HUME’S CRITIQUE AGAINST THE “IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNECTION”

Introduction

Some authors would say that the philosophical subjects of metaphysics and epistemology would
have been different from what they are today if there had been no David Hume. They claimed
that Hume challenged traditional philosophical beliefs in ways that shocked the readers of his day
and have demanded the attention of philosophers ever since. 1 There are several philosophical
problems that have been permanently associated with his name: (1) the analysis of causality, (2)
the problem of personal identity, and even (3) the problem of induction. The aspects of Hume's
metaphysical and epistemological theories that we find interesting today were largely the same
issues that captivated Hume's early critics. Among the more prominent works of Hume are the
Treatise of Human Nature published in 1739; An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748); and (3)
the "Dissertation on the Passions" (1757).

Understanding his works, Hume was given several titles. He is named as a sceptic because of his
refusal to speak about the substance. In one of our lectures during the early part of this course,
we were informed that Hume rejected the idea of a “substance” about the existence of which
Locke was somehow even forced to accept. He is also at times named as a “cautious naturalist,”2
or a “sophisticated empiricist.”3

Among the areas whereby Hume had probably shocked his readers is the one of causality. He is in
fact aware of this when after showing his argument about his refutation of the idea of causality,
he said, “But though this be the only reasonable account we can give of necessity, the contrary
notion is so riveted in the mind from the principles above mentioned, that I doubt not but my
sentiments will be treated by many as extravagant and ridiculous. What! the efficacy of causes lie
(sic.) in the determination of the mind!”4 This report then will dedicate itself specifically on Hume’s
criticism of our “vulgar”5 or popular understanding of the concept of causality.

Among the basic epistemological and metaphysical postulations of Hume is the claim that there is
no idea is without impression.6 He says, “ideas always represent their objects or impressions; and
vice versa, there are some objects necessary to give rise to every idea.”7 Hence, his critique to
concepts like causality is initiated by the question: is there any impression that can ultimately
lead to the idea of causality?

Hume believes that our understanding of causality is a consequence of philosophy’s search to

explain the commonly taken for granted idea of necessity, which has been almost presupposed by
the metaphysics of the past. Hume believes that causality is among those ideas whereby we
normally associate the idea of necessity.8 So, Hume turns his eyes to the concept of causality and
would again ask, what impressions would warrant my idea of causality?

Impressions that support the idea of causality

Hume argues that if one would have to look for an impression that would warrant the idea of
causality, one would be confronted by two immediate impressions: (1) The first is the impression
of contiguity, that is, the supposed “cause” and “effect” do not actually display a relationship of
necessity. The cause and the effect are two separate phenomena, and the supposed necessary

1
James Fieser, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2004), accessed on February 26, 2009 from
http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/humeepis.htm.
2
David Pears, Hume’s System, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 64.
3
Ibid., p. 66.
4
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, (New York: Everyman’s Library, 1911), p. 165.
Hereafter, this work will simply be referred to as Treatise.
5
See James Fieser’s article on Hume in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
6
Treatise, p. 14.
7
Treatise, p.154, 156.
8
See, Treatise, p. 154.

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connection between the two is not warranted by the immediate impression from experience.
Secondly, (2) the vulgar experience of causality also provides the impression of “succession” that
is, that the cause always precedes the effect. Hume himself says, “I immediately perceive that
they are contiguous in time and place, and that the object we call cause precedes the other we
call effect.”9 In the earlier part of the Treatise, he even claimed, ““I consider the order of their first
appearance; and find, by constant experience, that the simple impressions always take the
precedence of their correspondent ideas, but never appear in appear in a contrary order.”10
Consequently, Hume says that since no idea is without impression, the instances of causality do
not really guarantee the idea of necessary connection between the cause and the effect. What is
only produced are the impressions of contiguity and succession.

Hume however proceeded to say that if we are to multiply the number of instances of the idea of
cause and effect, there is a third impression that may be found out, and that is, that the mind is
determined by custom to expect the occurrence of the effect after the occurrence of the cause.
Hence he says, “It is this impression, then, or determination, which affords me the idea of
necessity.”11 Hence, even if several sciences already treated the relationship of cause and effect
as something fundamental and evident, Hume still regards such relationship as an important
object for philosophical inquiry. He even claims that he is about to examine “one of the most
sublime questions in philosophy, viz, that concerning the power and efficacy of causes.”12

On the question about the efficacy of causes

Noting that necessary connection is not warranted by impressions, as already shown above, Hume
has then proceeded to the consideration of the question of the efficacy of causes. He attempts to
answer the question: Is there anything in matter, any power in it, that allows a matter to cause, or
to bring into fruition, the effect? Hume observes that “the terms efficacy, agency, power, force,
energy, necessity, connection and productive quality are all nearly synonymous; and therefore it
is an absurdity to employ any of them in defining the rest.”13 Hence, Hume argues, we could not
also use any of these words to explain the idea of the efficacy of causes.

Hume argues that we develop the idea of power and efficacy because we find from experience
that there are several new productions in matter, which led us to the conclusion that “there must
somewhere be a power capable of producing them.”14 But Hume hesitated to accept this as a
philosophical idea. He is inclined to believe that the understanding of power as inherent in matter
is more of a popular idea rather than philosophical. This is simply a customary belief and is not
really warranted by experience.

The need for an impression to warrant the productivity of causes

Hume then argues that there is a need to identify an impression that would warrant the idea of
productivity of causes. Where can we possibly find that power? Hume says, “Our present business
then must be to find some natural production, where the operation and efficacy of a cause can be
clearly conceived and comprehended by the mind, without any danger of mistake or obscurity.” 15
Hume again observed that any claim for the productivity of matter is not really supported by
experience but rather only any of the following a priori assumptions: (1) It is based on the
assumption that a Deity has given any matter a power to produce. Hume says that this is evident
in the philosophy of Descartes. (2) or, that there is an unknown principle in matter which has the
power to produce. Neither of these arguments however is satisfactory. They are both not founded
on impression, and are therefore, simply illusions and even deceptions. He says, “Thus, upon the
whole, we may infer, that when we talk of any being, whether of a superior or inferior nature, as

9
Treatise, p.154.
10
Treatise, p. 14.
11
Treatise, p. 154.
12
Treatise, p.154.
13
Treatise, p. 155.
14
Treatise, p. 155.
15
Treatise, p. 156.

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endowed with power or force, proportioned to any effect; when we speak of a necessary
connection betwixt objects, and suppose that this connection depends upon an efficacy or energy,
with which any of these objects are endowed; in all expressions, so applied, we have really no
distinct meaning, and make use only of common words, without any clean and determinate
ideas.”16

What then is the basis for man’s claim about the productivity (power) of the causes?
If there is no impression upon which we could directly base our idea of the power or productivity
of matter, then what impressions can account for the idea that we have of the productivity of
causes? Hume suggests that such idea is produced by the impressions of conjunction and
repetition. Hume repeats the arguments that he has previously. First, he claims that what our
experience produces is the impression of the contiguity of events or things. But, conjunction does
not grant any assurance of connection between the things or events that are conjoined. No matter
how close these things or events are, they remained to be entirely distinct from one another.
Secondly, Hume argues that our experience produces the impression of repetition. The experience
of the conjunction of things or events is aided by the series of repetitions of these conjunctions so
much so that it creates a “custom” or a “habit” on the part of the perceiver. But Hume added that
despite the repetition, there is no new impression that is produced. Regardless of the number of
occurrences, these conjoined things, oftentimes referred to as cause and effect are not still
proven to be necessarily connected because the repetitions could not still explain or account the
productive capacity or the power of the matter, referred as cause, to produce another matter,
referred as effect. Hume himself says, “the several instances we have of the conjunction of
resembling causes and effects, are in themselves entirely independent... There is nothing new
either discovered or produced in any objects by their constant conjunction, and by the
uninterrupted resemblance of their relations of succession and contiguity.”17

One may then ask, if these impressions do not guarantee the necessary connection of the effect
to the cause or vice versa, then why do we gain the idea of causality with the understanding that
the cause and effect are necessarily connected? Hume here says that the repeated occurrences
produce not a philosophical idea but the popular idea impelled by a great expectation that certain
things would go together.18 This popular expectation constitutes the notion of power and
necessity.

Hume’s Conclusion

Hume then contends that necessity is nothing but an effect of this observation, and is nothing but
an internal impression of the mind, or a determination to carry out thoughts from one object to
another. Causality, which is hinged on the understanding of necessity, is an a priori concept that is
not warranted by experience. It is something that exists in the mind, not in object. 19 Necessity,
then, does not warrant anything. “Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but
that determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects, and from effects to causes,
according to their experienced union.”20

Meanwhile, Hume explains, it is sufficient to observe, that the same propensity is the reason why
we suppose necessity and power to lie in the objects we consider, not in our mind, that considers
them. “It never gives us any insight into the internal structure or operating principle of objects,
but only accustoms the mind to pass from one to another.”21

16
Treatise, p. 160-161.
17
Treatise, p. 162.
18
Cf. Treatise, p. 163.
19
Treatise, p. 163-164.
20
Treatise, p. 164.
21
Treatise, p.167.