1

Brinksmanship at its Best

The Origins of and Solutions to Americas Political Polarization Problem
By Matt Steiner















Introduction
Today, it is commonplace to assume that American politics is more polarized than it has
ever been. With Washington mired in endless debates over health care, the budget, and the debt
2
ceiling, it is no surprise that many Americans have little faith in the political process. Instead,
they lament the hyper-partisanship and political gridlock that they witness on a daily basis.
In this paper, I try to shed greater light on this entire topic. First, I provide evidence to
confirm that American politics has become more polarized. Then, I assess the factors that have
led to this dramatic shift. Finally, I conclude the paper by offering solutions that I believe will
help the country overcome political polarization.
The Evidence of Political Polarization
Many scholars believe that American politics has become more polarized over the past
thirty years (eg. Cameron 2002; Baldassarri et al. 2008). In this section, I provide two types of
evidence to back up this claim. First, I consider anecdotal evidence that seems to support the
political polarization hypothesis. Then, I turn to numerical evidence to verify this finding.
Anecdotal Evidence
There is quite a bit of anecdotal evidence supporting the political polarization hypothesis.
Personal accounts from former politicians like Olympia Snowe and Joe Liebermann seem to
indicate that many in Washington have moved away from the political center (Snowe 2013;
Lieberman 2014). Recent events such as the government shutdown and the health care reform
debate also lend support to this theory.
Several scholars have tried to document this dramatic shift. In their most recent book,
Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson (2005) blamed political polarization on the Republican
Revolution of the 1990s. To some extent, their findings drew on earlier works, such as David
Rohdes (1991) in depth analysis of party leadership and its effects on party homogeneity in the
House of Representatives. Since then, many scholars have continued to document political
3
polarization in American politics (Sinclair 2006; Mann et al. 2012). Their work has encouraged
others in the academic community to quantify this trend.
Numerical Evidence
Many scholars have increasingly relied on numerical evidence to show that political
polarization has increased. The most common measure to which they have turned is roll-call
voting behavior in Congress. Several studies show that Republicans and Democrats have voted
less frequently with one another on many initiatives than they did in the past (Poole et al. 1997;
Groseclose et al. 1999; Clinton et al. 2004). This change seems to indicate that Congress has
become more polarized.
Other scholars have accepted this finding but have also tried to measure political
polarization in different ways. For example, Michael Barber and Nolan McCarty (2013) found
that the number of political issues outside of party conflict has fallen dramatically. Instead, many
previously non-partisan issues have become politicized. Similarly, Geoffrey Layman and
Thomas Carsey (2002) showed that the attitudes of party activists have moved farther away from
the political center.
Nevertheless, some scholars have challenged this theory. The most poignant critique has
come from Morris Fiorina (2010), a political scientist at Stanford University. According to
Fiorina, everyday Americans havent become more polarized. Instead political elites have moved
away from the center. In order to defend this claim, Fiorina relies on a mountain of survey data
measuring political attitudes across the country. In the process, he casts some doubt on the
political polarization hypothesis. Nevertheless, his findings dont debunk the entire theory
altogether. Instead, they paint a much more intricate picture of political polarization in America.
The Causes of Political Polarization
4
The causes of political polarization are multiple and complex. Several scholars have tried
to identify which factors have played the largest role, but the academic community is yet to
arrive at any definitive conclusion. In this section, I outline each of these factors and identify
which ones I believe have polarized American politics most.
Political Realignment
Many political scientists believe that political realignment is the primary cause of
polarization in American politics (Carmines et al. 1990; Kimball et al. 2010, 8; Pildes 2011, 287-
297; Bonica 2014, 7). According to this logic, civil rights legislation alienated many southern
Democrats and moved them more toward the Republican Party. This removed an important
conservative constituency from the Democratic Party and made the party as a whole more
liberal. Over several decades, both parties homogenized and became more ideologically pure.
The net result, according to this theory, is that American politics became more polarized.
Some scholars believe that this narrative oversimplifies American political history and
only looks at the Democratic half of the coin. Nolan McCarty (2011) in particular has challenged
this one-sided view and has said that the death of moderate Republicans played as large a role in
political polarization as southern backlash against the Democratic Party. However, McCarty does
not clearly identify which factors led to the demise of moderate Republicans. Its possible that
President Nixons southern strategy alienated many northern moderates within the party and
discouraged them from voting Republican. This may have made the Republican base more
conservative and homogenous and may have also set the stage for todays polarized
environment. Whatever the cause may be, it is clear that changes within the Republican Party
have contributed to political polarization as much as changes within the Democratic Party.
Individual Personalities
5
Some pundits believe that a lack of moderate statesmen is to blame for political
polarization (eg. Poole et al. 2007, 319). To some extent, their analysis is warranted. Over the
past thirty years, the number of congressmen or senators with centrist ideological scores has
dwindled to almost zero (Theriault 2006). This means that there has been less compromise in
Washington and more partisanship.
The problem with this theory is that it fails to recognize the much larger factors at work
that have moved politicians toward the political extremities. Washington has fewer moderate
statesmen because both political parties are more ideologically pure. This theory fails to
recognize this simple fact. Instead, it blames Washingtons dysfunction on a lack of courage and
political will. While many politicians might lack both of these qualities, they also hold
increasingly extreme views that make compromise difficult. As a result, this theory is not valid
and cannot account for todays polarized environment.
Demographic Changes
Other scholars have turned to demographic factors to explain Americas political
polarization. Famed journalist Bill Bishop (2008) first identified this trend when he wrote his
seminal book The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded Americans is Tearing us Apart.
According to Bishop, Americas socioeconomic landscape has changed considerably over the
past thirty years. Instead of living side-by-side with individuals of different economic and social
standing, Americans have increasingly sorted themselves into homogenous communities. This
has exposed many communities to a narrower range of political views and has made Americans
more ideologically extreme.
Several demographic factors underlie this change. Perhaps the most important of these
factors is the economic success of the south. Beginning in the 1970s, millions of Americans
6
began migrating southward. Though some were inevitably drawn by the souths milder climate, a
large portion moved to seek out new economic opportunities. Their entrepreneurial enthusiasm
injected new energy into the southern economy and helped fuel newfound economic
conservatism all across the Sun Belt. No event more clearly illustrates this trend than the tax
revolts that swept across the entire country during the late 1970s and 1980s. By the 2000s, this
economic conservatism had turned many white southerners into uncompromising Republican
partisans.
Just as important as the economic success of the south was resurgent racial segregation
during the 1970s. Beginning in the 1970s, many affluent whites began to flee from inner cities
and settle in suburbs. This increased the proportion of poor African Americans in cities and
turned many urban areas into de facto areas of economic and racial segregation. Politically, it
also created many more homogenous constituencies with median ideological views that
increasingly diverged from the American political center.
These changes were exacerbated by a surge in income inequality. From the 1970s
onward, wages failed to keep pace with inflation. This left many individuals with less money and
increased the gap between the rich and poor. As a result, it pushed some voters to the left and to
the right. According to Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal (2006), this shift
polarized the American electorate and made compromise difficult.
During the same timeframe, the country also sorted itself by age. Younger, more
progressive individuals moved to cities while their older, more conservative parents stayed in the
suburbs. This made cities increasingly liberal and forced many politicians to concern themselves
with progressive issues, such as environmental protection, abortion, and same sex marriage. To a
7
large extent, this change reflected a much broader shift in attitudes away from materialism and
toward what political scientist Ronald Inglehart (1977) has called post-materialism.
Finally, religion also played a role. Beginning in the 1970s, churches became
increasingly politicized. On the right, evangelical crusaders like Pat Robertson started to infuse
religious doctrine with overt political gestures (Kurtzman 2013). These efforts culminated in
Robertsons 1988 presidential campaign, which saw record numbers of churchgoers take their
religious views to the political stage. On the left, the same process occurred, especially within
African American communities where some ministers injected ideological extremism into their
sermons. No minister better typified this phenomenon than Reverend Jeremiah Wright, whose
sermons frequently criticized free market capitalism and conservative racism (Sanchez 2014).
Together, these factors conspired to sort Americans based on their political tendencies and make
the country as a whole more polarized.
Mass Media
One of the least looked-at factors contributing to political polarization is the rise of mass
media (eg. Della Vigna et al. 2007). According to this theory, the rise of cable television, talk
radio, and internet has injected populism and ideological extremism into American politics. This
change has moved Republicans and Democrats farther apart and increased political polarization.
There is some evidence to support this hypothesis. Beginning in the 1970s, many
Americans stopped watching local broadcast television and instead turned to national cable
television and in particular, entertainment programs. This choice may have made some
individuals less politically engaged and less likely to vote. As a result, it may have also narrowed
the electorate to include only those individuals who followed the news on a regular basis. When
the conservative Fox News and liberal MSNBC were established in the 1990s, this change may
8
have had especially dire consequences. In particular, it may have fed many Americans a biased
view of the news. Over time, this might have made many Americans more partisan and
ideological.
This narrative certainly sounds plausible, but it isnt necessarily correct. Political scientist
Markus Prior (2013) has pointed out several flaws that potentially invalidate the theory.
According to Prior, most Americans rely on several news outlets that span the entire political
spectrum. This means that most of the country gets a relatively unbiased view of the news, which
precludes most individuals from any form of political indoctrination. Nevertheless, a small
portion of the population does consume news in a noticeably one-sided manner. For these
individuals, the theory does appear to hold.
International Power
Another argument that some scholars have recently advanced is that the level of domestic
polarization is directly linked to the amount of international power that America possesses.
According to the political scientists Joseph Bafumi and Joseph Parent (2012), America has
experienced more political polarization when it has been more powerful. This is largely because
during these times, there have been fewer global threats to pacify domestic divisions and hold
polarization at bay. This is certainly a plausible theory, but it remains under-researched and
requires more investigation.
Campaign Finance
Many everyday Americans blame the campaign finance structure used in American
elections for the countrys political discord (eg. Hollings 2014). According to this logic, many
politicians pursue an ideologically extreme agenda in order to please their campaign donors. This
decision exacerbates political divisions and makes any form of compromise difficult.
9
For the most part, the evidence for this theory is mixed. On the one hand, a number
studies show that the sources of campaign funding have little effect on a politicians voting
behavior (eg. Ansolabehere et al. 2003). Nevertheless, several others show that candidates have
raised more money from individual donors, who are by most accounts more ideological than
their interest group or political action committee (PACs) counterparts (Barber 2013; Bonica
2013). Whether or not this kind of shift in campaign financing will lead to a corresponding shift
in political behavior is still up for debate (Baron 1994; Moon 2004; Ensley 2009). By this token,
it is unclear if Americas campaign finance structure has increased political polarization.
Primary Elections
Primary elections are also another potential cause of political polarization (Gerber et al.
1998; Burden 2004; Brady et al. 2007). In many cases, they force moderate Democrats and
Republicans to move toward the left or right in order to secure their partys nomination. In the
long run, this encourages politicians to avoid compromise and move away from the political
center.
There is quite a bit of anecdotal evidence to support this hypothesis. Perhaps the clearest
illustration of this theory is John McCains reelection bid in 2010. Like many moderate
Republican senators, McCain faced a primary challenger from the right. His opponent, former
congressman J.D. Hayworth, hoped to convince primary voters that McCain wasnt conservative
enough for the party. In order to address these concerns, McCain tacked to right and abandoned
many of the political initiatives he previously supported. Among these were climate change
legislation, immigration reform, and campaign finance reform. Though this move helped McCain
win reelection, it also led him to oppose several pieces of legislation that he might have
previously supported. As a result, it increased political polarization in Congress.
10
Recently, scholars have come to question this theory. For example, one study found that
the level of competition in primary elections has very little effect on political polarization in
Congress (Hirano et al. 2010). Other studies seem to confirm this finding and extend it to other
political contexts (eg. McCarty 2011, 363-366). This means that primary elections might not play
as a large a role in political polarization as previously thought.
Gerrymandering
Perhaps the most talked about cause of political polarization is gerrymandering (Carson
et al. 2007; Miller 2013). Exponents of this theory believe that allowing state legislatures to
control redistricting has created many heavily partisan districts that dont adequately represent
the American political center. This has encouraged politicians to diverge from the center and
instead support an extreme agenda.
This theory is flawed for several reasons. First, state legislatures dont always draw
heavily partisan districts (Levitt 2010, 57-66). In many cases, they actually try to maximize the
number of districts that will support their party even if this decision makes each district less
partisan. This is especially true when one party controls the redistricting process. Second, this
theory isnt supported by the entire academic community. Indeed, many studies show that
gerrymandering has virtually no effect on political polarization (Mann 2006; McCarty et al.
2009). With this in mind, it is hard to accept the gerrymandering hypothesis.
Congressional Leadership
Some political insiders believe that the increasing power of congressional leaders has
contributed to political polarization (Rottinghaus 2013). According to this theory, congressional
leaders have used their authority to force moderates within their respective parties to avoid
11
compromise and support party-line initiatives. This has increased partisan gridlock and
exacerbated political polarization.
There is some evidence to support this theory. For example, congressional reforms during
the 1970s weakened the seniority rule, a little-known rule that historically guaranteed a
committees chairmanship to the committees longest serving member. Instead, party leaders
assumed more control of the committee appointment process. This trend continued during the
1990s when Newt Gingrich was Speaker of the House. Under Speaker Gingrichs reign, the
seniority rule was eliminated and congressional leaders assumed even more control. Thereafter,
earning a committee chairmanship was contingent on supporting party leaders and their
initiatives. All of these changes coincided with increased polarization in Congress, which seems
to suggest that this theory is valid.
Nevertheless, there are several reasons to doubt the congressional leadership hypothesis.
Perhaps the main reason is the state of affairs in the current session of Congress. Far from being
all powerful, Republican leaders in the House of Representatives have had to give in to insurgent
tea partiers on several occasions. This has intensified partisan gridlock and made legislative
progress nearly impossible.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the theory does have some support. For example,
former Congressman Mickey Edwards (2012) has blamed political dysfunction in Washington
on congressional leaders. Some academics agree with Edwards and have also lent support to the
theory (eg. Hall et al. 2014). From this, one could reasonably conclude that this theory might be
valid.
The Solutions to Political Polarization
12
In order to fulfill its destiny as a fully functioning liberal democracy, America must
overcome political polarization. In this section, I outline several policy changes that I believe
will move the country in this direction. These solutions arent radical and dont represent a huge
departure from past practices. Instead, they are practical fixes that could potentially garner
enough political support to be enacted. Nevertheless, these solutions arent perfect and wont
entirely eliminate political polarization in America.
Reinstating the Fairness Doctrine
The first potential solution involves the Fairness Doctrine. The Fairness Doctrine was a
rule created in 1949 by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that required all
broadcast outlets licensed by the FCC to cover controversial issues in an unbiased manner. The
rationale behind this rule was simple. Since the number of broadcast outlets was very limited,
federal authorities wanted to ensure that Americans were receiving a fair and balanced view of
the news. In most cases, this meant that broadcasters had to give equal airtime to both
conservative and liberal points of view. Beginning in the 1980s, this rule came under attack.
Even though the Supreme Court had upheld it on a number of occasions, President Reagan
decided to repeal it during his second term in office. This decision enabled ideologues like Rush
Limbaugh and Howard Stern to fill the airwaves with relatively fringe views. Over time, this
may have radicalized regular listeners and moved them away from the political center.
The best way to address this problem is to reinstate the Fairness Doctrine (Holm 2014).
Though this change might generate some backlash, it would go a long way toward removing
populist extremism from many media outlets. At the same time, it would also encourage
Americans to consider both sides of important political debates. This might moderate political
discourse across the country.
13
Nevertheless, this change would only influence a small minority of the population that
consumes media in a one-sided manner (Prior 2013). As a result, it would not eliminate all
political extremism in America. By the same token, it would not directly address all of the other
ways in which the country has become polarized.
Reforming Primary Elections
Reforming primary elections is another potential option that policymakers can pursue
(Kraushaar 2013). Even if primary elections dont contribute to political polarization, pursuing
reform might increase civic engagement and public trust in American political institutions. In the
long-run, this could help eliminate Americas social capital deficit (Putnam 2001) and maybe
even moderate political views (Steketee 2011).
There are three basic ways in which America could accomplish this task. First, the public
could encourage state governments to use open primaries. Open primaries enable voters to
participate in any primary election regardless of political affiliation. This means that centrist
independents can vote in a political primary and potentially moderate the outcome. However, it
also means that members of the opposite party can engage in strategic voting and support an
extreme candidate in another party (Chen et al. 2002). To some extent, this defeats the purpose
of the open primary and makes moderation harder to come by.
Second, state governments could experiment with blanket primaries. Blanket primaries
are very similar to open primaries, but they require that all candidates be on the same slate
regardless of political affiliation. Under these rules, the top two candidates in the primary
election proceed onto the general election. Since political independents can participate, some
believe that this electoral formula encourages moderation. However, just like open primaries,
14
blanket primaries can see quite a bit of strategic voting (eg. Alvarez et al. 2002). Therefore, they
arent an ideal solution.
Finally, state governments could turn to semi-closed primaries. Semi-closed primaries
have many of the same rules as open primaries, but they bar voters registered with political
parties from voting in another partys primary. At the same time, they still allow political
independents to participate in any primary election. Together, these two rules ensure that
strategic voting doesnt occur on a widespread basis (Gerbert et al. 1998, 310-312). As a result,
they also make semi-closed primaries the best potential reform option.
Eliminating Gerrymandering
Policymakers could also consider eliminating gerrymandering (Levitt 2010). Like
primary election reform, this change might not reduce political polarization, but it could very
well increase civic engagement, social capital, and public trust. In the long-run, this could
potentially moderate American political discourse (Steketee 2011).
In order to eliminate gerrymandering, state legislatures should turn redistricting over to
independent, non-partisan commissions. These commissions should be transparent and should
operate under a specific set of rules. First, they should try to make electoral districts as
competitive as possible. Second, they should make sure that local communities arent split up
even if this means that some districts are slightly less competitive than they otherwise would
have been. Third, they should operate in accordance with the Voting Rights Act, which requires
that minority communities receive adequate electoral representation. Finally, they should avoid
using certain redistricting tactics like cracking, packing, and tacking when they draw electoral
districts. This will make many districts more competitive and potentially encourage more centrist
independents to vote. Eventually, this might lead to greater political moderation.
15
Reinstating the Seniority Rule
Policymakers could also address political polarization by reinstating the seniority rule
(eg. Parker 1996, 142). This move would make the committee chairmanship selection process
less political and would encourage members of Congress to sometimes vote against their
respective parties. In the process, it would also give congressional leaders less power and
potentially lead to more moderation.
Nevertheless, it would do little to address political polarization in the Senate. This is
largely because the Senate still uses the seniority rule to fill committee chairmanships. Therefore,
this solution wouldnt entirely eliminate political polarization in Washington.
Other Potential Solutions
There is also a myriad of other solutions that might reduce political polarization.
However, quite a few of them are not feasible or wouldnt garner enough political support. Still,
they are worth noting.
First, the federal government could try to enact measures to combat the demographic
changes and geographic sorting that has occurred throughout the United States. These could
include tax breaks to encourage wealthy families to move into poorer areas or federal mandates
that force localities to build mixed income communities. These reforms would probably run into
stiff opposition and fail to change the status quo. Even if they were enacted, they wouldnt
necessarily end partisan gridlock and bring political moderation. This is especially true given that
past efforts at integration such as school busing have ended in failure. Therefore, these changes
arent the best way to cut through political polarization.
Second, Washington could change its strategic objectives, cut defense spending, and
reduce its international power (eg. Press et al. 1997). This, in theory, might increase security
16
competition and help unify the populace around a common security threat. In the long-run, these
changes might also bring an end to political polarization. The problem with this solution is that it
doesnt account for the natural security that Americas geographic location already provides
(Van Evera 1998, 19). Since America is surrounded by two large oceans and flanked by two
relatively docile countries, it is a very secure country. Only a massive shift in the global
distribution of power could change this situation. The rise of China might represent this very
shift (Ross 2010), but until Beijing reaches parity with Washington, it will be impossible to tell
whether international power actually influences domestic political polarization.
Third, the federal government could change the campaign finance structure of American
elections. This might reduce the influence of special interests and make Congress less polarized.
However, given that the Supreme Court has not been very amenable to strict limits on campaign
spending (Kennedy 2010; Roberts 2014), it is highly unlikely that any strong measure would
survive a battle in court. Therefore, policymakers should consider other options if they want to
overcome political polarization.
Conclusion
Over the past decade, America has been plagued by political polarization. Both anecdotal
evidence and numerical evidence seem to confirm this claim. The causes of this political shift are
indeed complex, but they do boil down to a concrete set of factors, such as political realignment,
demographic change, the rise of mass media, and empowered congressional leadership.
Reversing this trend will be difficult, but as this paper has demonstrated, it isnt impossible. By
reinstating the Fairness Doctrine and the seniority rule, reforming primary elections, and
eliminating gerrymandering, American can once again put itself on the right path toward political
consensus.

17










Works Cited

Alvarez, Michael, and Jonathan Nagler. Should I Stay or Should I Go? Sincere and Strategic
Crossover Voting in California Assembly Races, in Voting at the Political Fault Line:
Californias Experiment with the Blanket Primary, edited by Bruce Cain and Elisabeth
Gerber. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, John de Figueiredo, and James Snyder. Why is there so little money
in U.S. politics? Journal of Economic Perspectives 17.1 (2003): 105-130.

Bafumi, Joseph, and Joseph Parent. International polarity and Americas polarization.
International Politics 49.1 (2012): 1-35.

Baldassarri, Delia, and Andrew Gelman. Partisans without Constraint: Political Polarization
and Trends in American Public Opinion. American Journal of Sociology 114.2 (2008):
408-446

Barber, Michael. Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of State
Legislatures. Unpublished Manuscript, 2013.

Barber, Michael, and Nolan McCarty. Causes and Consequences of Political Polarization,
in Negotiating Agreement in Politics, edited by Jane Mansbridge and Cathie Jo Martin.
Washington: American Political Science Association (2013): 19-53.

Baron, David. Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters. American
Political Science Review 88.1 (1994): 33-47.

Bishop, Bill. The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded Americans is Tearing us
Apart. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2008.

Bonica, Adam. Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace. American Journal of
Political Science 57.2 (2013): 294-311.
18

Bonica, Adam. The Punctuated Origins of Senate Polarization. Legislative Studies
Quarterly 34.1 (2014): 5-26.

Brady, David, Hahrie Han, and Jeremy Pope. Primary Elections and Candidate Ideology:
Out of Step with the Primary Electorate? Legislative Studies Quarterly 32.1 (2007): 79-
105.

Burden, Barry. Candidate Positioning in U.S. Congressional Elections. British Journal of
Political Science 34.2 (2004): 211-227.

Cameron, Charles. Studying the Polarized Presidency. Presidential Studies Quarterly 32.4
(2002): 647-663.

Carmines, Edward, and James Stimson. Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of
American Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

Carson, Jamie, Michael Crespin, Charles Finocchiaro, and David Rohde. Redistricting and
Party Polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives. American Politics Research
35.6 (2007): 878-904.

Chen, Kong-Pin, and Sheng-Zhang Yang. Strategic Voting in Open Primaries. Public
Choice 112.1 (2002): 1-30.

Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call
Data. American Political Science Review 98.2 (2004): 355-370.

Della Vigna, Stefano, and Ethan Kaplan. The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 122.3 (2007): 1187-1234.

Edwards, Mickey. The Parties Versus the People: How to Turn Republicans and Democrats
into Americans. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012.

Ensley, Michael. Individual Campaign Contributions and Candidate Ideology. Public
Choice 138.1 (2009): 221-238.

Fiorina, Morris, Samuel Abrams, and Jeremy Pope. Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized
America. London: Longman, 2010.

Gerber, Elisabeth, and Rebecca Morton. Primary Election Systems and Representation.
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 14.2 (1998): 304-324.

19
Groseclose, Timothy, Steven Levitt, and James Snyder. Comparing Interest Group Scores
Across Time: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress. American Political Science
Review 93.1 (1999): 33-50.


Hacker, Jacob, and Paul Pierson. Off Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of
American Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.

Hall, Andrew, and Kenneth Shepsle. The Changing Value of Seniority in the U.S. House:
Conditional Party Government Revised. Journal of Politics 76.1 (2014): 98-113.

Hirano, Shigeo, James Snyder, Stephen Ansolabehere, and John Hansen. Primary Elections
and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress. Quarterly Journal of Political Science
5.1 (2010): 169-191.

Hollings, Ernest. How to break Washington gridlock: limit campaign spending. The Post
and Courier, January 10, 2014.

Holm, Nancy. Bring Back the Fairness Doctrine: Id Rather Have Debate Than
Ranting-and-Raving Journalism. The Huffington Post, February 13, 2014.

Inglehart, Ronald. The Silent Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Kennedy, Anthony. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. Supreme Court Case,
January 21, 2010.

Kimball, David, Matthew Owings, and Michael Artime. Race, Class, and Religion in the
Southern Realignment, presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Association, 2010.

Kraushaar, Josh. Why Reforming the Primary Process Would Produce a More Productive
Congress. The National Journal, February 6, 2013.

Kurtzman, Daniel. Stupid Pat Robertson Quotes: The 10 Stupidest Things Pat Robertson
Ever Said. About.com, November 10, 2013.

Layman, Geoffrey, and Thomas Carsey. Party Polarization and Conflict Extension in the
American Electorate. American Journal of Political Science 46.4 (2002): 786-802.

Levitt, Justin. A Citizens Guide to Redistricting. New York: The Brennan Center for Justice,
2010.

20
Lieberman, Joseph. An Interview with Joe Lieberman. Penn Political Review, February
11, 2014.

Mann, Thomas Polarizing the House of Representatives: How much does gerrymandering
matter? in Red and Blue Nation?: Characteristics and Causes of Americas Polarized
Politics, edited by Pietro Nivola and David Brady. Washington: Brookings Institution
Press (2006): 263-283.

Mann, Thomas, and Norman Ornstein. Its Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American
Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism. New York: Basic
Books, 2012.

McCarty, Nolan. The Limits of Electoral and Legislative Reform in Addressing
Polarization. California Law Review 99.2 (2011): 359-372.

McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. Polarized America: The Dance of
Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006.

McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. Does Gerrymandering Cause
Polarization? American Journal of Political Science 53.3. (2009): 666-680.

Miller, Jay. Yes, gerrymandering is a cause of political polarization. Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel, October 19, 2013.

Moon, Woojin. Party Activists, Campaign Resources, and Candidate Position Taking:
Theory, Tests, and Applications. British Journal of Political Science 34.4 (2004): 611-
633.

Pildes, Richard. Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy
in America. California Law Review 99.2 (2011): 273-334.

Poole, Keith, and Howard Rosenthal. Congress: A Political Economic History of Roll-Call
Voting. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Poole, Keith, and Howard Rosenthal. Ideology and Congress. Piscataway: Transaction
Publishers, 2007.

Press, Daryl, Eugene Gholz, and Harvey Sapolsky. Come Home, America: The Strategy of
Restraint in the Face of Temptation. International Security 21.4 (1997): 5-48.

Prior, Markus. Media and Political Polarization. Annual Review of Political Science 16.1
21
(2013): 101-127.

Putnam, Robert. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2001.

Roberts, John. McCutcheon et al. v. Federal Election Commission. Supreme Court Case,
April 2, 2014.

Rohde, David. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1991.

Ross, Robert. Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and
Balancing in East Asia. Security Studies 15.3 (2006): 355-395.

Rottinghaus, Brandon. Going Partisan: Presidential Leadership in a Polarized Environment.
Issues in Governance Working Paper # 39, Brookings Institution, October 28, 2013.

Sanchez, Mary. The Rev. Jeremiah Wright Jr.s visit to Kansas City aims to spotlight policy
and debate. Kansas City Star, April 20, 2014.

Sinclair, Barbara. Party Wars: Polarization and the Politics of National Policymaking.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006.

Snowe, Olympia. Americans must mobilize for moderation. The Christian Science Monitor,
September 9, 2013.

Steketee, Mike. Trapped in echo chamber world of our own opinions. The Australian, April
9, 2011.

Theriault, Sean. Party Polarization in the U.S. Congress: Member Replacement and Member
Adaptation. Party Politics 12.4 (2006): 483-503.

Van Evera, Stephen. Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War. International Security 22.4
(1998): 5-43.