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PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA v. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA

G.R. No. 187167, 16 July 2011,

FACTS: R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress in March 2009 to comply with terms of the Uni ted Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984. Such
compliance shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some base points around the Philippine
ar c hi pel ago and cl as si f i ed adj acent t er r i t or i es s uc h as t he Kal ayaan I sl and Ground (KIG) and
the Scarborough Shoal as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. Petitioners,
in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers or legislators assail the constitutionality of R.A. 9522 with one of their
arguments contending that the law unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters, thus
subjecti ng these waters to the right of i nnocent and sea l anes passage under UNCLOS III, i ncl udi ng
over fli ght. Peti tioners have contended that these passage rights will violate the Constitution as it shall
expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard.

ISSUE: WON R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional for converting internal waters into archipelagic waters

HELD: Petition DISMISSED. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional and is consistent with Philippines national
interest. Aside from being a vital step in safeguarding the countrys mariti me zones,
the l aw al so al lows an internationall y-recogni zed deli mi tati on of the breadth of the Phili ppi nes
mariti me zones and conti nental shelf. The Court also finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic
waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has
sovereign power that extends to the wat er s encl osed
by t he ar c hi pel agi c basel i nes , r egar dl es s of t hei r dept h or distance from the coast. It is further
stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the
exercise of soverei gnty over waters and ai r space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein. The conversion
of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines because an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to
the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.

Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
G.R. No. 1833591, October 14, 2008

Facts: Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. The signing was not to materialize specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled
signing, this Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same. MOA-AD was preceded by a long process
of negotiation and concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when GRP-
MILF peace negotiations began. GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of
Hostilities. Next year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent. Province of North Cotabato and
Vice-Gov. Emmanuel Piol filed for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and TRO. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments,
and prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending disclosure of contents of MOA-AD and holding of a public
consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.

Issues: 1. WON the petitions have become moot and academic
2. WON the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
3. WON GRP Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD
4. WON there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution,
Article III, Sec. 7)
5. WON by signing the MOA, the GRP would be BINDING itself
6. WON inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato et al. in/from the areas covered by the projected
Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and
7. WON desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of GRP.

Held: MOA-AD is divided into 4 strands; Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance. The power
of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or resolve
hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. Llimitation of the power of judicial review to actual
cases and controversies defines the role assigned to judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. As the petitions involve
constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, Court grants the
petitioners et al the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance. Contrary to the assertion of respondents
that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present
petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view
of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) exceptional character of the situation and paramount
public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d)
fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of
agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and MILF.
MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions
compared to the original. MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as
mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-
AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,
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capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and
laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated
entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. The Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the
Constitution.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. PRES. AQUINO
G.R. NO. 73748, May 22, 1986

FACTS: President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 on February 25, 1986 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise
of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines." Petitioners alleged
that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE: WON the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people are the judge. The Supreme Court further held that:
1. The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;
2. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 155832

FACTS: PCGG Commissioner Daza gave written authority to two lawyers to sequester any property, documents,
money, and other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda Marcos. A sequestration order was issued against the Olot
Resthouse in Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda Marcos filed a motion to quash claiming that such order was void for failing to
observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of at least 2 PCGG
Commissioners. Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped from questioning the sequestration since by her
acts ( such as seeking permission from the PCGG to repair the rest house and entertain guests), she had conceded to
the validity of the sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda failed to exhaust administrative remedies by
first seeking its lifting as provided in the Rules; that the rule requiring the two signatures did not yet exist when the
Olot Resthouse was sequestered; and that she intended to delay proceedings by filing the motion to quash.
Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the sequestration order was void because it was signed
not by the 2 commissioners but by 2 agents. Hence the certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the sequestration order is valid.

HELD: No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the Constitution, a sequestration order may be issued
upon a showing of a prima facie case that the properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court nullifies an Order, the
court does not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG. PCGG did not make a prior determination of the
existence of the prima facie case. The Republic presented no evidence to the Sandiganbayan. Nor did the Republic
demonstrate that the 2 PCGG representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider
evidence that would warrant a prima facie finding. The Republic's evidence does not show how the Marcoses'
acquired the property, what makes it ill-gotten wealth, and how Ferdinand Marcos intervened in its acquisition.
As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and cannot be validated under the doctine of
estoppel. The Court cannot accept the view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the sequestration
order. Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on sight.
Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed and orders the annotation of lis pendens on the title of the Olot Resthouse with
respect to the claim of the Republic in another civil case.

Tanada vs Angara,
GR NO. 118295, May 2, 1997

Facts : This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement. Petitioners question the
concurrence of respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the agreement.WTO opens access to
foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty
associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the
agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO. Petitioners viewed the WTO
agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the
Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue : WON there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
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cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a
legally binding obligation on the parties. Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be
considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines
joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as
autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a
legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also,
it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for
multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation,
stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make
their free choice. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.


EPG CONSTRUCTION VS VIGILAR
March 16, 2001
FACTS: Petitioners-contractors, under contracts with DPWH, constructed 145 housing units but coverage of
construction and funding under the said contracts was only for 2/3 of each housing unit. Through the verbal request
and assurance of then DPWH Undersecretary Canlas, they undertook additional
constructionsfor the completion of the project, but said additional constructions were not issued payment by DPWH.
With a favorable recommendation from the DPWH Asst. Secretary for Legal Affairs, the petitioners sent a demand
letter to the DPWH Secretary. The DPWH Auditor did not object to the payment subject to whatever action COA may
adopt. Through the request of then DPWH Secretary De Jesus, the DBM released the amount for payment but DPWH
Secretary Vigilar denied the money claims prompting petitioners to file a petition for mandamus before the RTC
which said trial court denied. Among others, respondent-secretary argues that the state may not be sued invoking
the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State also known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty.

ISSUE: WON the Principle of State Immunity is applicable in the case at bar.

HELD: The principle of state immunity finds no application in this case. Under the circumstances, respondent may
not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and hide under the states cloak of invincibility
against suit. Considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. The rule is not absolute for it does not
say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. It is just as important that there be fidelity to legal
norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law is to be maintained. The ends of justice would be subverted if we
were to uphold, in this instance, the states immunity from suit. This court - as the staunch guardian of the citizens
rights and welfare- cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument
of perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the states
cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance and that petitioners-contractors be duly
compensated, on the basis of quantum meruit, for construction done on the public works housing project Petition
GRANTED.

Calub and Valencia vs. CA
G.R. No. 115634, April 27, 2000

Facts: The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles loaded with illegally sourced lumber. The drivers of the vehicles
failed to present proper documents. Thus, the apprehending team impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber.
The impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by the drivers from the custody of DENR. Thereafter, one of the 2
vehicles was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENRO and Phil. Army elements. The vehicle was
again loaded with forest products. Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a
complaint for the recovery of possession of the vehicle with an application for replevin against petitioners DENR and
DENR Officer Calub.

Issue: WON the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a
suit against the State

Held: Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a public
officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable.
However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope
of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for which
the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts
in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Secs. 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code
through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and
did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice or bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the
petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the States consent.

NHA VS HEIRS OF GUIVELONDO
June 19, 2003
FACTS: In a complaint for eminent domain filed by the NHA against the heirs of Guivelondo as owners of lands that
were within an urban center intended by the petitioner for socialized housing project, RTC, in an expropriation
proceeding, fixed the just compensation for the lands. Petitioner assailed the amount of compensation up to the SC
but did not succeed. Later, it filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent domain alleging that the socialized
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housing project was rendered impossible by the unconscionable value of the land sought to be
expropriated. Meanwhile, a notice of garnishment was issued against petitioners Land Bank deposits. Subsequently,
a levy was imposed on the funds and personal properties of NHA.

ISSUE: WON the funds and assets of the petitioner NHA are exempt from levy and garnishment.

HELD: Generally, funds and properties of the government cannot be object of garnishment proceedings even if the
consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. However, if the funds belong to a
public corporation or a government owned or controlled corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own,
separate and distinct from that of the government, then the funds are not exempt from garnishment. This is so
because when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be
treated like any other corporation. Petition for review is DENIED. Prayer for injunctive relief against the levy and
garnishment is DENIED.


CITY OF CALOOCAN v. HON. MAURO T. ALLARDE
G.R. No. 107271; September 10, 2003

FACTS: Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other
positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition. The CFI declared
abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and payment of back-wages and other
emoluments. City Government appealed but was dismissed. City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her
back-wages. The others were paid in full. City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries but the City refused to
release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to back wages.
Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City for P100,000.The amount was
given to Santiago. City Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle; properties of the municipality were
exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public
auction 3 more vehicles. City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the amount of
P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to release the check
but City Treasurer cant do so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to
immediately garnish the funds of the City of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment
was forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and
that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city.

ISSUE: WON the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished to satisfy Santiagos claim.

HELD: Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject his claim
property of defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person or garnishee to defendant.
The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in PNB or any other official depositary of the
Philippines by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government
funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by
law. Eventhough the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when
the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to
determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state.
Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an
implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof.
However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding
appropriation as required by law.
In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. City Council of Caloocan
already approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for
Santiagos back-wages plus interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. The judgment of the trial
court could then be validly enforced against such funds.


Lansang vs. CA
G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000

Facts: General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) and Jose Iglesias were allegedly awarded a verbal contract of
lease in 1970 to occupy a portion of Rizal Park by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), a government
initiated civic body engaged in the development of national parks. Private respondents were allegedly given office
and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. Private respondent GABI was to remit to NPDC 40%
of the profits derived from operating the kiosks. After the EDSA Revolution, petitioner Lansang, the new Chairman of
the NPDC, sought to clean up Rizal Park. Petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and
demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. On the day of the
supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction against petitioner.

Issue: WON the complaint filed against the petitioner is in reality a complaint against the State, which could not
prosper without the States consent

Held: The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the
performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of
the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as
appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where
the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others.
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Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith.
Neither does its apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal
capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. In the case,
the petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. It is also evident the
petitioner is sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park. The Court
found no evidence of such abuse of authority. Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the
subject of lease contract. That private respondents were allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was
only a matter of accommodation by the previous administrator. This being so, petitioner may validly discontinue the
accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary. Private
respondents cannot and do not claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park.

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MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY vs. DUMDUM, JR.
G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010
FACTS: The complaint filed by Lim Chao for collection of money alleged that a contract was entered into by Lim Chao
and the Municipality for the delivery of motor vehicles, which were needed to carry out certain developmental
undertakings in the municipality. Lim Chao then delivered to the Municipality of Hagonoy 21 motor vehicles
amounting to P5,820,000.00. Municipality allegedly did not heed Lim Chaos claim for payment. Thus, she filed a
complaint for full payment of the said amount, with interest and damages and prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against Municipality. Trial court issued the Writ of Preliminary Attachment to attach the
estate, real and personal properties of the Municipality. Municipality filed a MTD on the ground that the claim was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds, that there was no written contract or document that would evince the
agreement they entered into with respondent. It also filed a Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment already issued, invoking immunity of the state from suit. The Municipality argued that as a
municipal corporation, it is immune from suit, and that its properties are by law exempt from execution and
garnishment. Lim Chao counters that Municipalitys claim of immunity from suit is negated by LGC, which vests
municipal corporations with the power to sue and be sued. CA affirmed the trial courts order.

ISSUE: W/N the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the Municipalityof Hagonoy is valid.

HELD: No. The universal rule is that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimants action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage
of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriations
as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects.

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. JAMES VINZON
GR 154705, June 26, 2003

FACTS: Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement
with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The equipment covered by the
Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units and was to take effect in a period of four years. When Indonesian
Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration, he allegedly found respondents work and
services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the
Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter. Respondent filed a complaint claiming that the
termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Petitioners filed a MTD assailing that Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign
sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in sustaining the trial courts decision that petitioners have waived their immunity from suit
by using as its basis the abovementioned provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

RULING: The SC GRANTED the petition. The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign
State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure
gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission
and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the
State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the
embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia
was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or
maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps
of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador.

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ vs. HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO
G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004

FACTS: This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the rising crime
rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property.

ISSUE: WON the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional.
WON the right to carry firearms is a vested property right

HELD: Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision. In evaluating a due process claim,
the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk
of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property
right. A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor
does it create a vested right. In Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of
the Constitution. Xxx In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is
evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of
Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose,
authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence. It is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR
does not constitute a property right protected under our Constitution. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary
licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal
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privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee
takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions
of this license is that it might be revoked by the select men at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a
revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these
words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: The correlative
power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is
always revocable.

Bureau of Fisheries v. COA
G.R. No. 169815 August 13, 2008

FACTS: BFAR Employees Union, Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City issued Resolution No. 01, series of
1999 requesting BFAR Central Office for a Food Basket Allowance. It justified its request on the high cost of living,
i.e., "the increase in prices of petroleum products which catapulted the cost of food commodities, has greatly affected
the economic conditions and living standard of the government employees of BFAR Region VII and could hardly
sustain its need to cope up with the four (4) basic needs, food, shelter, clothing and education. It also relied on
the Employees Suggestions and Incentive Awards System (ESIAS). The ESIAS "includes the granting of incentives
that will help employees overcome present economic difficulties, boost their morale, and further commitment and
dedication to public service. Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO) Cebu City disallowed the grant of Food Basket
Allowance under Notice of Disallowance. BFAR Regional Office No. VII, moved for reconsideration and prayed for the
lifting of the disallowance. It argued that the grant of Food Basket Allowance would enhance the welfare and
productivity of the employees. Further, it contended that the approval by the Honorable Drilon, Undersecretary for
Fisheries and Livestock, of the said benefit was the law itself which vested the specific authority for its release. COA-
LAO Regional Office No.VII, Cebu City denied the motion. BFAR appealed to the COA. Legal and Adjudication Office
(COA-LAO) National, Quezon City. The appeal was denied.

ISSUE: 1. WON disallowance in question is unconstitutional as it contravenes the fundamental principle of the State
enshrined under Sections 9 and 10, Article II of the 1987Constitution, which provide as follows:

SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of
the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full
employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.

SEC. 10.The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

2. WON the Undersecretary for Fisheries and Livestock is an extension of the Secretary of Agriculture who is an alter-
ego of the President. His approval was tantamount to the authority from the Office of the President, as contemplated
in DBM Budget Circular No.16, dated November 28, 1998.3. The grant of the Food Basket Allowance is in conformity
with Sec. 12 of the Salary Standardization Law.

HELD: We deny the petition. First, we rule on the issue of constitutionality. BFAR invokes the provisions of the 1987
Constitution on social justice to warrant the grant of the Food Basket Allowance. Time and again, we have ruled that
the social justice provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the
courts. They are merely statements of principles and policies. To give them effect, legislative enactment is required.
As we held in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and
some sections of Article XII are "not self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of
action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS: Pamatong filed his COC for President. COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates
who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency. Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the SC
claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to equal access to opportunities for public service under Section 26,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying
him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and
legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous
national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has
practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable
right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort. The equal access provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
Declaration of Principles and State Policies. The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the equal access provision. Like
the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision
does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the
State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover,
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the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult
to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-
ended. Words and phrases such as equal access, opportunities, and public service are susceptible to countless
interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on
the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations
specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on
Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the
equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are
meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing
that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.



ASSOC. OF PHIL. COCONUT DESICCATORS VS PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998

FACTS: PCA was created by PD 232 as independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development
and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become
direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law.
PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant operators. PCA issued Board Resolution No.
018-93 which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for
engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations
and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in
congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities. The APCD then filed a
petition for mandamus to compel PCA to revoke BR No. 018-93.

ISSUE: Whether or not PCA ran in conflict against the very nature of its creation.

HELD: Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle.
Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government
the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for
the removal of protective regulations for the benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art 12, Sec 6
and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the
general welfare and when the public interest so requires.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v Duque III
GR 173034 OCTOBER 9, 2007

Facts: Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51
(Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go
beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom
Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to
Art 11 of the Intl Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should
be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.

Issue: WON AO or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health
(DOH) is not constitutional

Held: YES. under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the same way that
conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO
Constitution reads: Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with
respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization for an international rule to be considered as
customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to
comply with such rules. Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic
law either By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation
method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic
law. Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The
provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by
executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.
ARTHUR D. LIM vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002

Facts: Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the
constitutionality of Balikatan-02-1. They were subsequently joined by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA,
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both party-list organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention. Lim and Ersando filed suits in their capacities as
citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO on the other hand, claimed that certain members of their
organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by the operations being
conducted in Mindanao. Petitioners alleged that Balikatan-02-1 is not covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)
between the Philippines and the United States. Petitioners posited that the MDT only provides for mutual military
assistance in case of armed attack by an external aggressor against the Philippines or the US. Petitioners also claim
that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) does not authorize American Soldiers to engage in combat operations in
Philippine Territory.

Issue: WON Balikatan-02-1 inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution?

Ruling: The MDT is the core of the defense relationship between the Philippines and the US and it is the VFA which
gives continued relevance to it. Moreover, it is the VFA that gave legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercise. The
constitution leaves us no doubt that US Forces are prohibited from engaging war on Philippine territory. This
limitation is explicitly provided for in the Terms of Reference of the Balikatan exercise. The issues that were raised by
the petitioners was only based on fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference. Based on the facts obtaining, the
Supreme court find that the holding of Balikatan-02-1 joint military exercise has not intruded into that penumbra of
error that would otherwise call for the correction on its part. The petition and the petition-in-intervention is
DISMISSED.

PT&T vs. NLRC and Grace de Guzman
G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997

FACTS: This is a case for illegal dismissal filed by Grace de Guzman against PT&T. Grace de Guzman is a
probationary employee of PT&T. In her job application, she represented that she was single although she
was married. When management found out, she was made to explain. However, her explanation was found
unsatisfactory so she was subsequently dismissed from work. Grace thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against
PT&T with RAB. According to the Labor Arbiter, Grace, who had already gained the status of regular employee, was
illegally dismissed by PT&T. Moreover, he ruled that Grace was apparently discriminated against on account of her
having contracted marriage in violation of company rules. On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter
was upheld. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise rebuffed, hence, this special civil action. Petitioner argued
that the dismissal was not because Grace was married but because of her concealment of the fact that she
was married. Such concealment amounted to dishonesty, which was why she was dismissed from work.

ISSUES: WON the company policy of not accepting married women for employment was discriminatory
WON Graces act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to loss of confidence

HELD: There was discrimination. Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of
the marriage of a female employee. Petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any
woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all
women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioners assertion that
it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her
ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not
qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly
characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain
a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company
policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just
cause for termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed
by the employee and not on the employers caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for
causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.


Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. de Guzman
[GR 14681, 21 June 2004]

Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They
passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical
licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful
examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-
Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees
scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one
scored 99% in OB-Gyne.
For its part, the NBI found that the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician
Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.

Issue: Was the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 a valid exercise of police power

Ruling: Yes, it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or
course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the
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State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons
who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take
an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers.

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OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
G.R. No. 1010183, July 30, 1993

FACTS: A cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth." The complaint
was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The
minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." Consequently, it
is prayed for that judgment be rendered: 1] Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
2] Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable
of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?

HELD: YES. Petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a
balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said
right implies the judicious management of the countrys forests. This right is also the mandate of the government
through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. GUINGONA
G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998
FACTS: During the first regular session of the 11
TH
Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared the duly elected
President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen.
Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader. Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator
Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for
him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the
senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority had chosen
Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the
debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third
session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue. The following day, Senators Santiago and
Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had
been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to
them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES: Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader

HELD: There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support
from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The Constitution
mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the
members thereof, it however does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute
the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated
candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing
a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in
both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.

Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title
or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or
title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the
solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercise by another. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing
must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a
clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion
has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

Gerochi v. DOE
GR No. 15979617 July 2007

FACTS: RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), which sought to
impose a universal charge on all end-users of electricity for the purpose of funding NAPOCORs projects, was enacted
and took effect in2001.Petitioners contest the constitutionality of the EPIRA, stating that the imposition of the
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universal charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation for
not giving the consumers a chance to be heard and be represented.

ISSUE: W/N the universal charge is a tax.

HELD: NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the States police power.
That publicwelfare is promoted may begleaned from Sec. 2 of theEPIRA, which enumerates the policies of the
State regarding electrification. Moreover, the Special Trust Fund feature of the universal charge reasonably serves
and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the universal charge is imposed (to ensure the
viability of the countrys electric power industry), further boosting the position that the same is an exaction primarily
in pursuit of the States police objectives. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely
incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised
does not make the imposition a tax. The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power. The theory
behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government cannot fulfill its
mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.

BAKADA GURO PARTYLIST VS. PURISIMA
GR 166715 AUGUST 14, 2008

FACTS: Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005 and contend that by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives when they exceed their revenue targets, the law (1) transforms the officials and employees of the BIR
and BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters; (2) violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection as it
limits the scope of the law to the BIR and BOC; (3) unduly delegates to the President the power to fix revenue
targets without sufficient standards; and (4) violates the doctrine of separation of powers by creating a Congressional
Oversight Committee to approve the laws implementing rules.

ISSUE: Is R.A. No. 9335 constitutional?

HELD: YES. R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional, except for Section 12 of the law which creates a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee to review the laws IRR. That RA No. 9335 will turn BIR and BOC employees and officials into
bounty hunters and mercenaries is purely speculative as the law establishes safeguards by imposing liabilities on
officers and employees who are guilty of negligence, abuses, malfeasance, etc. Neither is the equal protection clause
violated since the law recognizes a valid classification as only the BIR and BOC have the common distinct primary
function of revenue generation. There are sufficient policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue
targets as the revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the
BOC. However, the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the purpose of reviewing the IRR
formulated by agencies of the executive branch (DOF, DBM, NEDA, etc.) is unconstitutional since it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers since Congress arrogated judicial power upon itself.