PELAEZ V.

AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 390 (1965)

FACTS: In 1964, President Marcos issued EOs creating 33 municipalities pursuant to the Sec 68
of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President may by EO define the
boundary, or boundaries of any province, sub-province, municipality, municipal district or
other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein
1. VP Pelaez filed a special civil action to prohibit the Auditor General from disbursing
funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Petitioner alleged that the EOs
were null and void on the ground that Sec 68 has been impliedly repealed by RA
2370 and such constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
2. Sec 3 of RA 2370 provides that barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by act of
Congress. Petitioner argued that if under RA 2370, the president cannot create a
barrio, by analogy he cannot create a municipality since a municipality is composed
of several barrios
3. In its defense, respondent alleged that only barrios are barred from being created by
the president. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be
created without creating new barrios

ISSUE: WON the Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by
virtue of Sec 68 RAC

HELD: No. It is well-settled that the authority to create new municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. Although the Congress may delegate to another branch of
the government the power to fill in the details of the execution, enforcement or
administration of law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers, that said law:
(a) Be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out
or implemented by the delegate; and
(b) Fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinableto
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate
such policy, which is the essence of every law; and without the aforementioned standard,
there could be no means to determine with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has
acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon
himself the power, not only to make the law, but also to unmake it, by adopting
measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus
nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and
consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.


















JIMENEZ V. BAZ, 265 SCRA 182 (1996)
FACTS: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258 by then President Quirino
pursuant to Sec 68 RAC.
1. By virtue of a Municipal Resolution, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o
and Barrios Macabayo, Adrorable, Sinara, Baja and Sinara Alto based on the
technical description EO 258. The claim was filed with the provincial board of Misamis
Occidental against the Municipality of Jimenez
2. While contending that the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, the Municipality of
Jimenez, in its answer, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement
it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement, which was approved by
the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental, fixed the common boundary of
Sinacaban and Jimenez
3. On October 11, 1989, the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of
Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving the agreement between
the parties was void since the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of
Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258, that power being vested in Congress pursuant to the
Constitution and LGC of 1983 (BP 337), Sec 134.
4. On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
in the RTC of Oroquieta City against Sinacaban, Province of Misamis Occidental and
its Provincial Board, COA, DILG, DBM and Executive Secretary
5. The trial court held that Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had completely
organized itself even prior to the Pelaez case and exercised corporate powers for 40
years before its existence was questioned

ISSUE: WON Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim

HELD: No. The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a
municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General that the creation
of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was
without power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. However, where
a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts
are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned.

A municipality has been conferred the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation
where its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.

A quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced
within 5 years from the act complained of was done/committed. Sinacaban has been in
existence for 16 years, yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned.
Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only
because it had laid claim to an area that is apparently desired for its revenue. The State and
even the Municipality of Jimenez itself has recognized Sinacabans corporate existence.
Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of MTCs
in the country. Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an
agreement with it regarding their common boundary.

The Municipality of Sinacaban attained a de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country,
which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Sec.
442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in
the creation of Sinacaban since it states that:

Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective set of municipal officials holding office at
the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be regular municipalities.

ISSUE: WON RA 7160, Sec 442(d) is valid despite not conforming to the constitutional and
statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscite in the creation of new municipalities

HELD: Yes. Sinacaban is not subject to the plebiscite requirement since it attained de
facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. The plebiscite requirement for the
creation of municipalities applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under
the Constitution it cannot be applied to municipalities created before.

ISSUE: WON the boundary provided for in EO 258 or in the Provincial Resolution should be
used as basis for adjudicating Sinacabans territorial claim

HELD: EO 258. E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now
barangays) therein mentioned. What it says is that Sinacaban contains those barrios. The
reason for this is that the technical description, containing the metes and bounds of a
municipalitys territory, is controlling. The trial court correctly ordered a relocation survey as
the only means of determining the boundaries of the municipality & consequently to which
municipality the barangays in question belong.

Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality
is not the carrying into effect of the law but its amendment and a resolution of a provincial
Board declaring certain barrios part of one or another municipality that is contrary to the
technical description of the territory of the municipality is not binding. If Resolution No. 77 of
the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical description of the
territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as basis for opposing Sinacabans
claim.

In case no settlement of boundary disputes is made, the dispute should be elevated to the
RTC of the province (Sec. 79, LGC of 1983). Jimenez properly brought to the RTC for review
the Decision and Resolution of the Provincial Board. This was in accordance with the LGC of
1983, the governing law when the action was brought by Jimenez in 1989. The governing law
now is Secs. 118-119, LGC of 1991 (RA 7160).

Jimenezs contention that the RTC failed to decide the case within 1 year from the start of
the proceedings as required by Sec. 79 of the LGC of 1983 and the 90-day period provided
for in Art VIII, Sec15 of the Constitution does not affect the validity of the decision
rendered. Failure of a court to decide within the period prescribed by law does not divest it
of its jurisdiction to decide the case but only makes the judge thereof liable for possible
administrative sanction.



















SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI V. COMELEC, 334 SCRA 379 (2000)
FACTS: In 1997, a petition for annulment of several precincts and annulment of book of voters
in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, including Padian Torogan, was filed with the COMELEC by
private respondents
1. COMELEC, then, sent telegrams to the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of the
questioned precincts to file their answer to the petition
2. The incumbent of mayor of Madalum, petitioner Usman Sarangani opposed the
petition alleging that the abolition of the questioned precincts were for the purpose
of diminishing the bailiwicks of the incumbent mayor of Madalum.
3. COMELEC conducted an ocular inspection on the alleged ghost precincts and found
that the area had only 2 structures which were obviously uninhabited.
4. As such, COMELEC declared Padian Torogan as ghost precinct and shall be
excluded from the special election to be conducted in Madalum

ISSUE: WON respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Padian-
Torogan as ghost precinct

HELD: No. It is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its
own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more so,
in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same.COMELEC exerted
efforts to investigate the facts and verified that there were no public or private buildings in
the said place, hence its conclusion that there were no inhabitants. If there were no
inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the registered voters may have
left the place. It is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants
considering that people migrate. A barangay may officially exist on record and the fact that
nobody resides in the place does not result in its automatic cessation as a unit of local
government. Under the LGC of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit may be done
by Congress in the case of a province, city or municipality, or any other political subdivision.
In the case of a barangay, except in the Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural
communities, it may be done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang
Panlungsod concerned subject to the mandatory requirement of a plebiscite conducted for
the purpose of political units affected.

























ALVAREZ V. GUINGONA 252 SCRA 695 (1996)
FACTS: In April 1993, HB 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the HOR.
1. In May 1993, a Senate bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817
was introduced in the Senate.
2. In January 1994, the HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the
Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate
Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB
8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA
7720).
3. Now Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that
the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that the Santiago
was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to
be a city. That in the computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97
included the IRA which should not be.

ISSUE: WON RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.

HELD: No. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further, the
Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1
st
, 2
nd
and
3
rd
reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1
st
hearing on the said SB one month
after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well).

ISSUE: WON the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) should be included in the computation of
an LGUs income.

HELD: Yes. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGUs average annual income
as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the
gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and
automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of
the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government can
invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.

To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the
same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its
own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special
funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of funding support from the national
government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.



















LEAGUE OF THE CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COMELEC, 571 SCRA 263 (2008)
FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the
COMELEC and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the
Cityhood laws
1. During the 12
th
Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 which took effect on
June 30, 2001. RA 9009 amended Sec 450 LGC by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality to a city from P20 million to P100 million
to prevent the mad rush of municipalities to convert to cities solely to secure a
larger share in the IRA despite the fact they are incapable of fiscal independence
2. During the 13
th
Congress, 16 municipalities filed individual cityhood bills. The Cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all 16 municipalities from the P100
million requirement in RA 9009
3. The HOR subsequently approved the cityhood bills. The bills lapsed into law in 2007
without the Presidents signature
4. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the
voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their
municipality to a city
5. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Art X, Sec 10 of the Constitution as well as for violation of equal protection
clause. Petitioners also argued that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the IRA because more cities will share
the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec 285 LGC

ISSUE: WON the Cityhood Laws violate Art X, Sec 10 of the Constitution

HELD: Yes.

1. Applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a
prospective application because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the Cityhood bills
became laws more than 5 years later

2. The Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation
of a city in the LGC and not in any other law, including the Cityhood laws The
criteria prescribed in the LGC govern exclusively the creation of a city. The clear
intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units
must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the LGC.

RA 9009 amended Sec 450 LGC to increase the income requirement from P20 million
to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect in June 2001. Hence, from
that moment the LGC required that any municipality desiring to become a city must
satisfy the P100 million income requirement.

3. The Cityhood Laws violate Art X, Sec 6 of the Constitution because they prevent a fair
and just distribution of the national taxes to LGUs

4. The criteria prescribed in Sec 450 LGC as amended by RA 9009 are plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction -- It does not provide
any exemption from the increased income requirement

5. Even if the Cityhood laws were written in Sec 450 LGC, the exemption would be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause





MARIANO JR. V. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 213
FACTS: Two petitions were filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as
unconstitutional.
1. Sec 52 RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of
Makati by special law in violation of Art VI Sec 5(4) requiring the general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following the return of
every census
2. Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord within Art VI
Sec5(3) of the Constitution for as of the 1990, census, the population of Makati stands
at only 450,000

ISSUE: WON the additional of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional

HELD: No. Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such
as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in
enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makatis legislative district. Moreover, to
hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a
review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would
create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be
denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable
situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with Art VI, Sec 5(3) of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census of the population of
Makati stands only at 450,000. Said section provides that a city with a population of at least
250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati
as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has
met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.

























AQUINO III V. COMELEC
FACTS: The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as
unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st)
and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating
a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment.
1. Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President
Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and
apportioned districts shall form additional district where the new first district shall be
composed of 176,383 population count.
2. Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard with a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a
legislative district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
3. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that if population is less than that
provided by the Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-compliance with the
minimum population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.
4. Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical
effects: first, error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus
standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. 9716.
5. Respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue
that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the same
has no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces.
Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a
legislative district in a city

ISSUE: WON a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province


HELD: No. It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction
between a city and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3)
of the Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was
mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must first be
satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to two
additional districts from the present of four.

There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the additional district within a city,
should be applied to the additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative
district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in
order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province,
considering that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and
regardless of its population.

Moreover, Sec 461 LGC provides that the requirement of population is not an indispensable
requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.










CITY OF MANILA V. IAC, 179 SCRA 428 (1989)
FACTS: Vivencio Sto. Domingo was buried on June 6, 1971 in Lot 159 Block 194 of the North
Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to private respondent Sto. Domingo from June 6,
1971 to June 6, 2021
1. Apart from the receipt, no other document was executed to embody such lease
over the burial lot in question.
2. In 1975, the Mayor of Manila prescribed uniform procedure and guidelines in the
processing of documents pertaining to and for the use and disposition of burial lots
and plots within North Cemetery. Based on such, the subject burial lot was leased to
private respondent for 5 years only; subject lot was certified in January 1978 as ready
for exhumation
3. As such, the remains of Vivencio were exhumed and removed from the burial lot and
kept in the depositary of the cemetery.
4. Subsequently, the same lot was rented out to another lessee so that when the private
respondents went to said lot, the resting place of their departed did not bear the
stone marker placed on the tomb
5. As such, Sto. Domingo filed an action for damages against the City of Manila
6. Petitioners alleged that North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use. Since
the city is a political subdivision in the performance of its governmental function, it is
immune from tort liability which may be caused by its public officers or employees
7. On the other hand, private respondents contended that the City of Manila entered
into a contract of lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with
private respondent. As such, the city and its officers can be sued for any violation of
the contract of lease

ISSUE: WON the operations and functions of a public cemetery are governmental or
proprietary

HELD: Proprietary. The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with
the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in
conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. it may sue and be sued, and contract
and be contracted with. Its powers are two fold in character: (1) governmental or political:
and (2) corporate, proprietary and corporate.

Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the State and
promoting public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political.
Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of
the community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In
connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may acquire property in its public
or governmental capacity, and private or proprietary capacity.

It is well-settled that with respect to proprietary functions, the rule is that a municipal
corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu.

CAB: The North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created
by a resolution of the Municipal Board. The administration and government of the cemetery
are under the City Health Officer, the order and police of the cemetery, the opening of the
graves, niches or tombs, the exhuming of human remains are under the charge and
responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. With the acts of dominion, there is no
doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in
its proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was
leased in favor of private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the
force of law between the contracting parties. Therefore, a beach of contractual provision
entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the
contract.


BAYAN V. ERMITA, 488 SCRA 226 (2006)
FACTS: Petitioners assail some provisions of BP 880, as well as the policy of Calibrated
Preemptive Response (CPR). They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no
permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy recently announced
1. In the height of protests and rallies, the Executive Secretary released a statement
instructing the PNP and LGUs to strictly enforce a no permit, no rally policy and
disperse groups that violate this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of
the land and ordinances on proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations
2. Petitioners alleged that BP 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It
also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression
clause
3. Respondent Mayor Lito Atienza contended that the petition should be dismissed on
the ground that RA 7160 gives the mayor power to deny a permit independently of
BP 880, and that his denials were under the clear and present danger rule as there
was a clamor to stop rallies that disrupt the economy and to protect the lives of other
people

ISSUE: WON the mayor may deny the issuance of a permit to conduct a protest or rally

HELD: Yes. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety
and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as
inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order
upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most
familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of
highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all,
it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other
circumstances would be entitled to protection.

As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient
standardthe clear and present danger test stated in Sec 6(a). The reference to imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil in Sec 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is
not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent mayor has the same power
independently under RA 7160 is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was
not pursued by the parties in their arguments.























BINAY V. DOMINGO, 201 SCRA 508 (1991)
FACTS: IN 1988, the Municipality of Makati approved Resolution No. 60 which confirmed the
ongoing burial assistance program by the Office of the Mayor. Qualified beneficiaries, under
the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income
does not exceed P2,000 a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements,
would receive P500 cash relief from the Municipality of Makati
1. Pursuant to the resolution, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement fund of
P400,000 for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program
2. The resolution was then referred to COA for its allowance in audit. However, COA
disapproved the resolution and disallowed in audit the disbursement of the funds for
the implementation thereof


ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power
under the general welfare clause

HELD: Yes. Police power is inherent in the State but not in municipal corporations. Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such
power by the legislature which is the repository of inherent powers of the State. A valid
delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere
fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal
corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation
which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes
conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do
things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people.
Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such measures
of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental functions. The
power is a continuing one, founded on public necessity.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant
thereto they are clothed with authority to enact such ordinances and issue regulations as
may be necessary and proper to provide for health, safety, comfort and convenience,
maintain peace and order, improve public morals etc. Under Sec 7 of BP 337 (Old LGC),
every LGU shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom,
as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and
safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the LGU, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited
number of persons. The drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies
to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as
well as human dignity and respect for human rights.














BALACUIT V. CFI, 163 SCRA 182 (1988)
FACTS: The Municipality of Butuan City passed an ordinance, which penalizes any person/s
who charges full price for a movie ticket for children between ages 7 and 12
1. Petitioners, who are managers of theaters in Butuan City, challenged the
constitutionality of the ordinance
2. Petitioners argued that the ordinance is void for being ultra vires and an invalid
exercise of police power
3. Respondent City of Butuan, on the other hand, argued for its validity on the ground of
the general welfare clause

ISSUE: WON the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power

HELD: No. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such
regulation must come within the bounds of reason, i.e. the regulatory ordinance must be
reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference
with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under
the guise of regulation, be reasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.
A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business
should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property
rights. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own
way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any
person who did not approve should stay away.

The exercise of police power by the LGU is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of
the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a common right.

The ordinance in question clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for
even assuming that the interference is reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it was
fully shown that it was an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and
personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and undue restraint of trade, it cannot,
under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
























ESTATE OF FRANSCISCO V. CA, 199 SCRA 595 (1991)
FACTS: Francisco owned a Quonset building on a lot owned by the Philippine Ports Authority.
In January 1989, the spouse of Francisco was issued by a permit by PPA to occupy the lot
where the building stood for a period of 1 year. Franciscos spouse was using the Quonset as
a storage for copra
1. Subsequently, the respondent mayor notified Tan Gin San (Franciscos spouse) to
remove or relocate the Quonset building as part of the cleanup campaign of the
municipality
2. Since petitioner refused to comply, respondent mayor ordered the demolition of
structure
3. As such, petitioner filed an action for damages against respondent mayor. The trial
court held in favor of the respondent mayor
4. On appeal, CA reversed the same ruling that the Mayor was not vested with power
to order summarily and without any judicial proceeding, the demolition of the
Quonset building which was not a nuisance per se
5. Respondent argued that demolition was in the exercise of police power and for
reasons of health, safety and general welfare

ISSUE: WON respondent Mayor could summarily, without judicial process, order the
demolition of petitioners Quonset building

HELD: No. Respondents cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the
abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to nuisance per se
or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity. The storage of copra in the Quonset is a
legitimate business. By its nature, it cannot be said to injurious to the rights of property, of
health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens, it may be proven so
in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not a nuisance per se warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.

While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance, it cannot
declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The nuisance
can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.























CABRERA V. CA, 195 SCRA 314 (1991)
FACTS: The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted a resolution to close off the old road
leading to the new Capitol Building and to give to the owners of the properties traversed by
the new road equal area
1. Pursuant to said resolution, Deeds of Exchange were executed by the Province of
Catanduanes to private respondents (owners of the properties traversed by the new
road). Portions of the closed road were given in exchange for their own adjacent
properties
2. Petitioner filed a complaint to restore the closed road, alleging that the Deeds of
Exchange were invalid
3. The trial court held in favor of the private respondent holding that the land in question
was not a declared public road but a mere passageway
4. Petitioner insists that Sec 2246 RAC is not applicable because the resolution is not an
order for the closure of the road in question but an authority to exchange it with
private properties. Since the public road was owned by the province in its
governmental capacity, it could not be the subject of a barter

ISSUE: WON the resolution closing the old road is valid

HELD: Yes. The authority of the provincial board to close that road and use or convey it for
other purposes is derived from RA 5185 in relation to Sec 2246 RAC. In the case of Cebu
Oxygen & Acetylene Co v. Bercilles, the Court held that the closure of a city street is within
the powers of the city council. It sustained the subsequent sale of the land as being in
accordance not only with the charter but also with Art 422 NCC which provides that
property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State.

While it is true that the above cases dealt with city councils and not the provincial board,
there is no reason for applying the doctrine announced therein to the provincial board in
connection with the closure of provincial roads. The provincial board has the duty of
maintaining such roads for the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the province.
Moreover, this authority can be inferred from the grant by the national legislature of the
funds to the Province of Catanduanes for the construction of provincial roads.

The general rule is that one whose property does not abut on the closed section of a street
has no right to compensation for the closing or vacation of the street, if he still has
reasonable access to the general system of streets. But to warrant recovery in any such case
the property owner must show that the situation is such that he has sustained special
damages differing in kind, and not merely in degree, from those sustained by the public
generally.

















DACANAY V. ASISTIO, 208 SCRA 404 (1992)
FACTS: An ordinance was enacted by the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) designating
certain city and municipal streets, roads and open sites for flea markets.
1. Pursuant thereto, the Caloocan City Mayor opened up 7 flea markets in that city
2. Subsequently, Marquez as the OIC city Mayor of Caloocan, caused the demolition of
the market stalls in Heroes Del 96, V. Gozon and Gonzales streets.
3. Private respondents who are leasing stalls in the said flea market, filed an action for
prohibition against the City of Caloocan
4. The trial court found that the subject streets are of public dominion, hence outside of
the commerce of man
5. However, the new mayor (Asistio) did not pursue the policy of clearing and cleaning
up the city streets
6. As such, Dacanay, as resident and taxpayer, filed a complaint against Asistio and
Sarne (City Engineer)

ISSUE: May public streets or thoroughfares be leased or licensed to market stallholders by
virtue of a city ordinance or a resolution of the Metro Manila Commission?

HELD: No. There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which private respondents market
stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets. A public street is property for public use
hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside of the commerce of man, it may not be
the subject of a lease or any other contract.

As stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public
street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them.
Such leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to
use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of the few
should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health,
peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal
obligation to protect.


























PLAZA II V. CASSION, 435 SCRA 294 (2004)
FACTS: Before the passing of LGC of 1991, the task of delivering basic social services was
dispensed by the national government through DSWD.
1. Butuan City, through its Sangguniangn Panlungsod passed a resolution providing for
the devolution of the DSWD to the City of BUtuan
2. Pursuant thereto, the city mayor signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with
DSWD for the latters services, personnel, assets and liabilities to be transferred to its
city counterpart
3. By virtue of the same MOA, the city mayor (Plaza), issued an executive order
reconstituting the City Social Services Development Office (CSSDO), devolving or
adding thereto 19 national DSWD employees, and placing Tuazon as head of CSSDO
4. The CSSDO was originally headed by respondent Cassion. Because of such
development, respondents refused to recognizes Tuazon as their new head and
report at the DSWD building
5. Because of respondents refusal to report at the DSWD building, mayor Plaza issued
an order dropping respondents from the rolls
6. Respondents averred that their refusal to report for work is justified because EO is not
valid as it was issued without the prior approval by the Sanggunian in violation of Art
164, Rule XXII IRR of LGC

ISSUE: WON the city mayor may authorize the devolution of the DSWD without prior approval
of the Sanggunian

HELD: Yes. Sec 17 LGC authorizes the devolution of personnel, assets and liabilities, records of
basic services and facilities of a national government agency to LGUs. Under the LGC,
devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority
upon the various LGUs to perform basic functions and responsibilities.

As a consequence of the devolution of national agencies, EO 503 was enacted which
provides that the local chief executive shall be responsible for all devolved functions.

It is thus clear that petitioner Plaza is empowered to issue the EO in order to give effect to the
devolution decreed by the LGC. As the local chief executive of Butuan City, Plaza has the
authority to reappoint devolved personnel and may designate an employee to take charge
of a department until the appointment of a regular head, as was done by the mayor in this
case.




















PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR V. CA, 222 SCRA 173 (1993)
FACTS: In 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur passed a resolution
authorizing the Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial
Capitol site in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural
crops and housing project for provincial government employees
1. Pursuant thereto, the province of Camarines Sur filed 2 separate cases for
expropriation against Ernesto San Joaquin and Efren San Joaquin
2. San Joaquin moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of price
offered for their property. They also questioned the validity of the resolution
3. In their answer, the province of Camarines Sur claimed it has the authority to initiate
the expropriation proceedings under Sec 4 and 7 LGC and that the expropriations
were for a public purpose
4. According to OSG, petitioner must first secure the approval of the DAR of the plan to
expropriate the lands of private respondents for use as a housing project
5. Petitioner maintained that its exercise of power of eminent domain cannot be
restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

ISSUE: WON the expropriation of agricultural lands by LGUs is subject to the prior approval of
the DAR Secretary as the implementor of the agrarian reform

HELD: No. The Court held that the power of expropriation is superior to the power to distribute
lands under the land reform program. The expropriation of the property authorized by the
questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development
center would directly inure to the benefit and advantage of the people of Camarines Sur.

It is true that LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when
expressly authorized by the legislature. It is also true that in delegating the power to
expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the
exercise thereof by the local governments. While such delegated power may be a limited
authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of delegated
power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other
legislations.

Sec 9 BP 337 (Old LGC) does not intimate in the least that LGUs must first secure the approval
of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-
agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise,
there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the
expropriation of agricultural lands by LGUs to the control of DAR.



















CITY OF ILOILO V. LEGASPI, 444 SCRA 269 (2004)
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Iloilo City enacted an ordinance granting the City
Mayor to institute expropriation proceedings on the lot registered in the name of Manuela
Yusay
1. The Mayor wrote the heirs of Yusay making a formal offer to purchase their property
for the purpose of converting the same as an onsite relocation for the poor and
landless residents of the city in line with the citys housing program
2. The expropriation proceedings were subsequently terminated due to the apparent
refusal of private respondents to sell the property
3. The Mayor then filed a complaint for eminent domain against private respondents

ISSUE: WON the petitioners expropriation proceedings can prosper

HELD: Yes. Petitioner has the irrefutable right to exercise its power of eminent domain. It being
a local government unit, the basis for its exercise is granted under Sec 19 RA 7160:

Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or
purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided,
however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted:
Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with
the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally,
That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent
to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on
its current tax declaration.
31
Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of a writ
of possession becomes ministerial.

CAB: Petitioner avers that the Amended Complaint it filed complies with both requisites, thus
entitling it to a writ of possession as a matter of right and the issuance thereof becoming
ministerial on the part of the lower court even without any hearing. On the other hand,
private respondents allege that the Amended Complaint is not sufficient in form and
substance since it failed to allege compliance with the mandatory requirements for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain for purposes of socialized housing.

Sec 1 of Rule 67 ROC reads: Section 1. The complaint. The right of eminent domain shall be
exercised by the filing of a verified complaint which shall state with certainty the right and
purpose of expropriation, describe the real or personal property sought to be expropriated,
and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part hereof
or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of each defendant. If
the title to any property sought to be expropriated appears to be in the Republic of the
Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or
doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real
owners, averment to that effect shall be made in the complaint.

The Court finds the Amended Complaint sufficient in form and substance, and the amount of
P2,809,696.50 deposited with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo is equivalent 15% of the fair
market value of the property sought to be expropriated per current tax declaration.

BASCO V. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991)
FACTS: PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable to Government to regulate and
centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.
1. Petitioners are questioning the validity of PD 1869. In particular, they contend that PD
1869
a. constitutes a waiver of right of the city of Manila to impose taxes and legal
fees;
b. the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of the principle of local
autonomy

ISSUE: WON the City of Manila can impose taxes on PAGCOR

HELD: No.
1. The City of Manila, being a mere municipal corporation, has no inherent right to
impose taxes. The Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power
or the municipality cannot assume it. It follows then that its power to tax must always
yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the State itself
which has the inherent power to tax.
2. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. Congress has the
power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative
powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over LGUs. And if Congress can
grant the City of Manila the power tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even take back the power.
3. The City of Manilas power to impose license fees on gambling has long been
revoked. As early as 1975, the power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the grant
of franchise, licences or permits was withdrawn by PD 771 and was vested exclusively
on the National Government. Therefore, only the National Government has the
power to issue licenses or permits for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the
power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of
licenses or permits is no longer vested in the City of Manila
4. LGUs have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is
a GOCC with an original charter. All of its shares are owned by the National
Government. Moreover, PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate
gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of
an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the
Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise,
its operation might be burdened, impeded or subject to control by a mere LGU.
5. The power of LGUs to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which the
Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an operative law until
amended, repealed or revoked, its exemption clause remains an exception to the
exercise of the power of LGUs to impose taxes and fees. It cannot, therefore, be
violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
6. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the Constitution means
decentralization. It does not make LGUs sovereign within the state or an imperium in
imperio











OLIVAREZ V. MARQUEZ, 438 SCRA 679 (2004)
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC questioning the assessment and levy made
by the Office of the City Treasurer of Paranaque on petitioners properties
1. Petitioners alleged that they received a final notice from the Office of the City
Treasurer on their real estate delinquencies
2. They protested the assessment and sought reinvestigation on the grounds:
a. Some of the taxes being collected have already prescribed and may no
longer be collected as provided under Sec 194 LGC
b. Some properties have been double taxed/assessed
c. Some properties being taxed are no longer existent
d. Some properties are exempt from taxation as they are being used
exclusively for educational purposes
e. Some errors made in the assessment
3. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that RTC had no jurisdiction over
tax assessment matters
4. Petitioners argued that the trial court had jurisdiction since the issue raised pertains to
the authority of respondents to assess and collect real estate taxes

ISSUE: WON the trial court has jurisdiction to try the case involving the authority of the city
treasurer to impose and collect real estate taxes

HELD: No. Under the doctrine of primacy of administrative remedies, an error in the
assessment must be administratively pursued to the exclusion of the ordinary courts whose
decisions would be void for lack of jurisdiction.

The LGC of 1991 sets forth the administrative remedies available to a taxpayer or real
property owner who is not satisfied with the assessment or reasonableness of the real
property tax sought to be collected.

Should the taxpayer/real property owner question the excessiveness or reasonableness of
the assessment, Sec 252 LGC provides that the taxpayer should first pay the tax due before
his protest can be entertained. There shall be annotated on the tax receipts, paid under
protest. It is only after the taxpayer has paid the tax due that he may file a protest in writing
within 30 days from the payment of the tax to the Provincial, City or Municipal Treasurer, who
shall decide the protest within 60 days from receipt. In no case is the local treasurer obliged
to entertain the protest unless the tax due has been paid.

If the local treasurer denies the protest or fails to act on it within the 60-day period, the
taxpayer may then appeal or directly file a verified petition with the LBAA within 60 days from
the denial of the protest or receipt of the notice of assessment.

If the taxpayer is not satisfied with the decision of LBAA, he may elevate the same to the
CBAA. An appeal may be taken to the CBAA by filing a notice of appeal within 30 days from
the receipt thereof. From the CBAA, the dispute may be taken to CA by filing a verified
petition for review under Rule 43 ROC.

CAB: The authority of the assessor is not being questioned. Despite petitioners protestations,
the petitioner filed before the trial court involves the correctness of the assessments, which
are questions of fact that are not allowed in a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus.







BULACAN V. CA, 299 SCRA 442 (1998)
FACTS: In 1998, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bulacan passed a provincial ordinance
which provides an imposition of 10% tax on the fair market value of per cubic meter on
ordinary stones, sand, gravel and other quarry resources extracted from public lands or from
beds of seas, lakes, rivers, streams and other public waters within its territorial jurisdiction
1. Pursuant thereto, the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan assessed private respondent
Republic Cement for extracting limestone, shale and silica from several parcels of
private land in the province
2. Republic Cement contested the assessment on the ground that the Provincial
Treasurer had no authority to impose taxes on quarry resources extracted from
private lands. The Provincial Treasurer denied the same.
3. In the interim, the Province of Bulacan issued a warrant of levy against Republic
Cement allegedly because of its unpaid tax liabilities. Negotiations between
petitioner and Republic Cement resulted in a temporary agreement whereby by
Republic Cement shall pay under protest 50% of the tax assessment

ISSUE: WON the Provincial Government could impose and/or assess taxes on quarry
resources extracted from private lands

HELD: No. A province has no authority to impose excise taxes on quarry resources extracted
since the same are already taxed by the National Government under Sec 151 NIRC. Thus a
province may not ordinary impose taxes on stones, gravel, earth and other quarry resources
when the same are already taxed under the NIRC. However, the province can impose a tax
on stones, gravel, earth and other quarry resources extracted from public land because it is
expressly empowered to do so under LGC.