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Tax Notes

Tax Notes

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Published by Zoe Galland
Tax Notes
Tax Notes

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Published by: Zoe Galland on Aug 05, 2014
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Mr. Secretary, Take the Tax JuiceOut of Corporate Expatriations
By Stephen E. Shay
A. Introduction
The lack of government response to the currentwave of tax-motivated corporate expatriations isdisheartening.
Senate Finance Committee ChairRon Wyden, D-Ore., Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., andRep. Sander Levin, D-Mich., are to be praised fortheir leadership on this issue; however, in thecurrent political environment there is little reason to believe that a statutory solution will be enacted.One looks in vain at the tax press each day to seewhat action is being taken, not just talked about,and as of this writing, nothing has been done. Thisarticle demonstrates that it is not necessary forTreasury to wait for Congress to act on corporateexpatriations.This article describes the principal tax benefitscompanies seek from expatriating and outlinesregulatory actions that can be taken without legis-lative action to materially reduce the tax incentiveto expatriate. These proposals for regulations aresupported by existing statutory authority. Theywould be good policy and consistent with, or easilyintegrated with, publicly proposed tax reform pro-posals.One of the Treasury secretary’s most importantresponsibilities is the health of the tax system underthe laws adopted by Congress. Congress has givenTreasury broad and in some cases sweeping author-ity to adopt regulations, including specific grants of authority that bear on issues at the heart of corpo-rate inversions. The proposals here are just one setof alternatives available to Treasury that couldpowerfully affect the incentive to expatriate. Othersno doubt have improvements to these or otheralternatives to propose; however, when a materialportion of the U.S. corporate tax base is at risk,doing nothing borders on the irresponsible.
B. Tax Benefits of Corporate Expatriation
Corporate expatriations afford two principal tax benefits. First, the new foreign parent (or one of itsnon-U.S. subsidiaries) can strip the U.S. tax base (forexample,throughdistributionofanotefromtheU.S.group)toachievecashandbooktaxsavings.Second,the untaxed foreign earnings of former U.S. parentcompany’s controlled foreign corporations can beredeployed for use by non-CFC affiliates, includingforgroupdebtreductionandstockbuy-backsbythenew foreign parent, without causing a taxabledeemed repatriation to the former U.S. parent.
President Obama has spoken out against corporate expa-triations. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew has written letters toSenate Finance Committee Chair Ron Wyden, D-Ore., HouseWays and Means Committee Chair Dave Camp, R-Mich., andranking members of the congressional taxwriting committeesurging immediate legislative action to stop corporate expatria-tions and calling for a ‘‘new sense of economic patriotism.’Wyden has also written a
 Wall Street Journal
 op-ed stating thatany legislation will have a May 8, 2014, effective date (‘‘We MustStop Driving Businesses Out of the Country,’’
 The Wall Street Journal
, May 9, 2014). Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., and others haveintroduced legislation that would make expatriations moredifficult to achieve (S. 2360; H.R. 4679). The Obama administra-tion has included a similar proposal in its budget. In a reply toLew, Finance Committee ranking minority member Orrin G.Hatch, R-Utah, has indicated his willingness to work on ashort-term response short of tax reform, while objecting to whathe believes are the political overtones of Lew’s call for economicpatriotism.
In some situations, it may be possible to deny tax benefitsfrom these strategies under existing tax doctrines. I do not
Stephen E. Shay
Stephen E. Shay is aprofessor of practice at Har-vard Law School. Shaythanks Nell Geiser andMolly Thomas-Jensen fromChange to Win for drawinghis attention to the Wal-greens transaction and Cliff Fleming, Nell Geiser, StevenRosenthal, Molly Thomas- Jensen, and others who pre-fer not to be identified for discussions aboutmarket activity and helpful comments on earlierdrafts.In this article, Shay describes the principal tax benefits companies seek from expatriating, and heoutlines regulatory actions that can be taken with-out legislative action to materially reduce the taxincentive to expatriate.Copyright 2014 Stephen E. Shay.All rights reserved.
(Footnote continued on next page.)
TAX NOTES, July 28, 2014 473
 (   C  )   an al   y  s  t   s  0 .l  l  i   g t   s  e s  e e d . an al   y  s  t   s  d  o e s n o t   c l   ai  m  c  o p y i   g t  i  n an y  p u b l  i   c  d  om ai  n o t  i   d  p a t   y  c  on t   en t  .
The financial statement and cash tax savings thatderive from introducing substantial intercompanydebt into the U.S. group to strip the U.S. tax baseinto a jurisdiction where the interest income will besubject to much lower rates of tax are a major driverof corporate expatriations. In their report on therumored Walgreens inversion, Barclays Bank PLCresearch analysts estimated that Walgreens couldoffset just under half of its earnings before interest,taxes, depreciation, and amortization with inter-company interest and not run afoul of the interestdeduction limitation rules of section 163(j).
Theyestimated that the tax savings (for one year) would be $783 million. It is not surprising that Wall Streetinvestment bankers are pushing these deals andthat deal activity is reaching a frenzied level.Companies involved in expatriations from theearly 2000s have filed tax court petitions to protectthe fruits of their huge leveraging of U.S. opera-tions.
There is reason to suspect that the IRS willhave mixed success combating this stripping of theU.S.taxbase.In2012theIRSlostitsdebt-equitycaseagainst ScottishPower Ltd.’s hybrid instrument.
Ina 2009 Tax Court case, the IRS conceded 100 percentof a huge GlaxoSmithKline PLC deficiency relatingto a $13.5 billion intercompany obligation to Glaxo-SmithKline Investments (Switzerland) GmbH.
A second major incentive to invert is to lenduntaxed offshore controlled foreign subsidiary(CFC) earnings to non-U.S. affiliates (that are notdirect or indirect subsidiaries of the former U.S.parent), to repay debt (including debt incurred tomake the acquisition), to fund distributions in re-spect of stock and, indirectly, to make up forfunding of the U.S. group.
To achieve these taxsavings, it is necessary to avoid constructive divi-dend foot faults,
 but the case law is quite favorablefor taxpayers. With diligence and planning, the taxrisks are manageable. The pressure to be able to useuntaxed foreign subsidiary earnings held in cashoffshore is evidenced by the lengths that Hewlett-Packard Co. went to in trying to circumvent theinvestment in U.S. property rules of section 956.
Cross-border, related-party debt equity issuesneed to be addressed in tax reform and, indeed,have been targeted by Camp’s tax reform plan andan administration budget proposal. There is clearregulatory authority, however, to address excessiverelated-party debt under current law. A secondmajor object of a corporate expatriation is to obtainaccess to offshore cash, earned while the foreignsubsidiary was subject to U.S. taxing jurisdiction,without U.S. taxation of the earnings that gave riseto the cash. Clever tax planners use corporateexpatriations to insert a foreign parent and useloans to try to hopscotch over or out of the U.S. tax base.
Treasury has both conventional regulatoryauthority and extraordinary multiparty financialregulatory authority to protect against this latestform of avoidance of these rules.
C. Reduce Expatriation Tax Incentives1. Related-party debt-to-equity limitation.
 The ex-plicit language of section 385 gives the Treasurysecretary direct and powerful regulatory authorityto reclassify debt as equity and thereby transform adeductible interest payment into a nondeductible
discuss this possibility simply because those risks have not beensufficient to deter corporate expatriations.
Meredith Adler and Eric Percher, ‘‘Walgreen Co., Investorsin the Driver’s Seat; Upgrading to Overweight,’’ Barclays Re-search, at 36 (June 18, 2014) (‘‘Put another way, as much as 50percent or more of Walgreen’s annual adjusted taxable income(which would otherwise be paid as a taxable dividend to the[new foreign] parent) may be effectively exempted from U.S.income taxes by recapitalizing Walgreens with intercompanydebt’’).
 See also
 Americans for Tax Fairness and Change to Win,‘‘Offshoring America’s Drugstore, Walgreens May Move ItsCorporate Address to a Tax Haven to Avoid Paying Billions inU.S. Taxes’’ (June 2014),
 available at
All of the former Tyco International Ltd. companies havefiled petitions contesting the disallowance of interest expense onintercompany debt.
 Matthew Madara, ‘‘Tyco Petition Seeksto Avoid Billions in Adjustments,’’
 Tax Notes
, Sept. 2, 2013, p.976.
NA General Partnership v. Commissioner
, T.C. Memo. 2012-172.
GlaxoSmithKline-Kline Holdings (America) Inc. v. Commis-sioner
, Nos. 18940-08, 18941-08 (T.C. Nov. 18, 2009).
 Jasper L.Cummings, Jr., ‘‘Income Stripping by Interest Deductions,’’
, Dec. 2, 2013, p. 971 (‘‘The IRS knows that the debt/equityargument is messy and hard to win against a taxpayer that hastried to plan around it. For example, in 2009 the IRS conceded100 percent of a huge deficiency assessment contested byGlaxoSmithKline Holdings in the Tax Court. The debt and theinterest paid on it to the foreign parent were pretty obviously asort of income stripping, which the IRS effectively blessed’’).
Credit Suisse European Pharma Team, Shire + AbbVie 1(June 24, 2014) (‘‘Reducing the US tax penalty on repatriation of ABBV’s overseas earnings is the key driver of the transaction, inour view’’).
Under the tax law, generally, a corporate action gives rise toa constructive dividend if it confers a specific economic benefiton its shareholder.
 See generally
 Bittker and Eustice,
 FederalIncome Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders
, para. 8.06.
 Senate Homeland Security and Governmental AffairsPermanent Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Off-shore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code, Exhibit 1, ‘‘Memo-randum From Chairman Carl Levin and Senator Tom Coburn toSubcommittee Members, Offshore Profit Shifting and the Inter-nal Revenue Code,’’ 24-27 (Sept. 20, 2012),
 available at
Edward D. Kleinbard, ‘‘Tax Inversions Must Be StoppedNow,’’
 The Wall Street Journal
, July 21, 2014.
 (   C  )   an al   y  s  t   s  0 .l  l  i   g t   s  e s  e e d . an al   y  s  t   s  d  o e s n o t   c l   ai  m  c  o p y i   g t  i  n an y  p u b l  i   c  d  om ai  n o t  i   d  p a t   y  c  on t   en t  .
Under section 385, it is possible andappropriate to identify cases in which the use of related-party debt exceeds thresholds that should be acceptable in a particular case.A variation of Camp’s proposal to limit excessdomestic indebtedness for U.S. members of aworldwide affiliated group, and the administra-tion’s budget proposal to limit earnings stripping,could be implemented as a regulation under section385. The target is excessive related-party debt. Thisdebt routinely is subordinated to external debt,directly or structurally. Consequently, two or moreof the factors in section 385(b) will be relevant to theanalysis of excess domestic indebtedness.
Oneproposal would be described roughly as follows:AU.S. corporation that is an expatriated entitywould classify as equity any debt issued to aforeign member of the expanded affiliatedgroup that is not a CFC to the extent that, atthe close of the year of issuance, the U.S.corporation otherwise would have excess U.S.indebtedness. Excess U.S. indebtedness would be determined according to the lesser of thefollowing two amounts:
 The amount by which the total indebted-ness of the U.S. members of the expandedaffiliated group exceeds 110 percent of thedebt those members would hold if theiraggregate debt-to-equity ratio were equalto the ratio of debt-to-equity of the expa-triated entity’s affiliated group, averagedfor the three years prior to the expatria-tion date and determined without regardto intragroup debt.
 The amount of U.S. corporation debt withrespect to which net interest expense of the U.S. corporation would exceed 25percent of the U.S. corporation’s averageadjusted taxable income for the threeyears prior to the year of debt issuance.
If this provision were adopted, Barclays’ pro- jected benefit of the Walgreens intercompany debtwould be reduced by hundreds of millions of dollars. That would change the calculus of a deci-sion to expatriate, even if it would not change thedecision in every case.Section 385 is not normally thought of as anantiabuse provision (indeed, it has hardly beenthought of at all since it was amended in 1992) andthis proposal is to apply it to only a subset of relatedparty cases — those involving expatriated entities.The plain language of the statutory provision, how-ever, authorizes its application to a particular fac-tual situation and therefore supports a regulationaddressing expatriated entities, which is compa-rable to a group found by Treasury in 2007 toengage in earnings stripping against which section163(j) was ineffective.
Why limit this proposal to an expatriated entity?Why not apply it to every foreign parent group?Also, why not extend the use of section 385 to pickup base erosion cases in which interest income on
Section 385(a) provides in relevant part:Section 385. Treatment of certain interests in corporationsas stock or indebtedness(a) Authority to prescribe regulations. — The Secretary isauthorized to prescribe such regulations as may be nec-essary or appropriate to determine whether an interest ina corporation is to be treated for purposes of this title asstock or indebtedness (or as in part stock and in partindebtedness).(b) Factors. The regulations prescribed under thissection shall set forth factors which are to be taken intoaccount in determining
 with respect to a particular factualsituation
 whether a debtor-creditor relationship exists or acorporation-shareholder relationship exists. The factorsso set forth in the regulations may include among otherfactors:. . .(2) whether there is subordination to or preference overany indebtedness of the corporation,(3) the ratio of debt to equity of the corporation,. . . , and(5) the relationship between holdings of stock in thecorporation and holdings of the interest in question.[Emphasis added.]
As a matter of textual statutory interpretation, none of thefactors listed in section 385 need to be invoked. The onlyrequirement of the statute is that Treasury set forth factors totake into account a particular factual situation.
Some definitions and rules of application drawn from thevarious proposals flesh out this approach:
 If the U.S. corporation is a member of a group filing aU.S. consolidated return, the rules would treat theconsolidated return participants as a single taxpayer.
 An expanded affiliated group is one or more chains of corporations, connected through stock ownership witha common parent that would qualify as an affiliatedgroup under section 1504, except the ownership thresh-old of section 1504(a)(2) is applied using 50 percentrather than 80 percent and the restriction on inclusionof a foreign corporation under section 1504(b)(3) isdisregarded for purposes of identifying the worldwideaffiliated group. This is the definition in section7874(c)(1).
 Net interest expense is the amount of interest paid oraccrued in the tax year in excess of the amount of interest includable in gross income for the same taxyear, as defined in section 163(j)(6)(B).
 Adjusted taxable income is taxable income increased bydeductible losses, interest, depreciation and amortiza-tion, qualified production expenses, and so on asdefined in section 163(j)(6)(A).The regulations would provide antiavoidance rules and rulesfor the treatment of partnership indebtedness, allocation of partnership debt, interest, or distributive shares.
Treasury, ‘‘Earnings Stripping, Transfer Pricing, and U.S.Income Tax Treaties,’’ at 21-31 (Nov. 2007).
 (   C  )   an al   y  s  t   s  0 .l  l  i   g t   s  e s  e e d . an al   y  s  t   s  d  o e s n o t   c l   ai  m  c  o p y i   g t  i  n an y  p u b l  i   c  d  om ai  n o t  i   d  p a t   y  c  on t   en t  .

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