of decisions excepted from the final-judgment rule,” the Supreme Court created thecollateral order doctrine.
Papotto v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Corp.
731 F.3d 265,269-70 district court’s stay-and-abey order, however, does not satisfy the criteria for thecollateral order doctrine, thus it does not fit within the small class of decisions exceptedfrom the final judgment rule. Before the United States Supreme Court decision in
Rhines v. Weber,
544 U.S. 269(2005), this Circuit held that stay-and-abey orders allowing habeas petitioners to exhaustclaims in state court satisfied the collateral order doctrine.
Carmichael v. White,
163 F.3d1044 (8th Cir. 1998). At that time, “[t]he question whether a district court may hold anunexhausted habeas petition in abeyance pending resolution in state court of certainclaims remain[ed] unsettled [and thus] present[ed] an issue that [was] important enoughin a jurisprudential sense to require an immediate interlocutory appeal.”
Christy v. Horn
115 F.3d 201, 205 (citation omitted). This was also an animating principle in
163 F.3d at 1045 (deeming “important” the unresolved question whether a districtcourt could stay habeas proceedings). However, as this Circuit has acknowledged inoverruling
the “rationale for employing the collateral order doctrine [toallow interlocutory review of stay-and-abey orders] is no longer applicable. Rather
544 U.S. 269 (2005)] conclusively decided a reasonable delay for petitioner’s trip to state court and back, to exhaust unexhausted claims, is justified inlimited circumstances.”
Howard v. Norris,
616 F.3d 799, 803 (8
Cir. 2010). A year before the Supreme Court decided
the Third Circuit held that a district court is
Appellate Case: 14-2677 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/16/2014 Entry ID: 4175632