Operation Cast Lead and the Civilian Front: An Interim Assessment INSS Insight

No. 87, January 7, 2009

Elran, Meir

Already by the second week of Operation Cast Lead, a number

of initial insights about Israel's civilian front have emerged. First,
the statistics: In the first six days of the operation, 182
improvised Qassam rockets and 65 standard Grad katyusha
rockets were launched against Israel – an average of 41 rockets
per day (compared with an average of nine rockets per day in all
of 2008). In addition, 277 mortar shells were fired. These
numbers are far fewer than what was expected in Israel before
the operation. They represent about 30 percent of the daily
average of rockets launched by Hizbollah during the Second
Lebanon War. The rockets fired at Ashdod and Beer Sheva
reflect a significant upgrade in Hamas’ range capabilities. This expanded capability
relies on standard katyusha rockets smuggled into the Gaza Strip, some probably during
the recent six-month lull. Thus far, four people in Israel were killed (eight in all of
2008) and a few dozen wounded by Gaza Strip fire.
These figures are important in evaluating the performance of the civilian front
after the first week of warfare. There is no belated Hanukah miracle here. The relatively
low number of launchings and hits is a combined result of the air force’s attacks and the
relatively limited supply of launching equipment possessed by Hamas and the other
organizations in the Gaza Strip. The relatively few losses also result from proper
conduct by the home front in response to the threat, in accordance with the instructions
of the Home Front Command. The conclusion is that the threat to the home front in the
south has so far been limited. While the routines of hundreds of thousands of civilians
under the threat have been disrupted, this does not approach what Hizbollah achieved in
2006 in terms of severity, extent, or results. It is also far from representing the potential
threat to the Israeli home front in the event of a large scale conflict.
It is important to keep the current limited nature of the threat in mind while
drawing initial conclusions about the home front. Utmost caution is required before the
current experience becomes a basis for overall decisions for the future. At the same
time, it is already clear that a number of areas require more updated thinking once the
shooting stops.
The first is the need to reinforce effective tactical defense. Until now, Israel has
devoted most of its efforts and investments to strengthening its attack capabilities
(mostly from the air), and to a lesser degree to strengthening its effective long range
strategic defense, mostly against the Iranian threat. Regarding the tactical counterpart,
the process has been slower and more hesitant. The result is that as of now, and
probably also in the near future – barring a decision to switch from developing an
independent defense system to purchase existing systems on the market – Israel lacks a
defensive military capability that can reduce the number of rockets that reach the home
front. This is not only a question of budget: the source of the hesitation is conceptual
and requires rethinking.
The second concerns passive defense. Not long ago the government decided
after much hesitation and repeated postponements to spend NIS 600 million on
expanding the shelters and fortifications in the Gaza Strip envelope. It is obvious that
this decision had no significant effect on the current conflict, and that its
implementation will take a long time. There have been interesting improvisations
related to temporary shelters at distant sites where protection was clearly lacking, but
not enough has been done in this area. This effort demands extensive investment and is
aimed at strengthening a personal and community sense of security, beyond actual
physical defense.
The third involves the function and responsibility of the Home Front Command.
Overall the Home Front Command is earning justified praise for its deployment and
management in the field, both in terms of the extensive and qualitative instruction to
civilians, and for direct assistance to the local authorities, mostly through the important
innovation of IDF liaison units with local authorities and direct assistance to civilians in
distress. At the same time, until now the challenge to the Home Front Command has
been limited. It is evident that as to advanced preparation, the Home Front Command
naturally spent most of its efforts on the communities located near the Gaza Strip. The
larger and more remote areas such as Beer Sheva and Ashdod reached the current
conflict at a lower level of readiness, despite talk before the outbreak of warfare about
the expanding threat reaching them. Beyond this, however, the main question is to what
degree the Home Front Command should and can be the authorized entity to manage
the emergency routine in Israel (as per the current law, which dates back to 1951). For
example, is it appropriate that IDF officers decide when to close the schools? Clearly
the Home Front Command's expertise must constitute decisive input in the general
considerations, but questions of this sort that have major civil, economic, and social
ramifications should be decided by a civilian authority.
The fourth involves the local authorities. Displaying major improvement over
past performances, the local authorities are more prepared, function more effectively,
and above all, project to civilians an appropriate level of confidence, stability, and
efficiency. This is of decisive importance in an emergency. The way the local
authorities behave as the entity responsible for coordinating all activities among the
many state and volunteer groups operating in the field is the principal key to success or
failure. Local leadership has been particularly prominent over the past week – not only
in providing an appropriate solution for most of the problems facing it, but also in
building and leading the local civilian public’s steadfastness. This is important on the
national level as well and constitutes a vital contribution to national resilience.
The fifth deals with the Israeli media. Even in an era of competitive commercial
media, there is room to demonstrate responsibility and restraint in extreme portrayal of
home front damage. What the media shows has a strong impact on the national mood –
often more so than other factors.
Thus in terms of the limited threat evidenced thus far in Operation Cast Lead, all
elements of the home front functioned reasonably. The important result has been the
maintenance of a high degree of national resilience and public morale in Israel, as
illustrated by the demonstration of broad support for the civilian and military leadership,
with no expression of any desire for a restriction on the government’s freedom of
decision and the IDF’s operational space. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind
that this essential element is potentially very volatile; changes on the battlefield are
liable to have a rapid effect on it.