Professional Documents
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2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR )
MARRIAGE, INC. )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 13-1225-JCC-IDD
)
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Defendant. )
___________________________________________ )
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAS RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES
Despite losing all the significant issues in this case and settling a damages claim of hundreds
of thousands of dollars for $50,000, the National Organization for Marriage, Inc. (NOM) now
seeks over $691,000 in attorneys fees. The Court should deny NOMs motion in its entirety. The
Court need not delve into NOMs massive bills and complex algorithms to determine a reasonable
attorney fee, because NOM is not the prevailing party either with respect to the amount in
controversy or the most significant issue pled. Regarding the amount in controversy, NOM has
cherry picked the actual damages it was claiming during the course of this suit and, in fact, received
less than half of what it was claiming when all amounts are properly considered. Also, NOMs view
of the most significant issue is belied by the face of its sworn Verified Complaint. Under both
analyses, therefore, NOM is not a prevailing party. The Courts analysis should end there NOM is
not entitled to any attorneys fees.
The United States was also substantially justified in defending this case, which included
debunking claims of governmental conspiracy and gross negligence. NOMs Verified Complaint
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alleged a willful disclosure of its tax return stemming from such a conspiracy or one that resulted
from gross negligence, which, if proven at trial, would have subjected the United States to punitive
damages. As long as NOM pursued those baseless claims, the government, which admitted an
inadvertent disclosure in its Answer, was obligated to zealously represent its client and defend the
suit. Two weeks after the Court dismissed those claims upon the governments summary judgment
motion, the United States settled the remaining actual damages issue an amount that NOM
changed significantly during the course of discovery. These acts are the epitome of a reasonable
defense in the face of an over-pled and unproven complaint.
But even assuming, arguendo, that the Court were to determine that (a) NOM was the
prevailing party, and (b) the United States was not substantially justified in defending this suit,
NOMs fee request is deficient in several respects. First, NOM incorrectly uses the Vienna Metro
Matrix to determine a reasonable hourly fee for its seven timekeepers; federal law provides for a
statutory cap on an attorneys hourly rate in such suits against the government. Second, the very
request for over $691,000 in fees in order to collect a $50,000 settlement is facially unreasonable.
There are also other deficiencies in NOMs request, including the fact that counsel spent over a year
preparing for, researching and drafting its Verified Complaint. Thus, if the Court were to even reach
the issue of whether NOMs fee request is reasonable, which it should not, the Court should
significantly reduce NOMs request and award it minimal fees.
FACTS
Disclosure / Inspection Claims
On October 3, 2013, NOM filed this suit against the United States, seeking damages for the
IRS wrongful inspection and disclosure of NOMs amended 2008 Form 990, Schedule B (2008
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Schedule B) to a third party. [Dkt. 1]. The Schedule B identifies the names, addresses, and
donation amounts of NOMs major donors. While federal law requires the IRS to provide a copy of
a 501(c)(4)s Form 990 to the public upon request, it is also required to redact the names and
addresses of the organizations donors before complying with that request. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.
6104(b). Here, an IRS clerk mistakenly neglected to redact NOMs 2008 Schedule B before the IRS
sent it to a third-party requestor. [Dkt. 79 at 11.]
Accordingly, the government admitted in its Answer that the IRS inadvertently disclosed one
unredacted copy of the 2008 Schedule B to that single third party-requestor, entitling NOM to $1,000
in statutory damages. [Dkt. 33 78, et seq., filed on Dec. 2, 2013.] Two weeks later, on December
17, 2013, the United States, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68, made an offer of judgment to NOM for
$1,000, plus costs of the action to date the statutory damages limit under federal law. See 26
U.S.C. 7431(c). NOM rejected that offer and elected to continue pursuing this case. [Dkt. 91 5.]
NOMs Verified Complaint wrongly alleged, among other things, that: (1) the disclosure of
the 2008 Schedule B was intentional and willful; (2) it was made to NOMs ideological opponent, the
Human Rights Campaign (HRC); and, (3) it was part of some ill-defined conspiracy against NOM.
[Dkt. 1 at 14]; [Dkt. 68-2 at Resps. #1, 6, 7, 9.] Alternatively, NOM alleged that the disclosure was
the result of gross negligence, and that the inspection (i.e. the IRS review) of the tax return was
also unlawful and done willfully or as the result of gross negligence. [Dkt. 68-2 at Resps. #1, 6, 7, 9.]
NOM never sought to amend its Verified Complaint during its suit. The complaint itself contained
two counts: one alleging a willful or grossly negligent unauthorized disclosure, and another alleging
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a willful or grossly negligent unauthorized inspection. [Dkt. 1 at 19-21.]
1
Although the United
States settled the issue of actual damages, NOM prevailed on neither count as pled in its complaint.
Damages Claims
NOMs actual damages claims varied during litigation. Initially, NOMs Verified Complaint
claimed damages for (1) $10,500 in fees and costs incurred as a result of a complaint Fred Karger
filed with the California Fair Political Practices Commission; (2) $50,000 resulting from a lost
donation; (3) statutory damages resulting from an unspecified number of wrongful inspections; and,
(4) punitive damages. [Dkt. 1 124-25]; DEX 1, Pl.s Initial Disclosures. On January 21, 2014,
NOM responded to the governments interrogatories but refused to identify the donor who withdrew
the $50,000 lost donation, even while claiming it as an actual damage. [Dkt. 68-2 at Resps. #2, 3, 5.]
In the same responses, NOM increased its claimed damages from the Karger Complaint to $12,500,
and added for the first time an additional $46,086.37 for legal fees and expenses resulting from
the unauthorized disclosure. [Dkt. 68-2 at Resp. #5.] Thus, as of January 21, 2014, NOMs actual
damages claim totaled $108,586.37.
2
This amount was later increased by the eight other inspections
that NOM alleged occurred after the disclosure became public. [Dkt. 79 at 19.] Throughout the
course of this litigation, then, NOMs claims for damages totaled $117,586.37 in actual and statutory
damages, not including any amount of punitive damages.
As part of its defense, the government requested a full response to Interrogatories 2 and 3,
1
In response to the governments summary judgment motion, NOM added eight new inspection claims, which
allegedly occurred a year after the disclosure. [Dkt. 73 at 17-18.] The Court agreed with the governments position
that there was no evidence that these new inspection claims which were never pled in NOMs complaint or
otherwise identified in response to government interrogatories were unauthorized; the Court thus dismissed
NOMs baseless claims of unauthorized post-disclosure inspections as well. [Dkt. 79 at 18-22.]
2
This did not include any claim for punitive damages or $1,000 statutory damages for the initial inspection claim.
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including information about the would-be donor that NOM was using to claim its damages. DEX 2
(e-mails between counsel) (highlighting added). Asserting a dubious First Amendment privilege,
NOM declined to identify the donor. Several days later, the parties had a meet-and-confer: the
government informed NOM that it would be filing a motion to compel if NOM either did not
respond to the interrogatories or withdraw the lost donation claim. Ultimately, NOM agreed to drop
that claim from its damages calculation and to supplement its response to Interrogatory No. 5 to
reflect the change in its litigating position. [Dkt. 68-3.]
Furthermore, the United States sent NOM written discovery regarding its fundraising
activities as part of the governments mitigation defense. The United States discovery requests
directed NOM to produce documents showing quarterly or monthly contributions by donors to
NOM and documents relating to fundraising expenses in 2012 and August 3, 2013 through
November 3, 2013 (i.e., two months before and one month after NOM filed its Verified Complaint).
See DEX 3, RFP No. 20 at 33. Defendant also sought information relating to contributions that
NOM sought out or received as a result of the disclosure, id., RFP Nos. 23-24 at 34-35, and
documents relating to individuals who donated to NOM who had never donated before the disclosure
or who donated in amounts larger after the disclosure than before. Id., RFP No. 25 at 35. In a
follow-up interrogatory, the United States also asked NOM to identify those donors who had never
donated before the disclosure or who donated in amounts larger after the disclosure than before. Id.,
Interr. No. 15 at 36.
3
3
These discovery requests were conditionally propounded, and depended on NOMs responses to three of the
governments requests for admission. In particular, NOM needed to respond to these requests only if it did not
provide unqualified admissions to requests for admission 3, 6, and 9. These asked NOM to admit that it received
more in donations as a result of the disclosure than it was claiming in actual damages. See DEX 3 at 27, 29-30.
(continued...)
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NOM objected to these discovery requests, asserting a relevance objection and First
Amendment privilege, and refused to provide any information or produce any documents. See DEX
4 (Pl.s Obj.) at 40-41, 44-48; DEX 3 at 33-36. Again, the parties discussed the objections over e-
mail and at the February 5th meet-and-confer. DEX 2. NOM then agreed to provide (a) generic
fundraising correspondence to supporters that mentioned the disclosure or its lawsuit, (b) numerical
responses to the interrogatories (i.e., amounts of donations without donor names), and (c) responses
to related requests for admission concerning increases in donations post-disclosure. The United
States did not file a motion to compel as to other information originally requested.
On March 14, 2014, the United States took the 30(b)(6) deposition of NOM. During that
deposition, NOMs designee and President, Brian Brown, testified that NOM sent its donors and
supporters direct mailings that referenced (to some degree) the disclosure of NOMs amended 2008
Form 990 unredacted Schedule B and/or its lawsuit against the IRS. Mr. Brown also testified that
NOM tracked the donations it received in response to these mailings using specific codes. Finally, he
testified that NOM was still in possession of such documents, going back as far as March 30, 2012
the date NOM learned of the disclosure. On March 18, 2014, the United States sent an e-mail to
NOMs counsel stating that these documents had not been produced to the United States, despite that
they were covered under multiple requests for production of documents and were directly relevant to
the governments defense on the issue of actual damages. DEX 5 (3/18/14 e-mail). Given that
discovery had closed and in an attempt to narrow any dispute, the United States offered to forego
( continued)
Because NOMs response was that it is not within NOMs control to know the motive behind a specific donation,
the format of the discovery requests directed NOM to respond to RFPs 20, 23, 24 & 25 and Interrogatory 15, so that
the United States could conduct its own discovery and defend against NOMs allegations of actual damages.
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NOM producing documents evidencing specific donations if NOM fully responded to Interrogatory
number 19 with information on donations in response to NOMs mailings that referenced the
disclosure or NOMs prospective or actual lawsuit against the IRS. Id. On April 2, 2014, two weeks
after the close of discovery, NOM supplemented its discovery requests to provide information
pertaining to donations it received in response to direct mailers to its supporters in which NOM
mentioned the disclosure or its lawsuit against the IRS. See [Dkt. 68-25.]
Motion for Summary Judgment
After the completion of discovery on March 14, 2014, NOM had failed to present any
evidence: (a) that the disclosure was intentional, willful, and/or the result of any agreement or
conspiracy, (b) that the disclosure was the result of gross negligence, or (c) that there were any
unauthorized inspections of NOMs 2008 Schedule B. The United States moved for summary
judgment as to all issues, including that, as a matter of law, NOM had failed to demonstrate that the
disclosure caused it to incur any actual damages. [Dkt. 68.] After briefing and argument, the Court,
on June 3, 2014, issued a Memorandum Opinion, which granted the United States motion as to
NOMs claims of (1) a willful disclosure stemming from a conspiracy, (2) a disclosure as a result of
gross negligence, and (3) any unlawful inspections of NOMs tax return, either before the disclosure
or after. [Dkt. 79 at 10-22.]
4
The Court denied the governments motion as to its arguments that
NOM could not recover any actual damages because the disclosure did not proximately cause
NOMs injuries and because NOM fully mitigated any claimed damages through fundraising related
4
The Court also agreed with our argument that NOM violated its discovery obligations by failing to supplement its
interrogatory responses pertaining to its theory of gross negligence; the Court thus sanctioned NOM and excluded
that claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c). [Dkt. 79 at 15 n.3.] NOM is thus seeking fees where the Court has
already determined that, to some extent, NOM inappropriately litigated this case.
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to the disclosure, and set those issues over for trial. [Id. at 30-32.]
Settlement Discussions
Given NOMs unfounded allegations that the IRS intentionally and willfully conspired to
violate its rights, the parties were unable to participate in meaningful settlement discussions. During
the parties scheduling conference and the in-person conference with Judge Davis, the parties agreed
that a settlement was unlikely without the benefit of discovery, but that they would revisit the issue
afterwards. Despite this, the United States provided an offer of judgment, believing that NOM was
only entitled to $1,000, plus costs of the action. NOM rejected that offer, made no counteroffer, and
the parties did not revisit the possibility of settlement until after the close of discovery. On April 2,
2014, NOM submitted a settlement offer, totaling $707,597.37, which would have represented a full
concession on all claims of actual damages, over $37,000 of costs incurred, and over $600,000 in
attorneys fees.
5
After the Court issued its June 3, 2014 summary judgment opinion, the parties resumed
settlement negotiations. Because of the enormity of NOMs fees, the parties were not able to resolve
this case globally. The parties agreed to try and settle the damages claim and then litigate the fees
issue before the Court. On June 13, 2014, NOM made a formal offer to settle this case, except for the
issue of attorneys fees which the Court would decide on the parties motions. Three days later, on
June 16, 2014, the United States accepted NOMs settlement offer.
5
On April 2, 2014, NOM represented in a settlement letter that timekeepers had spent 2,200 hours on this case, with
attorney time amounting to over $809,000. NOMs petition here shows that, three months later, the 31 timekeepers
had expended approximately 3,000 hours, totaling $1.15 million in fees. [Dkt. 91-2 3 and page ID 1745.]
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ARGUMENT
1. NOM Is Not the Prevailing Party in this Case
In order to qualify for recovery of attorneys fees, NOM must establish that it substantially
prevailed in this litigation. Under 26 U.S.C. 7431(c)(3), reasonable attorneys fees may be
awarded only if the plaintiff is the prevailing party as determined pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
7430(c)(4). Section 7430(c)(4), defines prevailing party as: any party in any proceeding . . . (i)
which (I) has substantially prevailed with respect to the amount in controversy, or, (II) has
substantially prevailed with respect to the most significant issue or set of issues presented. Because
7430 renders the United States liable for attorneys fees for which it would not otherwise be liable,
[it] amounts to a partial waiver of sovereign immunity [and] must be strictly construed in favor of the
United States. Aredstani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 137 (1991); Goettee v. Commr, 192 Fed. Appx. 212,
222-223 (4th Cir. 2006). NOM has not met its burden to establish that it substantially prevailed with
respect to either the amount in controversy or the most significant issue or set of issues presented.
a. NOM did not substantially prevail with regard to the amount in controversy
The amount in controversy is any amount placed at issue by the pleadings increased by any
amount subsequently placed at issued by any party. Don Johnson Motors, Inc. v. United States,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36594, at *7 (S.D. Tex. 2008), affd, 433 Fed. Appx. 526, 528 (5th Cir. 2011)
(emphasis added and citations omitted). Initially, NOM filed suit seeking $60,500 in actual damages
$10,500 in fees and costs incurred as a result of a complaint Fred Karger filed with the California
Fair Political Practices Commission and $50,000 resulting from a lost donation as well as
statutory damages resulting from an unspecified number of wrongful inspections and punitive
damages. [Dkt. 1]; DEX 1.
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Months after filing its suit, NOM increased its actual damages claims and later identified at
least eight other alleged wrongful inspections in response to the summary judgment motion. In
written discovery responses, in January and February 2014, NOM increased its claim for damages
resulting from the Karger Complaint to $12,500, reiterated its $50,000 claim for a lost donation, and
for the first time identified $46,086.37 in attorneys fees and other costs incurred as a result of the
publication of the 2008 Schedule B.
Although NOM eventually withdrew the lost donation claim
rather than confront a motion to compel, this was after NOM served written discovery responses
identifying these categories of actual damages and after the parties had met-and-conferred on this
topic. [Dkt. 1 33, 34 & 124.] NOM also, in response to the summary judgment motion, identified
eight other inspections that it considered unlawful for a total potential recovery of $9,000 per 26
U.S.C. 7431 (i.e., one pre-disclosure and eight post-disclosure inspections). [Dkt. 79 at 19.] In
total, including all four categories of actual and statutory damages,
6
NOM sought $117,586.37 in
actual and statutory damages.
In addition, this Court should include the value of NOMs punitive damages claim in order to
calculate the amount in controversy. Based upon the inflammatory allegations in NOMs complaint,
this Court should use at least a 2:1 punitive damages multiplier (equaling $235,172.74 in punitive
damages). See Snider v. United States, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17438, at *39-41 (W.D. Mo. 2005),
affd in part, revd in part, 468 F.3d 500, 510 (8th Cir. Mo. 2006) (court awarded punitive damages
that were two times the amount of actual damages resulting from willful and grossly negligent
disclosures); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (Single-digit
6
NOM provides no legal support for the proposition that its lost contribution claim should not be considered in
determining the amount in controversy, especially when narrowly construing the statute in the United States favor.
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multipliers are more likely to comport with due process). Assuming a minimum 2:1 ratio and a
damages claim of $117,586.37, NOMs $50,000 recovery is only around 14 percent of its total
claim. Even assuming a minimal 1:1 ratio,
7
NOM did not substantially prevail when it recovered 22
percent of its damages claim.
As a result, when combining all the damages claimed by NOM and comparing the claims to
the $50,000 recovery including a settlement payment for $6,698.06 in costs this Court should
reject NOMs claim that it substantially prevailed. See, e.g., Ralston Dev. Corp. v. United States, 937
F.2d 510, 515 (10th Cir. 1991) (19% recovery does not constitute substantially prevailing); Don
Johnson Motors, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 36594, at *10 (3% recovery not substantially prevailing, and
stating that a taxpayer who receives only a proportionally small award compared to the amount in
controversy has not demonstrated that it substantially prevailed); Andrews v. Commr, T.C. Memo
1985-559, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1404 (1985) (settlement paying 41% of tax deficiency fails to show that
taxpayer substantially prevailed).
Even if the Court omitted NOMs punitive damages claim, which it should not, NOM only
recovered 43 percent of the $117,586.37 at issue. Thus, NOM failed to substantially prevail, even
under the cases that have considered whether a fifty percent recovery was sufficient. See Estate of
Johnson v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150120, at *3-4 (D. Mass. 2013) (citing Keeter v.
United States, 82 A.F.T.R. 2d 98-5943 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (55% recovery sufficient), Estate of Holmes
7
NOM cites Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008), for the proposition that a 1:1 multiplier would
be used to value its punitive damages claim. But that multiplier is inapplicable because the damages claim is less
than $120,000. By contrast, Exxon stated that a 1:1 multiplier could be appropriate where the compensatory
damages were substantial, as in $507.5 million. See id. (quoting State Farm that When compensatory damages are
substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the
due process guarantee) (internal citation omitted). In light of Exxon, NOMs claim was clearly not substantial.
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v. United States, 1990 WL 10062, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 1990) (54% recovery insufficient)); see also
Cox v. Commr, 1996 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 98, T.C.M. 1996-103, at *4 (T.C. 1996) (50% recovery
makes it questionable whether plaintiff substantially prevailed on amount in controversy), affd,
121 F.3d 390 (8th Cir. 1997). NOMs assertion that a 43 percent recovery would be substantial is
not supported by the cases referenced above, and NOM has not cited any case supporting that a 43
percent recovery (or far less as is the case here) is substantial. [Dkt. 91 at 7-8.]
b. NOM did not substantially prevail as to the most important issues
In determining whether NOM substantially prevailed with regard to the most important
issues, the Court starts with NOMs complaint. See Christian Coalition Intl v. United States, 133 F.
Supp. 2d 437, 439 (E.D. Va. 2001). An issue is the most significant if . . . the issue objectively
represents the most significant issue for the taxpayer or the IRS. Don Johnson Motors, 2008 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 36594, at *13 (emphasis added). In an attempt to justify the thousands of hours its
numerous attorneys spent, NOM self-servingly identifies the primary and most significant issue in
this case as whether the IRS unlawfully disclosed NOMs 2008 IRS Form 990, Schedule B, and
whether that disclosure resulted in actual damages. [Dkt. 91 at 5.]
NOMs attempt to change the crux of its Verified Complaint rings hollow. Those two issues
were not the primary reasons NOM filed suit. NOMs fee petition cites to paragraph 2 of the Verified
Complaint to support its characterization of the ultimate issue. Id. But paragraph 2 alleged that the
IRS disclosure was part of a deliberate attempt to chill the First Amendment activity of NOM, its
donors, and others who associate with NOM. The IRSs actions constitute gross violations of
NOMs statutory and constitutional rights and have caused appreciable harm to NOM for which must
it be compensated which is not what NOM is saying now in an attempt to win fees. See [Dkt 1
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2.] NOM also repeatedly asserted that the IRS disclosed the return intentionally to third parties,
including NOMs ideological opponent, HRC, as part of an ill-defined conspiracy against it. [Dkt. 1
at 14]; [Dkt. 68-2 at Resps. #1, 6, 7, 9]. Alternatively, NOM alleged that the disclosure was the result
of gross negligence, and that the inspection of the return, which preceded the disclosure at issue,
was also willful or the result of gross negligence. Id.
By way of illustration, the Verified Complaint asserted two counts: (1) Count I alleged a
willful or grossly negligent unauthorized disclosure of its tax return; (2) Count II alleged willful
or grossly negligent unauthorized inspection of its return. Both Counts focus on the requirements
for punitive damages, not the requirement for a finding of negligence.
8
Then, in its opposition to the
United States motion, NOM alleged that the IRS unlawfully inspected its return information on at
least eight other occasions.
In granting the United States motion, in part, the Court rejected NOMs arguments. This
Court held that NOM failed to present any evidence that the: (a) disclosure of its 2008 Schedule B
was willful or the result of a conspiracy; (b) disclosure was the result of gross negligence; (c)
disclosure was made to HRC, NOMs ideological opponent; (d) inspection preceding the disclosure
was willful; (e) inspection preceding the disclosure was grossly negligent; and, (f) eight other
inspections NOM identified in response to the motion were unauthorized. Indeed, even assuming
that NOM prevailed in establishing that the IRS negligently disclosed its 2008 Schedule B and that
this resulted in actual damages, NOM only prevailed on two of the eight issues at stake. Under either
8
The fact that this case centered on whether the disclosure of NOMs 2008 Schedule B resulted from an intentional
and willful disclosure distinguishes this case from Huckaby v. United States Dept of Treasury, where the court
found that the plaintiff was a prevailing party on the most significant issue: an IRS disclosure had in fact occurred
because a State agency had provided only an oral, and not written, request for the taxpayers information. 804 F.2d
297, 299-300 (5th Cir. 1986). Here, the fact of a disclosure was admitted in the Answer and not litigated.
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characterization, NOM cannot establish that it substantially prevailed on the most significant issues
presented in its Verified Complaint.
Nor is NOMs argument assisted by the United States admission, in its Answer, that the IRS
inadvertently disclosed one unredacted copy of NOMs 2008 Schedule B to a single third party-
requestor, entitling it to $1,000 in statutory damages. Without more, this admission does not mean
that NOM substantially prevailed. See Goettee, 192 Fed. Appx. at 223. In Goettee, the taxpayers
contended that the IRS had abused its discretion in waiting 16 months to respond to an offer-in-
compromise. Id. at 221-223. In deciding the underlying substantive tax issues, the Tax Court abated
three months of interest, not the 16 months claimed. Although the plaintiff presented a conflated
abuse-of-discretion claim against the IRS, the Fourth Circuit found that the taxpayer presented a
series of claims and that the vast majority of them were decided in the IRS favor. Id. at 223.
Thus, the court affirmed the decision that the taxpayers did not substantially prevail, even though
they proved that the IRS had abused its discretion. Id. Similarly, here, even though the United States
admitted that the IRS inadvertently disclosed the tax return, that admission and a settlement payment
of a fraction of its damages claim does not constitute substantially prevailing when the majority of
NOMs other claims were either decided against it or withdrawn. Thus, the Court should reject that
NOM substantially prevailed.
9
9
Moreover, NOMs position that it filed suit to determine that the IRS was the source of the disclosure is belied by
the fact that because of the unique markings on NOMs disclosed return it already knew the IRS was the
source. [Dkt. 1 20-28.] NOM cant have it both ways: either its suit was to determine that the IRS was the
source (a fact it already knew and which we conceded in our Answer), in which case the continuation of its claims
regarding willful conspiracy and gross negligence were unwarranted; or, as is the case, its suit was truly about what
was pled in the complaint willful conspiracy and gross negligence, issues that the Court dismissed.
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2. The United States Was Substantially Justified in Successfully Defending Against NOMs
False Allegations, and its Shifting and Disputed Actual Damages Claims
Because NOMs complaint alleged significantly false facts and claims, the United States was
substantially justified in defending this suit in its entirety, including debunking claims of
governmental conspiracy and gross negligence. NOMs Verified Complaint alleged inspections and
disclosures stemming from a conspiracy or as a result of gross negligence, which, if proven at a trial,
would have subjected the United States to costly punitive damages. As long as NOM pursued those
baseless claims, the government was obligated to zealously represent its client and defend the suit.
After the Court dismissed those claims upon the governments summary judgment motion, the
government quickly settled the remaining issue of actual damages. These actions epitomize a
reasonable defense.
If the Court determines that NOM substantially prevailed and, as shown above, it did not
the Court must still determine that the governments position was not substantially justified in
order to award NOM attorneys fees. 26 U.S.C. 7430(c)(4)(B)(i). A position is substantially
justified if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact or if it is justified to a degree that could satisfy a
reasonable person. Ripley v. Commr, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2732, at *4 (4th Cir. 1998); Secret v.
United States, 373 F. Supp. 2d 619, 629 (N.D. W. Va. 2005) (internal citations omitted); see also
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
Importantly for purposes of NOMs fee petition, In evaluating whether the governments
position is substantially justified under 7430, the relevant position of the government is
exclusively the one taken in the actual litigation. Secret, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 629 (citing Phillips v.
Commr, 851 F.2d 1492, 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988)) (emphasis added). The starting point for
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identifying the issues presented for litigation is the face of the Complaint. Christian Coalition Intl
v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 2d 437, 439 (E.D. Va. 2001). The fact that the United States might not
succeed on every issue does not establish that its litigation position was not substantially justified.
See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 569 (holding that the United States could take a position that is substantially
justified, yet lose).
10
Here, the governments positions were substantially justified throughout the course of this
litigation. NOM brought this civil action under two counts: (1) Count I alleged a willful or grossly
negligent unauthorized disclosure of its tax return; (2) Count II alleged willful or grossly negligent
unauthorized inspection of its return. Both of these claims were unfounded and dismissed upon the
governments motion for summary judgment. But until the Court agreed, NOM was alleging a set of
facts conspiracy with and intentional disclosures to NOMs ideological adversary which, if
proven at a trial, would have subjected the United States to costly punitive damages and significant
non-monetary injury to the IRS reputation. As long as NOM continued to pursue these baseless
claims, the government had to represent its client and defend the suit. See Jones v. United States, 207
F.3d 508, 513 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming a finding of substantial justification and further observing
that the district court quite rightly concluded that the governments aggressive resistance to the
Joneses various and excessive damages claims, including the claim for punitive damages, was
entirely warranted).
NOM never sought to amend its sworn complaint to remove these counts or claim that the
10
The Court must view the totality of the circumstances and, in so doing, determine that a reasonable person would
not find the position taken by the United States justifiable. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565. While the government bears the
burden of proving substantial justification, see 26 U.S.C. 7430(c)(4)(B), the Court should also keep in mind that,
at all times, NOM carried the burden to prove all elements of its case for all of its counts.
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IRS was simply negligent in disclosing NOMs tax return. When the Court dismissed both of
NOMs pled counts upon the governments motion for summary judgment, the United States moved
quickly to resolve the remaining issue of actual damages, which was settled less than two weeks
later. The United States defense therefore was reasonable at every phase of the litigation.
Even considering the issue of NOMs actual damages in isolation,
11
the United States was
substantially justified in defending against those claims. As late as May 13, 2014 (two months after
the close of discovery), NOM agreed that there was a Genuine Factual Dispute as to Whether the
Disclosure of NOMs Return Information Caused Actual Damages, and elected not to file its own
summary judgment motion on the issue of actual damages. [Dkt. 73 at 18.]
12
Second, that NOM shifted the amount of damages during discovery adding $46,086 in
attorneys fees as actual damages, dropping the $50,000 claim for a lost donation, and then later
adding eight unauthorized inspections in its summary judgment opposition substantially justified
the United States defending the actual damages claim. Indeed, the actual damages defense caused
NOM to completely remove its highest dollar amount damages claim in the face of a government
motion to compel. Regardless of NOMs rationale about why it withdrew this claim,
13
the facts are
11
NOMs entire substantial justification argument concerns what the government must have known about NOMs
actual damages. [Dkt. 91 at 9-12.] But the Court must measure the governments defense against what was alleged
in the complaint, i.e., a willful disclosure of its return directly to its main ideological opponent, HRC. NOM omits
any discussion of substantial justification vis--vis NOMs claims of willfulness or gross negligence. NOM ignores
that the complaints allegations were at odds with what the government knew; therefore, the government needed to
oppose the complaint and raise proper legal defenses in response to NOMs overreaching lawsuit.
12
NOMs position is thus incongruous: it can hardly maintain that the United States was not reasonable in defending
the actual damages portion of NOMs claim while at the same time conceding that the issue of actual damages was
nebulous enough to be subject to a genuine dispute of fact, which would necessitate a trial before the Court.
13
NOMs ostensible rationale would have supported not raising the lost donation claim in the complaint in the first
place. If it had done so, that issue would not have been considered for prevailing party or substantial
justification. But NOM elected to include that claim in its complaint, and it is therefore relevant.
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simple: (a) NOM pled a lost $50,000 donation; (b) NOM refused to provide any support for such a
proposition; (c) the parties had a frank meet-and-confer where the government threatened a motion to
compel; (d) NOM withdrew the claim and supplemented its interrogatory responses accordingly. As
for this $50,000 damages claim, then, the United States was 100 percent justified in defending
against NOMs unprovable ipse dixit claim of damages.
With regard to the newly added $46,086.37 in attorneys fees, NOMs argument seems to be
that the government should have known about these damages before NOM disclosed them in an
interrogatory response on January 21, 2014, and then acquiesced the moment NOM identified them
as an actual damage. See [Dkt. 91 at 9-11]; [Dkt. 68-2 at 9]. Of course, that is not what substantial
justification requires; it requires only that the government have a reasonable basis in law and fact for
its position. At the time NOM proffered these new damages, six weeks before the close of discovery,
it was unclear that the damages NOM incurred were necessary. The $46,086.37 included six FOIA
and Privacy Act requests and appeals, and attorneys fees used to lobby on Capitol Hill, the purpose
of which was allegedly to seek information relating to the circumstances of the disclosure and to
testify before Congress. [Dkt. 68-16.] Discovery of and defense against these claims was reasonable
and substantially justified.
Third, NOMs resistance to providing information regarding whether it mitigated its damages
also substantially justified the governments position. The United States primary defense of NOMs
actual damages claim was two-fold (lack of proximate causation and mitigation of any actual
damages). NOM did not fully disclose the extent to which it had received donations in response to
solicitations referring to the disclosure or its lawsuit against the government until April 2, 2014.
Accordingly, from a factual perspective, the United States was substantially justified in raising the
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issue of mitigation until at least that point in the litigation. From a legal perspective, the
governments motion for summary judgment and reply laid out reasonable legal bases for the
application of the mitigation defense and for why the collateral source rule was inapplicable. [Dkt.
68 at 28-30]; [Dkt. 77 at 15-17].
14
3. NOMs Fee Request is Unreasonable and Deficient
Even if the Court determines that NOM was the prevailing party and that the United States
was not substantially justified, the Court should award NOM only minimal fees because its request is
facially unreasonable and deficient for a number of reasons.
a. The statutory cap under federal law precludes NOMs requested hourly rates
NOM is incorrect that the hourly rates provided by the Vienna Metro Matrix apply to this
case.
15
Instead, the statutory cap regarding attorneys fees in 26 U.S.C. 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) governs
NOMs petition, and any award of fees must utilize that cap. That Code provision provides that fees
actually paid or incurred cannot be more than $125 per hour unless the court determines that a
special factor . . . justifies a higher rate.
NOMs claim that the few recent cases involving a matter brought pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
14
Furthermore, the legislative history clarifies that the point of the substantial justification analysis is to prevent the
government from adopting legal positions that it has lost in the Courts of Appeals. S. Rep. 105-174 (1998), at 47;
see also Marre v. United States, 117 F.3d 297, 301-02 (5th Cir. Tex. 1997) (This is not a case where the
government unreasonably defended [its] position after several earlier courts had rejected it, when the IRS had
ignored state law that clearly supported the taxpayer, [or] when the IRS had failed to conduct a reasonable
investigation that would have revealed the flaw in its position.). This is not the case here. NOM has only
identified one case a district court case from Nebraska to support its position that the government lost on a
related issue previously (in a case with completely different facts than those here). [Dkt. 91 at 12.] Moreover,
NOM has not cited any case holding against the governments mitigation or its collateral source rule position.
15
Mr. Zalls affidavit contains many pages of pure legal argument and factual assertions that should be in NOMs
brief and subject to the 30-page limit the local rules impose. The Court should not condone NOMs attempt at
circumventing that limit, and should strike Zalls affidavit as inappropriate expert testimony. See, e.g., United States
v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir. 2006) (expert testimony, which states a legal standard, is inadmissible).
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7431 [do] not apply[] any statutory cap, [Dkt. 91 at 18 n.9], is erroneous. In fact and contrary to
NOMs misrepresentation of the law in the primary case NOM cites via the Affidavit of Barnaby
Zall for this proposition, see id. (citing Zall Aff. 63-65), the court did hold that 7430s statutory
cap applied to a case brought under 7431. Snider, 2005 WL 3150761 at *1 (W.D. Mo. 2005).
16
In
Snider, the district court explicitly said that it may award fees to plaintiffs counsel pursuant to 26
U.S.C. Section 7430, and that the maximum hourly rate allowed by Section 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) is
$150.00 for fees incurred in calendar years 2002 through 2005. Id.
17
Thus, Snider involved the
straightforward application of the statutory cap outlined in 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) to a case brought
pursuant to 7431.
18
Applying the statutory cap of 7430 to cases brought under 7431 is also supported by the
provisions legislative history. Before 1998, 7431 did not explicitly provide for an award of
attorneys fees for unauthorized inspection or disclosure of tax returns. This ambiguity led to the
16
In addition to Snider, the Zall Affidavit cites Callies v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Ariz. 2003), as a
recent case[] on IRC 7431 that does not apply the statutory cap for attorneys fees. [Dkt. 91-2 63 & n.23.]
This characterization is also wrong. The district court in Callies denied the plaintiffs request for attorneys fees
under 7431(c)(3) because the court concluded that plaintiffs were not the prevailing party and were therefore not
entitled to an award of attorneys fees. 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1191. Therefore, the Callies court never considered
whether the statutory cap of 7430 applied. Callies fee discussion concerned the reasonableness of counsels fees
vis--vis his own clients under a contingency contract, not attorneys fees against the government (indeed there were
none). Id. at 1192. The government had nothing to do with the contingency contract and 7430 was inapplicable.
17
While the text of the statute caps the hourly fee rate at $125 per hour, it includes a cost-of-living adjustment,
which is why Snider identified $150 per hour as the cap for those calendar years. Currently, the cap is $180 per
hour for 2012 and $190 per hour for 2013 and 2014. See IRS Rev. Proc. 2011-52; 2012-41 & 2013-35. Thus, if the
Court were to award any fees, the cap applies absent some special factor (which NOM has not claimed).
18
As Zall notes, the Snider court approved higher rates than the statutory cap. [Dkt 91-2 63.] This does not mean,
however, as Zall claims, that the court did not apply the cap. See id. Again, the courts opinion makes clear that the
court applied the cap in accordance with the statutory language, which allows for an increase under certain
exceptional circumstances. See Snider, 2005 WL 3150761, at *1 (Unless the Court determines that a higher rate is
justified . . . the maximum hourly rate allowed by Section 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) is $150.00 . . . .). Thus, the Snider
opinion only proves that the cap applies, but that certain exceptional factors which NOM has not claimed here
could justify a fee higher than the one provided for by 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii).
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development of a circuit split on the question of whether attorneys fees were properly awardable in
such cases. Compare Huckaby, 804 F.2d at 298 (attorneys fees provisions of 7430 applied to a
7431 case), with McLarty v. United States, 6 F.3d 545 (8th Cir. 1993) (taxpayer may not recover
fees). Congress resolved the split by adding 7431(c)(3) to the Code, which explicitly provided for
attorneys fees in connection with unauthorized disclosure cases.
19
See Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685. The interconnectedness
of these two adjacent statutes is underscored by the structure of the 1998 Act itself; the addition of
7431(c)(3) was one of several changes to 7430 and 7431, all of which were subsumed under the
single heading Expansion of authority to award costs and certain fees. This history demonstrates
that Congress intention in adding 7431(c)(3) to the Code was solely to Clarif[y] that the award of
attorneys fees is permitted in actions for civil damages for unauthorized inspection or disclosure of
tax returns. See H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-599 (1998). There is no indication that Congress meant to
sever 7431 from the limitations on awards of attorneys fees provided by 7430, which would
amount to the grant of significantly more expansive fees in 7431 cases than in other 7430 cases.
Moreover, any ambiguity in either the statutes or their legislative history must be resolved in
favor of the United States. Section 7431 is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, and waivers of
sovereign immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the government. See, e.g., Goettee, 192
Fed. Appx. at 222 (noting that 7430 renders the United States liable for attorneys fees for which it
19
Congress explained the change by stating that it believe[d] that when the IRS violates taxpayers right to privacy
by engaging in unauthorized inspection or disclosure activities, it is appropriate to reimburse taxpayers for the costs
of their damages and noting that, under the previous law, [t]he Federal appellate courts [were] split over whether a
party who substantially prevails over the United States in an action under Code section 7431 is eligible for an award
of fees and reasonable costs. S. Rep. No. 105-174, at 47 & n.28, 48 (1998).
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would not otherwise be liable, and therefore amounts to a partial waiver of sovereign immunity
[and] must be strictly construed in favor of the United States) (quoting Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S.
129, 137 (1991)). Thus, even if the Court were to question the applicability of the statutory cap to
7431, the Court must resolve that question in the governments favor. See FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct.
1441, 1448 (2012) (waiver of immunity must be unequivocally expressed in the statutory text;
otherwise, ambiguity is resolved using the interpretation most favorable to the Government).
Indeed, construing the attorneys fees provisions of 7431(c)(3) to mean that there is no
hourly cap would not only make the fee provision of 7431 significantly more expansive than
7430, it would also make the fee provision of 7431 more extensive than the Equal Access to Justice
Act (EAJA), which generally caps the allowable hourly rate for attorneys fees at $125 per hour.
28 U.S.C. 2412(b), (d)(2)(A). Before 1982, EAJA was the sole authorization for the award of
attorneys fees to prevailing parties in civil tax cases. See McLarty, 6 F.3d at 548. In 1982, Congress
enacted 7430 and made it the exclusive provision for the award of attorneys fees in the
governments civil tax litigation, id., which lasted until Congress resolved the circuit split by adding
7431(c)(3) to the Code. It is unlikely that Congress expanded 7431 beyond both 7430 and
EAJA without any express provision or discussion in the legislative history. NOM has proffered no
evidence that Congress intended this result, and any ambiguity must be construed in the
governments favor. Thus, to the extent the Court awards any fees, the statutory cap on the hourly
rate for attorneys fees under 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) applies.
b. NOMs attorneys fees for actual damages claims are wholly distinct from its
bills relating to its unsuccessful claims of willfulness and gross negligence
After determining the governing hourly rate, the court then should subtract fees for hours
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spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful ones. See Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs.,
LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 244 (4th Cir. 2009). This Court should reject NOMs attempt to have the
taxpayers pay for its poor exercise in billing judgment. While NOM had every opportunity to prove
that a conspiracy caused the disclosure or that the disclosure was grossly negligent, it utterly failed at
that task even after 31 timekeepers spent 3,000 hours and generated over a million dollars in fees.
NOM simply has not established that its actual damages claims are interconnected with its other
claims or that they arose from a common core of facts. Because NOM cannot prove otherwise, this
Court should reject its attempt to lump its fees together.
While the United States recognizes that, in certain circumstances, a prevailing party may be
entitled to fees spent litigating unsuccessful claims, see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440; Abshire v. Walls,
830 F.2d 1277, 1283 (4th Cir. 1987), this is simply not one of those cases where the claims of
negligence and actual damages involved a common core of facts. The United States admitted in its
Answer that the IRS inadvertently disclosed NOMs 2008 Schedule B; thus, negligence was not at
issue. NOM has not established how discovery related to its punitive damages claims the
remaining liability issue along with the inspections claims impacted its actual damages claim.
Though NOM asserts that the facts supporting its willfulness/gross negligence theories were
inextricably intertwined with the facts supporting NOMs successful claims, it has not shown how
the facts were intertwined. See [Dkt. 91 at 22]. Given that NOM was taking affirmative discovery
on the disclosure claim but was responding to discovery on actual damages, the opposite is true.
In reality, the facts regarding the claims of willfulness/gross negligence and the claims for
actual damages were not at all intertwined involving different witnesses, different evidence, and
even a different time period as all of the claimed damages occurred well over a year after the
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disclosure.
20
Most tellingly, had NOM simply not brought its willfulness/gross negligence claims,
nearly all of the work that its attorneys completed and for which it seeks compensation would
never have happened. This is not a case where the same work would have occurred regardless of
whether a particular unsuccessful claim was brought. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 (explaining that
the Courts concern with regard to a common core of facts or related legal theories is purely a
practical consideration that it may be difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim
basis). Rather, there is a clear delineation here, and the evidence and witnesses regarding whether
there was a conspiracy do not overlap with the evidence and witnesses regarding whether NOM
suffered damages more than a year later.
The cases NOM relies upon simply do not support an expansive interpretation that would
reward it for filing an action based primarily on groundless allegations. Although NOM relies
heavily on Hensley, the Court stated that limited success should severely limit fees:
[If] a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the product of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may
be an excessive amount. This will be true even where the plaintiff's claims were
interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith. Congress has not authorized an
award of fees whenever it was reasonable for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit or
whenever conscientious counsel tried the case with devotion and skill. Again, the
most critical factor is the degree of success obtained.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436; see also id. at 440 (We hold that the extent of a plaintiffs success is a
crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorneys fees).
Here, where NOM has not established that its claims for punitive damages and wrongful
inspections related to its actual damages claims, especially where the United States conceded a
20
Indeed, NOMs will call witness list dropped from twelve witnesses to a single witness its own President
once the Court determined that NOM could not go forward on its willfulness/gross negligence claims. [Dkt. 84]
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violation of 6103, this Court should reject NOMs argument. Instead, this Court should follow the
holding in Hensley that, where a plaintiff has not prevailed on a claim that is distinct in all respects
from his successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded in
considering the amount of a reasonable fee Id. at 440. Even if NOM establishes some common
factual core, this Court should limit its award to what is reasonable. See id. (where the plaintiff
achieved only limited success, the district court should award only that amount of fees that is
reasonable in relation to the results obtained).
21
Other cases NOM cites do not support its position. In Mallas v. United States, the attorneys
initially represented ten plaintiffs and spent 1100 hours in their representation. 876 F. Supp. 86, 89
(M.D.N.C. 1994). Due to the difficulty in separating the work for each plaintiff and their respective
claims, the court grouped the plaintiffs into different categories and then awarded Mallas attorneys a
share of the fees Mallas paid on behalf of all the plaintiffs.
22
Similarly, the other two cases NOM
cites are distinguishable, because, unlike here, the claims were all based on the same evidence and
witnesses. See Tech Sys. v. Pyles, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110636 (E.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2013)
(explaining in detail why the same evidence and witnesses was necessary for both claims covered
21
If this Court concludes that NOM is entitled to recover the fees resulting from any limited success on the issue of
actual damages, the most reasonable way to approach this matter is to recognize that NOM spent almost all of its
time taking affirmative discovery against the United States and third parties almost none of which had to do with
the issue of actual damages and spent almost no time defending against the governments discovery requests,
which would have separately involved its claim of willfulness / gross negligence and its claims for damages. Cf.
[Dkt. 91 at 21 n.13] (NOM recognizes this possibility but does not perform this breakdown in its motion). The
Court could thus direct NOM to submit a new fee petition solely for the time it spent proving its successful damages
claims or responding to the governments discovery regarding the same. Steven N.S. Cheung, Inc. v. United States,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85488, at *24 (W.D. Wash. J an. 17, 2007) (directing plaintiff to file amended petition,
without any further briefing, for fees under 7430).
22
Interestingly, in Mallas, the attorneys worked only 1100 hours in order to represent ten different plaintiffs. The
Mallas court awarded $48,751 in fees and costs on a $73,000 statutory damages award (almost 67 %). Using Mallas
as a guide, NOM would be entitled to $33,391 in fees on $50,000.
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and uncovered by attorney fee provisions); Emplrs Council on Flexible Comp. v. Feltman, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2744 (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2010) (similar).
c. NOMs unsuccessful claims dominated this case, and consequently, it did not
enjoy a significant degree of success overall
After a court subtracts fees for unsuccessful claims, it may award some percentage of the
remaining amount, depending on the [plaintiffs] degree of success. Robinson, 560 at 244. (internal
quotations omitted). Because the degree of success obtained by the plaintiff is the most critical
factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award, the district court may simply reduce the
award to account for the limited success. Lilienthal v. City of Suffolk, 322 F. Supp. 2d 667, 675
(E.D. Va. 2004) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37). A reduced fee award is appropriate if the
relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole.
Signature Flight Support Corp. v. Landow Aviation L.P., 730 F. Supp. 2d 513, 528 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(Cacheris, J.) (internal citation omitted).
As stated above in the prevailing party section, NOM did not succeed on any claims in this
case, including the majority of its damages claim after accounting for all amounts asserted under its
theories. See supra at 9-14. But assuming that the Court disagrees, at a minimum, NOM was
unsuccessful concerning its claim: (a) that the disclosure of its 2008 Schedule B was willful or the
result of a conspiracy; (b) that the disclosure was the result of gross negligence; (c) that the
inspection preceding the disclosure was willful; (d) that the inspection preceding the disclosure was
grossly negligent; (e) that the eight other inspections identified in response to the governments
summary judgment motion were unauthorized; and, (f) that it suffered a $50,000 damage as a result
of a lost donation. The only claims it was marginally successful on were the claims relating to the
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Karger Complaint ($12,500), and its claims for attorneys fees spent in sending the government FOIA
and Privacy Act requests, and lobbying Congress ($46,086.37).
Thus, at most, NOM was successful on two of eight separate issues (and that assumes that the
Court does not count the eight post-disclosure inspections as separate issues). Even if the Court were
to award fees for these two discrete issues, it should take into consideration the time NOM spent
litigating these two issues in this case. This should be a de minimus amount considering that the vast
majority of NOMs fees were spent trying to unsuccessfully prove its claims of conspiracy and gross
negligence, and that NOM was fully in control of the information relating to its claims for damages,
and thus, need not have expended significant time and effort.
d. NOMs billing records involve block billing, inappropriate billing increments
and insufficient descriptions, and must be significantly reduced
NOMs billing records are insufficient and warrant a significant percentage decrease in any
award the Court may provide. Most notably, a number of NOMs counsel engaged in significant
block billing and provided time entries that are too vague for the Court to make a reasoned
determination of whether the time spent on tasks was appropriate.
23
As this court has previously
stated, Inadequate documentation practices like block billing or lumping are a proper basis for
reducing a fee because they prevent an accurate determination of the reasonableness of the time
expended in a case. Ebersole v. Kline-Perry, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138659, at *14-15 (E.D. Va.
Sept. 26, 2012) (Cacheris, J.) (internal citations omitted) (citing cases and noting that courts apply a
23
Moreover, Mr. Davis, who billed over 300 hours, billed in half-hour increments, and Messrs. Torchinksy and
Sheehy, who billed over 200 hours in total, billed in quarter-hour increments. [Dkt. 91-3 at 54.] All of these are
plainly inappropriate, and thus, a significant reduction to these attorneys hours is warranted. See Broyles v. Dir.,
OWCP, 974 F.2d 508, 510-11 (4th Cir. 1992) (cited in Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Dir., OWCP, 724 F.3d 561,
576 (4th Cir. 2013)) (both expressing concern about attorneys billing in quarter-hour increments).
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10% to 25% block billing reduction). Here, a review of the records indicates that at least the
following attorneys habitually block billed their time in this matter: Ms. Mitchell and Messrs. Davis,
Torchinsky and Sheehy. Those four timekeepers equal 556 hours of time, after NOMs final
adjustments. See [Dkt. 91-3 at page ID 1878.]
Separately, with regard to vague or insufficiently detailed time entries, Where the
documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly. Hensley,
461 U.S. at 433; see also Abusamhadaneh v. Taylor, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7451 at *63-64 (E.D.
Va. Jan. 17, 2013) (Cacheris, J.) (reducing fee award for insufficiently descriptive documentation of
tasks). Many of the time entries here are vague and cannot provide the Court with a basis to
determine whether the time spent was appropriate or reasonable, as detailed by way of example in
the chart below. Dozens of other examples like the ones below exist in NOMs billing records,
requiring further reduction in an award if one were warranted.
Date Attorney Description Time
11/29/2012 Phillips Collect and organize research 0.3
9/5/2013 Davis Review correspondence. 0.50
9/25/2013 Torchinsky Call with Cleta; Correspondence. 0.75
9/27/2013 Torchinsky Correspondence re: filing. 0.75
10/30/2013 Phillips C JAV re LR into pre-answer discovery. 0.2
12/20/2013 Torchinsky Correspondence re: discovery issues. 0.75
12/23/2013 Torchinsky Correspondence re: discovery matters. 0.75
1/7/2014 Davis Conference call with Bruce Brown; conference call with
DOJ.
2.00
3/13/2014 Torchinsky Correspondence re: deposition prepare. 0.75
e. In the final analysis, NOMs fees are unreasonable, and represent an overstaffed
and over-litigated case
NOMs fee request is unreasonable for additional reasons. NOM spent, and is seeking to
have the American taxpayer pay for, over a year of researching, discussing, and drafting a severely
Case 1:13-cv-01225-JCC-IDD Document 92 Filed 08/08/14 Page 28 of 32 PageID# 2061
11737516.2
29
flawed complaint. See [Dkt. 91-2] (start date for billing was September 19, 2012); [Dkt. 1] (case
filed October 3, 2013). There are hundreds of entries, covering the first nine pages of Dkt. 91-2,
which relate to a complaint that proved consistently wrong in its allegations.
Second, NOM is claiming that it was reasonable to spend $691,000 in attorneys fees to
collect $50,000 in damages. This is facially unreasonable. See Fiolek v. Tucson Unified School Dist.,
2004 WL 3366149, *5 (D. Ariz. Sep. 10, 2004) (reducing fee request by about one-third because fees
sought were seven times higher than the damages awarded the plaintiff).
24
NOM tries to justify this
expenditure by claiming that the IRS had a bunker mentality and engaged in hardball tactics in
this case. [Dkt. 91-2 at 20-25, 53.] Nothing could be further from the truth. Far from a bunker
mentality, the government in this case produced thousands of pages of documents in response to
discovery requests, responded in detail to interrogatories, and took no actions to hinder the taking of
any depositions of any government or third-party witnesses. In fact, NOM learned the identity of the
person responsible for the inadvertent disclosure and took that persons deposition. NOM also took
the deposition of the TIGTA agent primarily responsible for the investigation of the disclosure, as
well as a manager in the IRS Exempt Organizations division, and the database systems administrator
relating to the disclosure at issue. Name-calling aside, NOM has made no specific allegation that the
manner in which the government conducted itself in this case was anything other than responsive,
reasonable and cooperative.
Third, NOM overstaffed this case. While NOM is only seeking fees for seven attorneys out
of 31 timekeepers, even seven attorneys were unnecessary to reach the result NOM obtained. See
24
And, this fact also undercuts NOMs argument that actual damages were the key issue. If damages were the key
issue, NOM never would have spent that amount of money to establish those limited damages.
Case 1:13-cv-01225-JCC-IDD Document 92 Filed 08/08/14 Page 29 of 32 PageID# 2062
11737516.2
30
Abusamhadaneh, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7451 at *65-66 (noting that the Fourth Circuit has been
sensitive to the need to avoid use of multiple counsel for task where such use is not justified by the
contributions of each attorney).
25
As further evidence of the overbilling, even after reducing its
billing, NOM still has over 150 entries and 165 hours related to its summary judgment opposition. A
30-page response brief should not require that much time.
26
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court should deny Plaintiffs attorney fee petition for several reasons. NOM is
not the prevailing party, either with regard to the amount in controversy or the most important issues
presented. Moreover, the United States was substantially justified in its defense of this case, which
alleged conspiracy and flagrant violations of federal law. Finally, should the Court even reach the
issue of a reasonable fee amount, NOMs fee application is deficient, filled with overstaffed and
overbilling attorneys, and utilizes an excessive hourly rate in contravention of federal law.
25
As explained in footnote 4, NOM expended 800 hours and $300,000 between April 2, 2014 which was after
discovery closed and the end of the case. Although we have the billing records, it is still unclear how NOM
generated this excessive time. The sheer fact that timekeepers spent so much time between April 2nd and J uly 25th
underscores the haphazard manner in which NOM litigated this case, regardless of whether it is seeking those fees.
26
Other problems also abound: (a) NOM researched whether it could bring a Bivens claim, which it never brought,
and thus was unrelated and unnecessary; (b) NOM spent time taking the depositions of two third-party witnesses
where counsel knew that they would invoke their 5th Amendments rights, and that no adverse inference would
attach to the government; (c) NOM should not recover fees for its Chairman, Dr. Eastmans, work as a litigant and
not an attorney, see, e.g., [Dkt. 91-2 at 90] (1/15/2014) Review personal files for documents responsive to
discovery requests (4.0); (d) NOM habitually billed for multiple attorneys to attend nearly every deposition,
including four for the depositions of all government witnesses and three to defend its own 30(b)(6); and, (e) NOMs
fees for preparing its petition are themselves unreasonable, see Feltman, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2744 at *20
(reducing time spent on fee petition by 50% where firm spent 43.5 hours and $16,012 to prepare petition). Finally,
while NOM claims that counsel is representing it pro bono, it failed to attach a copy of NOMs fee arrangement with
the firms / public interest groups that represented it in this suit. See Abusamhadaneh, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7451
at *37 ([T]o be incurred within the meaning of a fee shifting statute, there must also be an express or implied
agreement that the fee award will be paid over to the legal representative.). In order to ensure that NOM (who will
receive any fee award as the prevailing party) has paid or incurred the services of an attorney, the Court must
satisfy itself that NOM is contractually obligated to pay its attorneys the previously agreed-upon fee. See id. NOM
has not adequately demonstrated that here.
Case 1:13-cv-01225-JCC-IDD Document 92 Filed 08/08/14 Page 30 of 32 PageID# 2063
11737516.2
31
August 8, 2014 TAMARA W. ASHFORD
Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Tax Division
PHILIP M. SCHREIBER*
CHRISTOPER D. BELEN
Trial Attorneys, Tax Division
U.S. Department of Justice
Post Office Box 14198
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
(202) 514-6069 (Mr. Schreiber)
(202) 307-2089 (Mr. Belen)
Fax: 202 514-9868
E-Mail: philip.m.schreiber@usdoj.gov
christopher.d.belen@usdoj.gov
BENJAMIN L. TOMPKINS*
Assistant United States Attorney
United States Attorneys Office for the
Central District of California
Federal Building, Suite 7516
300 North Los Angeles Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Telephone: (213) 894-6165
Facsimile: (213) 894-0115
E-mail: benjamin.tompkins@usdoj.gov
DANA J. BOENTE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
/s/
David Moskowitz
Assistant U.S. Attorney
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
Telephone: (703) 299-3845
Fax: (703) 299-3983
E-Mail: david.moskowitz@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for the United States of America
* Admitted pro hac vice
Case 1:13-cv-01225-JCC-IDD Document 92 Filed 08/08/14 Page 31 of 32 PageID# 2064
11737516.2
32
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on August 8, 2014, I will electronically file the foregoing with the
Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notification of electronic filing to the
following:
Jason Torchinsky
Shawn Toomey Sheehy
Holtzman Vogel Josefiak PLLC
45 North Hill Drive, Suite 100
Warrenton, VA 20186
(540) 341-8808 (telephone)
(540) 341-8809 (fax)
jtorchinsky@hvjlaw.com
ssheehy@hvjlaw.com
/s/
David Moskowitz
Assistant U.S. Attorney
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
Telephone: (703) 299-3845
Fax: (703) 299-3983
E-Mail: david.moskowitz@usdoj.gov
Attorney for the United States
Case 1:13-cv-01225-JCC-IDD Document 92 Filed 08/08/14 Page 32 of 32 PageID# 2065
1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
The NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
MARRIAGE, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
Defendants.
Civ. No. 13-cv-1225-J CC/IDD
Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures Pursuant to F.R.C.P 26(a)(1)
Plaintiff National Organization for Marriage, Inc. (NOM), by and through its
undersigned counsel, hereby submits the following initial disclosures pursuant to F.R.C.P.
26(a)(1)(A):
Individuals Likely to Have Discoverable Information
1. Mr. Brian Brown
a. Contact through Counsel.
b. Mr. Brown is the Executive Director of NOM and as such is likely to have
discoverable information relating to the claims, occurrences, and damages alleged
in the Complaint.
2. Mr. J oseph Solmonese
a. Managing Director, Gavin/Solmonese
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
b. Phone: (202) 772-3172
c. Mr. Solmonese was the President of the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) at the
time that Plaintiffs return and return information, allegedly disclosed by the IRS
without authorization, was published by HRC and the Huffington Post. As such,
Mr. Solmonese is likely to have discoverable information relating to the
unauthorized disclosure and subsequent publication of Plaintiffs return and return
information.
3. Mr. Matthew Meisel
a. c/o Harvest Power, Inc.
Case 1:13-cv-01225-JCC-IDD Document 92-1 Filed 08/08/14 Page 1 of 6 PageID# 2066
Defendant
Exhibit
_____________
1
2
221 Crescent St., Suite 402
Waltham, MA 02453
b. Phone: (781) 314-9500
c. According to media reports on the House of Representatives Ways and Means
Committees investigation of the IRS, Mr. Meisel was the recipient of Plaintiffs
return and return information, allegedly disclosed by the IRS without
authorization. As such, Mr. Meisel is likely to have discoverable information
relating to the unauthorized disclosure and subsequent publication.
4. Representative(s) of the Human Rights Campaign
a. 1640 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036-3278
b. Phone: (202) 628-4160
c. On March 30, 2012, HRC published Plaintiffs return and return information that
was allegedly disclosed by the IRS without authorization. As such, HRC is likely
to have discoverable information relating to the unauthorized disclosure and
subsequent publication.
5. Representative(s) of the Huffington Post
a. 770 Broadway
New York, New York 10003
b. Phone: Plaintiff does not have the telephone number for the Huffington Post in its
possession at this time.
c. Also on March 30, 2012, the Huffington Post published Plaintiffs return and
return information that was allegedly disclosed by the IRS without authorization.
As such, the Huffington Post is likely to have discoverable information relating to
the unauthorized disclosure and subsequent publication.
6. Mr. Fred Karger
a. 3699 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1290
Los Angeles, California 90010
b. Phone: Plaintiff does not have the telephone number for Mr. Karger in its
possession at this time.
c. In a complaint to the California Fair Political Practices Commission, Mr. Karger
republished Plaintiffs return and return information that was allegedly disclosed
by the IRS without authorization. As such, Mr. Karger is likely to have
discoverable information relating to the subsequent publication of disclosed
information and the damages incurred by Plaintiff.
7. Mr. William Wilkins, IRS Chief Counsel
a. Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service
1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20224
Case 1:13-cv-01225-JCC-IDD Document 92-1 Filed 08/08/14 Page 2 of 6 PageID# 2067
3
b. Phone: 202-803-9000
c. Mr. Wilkins is the Chief Counsel of the IRS and as such is likely to have
discoverable information relating to the internal investigation regarding the
alleged unauthorized disclosure of Plaintiffs return and return information.
8. Mr. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
a. Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service
1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20224
b. Phone: 202-803-9000
c. Mr. George is the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration. Mr.
George and his office conducted an investigation into the alleged unauthorized
disclosure of Plaintiffs return and return information. Mr. George is likely to
have discoverable information related to facts in this matter.
9. Unknown Representative(s) of the Internal Revenue Service
a. Address and phone number currently unknown.
b. Certain currently-unknown representatives of the Internal Revenue Service may
have discoverable information relating to the alleged unauthorized disclosure of
Plaintiffs return and return information, the training of IRS employees who have
inspected and/or disclosed Plaintiffs return and return information, the policy of
the IRS regarding the disclosure of returns and return information, the reason(s)
or motivation(s) for the inspections and disclosures, and any interaction with the
White House or any other government agencies regarding the targeting of
nonprofit organizations such as Plaintiff.
10. Unknown Representative(s) of the White House
a. Address and phone number currently unknown.
b. Certain currently-unknown representatives of the White House may have
discoverable information relating to the alleged unauthorized disclosure of
Plaintiffs return and return information, the reason(s) or motivation(s) for the
inspections and disclosures, and any interaction with the White House or any
other government agencies regarding the targeting of nonprofit organizations such
as Plaintiff.
11. All individuals listed in Defendant United States of Americas disclosures pursuant to
F.R.C.P. 26.
12. All individuals necessary or appropriate to impeach or rebut any statements or allegations
made by Defendant or any of its witnesses.
Case 1:13-cv-01225-JCC-IDD Document 92-1 Filed 08/08/14 Page 3 of 6 PageID# 2068
4
13. All individuals necessary to authenticate any evidence.
Documents, Electronically Stored Information, and Tangible things in the Possession,
Custody, or Control of Plaintiff
All documents are located at the office of Plaintiffs counsel, ActRight Legal Foundation, and
located at 209 West Main Street, Plainfield, IN 46168. ActRight Legal Foundations telephone
number is (317) 203-5599.
1. NOM Formation Documents
2. NOM 2008 990 (with redacted Schedule B)
3. Screen shots of HRC article
4. Screen shots of Huffington Post article
5. Online news articles relating to alleged unauthorized disclosure
6. Copies of letters from Members of Congress to the IRS and to TIGTA requesting
investigations of the alleged unauthorized disclosure.
7. Correspondence regarding TIGTAs subsequent investigation, referred to as Complaint
Number 63-1204-0051-C.
8. Fred Kargers complaint to the California Fair Political Practices Commission
9. Financial Records related to NOMs legal fees and expenses
10. TIGTA and IRS Letters In Response to Plaintiffs Freedom of Information Act and
Privacy Act Requests
Computation of Damages
1. Plaintiff seeks damages pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7431(c) in an amount equal to the greater
of: $1,000 for each act of unauthorized inspection or disclosure of its return or return
information; or the sum of the actual damages sustained by Plaintiff as a result of such
unauthorized disclosure, plus punitive damages.
2. Actual damages are calculated as follows:
a. Lost contributions exceeding $50,000.
Mr. Brown will testify as to the lost contributions that resulted from the alleged illicit
disclosure.
b. Attorney fees and costs in prosecuting the legal complaint filed with the
California Fair Political Practices Commission amount to $12,500.
Documents supporting this amount are in possession of ActRight Legal Foundation,
located at 209 West Main Street, Plainfield, IN 46168. The documents consist of legal invoices
Case 1:13-cv-01225-JCC-IDD Document 92-1 Filed 08/08/14 Page 4 of 6 PageID# 2069
5
and an affidavit from the attorney managing the litigation in California. Plaintiff asserts thatat
the very leastportions of the legal invoices are protected under the Attorney-Client privilege. See
Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 402-404 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Attorney Client
privilege extends to bills that include information about litigation strategy, legal research, mental
impressions, conclusions, and legal theories about a case).
Attorneys fees and costs in prosecuting this legal matter are not included in the $12,500.
Total actual damages, therefore, are at least $62,500 and continue to climb as NOM prosecutes
this matter.
3. Plaintiff is unable to calculate punitive damages at this time. Consistent with the Rules,
Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement these disclosures as warranted by further
discovery and required by F.R.C.P. 26(e).
4. Costs and attorneys fees pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7431(c).
Insurance AgreementsNot applicable.
Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement these disclosures as warranted by further discovery and
required by F.R.C.P. 26(e).
Case 1:13-cv-01225-JCC-IDD Document 92-1 Filed 08/08/14 Page 5 of 6 PageID# 2070
6
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of December, 2013.
/s/J ason Torchinsky
J ason Torchinsky (Va. 47481)
Shawn Sheehy (Va. 82630)
Holtzman, Vogel, J osefiak, PLLC
45 North Hill Drive, Suite 100
Warrenton, VA 20186
(540) 341-8808 (telephone)
(540) 341-8809 (fax)
jtorchinsky@hvjlaw.com
ssheehy@hvjlaw.com
Counsel for Plaintiff
Cleta Mitchell, of counsel
(D.C. 433386)*
William E. Davis, of counsel
(D.C. 280057)*
Mathew D. Gutierrez, of counsel
(Fla. 0094014)*
Kaylan L. Phillips (Ind. 30405-84)*
Noel H. J ohnson (Wisc. 1068004)*
ACTRIGHT LEGAL FOUNDATION
209 West Main Street
Plainfield, IN 46168
(317) 203-5599 (telephone)
(888) 815-5641 (fax)
cmitchell@foley.com
wdavis@foley.com
mgutierrez@foley.com
kphillips@actrightlegal.org
njohnson@actrightlegal.org
Counsel for Plaintiff
J ohn C. Eastman (Cal. 193726)*
Anthony T. Caso (Cal. 88561)*
Center for Constitutional J urisprudence
c/o Chapman University School of Law
One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866
(877) 855-3330 x2 (telephone)
(714) 844-4817 (fax)
jeastman@chapman.edu
caso@chapman.edu
Counsel for Plaintiff
* Admitted Pro Hac Vice
Case 1:13-cv-01225-JCC-IDD Document 92-1 Filed 08/08/14 Page 6 of 6 PageID# 2071
1
Schreiber, Philip M. (TAX)
From: Kaylan Phillips <kphillips@actrightlegal.org>
Sent: Monday, February 03, 2014 12:33 PM
To: Schreiber, Philip M. (TAX)
Cc: jtorchinsky@hvjlaw.com; ssheehy@hvjlaw.com; CMitchell@foley.com;
wdavis@foley.com; mgutierrez@foley.com; njohnson@actrightlegal.org;
jeastman@chapman.edu; caso@chapman.edu; Tompkins, Benjamin L. (TAX);
Moskowitz, David (USAVAE); Belen, Christopher D. (TAX)
Subject: RE: NOM - Responses to Defendant's First Set of Discovery Requests
Phil,
Bill Davis and I are available to meet Wednesday morning before the deposition. How about 11:15 in
the Foley office?
When you arrive, please go to the 6
th
Floor to be checked in. Also, please send me a list of the
individuals attending on behalf of the Government so that your names will be put on the list.
Kaylan
Kaylan L. Phillips
Litigation Counsel
ActRight Legal Foundation
209 W. Main Street
Plainfield, IN 46168
(317) 203-5599
kphillips@actrightlegal.org
www.actrightlegal.org
The above communication is confidential and may be protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or
the work product doctrine. If you believe you received this email by mistake, please notify the sender
by return email as soon as possible.
From: Schreiber, Philip M. (TAX) [mailto:Philip.M.Schreiber@usdoj.gov]
Sent: Thursday, J anuary 30, 2014 11:50 AM
To: Kaylan Phillips
Cc: jtorchinsky@hvjlaw.com; ssheehy@hvjlaw.com; CMitchell@foley.com; wdavis@foley.com; mgutierrez@foley.com;
njohnson@actrightlegal.org; jeastman@chapman.edu; caso@chapman.edu; Tompkins, Benjamin L. (TAX); Moskowitz,
David (USAVAE); Belen, Christopher D. (TAX)
Subject: RE: NOM - Responses to Defendant's First Set of Discovery Requests
Kaylan,
IhopeyouhadasafeandeasytripbackfromUtah.Canyoupleaseadvisewhetheryouareavailabletomeetand
conferWednesdaymorningbeforeMr.Meiselsdepositionregardingyouremailbelowand,morebroadly,the
positionsNOMhastakenconcerningitsdiscoveryresponses?
Kindregards,
WehaveseveralquestionsandconcernsregardingPlaintiffsresponsestothegovernmentsfirstsetofdiscovery
requests.
First,whilewenoticedthatPlaintiffproducedsomedocumentsreflectingcommunicationswithmembersor
committeesofCongress(RFPs1&5),weareuncertainwhetherPlaintiffiswithholdinganydocumentsonthe
basisofitsobjections.CanyoupleaseconfirmwhetherPlaintiffisdoingsoandifthatisthecasethelegal
citationsthatsupportwithholdingsuchdocumentsfromproduction?
Second,afterreviewingPlaintiffsproductionanddiscoveryresponses,itisclearthatPlaintiffhasdecidedto
withholdthenameoftheNOMdonorwhoallegedlywithdrewa$50,000donationafterthedisclosureofNOMs
2008Form990,ScheduleBand,alongthesamelines,thatPlaintiffisnotproducinganydocumentsregarding
thisunknowndonor.SeeRogs2&3andRFP9.Youhavementionedthisonthephonewithusbefore,butcan
youpleaseconfirmthatPlaintiffintendstorelysolelyonthetestimonyofoneofitsofficerstoestablishthislost
donationandthisportionofitsclaimedactualdamages?
Similarly,itappearsthatPlaintiffhasnotproducedanydocumentsorprovidedanyinformationresponsiveto
RPFs20,2325andRogs15&16,despitenothavingprovidedunqualifiedadmissionstoRFAs3,6&9.Weare
confusedbyPlaintiffsresponse,becausewebelievedthatPlaintiffandthegovernmenthadanunderstanding
thatwiththeCourtsprotectiveorderinplacePlaintiffwouldbeprovidingdocumentsandinformation
responsivetothesediscoveryrequests.Indeed,Plaintiffraisedtheideaofaprotectiveorderoverthephone,in
itsobjectionstothegovernmentsdiscoveryrequests,andinitsemailsimmediatelybeforeprovidingits
production.(ThegovernmentevenagreedtoabidebythetermsoftheprotectiveorderbeforetheCourt
entereditsorder.)Accordingly,weseenojustificationforwithholdingresponsivedocumentsandinformation,
especiallygiventheexistenceofaprotectiveorderandourpriorgoodfaithdiscussions.TotheextentPlaintiff
hascaselawsupportingitspositionwhenaprotectiveorderisinplace,pleaseprovideuswiththosecitations.
Third,whencanweanticipatereceivingPlaintiffsprivilegelog?
Fourth,March12thisfineforMr.Kargersdeposition.
Finally,canyoupleaseprovideavailabledepositiondatesfora30(b)(6)depositionofPlaintiffinearlyMarch?
Becausediscoveryclosesinamonthandahalf,wewouldlikePlaintiffsresponsestotheaboveassoonaspossibleso
wecanevaluatewhetherweneedtofileamotiontocompel.
Kindregards,
PhilSchreiber
Philip M. Schreiber
Trial Attorney
Case 1:13-cv-01225-JCC-IDD Document 92-2 Filed 08/08/14 Page 3 of 4 PageID# 2074
4
U.S. Department of J ustice
Tax Division
Civil Trial Section - Southern Region
P.O. Box 14198
Washington, DC 20044
or, for Federal Express or UPS:
555 4th Street, NW, Room 6222
Washington, DC 20001
Telephone: (202) 514-6069
Facsimile: (202) 514-9868
The information contained in this communication is confidential and may be subject to disclosure limitations under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and 26 U.S.C. 6103. The information is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to whom it is addressed. If you are not
the intended recipient identified above, or the employee or agent responsible for delivering it to the recipient, you are hereby notified that any use,
dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please immediately
notify the sender identified above by telephone and e-mail, and delete this message.
Mr.BrowntestifiedduringthePlaintiffs30(b)(6)depositionthatPlaintiffsentitsdonors,supportersandmembers
directmailingsthatreferenced(toatleastsomedegree)thedisclosureofPlaintiffsamended2008Form990
unredactedScheduleBand/oritslawsuitagainsttheIRS.Mr.BrownalsotestifiedthatPlaintiffkepttrackofthe
donationsitreceivedinresponsetothesemailingsusingspecificsourcecodes.Finally,Mr.BrowntestifiedthatNOM
wasstillinpossessionofthesedocuments,goingbackasfarasMarch30,2012thedateNOMlearnedofthe
disclosure.
TotheextentPlaintiffdidnotpreviouslyproducecopiesofthesedirectmailings,werequestthatPlaintiffsupplementits
documentproductionandproducecopiesofeachdirectmailingthatmentionsthedisclosureorprospectiveoractual
lawsuitagainsttheIRS.WealsorequestthatPlaintiffproducedocumentsevidencingthedonationsPlaintiffreceivedin
responsetothesemailings,includingdocumentsthatreferencethedonationamountsandthecorrespondingsource
codesincludinganykeyorlegendthatwouldcorrelatethesourcecodetothemailingthedonationwassentin
responseto.
Furthermore,werequestthatPlaintiffsupplementitsinterrogatoryresponsestoidentifythedonationtotalsitreceived
for2012(postMarch30,2012),2013andthen2014brokendownbyelectronicsources,directmailingsandanyother
sources.WeareonlyseekingdonationtotalsPlaintiffreceivedinconnectionwithsolicitationsthatreferencethe
disclosureatissue,andanypossibleoractualcivilactionagainsttheIRS.Inanefforttonarrowourrequest,andina
showingofgoodfaith,ifPlaintiffrespondsfullytoInterrogatorynumber19withinformationondonationsin
responsetoNOMsmailingsthatreferencedthedisclosureorNOMsprospectiveoractuallawsuitagainsttheIRS,it
doesnotneedtoproducedocumentsevidencingspecificdonationsPlaintiffreceivedinresponsetoitsmailings.
Therequesteddocumentsandinformationareresponsivetothefollowingdiscoveryrequests:RequestsforProduction
5,6,7,9,11,18,21,22,23,and24;and,Interrogatories,16,17,and19.WhilePlaintiffhasstatedthatitcouldnot
determinetheintentofitsdonorsinresponsemanyofthegovernmentsdiscoveryrequests,webelievethatPlaintiff
canandmust,pursuanttoitsdiscoveryobligations,aggregatethedonationsitreceivedusingthereferencedsource
codesinordertorespondtothegovernmentsinterrogatories,includingInterrogatorynumber19.WhilePlaintiffhas
arguedthatthesedonationsdonotdemonstratethespecificintentofthedonors,thatisanissuefortheCourtto
decide.(Indeed,Plaintiffalreadyproducedelectronicdataanddocumentsonthesameexacttopic.)DespitePlaintiffs
contention,wecontendthatdonationsPlaintiffreceivedinresponsetoamailingthatreferencesthewrongful
inspectionand/ordisclosure,oranyprospectiveoractualactionagainsttheIRSdoesdemonstratesuchanintent,and
goestotheweightoftheevidenceattrialnotitsadmissibility.
Pleaseletusknowwhenwecanexpecttoreceivethesesupplementaldocumentsandinformation.
Kindregards,
PhilSchreiber
Case 1:13-cv-01225-JCC-IDD Document 92-5 Filed 08/08/14 Page 1 of 2 PageID# 2171
Defendant
Exhibit
_____________
5
2
Philip M. Schreiber
Trial Attorney
U.S. Department of J ustice
Tax Division
Civil Trial Section - Southern Region
P.O. Box 14198
Washington, DC 20044
or, for Federal Express or UPS:
555 4th Street, NW, Room 6222
Washington, DC 20001
Telephone: (202) 514-6069
Facsimile: (202) 514-9868
The information contained in this communication is confidential and may be subject to disclosure limitations under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and 26 U.S.C. 6103. The information is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to whom it is addressed. If you are not
the intended recipient identified above, or the employee or agent responsible for delivering it to the recipient, you are hereby notified that any use,
dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please immediately
notify the sender identified above by telephone and e-mail, and delete this message.