010 $C/75/2009 SPECIAL IMMIGRATION APPEALS COMMISSION Mohammed Rizwan SHARIF First OPEN Statement on behalf of the Secretary of State and July 2009 Volume 1 of 1THE SPECI GRATI APPEALS COMMISSION Mohammed Rizwan SHARIF Appellant =O. ‘THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT Respondent First Statement on behalf of the Secretary of State ~ Mohammed Rizwan SHARIF 4. This statement sets out the reasons for the recommendation to deport the Appeliant pursuant to 8.3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971 on the grounds that his deportation is deemed to be conducive to the public good, 2. Mohammed Rizwan SHARIF will be referred to as SHARIF throughout this statement. Immigration History 3. Mohammed Rizwan SHARIF is a Pakistani national who was born on nu November 1980 in Pakistan. SHARIF applied for a student visa in August 2007 and it was subsequently issued on 1 July 2008 which was valid until 31 August 2009. SHARIF ‘entered the UK on § July 2008 on this student vise to study at the Liverpool College of Management Sciences. Introduction Operation PATHWAY arrests. 4, On & April 2009, a series of arrests under the Terrorism Act 2006 (TACT) were made following an investigation. in Manchester, police arrested Abid NASEER, Tariq ur REHMAN’, Sultan SHER and Hamzah Khan SHENWARI. 5, In Liverpool, police arrested SHARIF, Mohammed RAMZAN, Abdul WAHAB Khan, Ahmad FARAZ Khan, Mohammed Umar FAROOQ, SHOAIB Khan and Janus KHAN. 6. Prior to the 8 April arrests, the investigation had been codenamed Operation PATHWAY. "Tariq Ur REHMAN voluntarily retumed to Pakistan from the UK on 10 June 20087. The evidence and assessments relied upon by the Security Service in relation to this operational planning are set out comprehensively in the First Statement in the case of Abid NASEER. The contents of that statement are relied upon in these proceedings. 8 The following particular matters are also relied upon. Operational planning and SHARIF's role 9. The Security Service assesses that SHARIF is involved in terrorist activity, most likely attack planning in the UK. The network is essessed to be co-ordinated by Abid NASEER and directed by AQ overseas. ‘The importance of Liverpool in Operation PATHWAY 40. SHARIF was in close contact with his housemates SHOAIB, FAROOQ and JANUS as well as the occupants of 51 Cedar Grove FARAZ, WAHAB and RAMZAN. in his own police interviews SHARIF made little comment to any questions posed to hirn. However, in his police interview SHOAIB confirmed their association and stated that the groups from the two Liverpool addresses (Highgate Street and Cedar Grove) knew one ‘another and would visit each others’ homes.” The Security Service assesses that the two groups were close 11. When asked about their knowledge of and relationship with one another in their police interviews both SHARIF and NASEER provided no comment. Security Service Survelliance coverage indicated that SHARIF met NASEER at least once, in a meeting on 23 March? Attendance on the Wales trip 12. On 27 January 2009, SHARIF was one of the nine Liverpool-based Security Service targets who travelled to Wales. During his custodial interview JANUS stated that during a trip to Wales the nine attendees (SHOAIB, FAROOQ, Abdul Wahab KHAN, Mohammed RAMZAN and Ahmad FARAZ Khan, Dr SHAHID and FAISAL) went ‘running and dancing in the hills. JANUS also used the word ‘commando’ to describe their {activities and entered into @ pose which involved JANUS flexing his upper arm muscies. JANUS went on to state that they were just ‘playing about’ and denied undertaking any form of military style training that day* 23 March meeting with NASEER 143. On 23 March 2009, Abid NASEER visited 51 Cedar Grove, Liverpool the home address of Abdul Wahab KHAN, Ahmed FARAZ Khan and Mohammed RAMZAN.” From surveillance and other methods the Security Service assesses that several ? Document 2 is a Greater Manchester Police document entitied ‘Operation SNOWCAT Interview Summary as of Monday Night 20" Aprit 2008", dated 20 April 2008. ° See paragraph 13. « Document 1 isan nteligence Inerview Log for JANUS KHAN dated 13 Apri|2008 * See paragraph 17 of the First Open Statement in Relation to Abid NASEER dated July 2009 (NASEER 10S),Liverpool-based associates of NASEER attended the address at the same time that evening, including SHARIF, SHOAIB, JANUS, FAROOQ, FARAZ and Faisal HARON’, while NASEER was there. 1 April meeting 14. Intelligence indicates that on 1 April 2009, three Liverpool-based associates, RAMZAN, Abdul Wahab KHAN and Ahmad FARAZ Khan, travelled to Manchester, where they met NASEER and Tariq Ur REHMAN,’ The Security Service assesses that this meeting was to also discuss the operational activity being conducted by Manchester and Liverpool-based targets. In particular it is assessed that NASEER and Wahab KHAN used this meeting to continue the discussions held at the 23 March meeting. 3 April email comespondence 15. _ NASEER sent a coded email to his AQ-linked contact SOHAIB on 3 April 2009. ‘The email referred to the fact that, ‘My mates are fine’ and ‘we both parties have agreed fo conduct the nikah after 15th and before 20th of this month’. The Security Service ‘assesses that this is a reference to a decision that was made at the meetings in Liverpool on 23 March and Manchester on 1 April The Security Service further assesses that these meetings related to NASEER’s operational activity. Assessment of SHARIF 16. The Security Service assesses that Abid NASEER has acted in support of AQ attack planning activities within the UK. The Security Service assesses that the network, co-ordinated by Abid NASEER, is engaged in operational activity with the most likely explanation being that itis attack planning against unspecified UK targets. 17. _ The Security Service assesses thet SHARIF has acted in support of NASEER's terrorism related activites in the UK. SHARIF has been a close contact of members of the PATHWAY network, most notably FAROOQ and SHOAIB. SHARIF is also an ‘associate of NASER. 18. The Security Service assesses that, given the likely attack plans the network are assessed to have been involved in at the time of their arrest, they may seek to re- ‘embark on their planned activity if permitted to remain in the UK. 18. For the above reasons, the Secretary of State considers that SHARIF's presence In the UK is not conducive to the public geod for reasons of national security and he opposes SHARIF's appeal against deportation on national security grounds. © Faigal HAROON left the UK for Pakistan (prior to the arrests on 8 Apri 2008), 7 See paragraph 18 and document 3 of the NASER 10S. * See paragraph 19 of the NASEER 108.IN THE SPECIAL IMMIGRATION SCI75I2009 APPEA\ i MOHAMMED RIZWAN SHARIF THE SEGRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT. Respondent Open Statement of Reasons for Objecting to the Disclosure of Information 1. In connection with the appeal made to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission by Mohammed Rizwan SHARIF ("the appellant’) there is being provided to the Commission a statement (First Closed Statement on behalf of the Secretary of State). The Closed Statement contains information relating to the work of the Security Service and the Secretary of State objects to its provision to the appellant. This statement sets out the reasons for this objection. There is a further statement (First Open Statement on behalf of the Secretary of State) which contains material which can be disclosed to the appellant without damaging the interests of national ‘security and which is accordingly in @ form suitable for being shown to the appellant. Reasons for objection 2. The very nature of the work of the security and inteligence services of the Crown requires secrecy if it is to be effective, and there is an obvious and widely recognised need to preserve that effectiveness. The Security Service has three functions: the protection of national security (including its protection against threats from terrorism and espionage); safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom against threats posed by the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands; and to act in support of the police and other iaw enforcement agencies in the prevention and detection of serious crime. Damage would be done by disclosure of the closed statement in issue in this appeal, in that it would cause real harm to the work of the Security Service. 3. The reason why disclosure would cause such harm is that the material in the closed statement includes information of one or more of the following kinds: f@) information relating to methods, techniques or equipment of the Security Service, disclosure of which would reduce or risk reducing the value of the ‘method, technique or equipment in current or future operations; () information relating to persons providing information or assistance in Confidence to the Security Service, disclosure of which would endanger or risk endangering the persons concerned or other persons or would impair or risk impairing their ability or willingness to continue providing information or assistance, or the ability of the Service to obtain information and assistance from the person concerned or other persons;(c) information relating to operations of the Security Service, disclosure of which would reduce or risk reducing the effectiveness of those operations or of other Operations either current or future; @ information relating to the identity. appearance, deployment or training of current and former members of the Security Service, disclosure of which would endanger or risk endangering them or other individuals or would impair or risk impairing their ability to operate effectively as members of the Service or the ability of the Service to recruit and retain staff in the future; (e) information received in confidence by the Security Service from foreign liaison sources, disclosure of which would jeopardise or risk jeopardising the Provision of such information in the future, © ‘other information likely to be of use to those of interest to the Security Service in pursuit of its functions, inciuding terrorists and other criminals, disclosure of which would impair or risk impairing the Service's performance of its functions; (9) information relating to the operations and activities of other UK intelligence agencies likely to cause damage similar to that described above. 4. The general nature of those concerns needs littie elaboration. They are aimed both at protecting the integrity of security and intelligence operations and at Protecting the safety and usefuiness of those who work for the Security Service or provide information to it. Disclosure of information of the kinds referred to would be likely to assist those whose purpose is to injure the security of the United Kingdom and whose actions in the past have shown that they are wiling to kill innocent Civilians both inside and outside the United Kingdom in pursuance of their aims. Disclosure of such information would also be likely to assist those who engage in Serious criminality, including members of organized criminal networks, As regards the gathering of intelligence information, whether from domestic sources or from foreign liaison sources, it is important to note that those who supply such information do So on the basis that what is imparted is in confidence, and any disclosure in breach of confidentiality creates a serious: risk that such information will be less Teadily forthcoming in the future. In addition, anything that might lead to identfication of the individual source or sources of the information could result in grave danger to the persons concerned 5. __ {tis not possible to be more specific in this statement about the information to whose disclosure objection is made, of the precise harm that its disclosure would cause, since doing so would be liable to cause the very damage that the statement Seeks to avoid, This information is, however, given for the benefit of the Commission in a separate Schedule to this statement. Although this statement is being made available to the appeliant. the Schedule is a highly classified document. which is being provided only to the Commission and, in due course, to the Special Advocate.