001). Uncertainty
in adaptive capacity stems from uncertain climate models, unreliable aggregate
measurements of adaptive capacity, the unknown effects of adaptive practices, the inability to
predict the ways in which adaptive capacity is transformed into adaptive action, and contested
underlying theories of behaviour, politics, and risk (Adger et al., 2003; Adger and Vincent,
2005; Ensor and Berger, 2009). In this paper, I call attention to such uncertainty by pointing
to our current inability to grapple with the complexity of the institutional arrangements that
both enable and constrain adaptation.
Current frameworks for understanding the role of institutions in adaptation aggregate
local complexity into regional and global models, which quantify and map vulnerability for
comparative purposes. This approach places vulnerability and adaptation within public policy
debates around climate change, whereby climate change impacts are a threat to nation
statesThis framing crowds out, subverts and constrains framing in terms of human-well
being (Adger, 2010). Demand for such an approach has been stimulated by supposed policy
relevance, but Barnett et al. (2008) argue that these frameworks cannot be relied upon to
communicate complexities, and should not be used for the comparison of vulnerability as a
context-specific problem. Engle and Lemos (2010) attempt at quantification, for example,
fails to adhere to the complex web of qualitative relations that they argue characterises the
adaptive capacity of water governance institutions in Brazil. Although some have tried to
overcome such limitations through the use of participatory methods (Fazey et al., 2010),
frameworks such as Gupta et al.s (2010) adaptive capacity wheel subjectively measure the

concept according to 22 criteria that are decided upon by Western scientists carrying pre-
determined yet unstated assumptions and belief systems (Hulme and Dessai, 2008). Such
attempts to govern adaptation compound uncertainty: not only is it difficult to project
scenarios of governance into the future or to predict their change, but the very notion of
governance indicators is problematic (Adger and Vincent, 2005, p. 403). In contrast to such
accounts, the approach taken here assumes that there are no measurable or generalisable a
priori factors, processes or functional relationships between exposure, sensitivity and
adaptive capacitythey are distinctive to particular places and times (Smit and Wandel,
2006, p. 286).
In general agreement with Adger et al.(2009), I maintain that the institutional
constraints to adaptation and the limits to our current frameworks for assessing such
constraints are not immutable. Assuming so runs the risk of yielding to broader and
supposedly hegemonic structural constraints. Rather than dwelling on unavoidable or
already-existing futures of climate change, we need to open up the governance of adaptation
to alternative and desirable futures and cast humans as agents of change rather than as
passive recipients of apocalyptic scenarios (O'Brien, Forthcoming). Such a didactic
futurology (Brace and Geoghegan, Forthcoming), may reveal that dynamic anticipatory
action is already helping to construct the future in the present. In this context, governing
adaptation begins from an open set of endless possibilities, rather than the predictable
outcome of present trends or past occurrences (Anderson, Forthcoming, p. 17). To explore
this notion, I follow a description of the research context with a critical reading of normative
governance frameworks, which aim to enhance knowledge, affiliation, representation, and
responsiveness in institutions. Such a reading points to forms of authority and expertise that
enable certain futures to appear, gain, and retain presence (Anderson, Forthcoming, p. 12). I
then turn to an analysis of the institutional context of adaptation in Nepal by drawing

attention to institutional differentiation and a critical reading of governance mechanisms.
Such an analysis points to the role that a scalar politics plays in producing (uneven)
possibilities for adapting to what Anderson calls the presence of the future. I conclude by
reflecting on how we might incorporate such a scalar politics into further research on the
governance of adaptation.
2 Researching adaptive capacity in Nepal
At the time of writing, the National Climate Change Policy of Nepal and the National
Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) the lynchpin of adaptation policy within the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) both remain under
construction. Different scales of government are working with non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) to generate data and information on climate change related impacts and
to raise awareness among local people. The research presented here was carried out in
collaboration with Practical Action Nepal, an NGO that is leading an Asian Development
Bank-funded project to assess and map vulnerability to climate change across Nepal in order
to inform the NAPA drafting process. A participatory vulnerability assessment (PVA) is
being conducted across the country to explore exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity to
climate change, the results of which will feed in to the development of Nepals NAPA. The
research presented here was carried out along-side the implementation of the PVA in the
districts of Chitwan and Nawalparasi, which lie in South-central Nepal and are divided by the
topography of the Narayani River.
The research was conducted in the villages of Laukhari and Swargadwari in Chitwan,
and the villages of Kadampur and Kirtipur in Nawalparasi. In Chitwan, the two villages fall
under the management of Meghauli village development committee (VDC) and they both
face bio-physical challenges from the same two rivers (Rapti and Narayani). In Nawalparasi,

the villages are linked by a watershed that is defined by the valley that drains into the
Baulaha River; Kirtipur is in the siwalik (200 to 1,000 metres above sea level) upstream area
of the watershed in the VDC of Devchuli, and is linked by a tributary of the Baulaha River to
the downstream community of Kadampur, located in the terai (0 200 m.a.s.l) of Divyapuri
VDC. In all research locations, agriculture is the primary livelihood activity and currently
revolves around the production of rice, maize (corn), and wheat. Crop production is
supplemented by livestock rearing, often just for subsistence, and in Meghauli by fishing.
Incomes are supplemented by wage labour in nearby towns, seasonal migration, remittances
from family members who have migrated to India, and more recently by the production of
alternative fruit and vegetable crops such as watermelon, bananas, lemon, and mangos.
In each village, qualitative and participatory research methods were carried out,
including in-depth semi-structured interviews with a key informants and participatory
workshops/focus group discussions. The workshops included the application of participatory
tools such as community resource and hazard mapping, seasonal calendars, historical
timelines, hazard ranking, resource and livelihood impact ranking, scenario development,
capacity assessments, and Venn diagramming. The workshops benefited from the embedded
knowledge of Practical Action Nepal and their local partner organisation Sahamati, both of
which have been working in the region for over a decade on vulnerability-reduction projects.
The interviews and dialogue from focus groups were recorded and transcribed verbatim into
the qualitative analysis software QSR NVivo 8, which was used to code and analyse the
content according to relevant themes. While the PVA included a static livelihoods analysis
for assessing adaptive capacity, the research also addressed more dynamic aspects of
livelihood adaptation through institution and political network analysis, the results of which
point to the need for a more nuanced approach to investigating the institutional context of
adaptation.

3 Unpacking complexity in governing adaptation
3.1 Deconstructing normative governance frameworks
A growing body of work is paying attention to the relational elements of governing
adaptation through a focus on social capital and social networks (Adger, 2003), the role of
cultural values and ethics (Adger et al., 2009), and the power and politics of decision-making
(Eakin et al., 2010; Moser, 2009). Questions of power and politics in decision-making are
increasingly being broached through institutional analyses, an area that remains under-
developed in adaptation research: there is relatively little empirical research uncovering how
institutions affect the current state of adaptabilityan understanding of institutions, and the
way they fit, integrate and interact with each other is crucial (Eakin and Lemos, 2010, p. 2).
In this context, institutions are defined as systems of rules, decision-making procedures, and
programs that give rise to social practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices,
and guide interactions among the occupants of the relevant roles (Gupta et al., 2010, p. 460).
While institutions may be formalised into organisations in the public, civic, and private
sectors, the two are not synonymous (Agrawal and Perrin, 2009).
As institutional approaches gained prominence within adaptation research, they
polarised into two camps: those exploring how institutional responsiveness can support
adaptive practices; and those that address the inherent adaptability of the institutional
response itself. Arguments for the former stress the need for rigidity within the institutional
structures that act as a fulcrum for the levers of economic resources, technology, information
and skills, and infrastructure all of which can be put to the task of raising adaptive capacity
(Agrawal and Perrin, 2009; Moser, 2009). Arguments for the latter emphasise the flexibility
and diversity of governance systems that are necessary to match the complexity of the
external world (Duit et al., 2010; Pahl-Wostl, 2009). These approaches seek to improve our
understanding of how complex and decentralised systems can given certain conditions

respond flexibly and effectively to abrupt as well as incremental change (Underdal, 2010, p.
390). For Ostrom (2010a, b) addressing such complexity points to a need for polycentric
governance systems, which are characterised by multiple governing authorities that link
together dynamic collective action through diverse information networks. This approach
positions decision-making within a dialectical tension between the institutional structures and
the agency decision-makers that are embedded in particular institutional, normative, and
political contexts at the centre of governance (Moser, 2009, p. 315). The responsiveness of
governance institutions, in this context, is underpinned by the ways in which knowledge and
information flows through networks of affiliation to determine the representativeness of
decision-making mechanisms.
Normative governance frameworks often presume a linear causal link between
knowledge availability and the degree of adaptive capacity, and as such address the barriers to
acquiring, processing, utilising, and disseminating knowledge (Inderberg and Eikeland,
2009). Anderson (Forthcoming), however, has drawn attention to the complex ways in which
institutional styles produce forms of knowledge that support the adaptation logics of
precaution, pre-emption, and preparedness. In this context, attention has turned to strategies
that build on local and traditional sources of knowledge in order to anticipate, plan, and
strengthen capacity in order to build more accountable communities of practice in adaptation
(Valdivia et al., 2010). As a result, there have been related calls for the decentralisation of
governance and increased attention to the emergence of new institutions at a variety of scales
(Brockhaus and Kambir, 2009; Hulme, 2010). Questions of how knowledge is used in
decision-making arenas are therefore essential (Moser, 2009), as useful knowledge comes
into being through particular social and political orderings and under particular institutional
arrangements (Hulme, 2010).

This focus on how knowledge is used conceives adaptation as a dynamic process
determined by the nature of individual and collective social capital, or affiliation, within
social networks (Adger, 2003; Pelling et al., 2008). Adaptation depends on a particular web
of relationships that determine power, resource, and information distribution in any situation
involving multiple stakeholders (Ensor and Berger, 2009, p. 21). Affiliation, then, is about
the extent, strength, and position of various individual and collective stakeholders within
socio-political networks that are built on trust and reciprocity. In this context, focus has
turned to the importance of networked key players in stimulating positive adaptation
decisions (Moser, 2009; Pralle, 2006). However, dominant political players and institutions
can also reinforce existing power relations. Manuel-Navarrete et al. (Forthcoming), for
example, have shown how hegemonic development visions in Mexico have reinforced the
status quo to the detriment of long-term adaptive capacity. The supposedly impartial work of
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is also implicated: NGO interventions are placed-
based and contextualised, while simultaneously connected to broader flows of knowledge,
resources, ideas, values, and power. While NGO interventions instil new forms of
connectivity that can help overcome geographies of poverty, they also rework places and
livelihoods by imposing external notions of viability (Bebbington, 2004). Thus, adaptation is
not something that can be done to a community, but relies upon the ways in which local
networks internalise external influences and rules (Ostrom, 2010a). In this context, there is
a danger that the very possibility of adaptation can be used by powerful actors to achieve
other political or economic gains (Adger and Barnett, 2009).
The ways in which knowledge flows through networks of affiliation raises questions
of representation in adaptation decisions. In the best case, according to Ensor and Berger
(2009, pp. 21-22), a communitys network will yield a productive, open, and democratic
relationship promoting both policy and social learningand the flow of non-material

resources along network linkages. However, this relationship is one that may be constructed
to discipline adaptation through a form of environmentality, often enacted by the state
(Dowling, 2010). Nonetheless, a trade-off between high levels of representation and the
effectiveness of decision-making has led some to conclude that powerful institutions such as
the state should have control over adaptation decision-making (Engle and Lemos, 2010).
Others, however, have focussed on the detriments of an invisibility of local knowledge in
decision-making (Jennings, 2009). Drawing on a case of adaptation to flood risk in Mexico,
Eakin et al. (2010) illustrate how unequal power and inadequate representation in decision-
making produces inaction, institutional paralysis, and clientelism. Such unequal
representation is exacerbated by the assumption that economic growth leads to greater
adaptive capacity, as capitalisms tendency to deepen inequalities of wealth and power makes
it difficult to build coalitions around which adaptive capacity can emerge (Adger and
Vincent, 2005; Wainwright, 2010).
3.2 Introducing a scalar politics
Institutional approaches to adaptation often seem incapable of moving beyond the
fetishisation of scale, as the ways in which knowledge, affiliation, and representation
underpin institutional responsiveness is assumed to occur at a particular scale frame. Sikor et
al.s (2010) call for attention to nested scales, for example, assumes scales to be distinct
entities that can be conveniently packaged within each other. In Osbahr et al.s (2008)
analysis of cross-scale adaptation at the local scale, the term cross-scale is often used as a
euphemism for horizontal social networks within the spatial ordering frame of the local.
Similarly, in Adger et al.s (2005) account of adaptation across scales, a rigorous scalar
analysis is forsaken in favour of a discussion of the efficiency of institutions at particular
scales. This followed Adgers (2001) earlier argument that adaptation is inherently local and
not global. Thus, adaptation research has been either unable to avoid the sin of

particularism, which prioritises the role of the individual vis--vis broader society (Head,
2010), or has succumbed a globalising instinct that conceives adaptation as a universal
phenomenon capable of being reproduced at the global, national, and local scales (Hulme,
2010).
There is a need for a more effective cross-scalar approach that takes account of the
political production of scale (Adger et al., 2005). In this context, Lesley Head proposes a
more dynamic and relational approach, and she makes passing reference to the processes of
scale-crossing and scale-jumping. Scale jumping refers to the ability of certain social groups
and organisations to shift between levels of activity in pursuit of their interests (MacKinnon,
2010), and as such relates to the similar notion of venue shopping (Pralle, 2006). Heads
call for greater attention to such practices is supported by Benson (2010), who argues that
scale fixity should be brought back into the debate, and that scale jumping is a useful way of
viewing the practices of actors seeking to influence practical outcomes in environmental
policy. For OBrien (Forthcoming, p. 4), the solution is a new science of global change that
questions the existing spatial biases that pay significant attention to levels of analysis, yet
little to the spatial disjunction between the causes and consequences of environmental change
and the implications for equity and justice.
There remains, therefore, an apparent inability to effectively theorise out (rather
than aggregate) from local complexity; as Head (2010, p. 239) has put it, there remains
insufficient attention given to questions of power and scaling up. In general agreement with
MacKinnon (2010), I argue that by paying attention to scalar politics we can begin to unravel
the strategic deployment of scale by actors, organisations, and movements seeking to
implement adaptive action. A scalar politics involves both scale jumping and scale bending
a related practice whereby social groups and individuals challenge and undermine the
existing arrangements that tie particular social activities to certain scales (MacKinnon, 2010).

Importantly, therefore, research into a scalar politics must address processes both within and
across scales, while seeking not to arbitrarily combine hierarchical and horizontal
perspectives (Reed and Bruyneel, 2010). In this way, a scalar politics may help reveal the
ways in which individuals and institutions can affect decision-making at multiple scales at
once. There is also a need, however, to account for the emergence of new institutions and
decision-making realms in order to trace new scalar arrangements that facilitate participation
in multiple scales. Thus, there are four components to a scalar politics: scale is a dimension of
political activity rather than the prime focus of analysis (scale emerges as a dimension of
contentious politics according to empirical significance); scale is strategically deployed by
actors; pre-existing scalar structures have an influence and effect on current and future scalar
politics; and, new scalar arrangements and configurations are created as a result (MacKinnon,
2010).
4 Institutions and the scalar politics of adaptation in Chitwan and Nawalparasi
4.1 Institutional differentiation
Administratively, Nepal is divided into development regions and administrative zones, within
which activities are co-ordinated by District Development Committees (DDCs) and carried
out by Village Development Committee (VDCs). Since the promulgation of the Local Self-
Governance Act (LSGA) in 1999, which provides the framework for decentralised
governance in Nepal, local levels of government have become increasingly autonomous
(Bhattacharya and Basnyat, 2005). However, the formal political structure remains founded
upon a feudal panchayat system, and questions of land reform, democracy, federalism, and
political-economic ideology remain to be fully resolved (Amin, 2009). In Chitwan, for
example, the de facto land system whereby temporary land-use rights are granted to
villages to make use of neglected public land remains a constraint upon agricultural
adaptability, as the poorest farmers lack security of tenure or access to productive agricultural

land. Village development committees, therefore, have been perceived as largely ineffective,
bureaucratic, cumbersome, and slow to respond. Although many VDC projects are linked to
other scales of government through funding (federal funding is distributed by DDCs to
VDCs), there is a lack of co-ordination between VDC and DDC activities. In all research
locations, there was consensus that the DDC appeared to have no bearing over local
development initiatives, and that any DDC activity was channelled through the district
agriculture office, which is itself too distant to be effective.
As a result, support for rural livelihoods has emerged through a network of non-
government institutions that are more responsive to adaptation needs. The institutions
identified by the research communities as most prevalent in supporting adaptation are
presented in table 1. Differentiation among these institutions has emerged according to
different types of property rights (clear/diffuse) and different productive processes
(extraction/cultivation). The community forestry programme (CFP), for example, emerged in
the mid-1970s as an innovative move in the participatory governance of extracted forest
resources (Ojha et al., 2009). The central mechanism of the CFP is the locally elected
community forest user group (CFUG), which makes democratic decisions on forest
management (Acharya and Gentle, 2006). Members of the CFUG elect an executive
committee to voice the groups interests and participate in decision-making forums with
government. Within this decision-making structure, interest-based sub-groups (e.g. fuelwood
sellers), tole (hamlet-based) decision-making structures, and women-specific groups have
emerged to articulate different interests (Ojha et al., 2009). Thus, a strong people-centred
politics has supposedly emerged, and the programme has been described as a platform for
democratic exercise at [the] local level (Paudel and Ojha, 2007, p. 41).


Table 1 Differentiation within the local institutional context of livelihood adaptation

Clear property rights Diffuse property rights
Extractive
resources
Co-management institutions
Community forestry programme (CFP):
community-forest user groups (CFUGs);
community-forest management committees.
User committees
Water User and Sanitation Committees (WUSCs)
Water User Associations (WUAs)
Disaster Management Committees (DMCs)
Cultivated
resources
Co-operative economic institutions
Agricultural and dairy co-operatives and
associations
Collective management
Community seed-saving initiatives, supported by
agrivets (agricultural and veterinary services)
(Adjusted from: Bakker, Forthcoming, p. 11.)
Meanwhile, a web of local agriculture and dairy co-operatives has developed in a
bottom-up process of building capacity for adaptation around cultivated resources. The co-
operatives are locally formed and locally run, meaning that the community members retain
ownership over management and activities. The co-operatives improve links to markets, and
also offer small-scale loans and savings schemes in order to build community capital
reserves. The co-operatives are helping to overcome the low levels of commercialisation that
result from insufficient land holdings and semi-feudal ground rent, which reduce farmers
income and their capacity to reinvest in improved inputs (Sugden, 2009).
Where property rights are diffuse (i.e. less tangible), user committees and collective
management institutions have emerged. The National Water Plan (NWP) of Nepal increased
emphasis on Water User and Sanitation Committees (WUSCs) and Water User Associations
(WUAs). In response, District Irrigation Offices (DOIs) and an Irrigation User Committee
Federation (IUCF) have been established to help support local water and irrigation
committees. Disaster management committees (DMCs), meanwhile, have been established as
a collaborative venture between local and international NGOs, local government, and local
residents, in order to reduce vulnerability to the increasingly erratic flows of the Rapti and
Narayani rivers.
Finally, a network of community seed-saving initiatives has emerged for the self-
management of seed production systems. The seed-saving initiatives have been supported by
agricultural and veterinary services (locally known as agrivets), which improve access to

necessary agricultural inputs and technical support (seeds, fertilisers, antibiotics, etc.).
Agrivets are usually quasi-government institutions linked to the District Agriculture Office or
private sector initiatives of entrepreneurs attempting to establish themselves as market
intermediaries.
4.2 Institutional mechanisms and adaptation
4.2.1 Knowledge
A normative analysis of the above institutions points to their benefits for enhancing access to
and the usability of knowledge for effective adaptation around particular resource needs and
property regimes. The community forestry programme, in particular, was frequently
identified for its active role in raising awareness on issues of forest conservation,
biodiversity, and ecosystem management. It has also proved to be a rich source of technical
knowledge on issues such as alternative fuel technologies (biogas and briquettes), agricultural
diversification (cultivating jatropha), flood management (plantations), and alternative
technology development (recycling cattle manure and urine for the production of natural
fertilisers and pesticides). Similarly, co-operatives are also playing an important role in
expanding knowledge of agricultural alternatives, both in terms of cultivation and financial
insurance mechanisms, which provide the security required for farmers to experiment with
new ideas and practices. Social security has also been provided by the seed saving initiatives
and the added information flows stimulated by agrivets, which has allowed farmers the room
to experiment with alternatives.
The growing network of international and domestic NGOs is also working with local
and district governments and community-based organisations to supplement local knowledge
with technical and scientific expertise. Practical Action, for example, has been the driving
force behind: agricultural diversification (diverse permaculture); technical developments
(irrigation, wildlife protection fences, gravity rope-ways across river valleys, etc.); enhanced

climate knowledge (through the establishment of climate stations); and, disaster risk-
reduction strategies (raising awareness on how to prevent erosion, how to build small dams,
etc.).
However, the role that NGOs play raises the recurring debate alluded to by
Bebbington (2004): that of balancing traditional practices (experimentation) with modern
scientific knowledge (technical support). This debate resurfaced in three particular ways.
First, changes that are based on technical knowledge derived from different contexts may not
always yield positive results. This was illustrated by the failure of a bamboo plantation that
was implemented to supposedly rejuvenate riparian vegetation, thereby reducing flood
frequencies, improving water storage in the soil, and enhancing socio-economic livelihoods
through the sale of non-timber forest products. The death of most of the bamboo plants means
that the initiative has had little effect on watershed dynamics or local livelihoods. Second,
external intervention can have widespread and long-term effects on local norms and
practices, such as the abandonment of traditional seed varieties. This was particularly evident
in Kadampur, where it has lead to the loss of genetic resources, reduced biodiversity (and
therefore ecosystem adaptive capacity), reduced local capacity to develop alternatives, and an
increased reliance on external technical assistance.
Third, in some instances local knowledge has proved more appropriate than the de-
contextualised Western counter-part. This was illustrated by the planting of banana trees as a
flood-response strategy in Swargadwari. Banana trees float and can be felled rapidly to
provide a form of raft, while the fruits provide added livelihood and food-security benefits.
While local residents conceived of this system, Practical Action was busy advocating bee
farming, a practice that has no direct impact on the ability to adapt to extreme events.
Similarly, while farmers in Kadampur are calling for external knowledge to solve their
problem of crop failure in maize, farmers in up-stream Kirtipur are aware that yams provide a

viable alternative in times of water shortage knowledge that was passed down from
previous generations. The point here is not that internal or external knowledge is
somehow true, or even that a binary opposition exists between the two. Rather, knowledge
is contextual and continuously re-shaped by a politics of technical expertise. It must,
therefore, be applied in its hybrid form to develop a nuanced approach for transforming it into
adaptive action.
4.2.2 Affiliation
The contextual nature of knowledge means that networks of affiliation mediate its multiple
flows its distribution, adoption, and implementation. Development assistance flows from a
network of NGOs, government, and community organisations and institutions. Institutions
perceived to be inherently local also rely upon flows of information through multi-scalar
networks. The wealth of knowledge now possessed within the community forestry
programme, for example, has been supported by information flows among user group
networks, which are connected by the Federation of Community Forestry Users Nepal
(FECOFUN). These flows touch-down in particular places to interact with cultural norms
and values in the process of co-constituting an adaptation environment that makes useful
knowledge accessible. Disaster management committees, for example, have emerged from
networked interactions between various scales of government, international and domestic
NGOs, local NGOs and community organisations, and local residents.
The benefits of networks, however, are not always equally derived. Irrigation
facilities, such as shallow tube wells, water reservoirs, and irrigation canals, have been
developed in the research locations to enhance resilience to changing water dynamics.
However, access to these facilities is becoming increasingly determined by private networks:
while lower income, spatially marginalised farmers remain dependant on rain-fed irrigation,
local elites have developed private tubs wells and are experimenting with deep bore wells in

order to cope with decreasing reservoir levels. In Kadampur, having failed to reach water at
80 metres the effectiveness and efficiency of the deep well experiment remain unknown, as
do the conditions of access that will prevail should it be successful.
Moreover, the fact that experimentation is being driven by the previous experience of
a local private enterprise, with which a key local political actor has a vested interest, reflects
Mosers (2009) points that key individuals play an important role in determining the
effectiveness and equality of decision-making frameworks. The bureaucracy involved in
pursuing projects through traditional VDC channels was recognised by the key player in
Kadampur, who has experience within local and district government and the community
forestry programme. This individual was able to use such links to drive forward adaptation
projects through the relatively fast and efficient decision-making processes of the community
forestry programme. However, the relatively vibrant adaptation environment of technical
experimentation has largely been led by an economic enterprise that is simultaneously
engaged in stone mining activities in the bed of the Baulaha River. These activities have
diverted the natural river course and have exposed the river bed to rapid water absorption,
thereby reducing flows of water to the depleting local reservoirs. It was such depletion that
prompted the initial interest in experimenting with deep bore drilling. With a stake in the
enterprise in question, the individual stands to gain from both the mining activities and the
subsequent drilling. Despite these questionable economic interests, the individual has been
able to exert influence in political networks to ensure that local economic interests are
prioritised over watershed management and that the blame for water shortages is placed on
the upstream community despite its limited invasive activities (a small irrigation canal from a
tributary of the Baulaha River). Such complex political-economic performances are often
overlooked in institutional approaches to adaptation.

4.2.3 Representation
Nominally, the institutional context in rural Chitwan and Nawalparasi appears to be directly
representative of local adaptation needs. The community forestry programme is predicated
upon local user groups that actively voice their concerns to an elected committee, which
participates in broader decision-making scenarios with local government. In theory, water
committees act in a similar fashion, though in reality they are currently dormant. Co-
operatives, meanwhile, are founded on the basis of equal stakes, while the rationale of
collective management mechanisms implies a degree of collective decision-making around a
shared resource problem.
As the previous section indicated, however, the ways in which power flows through
networks of affiliation does not always yield equal, fair, or desirable results. To continue with
the example of the Baulaha River, the dispute over watershed dynamics begs the question of
scales of representation. As residents Kirtipur identified, a resource governance mechanism is
required at the watershed level in order to span the particular interests of individuals, private-
sector actors, and communities. The current weak status of WUAs means that they are poorly
equipped to rise to such a challenge, allowing the powerful actor in Kadampur to manipulate
development. At the other end of the Baulaha River conflict, meanwhile, residents in Kirtipur
are struggling to have their voices heard due to a problem of poor and unequal
communication between the VDC and its jurisdictions. Even when participation in decision-
making scenarios is possible, it is restricted to symbolic rather than substantive participation;
participation does not affect the outcome of decisions or the development plans that emerge.
Local farmers, for example, are aware that yam cultivation offers a solution to the decreasing
availability of irrigated farmland, yet they are unable to capitalise on this knowledge as yams
are difficult to transport to the closest markets (over 3 hours away by foot, descending
approximately a kilometre in altitude). Residents have called for improved road

developments, but despite the governments mandate to improve access to rural and
mountainous areas, the route to Kirtipur remains a treacherous path frequented by landslides.
4.2.4 Responsiveness
In the research locations, it was assumed by many residents that the VDC should be the most
responsive formal institution. VDCs have played a role in previous incidences of adaptation,
including the development of flood defences (e.g. small dams), warning systems (viewing
towers), and response plans (evacuation routes; temporary shelters). However, traditional
VDC channels are often ineffective and, in some cases, have been circumnavigated. Thus,
adaptive responses also flow through a network of non-government institutions and
organisations. However, these networks do not necessarily produce equal or fair results,
meaning that the institutional response is not always good, sustainable, or even legal.
In the communities of Chitwan that border the Rapti River, the demand for grasses
(used as animal fodder, insulation, and fuel) has outstripped supply in a community forest
increasingly frequented by rhinos in search of the same grasses. While the rhinos previously
continued through the village to feed elsewhere, they are now blocked by an electric fence
that was erected as part of a multi-stakeholder initiative to prevent wildlife intrusion. With
the rhinos squeezed from both sides, the community forest is struggling to supply for all. In
response, villagers have begun crossing the Rapti River to retrieve grasses from Chitwan
National Park; it is illegal to enter the park without a permit and illegal to forage for plants. It
is also a dangerous practice, since in monsoon the river is prone to violent floods. This case
illustrates two points: 1) adaptation may not conform to broader social rules or even laws; 2)
adaptation may have negative consequences, forcing re-adaptation in this case, the erection
of an electric fence has negatively affected the availability of grasses in the forest, forcing
villagers to adapt by illegally crossing the Rapti River into the national park.

The responsive process of a network of institutions touching down to affect the
adaptation environment also points to questions of sustainability. Practical Action, for
example, has helped build technical and technological capacity, raise awareness of
agricultural alternatives and ecosystem management practices, build organisational capacity,
and provide links to other service providers. Although Practical Action has a long history as
an organisation, the projects are funded on a limited term basis with no guarantee of
longevity. While the community will be left with enhanced capacity in some areas, the
withdrawal of a key organisation due to funding decisions may leave a hole that hampers
future adaptation. This short-termism is exacerbated by the emphasis placed by many
institutional actors (including Practical Action and VDCs) on disaster risk-reduction (DRR)
activities, which prioritise short-term coping strategies rather than long-term transformation
and adaptation. As Manuel-Navarrete et al. (Forthcoming) point out, where DRR perspectives
combine with an emphasis on economic recovery and/or growth, the result can be increased
social inequalities, degraded ecosystems, and amplified overall exposure to extreme events.
The current response environment in Chitwan is characteristic of this problem, as decision-
makers in local government emphasise the provision of temporary shelters and bridges for
evacuation, while calling for improved road surfacing to increase tourism revenues. At the
same time, there is overall neglect of issues such as poor access to water for sanitation or
irrigation, the lack of adequate education facilities, and the insecurity of land tenure that
seriously undermines livelihood security.
4.3 The scalar politics of adaptation
In the above sections, the discussion of a scalar politics has been left largely implicit:
networks of international and domestic NGOs work with multiple scales of government and a
proliferating body of local institutions to govern adaptive decision-making and practices.
Within this context, institutions are inherently multi-scalar the community forestry

programme, for example, is constituted by CFUGs that interact with local and district
government, and form into CFUG networks within FECOFUN. Likewise, Practical Action
embodies a diverse network of relations with local NGOs and community organisations,
which produces a two-way flow of knowledge and information. This discussion, then, is
evocative of previous analyses of the interaction between community associations, NGOs,
and government bodies (Osbahr et al., 2008).
However, of importance here is not only the ways in which NGOs, for example,
touch-down in place to produce material outcomes of multi-scalar networks and flows.
Attention also needs to turn to how decision-making structures are co-determined at multiple
scales by a scalar politics. In this context, key players are able to jump scales to participate in
decision-making scenarios at a variety of scales and reap the benefits locally (as illustrated by
the Kadampur example). However, the power of key players is derived from horizontal
connections between a variety of government and non-government institutions and
organisations. Their powerful position in such networks enables them to pull down
institutional mechanisms: side-stepping traditional VDC channels to draw DDC development
funds and project approval directly to the local level through the community forestry
programme is a good case-in-point. This process simultaneously allows powerful players and
institutions to transgress scales of decision-making and so participate in broader processes of
governing vulnerability and adaptation: their influence is pushed up and pushed out to
multiple scales of decision-making.
Thus, as multiple scales of governance coalesce at the local level, such as in the
assessments of vulnerability to climate change that will inform the drafting of national
adaptation policies (e.g. NAPAs), powerful players and institutions are able to construct the
adaptation needs of communities. Politically connected individuals, therefore, affect
perceptions of local vulnerability and of knowledge and resource needs; a scalar politics

reproduces this perceived vulnerability at multiple scales at once. Vulnerability, in this
context, becomes less about an aggregated score, and more about a scalar politics of affecting
multiple and heterogeneous governance mechanisms. The eventual content of the NAPA, for
example, is likely to be as much a product of scalar politics as it is about material
vulnerabilities. A scalar politics, then, produces a local space of adaptation that represents the
interests of powerful local and translocal actors (NGOs, government structures, etc.), while
simultaneously pushing up selective local adaptation needs to broader scales of governance
(DDC, NGOs, NAPAs).
5 Conclusion
The above analysis indicates that the institutional context, which constitutes the structures of
governance around adaptation in Chitwan and Nawalparasi, is differentiated and complex.
The complex multi-scalar web of institutional mechanisms identified above touches-down in
place, and as such interacts with values and norms to co-constitute the adaptation
environment of knowledge, affiliation, representation, and institutional responsiveness. As a
consequence, the influence of differentiated formal and informal institutions over adaptive
capacity often extends beyond their strict remit or the practices with which they are often
associated.
Reading such a governance context through the lens of normative frameworks would
point to the emergence of a dynamic portfolio of livelihood assets, which can be drawn upon
and enhanced by a facilitative institutional context in order to build adaptive capacity. Yet,
this process remains constrained by barriers such as: legal issues, biophysical limitations,
reliance on (external) technical support and investment, loss of traditional practices,
resources, and lifeways, elite capture, existing social inequalities, and the need to effectively
balance the trade-offs between different and often competing adaptation paths. Moreover, the

mutually constitutive interaction between the institutional context and multiple livelihood
adaptation paths is not uniform. Differentiation among formal institutions emerges according
to property regimes and use-rights (strong or diffuse) and differing productive processes
(extraction and cultivation). Where strong property rights exist, community-based institutions
have proven to be rigid, resilient, and responsive to adaptation needs. Where week property
rights exist, dormant water user associations have been accompanied by diffuse collective
management initiatives, such as ad hoc seed savings programmes. Theorising differentiation
in this way enables us to see patterns of governance and the ways in which a scalar politics
flows between various institutional mechanisms to produce spaces of adaptation.
A critical reading, therefore, explores the ways in which the portfolio of assets is put
to work, paying attention to values and norms, networks of power and affiliation, questions of
representation, and the effectiveness, sustainability, and equality of institutional responses.
Thus, the set of endless possibilities for adaptation, to which Anderson (Forthcoming)
alludes, are not entirely open. Rather, institutional responsiveness is underpinned by
multiple forms of contested knowledge, forms that are produced across time and space and
which flow through multi-scalar networks of affiliation. These networks are often dominated
by politically powerful individuals, who can be champions of local needs and demands at
broader scales. However, they can also colonise scales of governance with the effect of
circumcising representation in decision-making processes, thereby reinforcing unequal power
relations and unequal results. Therefore, the ways in which vulnerability and adaptive
capacity are constructed within institutional contexts is in part determined by a scalar politics
that is implemented by a network of powerful actors, and which can be both enabling and
debilitating.
Finally, the above conclusions and the limits to this research point to potential areas
of future research. First, not addressed here as the political issue of caste, which in Nepal is

extremely important in constructing and perpetuating certain values and norms, and which
can enable but more often constrain (equal and effective) adaptation. Caste is also tied to
gender, as was evident in a correlation between cast and gender representation in focus
groups discussions. These insights point to an area of future research: contextualised norms
of socio-political hierarchy and institutionalised gender relations should not be ignored in
explorations of the limits to adaptation. Second, a full social network (or actor-network)
analysis was not carried out. To follow actors around their networks as they influence
decisions and actions at multiple scales is a complex undertaking that was beyond the scope
of this research project. This limit to the research reflects a broader problem: while in
academia we might be able to carry out such in-depth analyses of adaptation networks, it is
simply not feasible to incorporate the complexities of actor-network theory into temporally
constrained research processes such as participatory vulnerability assessments. As a
consequence, networks of power and decision-making are likely to go undetected in the
drafting of adaptation policy (NAPAs), thereby further opening the door to the scalar politics
of powerful actors capable of politically constructing vulnerability. Critical attention to such
a scalar politics is required if we are to avoid adaptation being colonised as a new realm of
imperial development assistance.


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