Co v.

Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: citizenship
Date: July 30, 1991
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and
reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of
Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in
the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto
Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of
the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent
premised on the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines;
and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of
Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the
private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November
12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated
February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:
WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:
The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's
grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his
residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought
from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate
of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was
born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year
1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside
community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices.
He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan
met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and,
thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong
who was born in 1948.
Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He
decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the
vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a
result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong
Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of
where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose
Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance
of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final
and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of
Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of
Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to
him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old,
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos
insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
After completing his elementary education, the private
respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to
acquire his secondary and college education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and
passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities
were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job
in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he
worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.
In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to
the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen
was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the
Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on
the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil
Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional
Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship
since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV
read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying
not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but
also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship
before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien
mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while
one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect
Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws,
conferred the status of a natural-born
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of
the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino
mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing
elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural
born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was
only nine (9) years old.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in
1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have
filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already
having been a citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a
citizen since he was nine years old
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of
the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right
of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized
citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of
stripping respondents father of his citizenship after his death. An attack on
a persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its
nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine
citizenship to respondents father as null and void would run against the
principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest

Djumantan vs. Domingo
Post under case digests, Political Law at Tuesday, February 21,
2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia
as a contract worker.

On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17,
1974, he married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to
the Philippines in January 1979. On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her
two children with Banez, arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The
latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and
was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in
Indonesia. When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport on January 13, 1979, Banez, together with
Marina Cabael, met them.As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived
in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the
Philippines as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act
of 1940.

In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband
and petitioner. On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was
changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident under Section
13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an alien
certificate of registration.

Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter
complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter to the
CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained at the CID
detention cell.

The CID issued an order revoking the status of permanent resident given to
petitioner, the Board found the 2nd marriage irregular and not in
accordance with the laws of the Phils. There was thus no basis for giving
her the status of permanent residence, since she was an Indonesian citizen
and her marriage with a Filipino Citizen was not valid.

Thus this petition for certiorari

Issue: Whether or not the courts may review deportation proceedings

Held : Yes. Section 1 of Article 8 says Judicial Power includes 1) settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable 2) determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.

We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under
the law the CID can validly deport petitioner as an "undesirable alien"
regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Generally, the right of the
President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to
the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and
prevent their entry into the country.

However, under clause 1 of Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 an
"alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by
means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and
admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at
any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to deportation.

The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a
prescriptive period and "shall not be effected ... unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for
deportation arises". Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19,
1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of
petitioner into the country, more than five years had elapsed before the
issuance of the order of her deportation on September 27, 1990.
CITIZENSHIP
"No person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen."
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ,
respondents.
FACTS: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. On November 5, 1985, respondent
Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the United
States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He was elected as the Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then
running for reelection.
Petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required
under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto
and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan.
The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE : Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
RULING: The petition is without merit.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
(1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4)
marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. If he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he
will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status
as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It
bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

MERCADO VS. MANZANO
G.R. No. 135083, May 26 1999

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B.
Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May
11, 1998 elections. Respondent was then declared the winning candidate;
however its proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that
private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC
granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a
dual citizen and, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code provides
that persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any
elective position.
Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau
of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and
alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a
Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States,
San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an
American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as
an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. From these
facts, respondent is a dual citizen - both a Filipino and a US citizen.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Manzano is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

HELD:
The petition was dismissed. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance,
such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as
a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San
Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act
on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause under Article IV of the Constitution, it
is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses
dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries
which follow the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if
by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that
country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the
former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are
deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result
of an individuals volition.

By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post,
private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced
his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy
sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;
that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that
he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear
true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand,
private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken
part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.
JACOT VS DAL
FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution dated 28
September 2007 of the Commission on Elections(COMELEC) En
Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June
2007 of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying him from
running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in
the 14 May 2007National and Local Elections, on the ground that
he failed to make a personal renouncement of his United
States(US) citizenship. Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13
December1989. Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request
for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los
Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006
an Order of Approval of petitioners request, and on the same
day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo.

On 27 September2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued
Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a
citizen of the Philippines. Six months after, on 26 March 2007,
petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of
Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. In the
meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were
held. Petitioner garnered the highest numberof votes for the
position of Vice Mayor.On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second
Division finally issued its Resolution disqualifying the petitioner
fromrunning for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman,
Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of hisUS
citizenship.

ISSUE: whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a
candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure to
make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.
HELD:
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los
Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially
comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct
requirements to be complied with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-
born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized
citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or
retain their Philippine citizenship.

By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino
swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein
on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation
might arise under Republic Act No.9225 wherein said Filipino has
dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine
citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship. The afore-quoted oath
of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the
Certificate of Candidacy which must be executed by any
person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine
elections. The law categorically requires persons seeking elective
public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or
those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public
officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or
before the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Hence, Section
5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born
Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a
foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those
seeking elective public offices in the Philippines
, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer
prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates
of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections

Jacot v. Comelec
G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner Jacot assails Comelec Resolution affirming his disqualification
from running for the position of Vice-Mayor for failure to comply the
citizenship requirement. Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, who became a naturalized U.S citizen. Petitioner sought to
reacquire his Philippine citizenship under R.A No. 9225. Six months after,
petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy. Respondent Dal filed a Petition
for Disqualification before the COMELEC against petitioner arguing that the
latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2)
of Republic Act No. 9225 for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws. When the local and national elections were
held petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice
Mayor. Thereafter, COMELEC finally issued its Resolution disqualifying the
petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
dismissed for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has validly comply the citizenship requirement as
required by law for persons seeking public office.
Ruling:
No. R.A 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are
already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain
their Philippine citizenship. It specifically provides that public office in the
Philippines should meet the Constitutional requirements and existing laws.
At the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath. Filipinos reacquiring or retaining
their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 should not only
take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to
explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective
posts in the Philippines. A candidate in Philippine elections must only have
one citizenship, that is, Philippine citizenship. This the petitioner fails to do.
A candidate who failed to comply with the election requirements applicable
to dual citizens and received the highest number of votes for an elective
position does not dispense with, or amount to a waiver of, the citizenship
requirement. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot
cure the ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the
candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a
candidate must be strictly applied. The application of the constitutional and
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. The
appeal was DISMISSED. Comelec Resolution was AFFIRMED and
petitioner was DISQUALIFIED.


TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 198742
Facts: Petitioner, a natural-born Filipino citizen, became a naturalized
Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas
Condon. In 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia
pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. It was
approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines. In 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of
Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn
issued the Order certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
citizen. Petitioner sought elective office during the May 10, 2010
elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the
highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate.
Separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility were
filed before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioners
disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a
dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225. Petitioner argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal
and not a mandatory requirement.

Issue: Whether petitioner is qualified to hold her elective post

Held: No. R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of
Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic.

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino
citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant
therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5. Under
the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-
acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she
held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine. Before she initially
sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian
citizenship in Canberra, Australia, which was not under oath, contrary
to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign
citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer
oath. When the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no
occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only room for
application. Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one such instance: In
Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its categorical and single meaning: a
Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public
position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a
renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the
certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the
renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be
contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law
who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal
terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship. Failure to
renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of
Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen
ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office.

Another ruling:
The Court held that petitioner Sobejana-Condon was disqualified from running for elective office for failure to
renounce her Australian citizenship under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Sec. 5(2) that the renunciation of
foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning and
must thus be read literally. The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before
an officer authorized to administer oath, the Court held.
The Court further held that the petitioners act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective
renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While the Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with
dual citizenship of a certificate of candidate is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling
was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of RA 9255 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional
condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. It added that the fact that petitioner won the
elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy since garnering the most number of votes does not validate the
election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
[Petitioner] is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her
Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines, held the Court.
The Court also held that it cannot read the Australian Citizen Act of 1978 under which petitioner claim she deemed to
have lost her Australian citizenship into RA 9225 as the Court would be applying not what the legislative department
has deemed wise to require. To do so would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the
people of this Republic.
Petitioner Sobejano-Condon was a natural-born Filipino citizen on August 8, 1944 but became a naturalized
Australian citizen due to her marriage to one Kevin Thomas Condon on December 13, 1984. On December 2, 2005,
she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia
pursuant to Sec. 3 of RA 9225, which was approved and she took her oath of allegiance to the Republic on December
5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the
Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the order dated
September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
She ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in 2007 elections but lost her bid. She ran again and won in
the May 2010 elections, this time for position of Vice-Mayor, and took her oath on May 13, 2010. However, private
respondents Luis M. Bautista, et al., all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo
warranto questioning her eligibility before the RTC on the issue of her dual citizenship and that she failed to execute
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
The RTC on October 22, 2010 ruled that petitioners failure to comply with sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 rendered her
ineligible to run and hold public office. It also nullified her proclamation as winning candidate and declared the
position of Vice-Mayor in Caba, La Union vacant. Sobejana-Condon appealed to the COMELEC and the poll bodys
Second Division dismissed the same for failure to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. On motion for
reconsideration, the appeal was reinstated by the COMELEC en banc in its September 6, 2011 resolution. However,
the COMELEC en banc,in the same resolution, concurred with the findings and conclusions of the RTC. Thus, it
dismissed petitioners instant appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the October 22, 2010 decision of the RTC, as well
as granted the Motion for Execution filed by private respondents.
The Court held also that the COMELEC en banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to decide
the substantive merits of the petitioners appeal after ruling for reinstatement. It held that an appeal may be
simultaneously reinstated and definitively resolved by the COMELEC en banc in a resolution disposing of a motion
for reconsideration pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the Constitution and Sec. 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
The Court further held that the COMELEC en banc has the power to order discretionary execution of judgment which
is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Citing Sec. 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the Court also held that execution pending appeal may be issued by an
appellate court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction.
The Court held that private respondents are not estopped from questioning petitioners eligibility to hold public office
pursuant to Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code which allows the filing of quo warranto petition within 10 days
after the proclamation of the elections results, which was what private respondents did. (GR No. 198742, Sobejana-
Condon v. COMELEC, August 10, 2012)