G.R. No.

202370 September 23, 2013

JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari
1
assails the 16 March 2012 Decision
2
and
the 28 June 2012 Resolution
3
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
95322. The CA affirmed the 26 September 2008 Order
4
of the Regional Trial
Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14 (RTC), in Civil Case No. 787.
The Facts
On 7 September 1985, petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. (Salas) and respondent
Eden Villena Aguila (Aguila) were married. On 7 June 1986, Aguila gave birth to
their daughter, Joan Jiselle. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling.
Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or their daughter.
On 7 October 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
(petition) citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
petition states that they "have no conjugal properties whatsoever."
5
In the Return
of Summons dated 13 October 2003, the sheriff narrated that Salas instructed
his mother Luisa Salas to receive the copy of summons and the petition.
6

On 7 May 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision
7
declaring the nullity of the
marriage of Salas and Aguila (RTC Decision). The RTC Decision further
provides for the "dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, if any."
8

On 10 September 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion
9
stating that she
discovered: (a) two 200-square-meter parcels of land with improvements located
in San Bartolome, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. N-259299-A and TCT No. N-255497; and (b) a 108-square-meter parcel of
land with improvement located in Tondo, Manila, covered by TCT No. 243373
(collectively, "Discovered Properties"). The registered owner of the Discovered
Properties is "Juan S.Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas." The manifestation was
set for hearing on 21 September 2007. However, Salas notice of hearing was
returned unserved with the remark, "RTS Refused To Receive."
On 19 September 2007, Salas filed a Manifestation with Entry of
Appearance
10
requesting for an Entry of Judgment of the RTC Decision since no
motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed and no conjugal property was
involved.
On 21 September 2007, the hearing for Aguilas manifestation ensued, with
Aguila, her counsel and the state prosecutor present. During the hearing, Aguila
testified that on 17 April 2007 someone informed her of the existence of the
Discovered Properties. Thereafter, she verified the information and secured
copies of TCTs of the Discovered Properties. When asked to clarify, Aguila
testified that Rubina C. Salas (Rubina) is Salas common-law wife.
11

On 8 February 2008, Salas filed an Opposition to the Manifestation
12
alleging
that there is no conjugal property to be partitioned based on Aguilas petition.
According to Salas, Aguilas statement was a judicial admission and was not
made through palpable mistake. Salas claimed that Aguila waived her right to
the Discovered Properties. Salas likewise enumerated properties he allegedly
waived in favor of Aguila, to wit:(1) parcels of land with improvements located in
Sugar Landing Subdivision, Alangilan, Batangas City; No. 176 Brias Street,
Nasugbu, Batangas; P. Samaniego Street, Silangan, Nasugbu, Batangas; and
Batangas City, financed by Filinvest; (2) cash amounting toP200,000.00; and (3)
motor vehicles, specifically Honda City and Toyota Tamaraw FX(collectively,
"Waived Properties"). Thus, Salas contended that the conjugal properties were
deemed partitioned.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its 26 September 2008 Order, the RTC ruled in favor of Aguila. The dispositive
portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises being considered, the petitioner and the
respondent are hereby directed to partition between themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, the following properties, without prejudice to the
legitime of their legitimate child, Joan Jisselle Aguila Salas:
(1) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S. Salas married to
Rubina C. Salas located in San Bartolome, Quezon City and covered
by TCT No. N-259299-A marked as Exhibit "A" and its improvements;
(2) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S.Salas married to
Rubina C. Salas located in San Bartolome, Quezon City and covered
by TCT No. N-255497 marked as Exhibit "B" and its improvements;
(3) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S.Salas married to
Rubina Cortez Salas located in Tondo and covered by TCT No.
243373-Ind. marked as Exhibit "D" and its improvements.
Thereafter, the Court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon bythe parties,
and such partition, together with the Order of the Court confirming the same,
shall be recorded in the Registry of Deeds of the place in which the property is
situated.
SO ORDERED.
13

The RTC held that pursuant to the Rules,
14
even upon entry of judgment
granting the annulment of marriage, the court can proceed with the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the conjugal partnership of gains if it has not been
judicially adjudicated upon, as in this case. The RTC found that the Discovered
Properties are among the conjugal properties to be partitioned and distributed
between Salas and Aguila. However, the RTC held that Salas failed to prove the
existence of the Waived Properties.
On 11 November 2008, Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that:
(1) she is Rubina Cortez, a widow and unmarried to Salas; (2) the Discovered
Properties are her paraphernal properties; (3) Salas did not contribute money to
purchase the Discovered Properties as he had no permanent job in Japan; (4)
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her as she was not a party in the case;
and (5) she authorized her brother to purchase the Discovered Properties but
because he was not well-versed with legal documentation, he registered the
properties in the name of "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas."
In its 16 December 2009 Order, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by Salas. The RTC found that Salas failed to prove his allegation that Aguila
transferred the Waived Properties to third persons. The RTC emphasized that it
cannot go beyond the TCTs, which state that Salas is the registered owner of
the Discovered Properties. The RTC further held that Salas and Rubina were at
fault for failing to correct the TCTs, if they were not married as they claimed.
Hence, Salas filed an appeal with the CA.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 16 March 2012, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC.
15
The CA ruled that
Aguilas statement in her petition is not a judicial admission. The CA pointed out
that the petition was filed on 7 October 2003, but Aguila found the Discovered
Properties only on 17 April 2007 or before the promulgation of the RTC decision.
Thus, the CA concluded that Aguila was palpably mistaken in her petition and it
would be unfair to punish her over a matter that she had no knowledge of at the
time she made the admission. The CA also ruled that Salas was not deprived of
the opportunity to refute Aguilas allegations in her manifestation, even though
he was not present in its hearing. The CA likewise held that Rubina cannot
collaterally attack a certificate of title.
In a Resolution dated 28 June 2012,
16
the CA denied the Motion for
Reconsideration
17
filed by Salas. Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Salas seeks a reversal and raises the following issues for resolution:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision
ordering the partition of the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. N-
259299-A and N-255497 in Quezon City and as well as the property in
Manila covered by TCT No. 243373 between petitioner and respondent.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision in
not allowing Rubina C. Cortez to intervene in this case
18

The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Since the original manifestation was an action for partition, this Court cannot
order a division of the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the
existence of a co-ownership.
19
Thus, the settlement of the issue of ownership is
the first stage in this action.
20

Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the
burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence.
21
Salas alleged that
contrary to Aguilas petition stating that they had no conjugal property, they
actually acquired the Waived Properties during their marriage. However, the
RTC found, and the CA affirmed, that Salas failed to prove the existence and
acquisition of the Waived Properties during their marriage:
A perusal of the record shows that the documents submitted by [Salas] as the
properties allegedly registered in the name of [Aguila] are merely photocopies
and not certified true copies, hence, this Court cannot admit the same as part of
the records of this case. These are the following:
(1) TCT No. T-65876 a parcel of land located at Poblacion, Nasugbu,
Batangas, registered in the name of Eden A. Salas, married to Juan
Salas Jr. which is cancelled by TCT No. T-105443 in the name of Joan
Jiselle A. Salas, single;
(2) TCT No. T-68066 a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of
Landing, Nasugbu, Batangas, registered in the name of Eden A. Salas,
married to Juan S. Salas Jr.
Moreover, [Aguila] submitted original copy of Certification issued by Ms. Erlinda
A. Dasal, Municipal Assessor of Nasugbu, Batangas, certifying that [Aguila] has
no real property (land and improvement) listed in the Assessment Roll for
taxation purposes, as of September 17, 2008.
Such evidence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, has the presumption of
regularity. x x x.
Suffice it to say that such real properties are existing and registered in the name
of [Aguila], certified true copies thereof should have been the ones submitted to
this Court. Moreover, there is also a presumption that properties registered in the
Registry of Deeds are also declared in the Assessment Roll for taxation
purposes.
22

On the other hand, Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired
by Salas during their marriage.1wphi1Both the RTC and the CA agreed that the
Discovered Properties registered in Salas name were acquired during his
marriage with Aguila. The TCTs of the Discovered Properties were entered on 2
July 1999 and 29 September 2003, or during the validity of Salas and Aguilas
marriage. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,
23
we held that the question of
whether the properties were acquired during the marriage is a factual issue.
Factual findings of the RTC, particularly if affirmed by the CA, are binding on us,
except under compelling circumstances not present in this case.
24

On Salas allegation that he was not accorded due process for failing to attend
the hearing of Aguilas manifestation, we find the allegation untenable. The
essence of due process is opportunity to be heard. We hold that Salas was
given such opportunity when he filed his opposition to the manifestation,
submitted evidence and filed his appeal.
On both Salas and Rubinas contention that Rubina owns the Discovered
Properties, we likewise find the contention unmeritorious. The TCTs state that
"Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas" is the registered owner of the
Discovered Properties. A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the
ownership of the land referred to, because there is a strong presumption that it is
valid and regularly issued.
25
The phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the
civil status of the registered owner.
26
Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute
the ownership of the Discovered Properties in his opposition to the
manifestation. It was only when Rubina intervened that Salas supported
Rubinas statement that she owns the Discovered Properties.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the
Discovered Properties, she has no right to intervene in this case. The Rules of
Court provide that only "a person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or
is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of
court, be allowed to intervene in the action."
27

In Dio v. Dio,
28
we held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the
union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this case. Article147 of the Family Code
provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in
the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation. (Emphasis supplied)
Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through the couples joint efforts and governed
by the rules on co-ownership.
29
In the present case, Salas did not rebut this
presumption. In a similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was also
psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of
the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-
ownership.
30
Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered Properties as ordered
by the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership
and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated
16
March
2012 and the Resolution dated 28 June 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 95322.
SO ORDERED.






G.R. No. L-45870 May 11, 1984
MARGARET MAXEY assisted by Santiago Magbanua; FLORENCE MAXEY
assisted by Ofrecinio Santos; and LUCILLE MAXEY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE SPOUSES BEATO C.
MACAYRA and ALACOPUE MONDAY,respondents.
Jose B. Guyo for petitioners.
Epifanio Estrellado for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:
This petition for review involves the rights of a woman over properties acquired
in 1912 principally through the efforts of the man she was living with and at a
time when the two were not yet legally married.
The facts of the case are briefly stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as
follows:
The record reveals that Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales
(both deceased) lived together as husband and wife in
Banganga, Davao; that out of said union were born six (6)
children, among them are the herein plaintiffs, namely: John or
Carlos, Lucille, Margaret, Florence, Fred and George, all
surnamed Maxey; that during the period of their (Melbourne
and Regina) cohabitation, or in 1911 and 1912, respectively,
the late Melbourne Maxey acquired the parcels of land
described under Par. 4 of the com;plaint as evidenced by the
documents of sale marked as Exhibits 4-a and 5-1 (same as
Exhibits Facts), Melbourne Maxey, through his attorney-in-fact
Julia Pamatluan Maxey, sold in favor of the defendants-
spouses in 1953 the parcels of land under litigation which fact
of sale was not controverted by the perties (Par. 1, /stipulation
of Facts); that since thereof, the defendants-spouses have
taken immediate possession thereof continuously up to the
present.
Plaintiffs instituted the present case on January 26, 1962,
before the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying for the
annulment of the documents of sale covering the subject
parcels of land and to recover possession thereof with
damages from the herein defendants-spouses, alleging,
among others, that the aforesaid realties were common
properties of their parents, having been acquired during their
lifetime and through their joint effort and capital; and that the
sales of the of the said lands in favor of the defendants-
spouses in 1953, after the death of their mother, Regina
Morales, was executed by their father, Melbourne Maxey,
without their knowledge and consent; and that they came to
know of the above mentioned sales only in 1961.
On the other hand, defendants-spouses deny the material
allegations of the complaint and assert by way of affirmative
defenses that they are the true and lawful owners and
possessors of the properties 'm question having purchased
the same in good faith and for value from Melbourne Maxey
during his lifetime in 1953, based upon the reasonable belief
that the latter is the me and exclusive owner of the said
parcels of land and that since then, they have been in
possession thereof openly, exclusively and continuously in
concept of owners. Defendants - spouses further counter for
damages and attorney's fees and in the alternative, for the
value of the improvements they have introduced in the
premises.
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903. Their
children claim that their parents were united in 1903 in a marriage performed "in
the military fashion". Both the trial court and the appellate court rejected this
claim of a "military fashion" marriage.
The couple had several children. John Carlos was born in 1903, followed by
Lucille, Margaret, Florence, Fred, and George. Except for the youngest son, all
the children were born before the disputed properties were acquired. The father,
Melbourne Maxey, was a member of the 1899 American occupation forces who
afterwards held high positions in the provincial government and in the Philippine
public schools system.
As earlier mentioned in the cited statement of facts, the disputed properties were
acquired in 1911 and 1912 before the 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales
Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church wedding. The husband remarried
and in 1953, his second wife Julia Pamatluan Maxey, using a power of attorney,
sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato C. Macayra.
The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
The court stated that "when a man and a woman lived together as husband and
wife, justice demands that the woman should be entitled to the share of the
property. Certainly she cannot be considered mere adornment or only for man's
comfort and passion." The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Evidence, testimonial and document considered the Court
hereby rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against
defendant declaring that:
1. Declaring the abovementioned sales as null and void;
2. Ordering defendant-spouses to return the said lands, and to
pay for the value of the use of the same at the rate of
P1,000.00 a year from 1953 until delivered, together with
interests corresponding thereto at the legal rate;
3. Ordering defendant-spouses to pay to plaintiff actual
damages in the sum of P500.00 and attorney fees in the sum
of P3,000.00.
Defendants counterclaim is hereby ordered dismissed.
The Court of Appeals, however, found the parcels of, land to be exclusive
properties of the late Melbourne Maxey. It set aside the decision of the trial
court, decease valid the deeds of sale, and ruled that the appellants are the
absolute owners of the properties in question.
The appellate decision sustained the following arguments of the respondent
spouses:
Plaintiffs' evidence is completely devoid of any showing that
these properties in question were acquired through the joint
efforts of Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales. Indeed, if at
all, plaintiffs' evidence tend to establish the fact that
Melbourne Maxey by virtue of his positions as Deputy
Governor of Zamboanga (p. 36, t.s.n. de la Victoria) School
Supervisor in the East Coast of Davao (p. 36, t.s.n., Id.) was
more than in a position to purchase these properties by his
own efforts, his own earnings and without the help of Regina
Morales. On the other hand, we have the declaration of Juana
A. Morales, a widow of 68 years of age when she testified, the
sister-in-law of Regina Morales Juana A. Morales confirmed
the fact that Melbourne Maxey held the positions of teacher,
provincial treasurer, deputy governor, district supervisor and
lastly superintendent of schools, respectively (p. 203, t.s.n., de
la Victoria). But more important is her declaration that her
sister-in-law Regina Morales had no property of her own
whence she could have derived any income nor was Regina
gainfully employed. (pp. 203-204, t.s.n., Id.) It must be
remembered that the showing must be CLEAR that Regina
Morales contributed to the acquisition of these properties.
Here the evidence is not only NOT CLEAR, indeed, there is no
evidence at all that Regina Morales contributed to the
acquisition of the properties in question. In the case of Aznar,
et al vs. Garcia, et al, supra, the Supreme Court had before it
the common-law wife's own testimony claiming that the
properties in controversy were the product of their joint
industry. Her assertions however, were completely brushed
aside because aside from her claim that she took a hand in
the management and/or acquisition of the same, "there
appears no evidence to prove her alleged contribution or
participation in the, acquisition of the properties involved
therein." (Id. p. 1069). In the case at bar, besides the absence
of any evidence showing that Regina Morales contributed by
her efforts to the acquisition of these properties in controversy,
both plaintiffs and defendants' evidence show that it was
through Melbourne Maxey's efforts alone that these properties
were acquired. Indeed, that Regina Morales had no means at
all to have contributed in any manner to all its acquisition.
The petitioners raise the following issues in this petition:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THE LATE SPOUSES MELBOURNE MAXEY AND REGINA
MORALES WERE MARRIED ONLY IN 1919, BECAUSE THE
TRUTH IS THAT THEY MARRIED AS EARLY AS 1903.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS, LIKEWISE, ERRED IN
DECLARING THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AS THE
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF THE LATE MELBOURNE
MAXEY, TO THE EXCLUSION OF HIS WIFE REGINA
MORALES, BECAUSE THE MENTIONED PROPERTIES
WERE ACTUALLY ACQUIRED BY THE JOINT EFFORTS
AND INDUSTRY OF BOTH OF THEM AND THEREFORE,
THESE PROPERTIES ARE COMMON PROPERTIES.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN
UNREASONABLY GIVING THE TERM "JOINT EFFORTS"
NOT ONLY A VERY, VERY LIMITED MEANING BUT A
CONCEPT WHICH IS ENTIRELY ABSURD AND
UNREALISTIC BECAUSE IN CONSTRUING THE TERM,
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT AN
INTERPRETATION WHICH IS MOST CONSISTENT WITH
COMMON PRACTICE AND CUSTOMS AS WELL AS IN
ACCORD WITH THE BEST TRADITION OF THE FILIPINO
WAY OF LIFE.
The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the
argument that Act No. 3613, the Revised Marriage Law, recognized "military
fashion" marriages as legal. Maxey and Morales were legally married at a
church wedding solemnized on February 16, 1919. Since Act No. 3613 was
approved on December 4, 1929 and took effect six months thereafter, it could
not have applied to a relationship commenced in 1903 and legitimized in 1919
through a marriage performed according to law. The marriage law in 1903 was
General Order No. 70. There is no provision in General Order No. 68 as
amended nor in Act No. 3613 which would recognize as an exception to the
general rule on valid marriages, a so called "Military fashion" ceremony or
arrangement.
The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals both ruled that Melbourne
Maxey and Regina Morales were married only in 1919. This is a finding of fact
which we do not disturb at this stage of the case. There is no showing that this
factual finding is totally devoid of or unsupported by evidentiary basis or that it is
inconsistent with the evidence of record.
The other issue raised in this Petition questions the Court of Appeals' finding that
the parcels of land in question were exclusive properties of the late Melbourne
Maxey.
The petitioners argue that even assuming that the marriage of Melbourne Maxey
and Regina Morales took place only in February 17, 1919, still the properties
legally and rightfully belonged in equal share to the two because the acquisition
of the said properties was through their joint efforts and industry. The second
and third errors mentioned by the petitioners are grounded on the alleged wrong
interpretation given by the Court of Appeals to the phrase "joint efforts". The
petitioners suggest that their mother's efforts in performing her role as mother to
them and as wife to their father were more than sufficient contribution to
constitute the parcels of land in question as common properties acquired
through the joint efforts to their parents.
The Court of Appeals, however, was of the opinion that Article 144 of the Civil
Code is not applicable to the properties in question citing the case of Aznar et al.
v. Garcia (102 Phil. 1055) on non-retroactivity of codal provisions where vested
rights may be prejudiced or impaired. And, assuming that Article 144 of the Civil
Code is applicable, the Court of Appeals held that the disputed properties were
exclusively those of the petitioner's father because these were not acquired
through the joint efforts of their parents. This conclusion stems from the
interpretation given by the Court of Appeals to the phrase "joint efforts" to mean
"monetary contribution". According to the Court
... This view with which this ponente personally wholeheartedly
agrees for some time now has been advocated by
sympathizers of equal rights for women, notably in the
Commission on the Status of Women of the United Nations. In
our very own country there is strong advocacy for the passage
of a presidential decree providing that "the labors of a spouse
in managing the affairs of the household shall be credited
with compensation." Unfortunately, until the happy day when
such a proposal shall have materialized into law, Courts are
bound by existing statutes and jurisprudence, which rigidly
interpret the phrase "joint efforts" as monetary contributions of
the man and woman living together without benefit of
marriage, and to date, the drudgery of a woman's lifetime
dedication to the management of the household
goes unremunerated, and has no monetary value. Thus, in the
case of Aznar vs. Garcia (supra) the Supreme Court held that
the man and the woman have an equal interest in the
properties acquired during the union and each would be
entitled to participate therein if said properties were the
product of their joint effort. In the same case it was stated that
aside` from the observation of the trial court that the appellee
was an illiterate woman, there appears no evidence to prove
appellee's contribution (in terms of pesos and centavos) or
participation in the acquisition of the properties involved;
therefore, following the aforecited ruling of the Court,
appellee's claim for one-half (1/2) of the properties cannot be
granted.
In so concluding, the respondent Court of Appeals accepted the private
respondents' argument that it was unlikely for the petitioners' mother to have
materially contributed in the acquisition of the questioned properties since she
had no property of her own nor was she gainfully engaged in any business or
profession from which she could derive income unlike their father who held the
positions of teacher deputy governor, district supervisor, and superintendent of
schools.
We are constrained to adopt a contrary view. Considerations of justice dictate
the retroactive application of Article 144 of the Civil Code to the case at bar.
Commenting on Article 2252 of the Civil Code which provides that changes
made and new provisions and rules laid down by the Code which may prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation shall
have no retroactive effect, the Code Commission stated:
Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided. The question of how far the new Civil Code should
be made applicable to past acts and events is attended with
the utmost difficulty. It is easy enough to understand the
abstract principle that laws have no retroactive effect because
vested or acquired rights should be respected. But what are
vested or acquired rights? The Commission did not venture to
formulate a definition of a vested or acquired right seeing that
the problem is extremely committed.
What constitutes a vested or acquired right well be determined
by the courts as each particular issue is submitted to them, by
applying the transitional provisions set forth, and in case of
doubt, by observing Art. 9 governing the silence or obscurity of
the law. In this manner, the Commission is confident that the
judiciary with its and high sense of justice will be able to
decide in what cases the old Civil Code would apply and in
what cases the new one should be binding This course has
been preferred by the Commission, which did not presume to
be able to foresee and adequately provide for each and every
question that may arise. (Report of the Code Commission, pp.
165-166).
Similarly, with respect to Article 2253 which provides inter alia that if a right
should be declared for the first tune in the Code, it shall be effective at once,
even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or
may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not
prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin, the Code
Commission commented:
... But the second sentence gives a retroactive effect to newly
created rights provided they do not prejudice or impair any
vested or acquired right. The retroactive character of the new
right is the result of the exercise of the sovereign power of
legislation, when the lawmaking body is persuaded that the
new right is called for by considerations of justice and public
policy. But such new right most not encroach upon a vested
right. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 167).
The requirement of non-impairment of vested rights is clear. It is the opinion of
the Court of Appeals that vested rights were prejudiced. We do not think so.
Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the
formation of an informal civil partnership between a man and wife not legally
married and their corresponding right to an equal share in properties acquired
through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was recognized
through decisions of this Court. (Aznar et al. vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055; Flores
vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 94 Phil. 451; Marata vs. Dionio, L-24449,
December 31, 1925; Lesaca v. Lesaca, 91 Phil. 135.)
With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article 144 codified the law
established through judicial precedents but with the modification that the
property governed by the rules on co-ownership may be acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry. Even if it is only the man who works,
the property acquired during the man and wife relationship belongs through a
fifty-fifty sharing to the two of them.
This new article in the Civil Code recognizes that it would be unjust and
abnormal if a woman who is a wife in all aspects of the relationship except for
the requirement of a valid marriage must abandon her home and children,
neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in
business before the rules on co-ownership would apply. This article is
particularly relevant in this case where the "common-law" relationship was
legitimated through a valid marriage 34 years before the properties were sold.
The provisions of the Civil Code are premised on the traditional and existing, the
normal and customary gender roles of Filipino men and women. No matter how
large the income of a working wife compared to that of her husband, the major, if
not the full responsibility of running the household remains with the woman. She
is the administrator of the household. The fact that the two involved in this case
were not legally married at the time does not change the nature of their
respective roles. It is the woman who traditionally holds the family purse even if
she does not contribute to filling that purse with funds. As pointed out by Dean
Irene R. Cortes of the University of the Philippines, "in the Filipino family, the
wife holds the purse, husbands hand over their pay checks and get an allowance
in return and the wife manages the affairs of the household. . . . And the famous
statement attributed to Governor General Leonard Wood is repeated: In the
Philippines, the best man is the woman." (Cortes, "Womens Rights Under the
New Constitution". WOMAN AND THE LAW, U.P. Law Center, p. 10.)
The "real contribution" to the acquisition of property mentioned in Yaptinchay vs.
Torres (28 SCRA 489) must include not only the earnings of a woman from a
profession, occupation, or business but also her contribution to the family's
material and spiritual goods through caring for the children, administering the
household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her husband from household
tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a housewife.
Should Article 144 of the Civil Code be applied in this case? Our answer is "Yes"
because there is no showing that vested rights would be impaired or prejudiced
through its application.
A vested right is defined by this Court as property which has become fixed and
established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy; an immediately fixed
right of present or future enjoyment as distinguished from an expectant or
contingent right (Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711;
Balbao vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). This cannot be said of the "exclusive" right of
Melbourne Maxey over the properties in question when the present Civil Code
became effective for standing against it was the concurrent right of Regina
Morales or her heirs to a share thereof. The properties were sold in 1953 when
the new Civil Code was already in full force and effect. Neither can this be said
of the rights of the private respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the
questioned properties are concerned as this was still open to controversy on
account of the legitimate claim of Regina Morales to a share under the
applicable law.
The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the
estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. Technically
speaking, the petitioners should return one-half of the P1,300.00 purchase price
of the land while the private respondents should pay some form of rentals for
their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable considerations, however, lead
us to rule out rentals on one hand and return of P650.00 on the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby granted. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside insofar as one-half of
the disputed properties are concerned. The private respondents are ordered to
return one-half of said properties to the heirs of Regina Morales. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996]
ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-
VALDES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J .:
The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of law, an alleged
error committed by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539.
Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the correct law that
should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage
is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of
either or both of the parties to the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by and large, not in
dispute.
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971.
Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June
1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After hearing the parties following the joinder
of issues, the trial court,
[1]
in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the
petition; viz:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo
Gomez-Valdes is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their
essential marital obligations;
"(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela
Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay with.
"Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother,
herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
"The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who
are in the custody of the other.
"(3) The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family
Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same
code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
"Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of
marriages."
[2]
(Italics ours)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision
directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She
asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically,
during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing
their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner.
In an Order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following
clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly
provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through
the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff
and defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that
matter in equal shares.
"In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the
plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code
shall apply."
[3]
(Italics supplied)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family
dwelling, the trial court said:
"Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the
property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.
"The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application
since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of
the absolute community of property."
[4]

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied
on 30 October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52
of the Family Code should be held controlling; he argues that:
"I
"Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychological incapacitated.
"II
"Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is
declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses.
"III
"Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab
initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may
be read consistently with Article 129.
"IV
"It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish
to stay."
[5]

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of
the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as
the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of
the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases;
[6]
it provides:
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
"In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
"Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in
the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
"When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation."
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,
suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together
as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage.
The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to
the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the
age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned
in Articles 37 and 38"
[7]
of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household."
[8]
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has
clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides
that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or
her share in co-ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the
period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit
his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default
thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the
innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the
cohabitation
[9]
or declaration of nullity of the marriage.
[10]

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or
when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife ),only the
property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however,
are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to
another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner already heretofore expressed.
[11]

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the
parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must
be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common
property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and
partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-
ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles
102 and 129,
[12]
of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to
govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled ),are irrelevant to the
liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The
first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2 ),(3 ),(4)
and (5) of Article 43,
[13]
relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages
and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40
[14]
of the Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior
void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special
rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void
marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage,
the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void
marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on
the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of
Article 43, in relation to Articles 41
[15]
and 42,
[16]
of the Family Code, on the
effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all
other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have
coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and
voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law
spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the
ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article
148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may
merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family
home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code,
remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October
1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.


































G.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000
GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J .:
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together conjugally,
may be deemed co-owners of a property acquired during the cohabitation only
upon proof that each made an actual contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere
cohabitation without proof of contribution will not result in a co-ownership.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the November 19, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals
1
(CA), which reversed
the October 7, 1997 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
2
The dispositive
part of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the questioned
orders of the court a quo dated October 7, 1997 and November 11,
1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the
court a quo dated June 5, 1997 is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against
the private respondents.
3

The assailed Order of the RTC disposed as follows:
Wherefore, the decision of this Court rendered on June 5, 1997
affirming in toto the appealed judgment of the [MTC] is hereby
reconsidered and a new one is entered reversing said decision of the
[MTC] and dismissing the complaint in the above-entitled case.
4

Petitioner also assails the February 14, 1999 CA Resolution denying the Motion
for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts as follows:
[Herein respondents] were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6756, an
action for ejectment filed before Branch 82 of the MTC of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila against [herein Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos, Toto
Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint dated July 5, 1996, the
said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila; that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-
private respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last seven
(7) years, since 1989, without the payment of any rent; that it was
agreed upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will
pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants promised to pay
P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was not complied
with by the said defendants; that they have demanded several times
[that] the defendants . . . vacate the premises, as they are in need of
the property for the construction of a new building; and that they have
also demanded payment of P84,000.00 from Toto and Gina Tumlos
representing rentals for seven (7) years and payment of P143,600.00
from Guillerma Tumlos as unpaid rentals for seven (7) years, but the
said demands went unheeded. They then prayed that the defendants
be ordered to vacate the property in question and to pay the stated
unpaid rentals, as well as to jointly pay P30,000.00 in attorneys fees.
[Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to
the complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no
cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject
premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that
she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with
[Respondent] Mario Fernandez. She then asked for the dismissal of the
complaint.
After an unfruitful preliminary conference on November 15, 1996, the
MTC required the parties to submit their affidavits and other evidence
on the factual issues defined in their pleadings within ten (10) days from
receipt of such order, pursuant to section 9 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. [Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos submitted her
affidavit/position paper on November 29, 1996, while the [respondents]
filed their position paper on December 5, 1996, attaching thereto their
marriage contract, letters of demand to the defendants, and the
Contract to Sell over the disputed property. The MTC thereafter
promulgated its judgment on January 22, 1997[.]
x x x x x x x x x
Upon appeal to the [RTC], [petitioner and the two other] defendants
alleged in their memorandum on appeal that [Respondent] Mario
Fernandez and [Petitioner] Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and
that they acquired the property in question as their "love nest." It was
further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building
with their two (2) children for around ten (10) years, and that Guillerma
administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the
other apartments, until she discovered that [Respondent Mario]
deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. It was also during the
early part of 1996 when [Respondent Mario] accused her of being
unfaithful and demonstrated his baseless [jealousy].
In the same memorandum, [petitioner and the two other] defendants
further averred that it was only recently that Toto Tumlos was
temporarily accommodated in one of the rooms of the subject premises
while Gina Tumlos acted as a nanny for the children. In short, their
presence there [was] only transient and they [were] not tenants of the
Fernandez spouses.
On June 5, 1997, the [RTC] rendered a decision affirming in toto the
judgment of the MTC.
The [petitioner and the two other defendants] seasonably filed a motion
for reconsideration on July 3, 1997, alleging that the decision of
affirmance by the RTC was constitutionally flawed for failing to point out
distinctly and clearly the findings of facts and law on which it was
based vis--vis the statements of issues they have raised in their
memorandum on appeal. They also averred that the Contract to Sell
presented by the plaintiffs which named the buyer as "Mario P.
Fernandez, of legal age, married to Lourdes P. Fernandez," should not
be given credence as it was falsified to appear that way. According to
them, the Contract to Sell originally named "Guillerma Fernandez" as
the spouse of [Respondent Mario]. As found by the [RTC] in its
judgment, a new Contract to Sell was issued by the sellers naming the
[respondents] as the buyers after the latter presented their marriage
contract and requested a change in the name of the vendee-wife. Such
facts necessitate the conclusion that Guillerma was really a co-owner
thereof, and that the [respondents] manipulated the evidence in order to
deprive her of her rights to enjoy and use the property as recognized by
law.
x x x x x x x x x
The [RTC], in determining the question of ownership in order to resolve
the issue of possession, ruled therein that the Contract to Sell
submitted by the Fernandez spouses appeared not to be authentic, as
there was an alteration in the name of the wife of [Respondent] Mario
Fernandez. Hence, the contract presented by the [respondents] cannot
be given any weight. The court further ruled that Guillerma and
[Respondent Mario] acquired the property during their cohabitation as
husband and wife, although without the benefit of marriage. From such
findings, the court concluded that [Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was a
co-owner of the subject property and could not be ejected therefrom.
The [respondents] then filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
reversal, but the same was denied by the [RTC].
5

As earlier stated, the CA reversed the RTC. Hence, this Petition filed by
Guillerma Tumlos only.
6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA rejected petitioner's claim that she and Respondent Mario Fernandez
were co-owners of the disputed property. The CA ruled:
From the inception of the instant case, the only defense presented by private
respondent Guillerma is her right as a co-owner of the subject property[.]
x x x x x x x x x
This claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma, as
correctly held by the trial court. No other evidence was presented to validate
such claim, except for the said affidavit/position paper. As previously stated, it
was only on appeal that Guillerma alleged that she cohabited with the petitioner-
husband without the benefit of marriage, and that she bore him two (2) children.
Attached to her memorandum on appeal are the birth certificates of the said
children. Such contentions and documents should not have been considered by
the . . . (RTC), as they were not presented in her affidavit/position paper before
the trial court (MTC).
x x x x x x x x x
However, even if the said allegations and documents could be considered, the
claim of co-ownership must still fail. As [herein Respondent] Mario Fernandez is
validly married to [Respondent] Lourdes Fernandez (as per Marriage Contract
dated April 27, 1968, p. 45, Original Record), Guillerma and Mario are not
capacitated to marry each other. Thus, the property relations governing their
supposed cohabitation is that found in Article 148 of Executive Order No. 209, as
amended, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines[.]
x x x x x x x x x
It is clear that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to
Article 147 of the Family Code which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the
acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or
industry (Agapay v. Palang, 276 SCRA 340). The care given by one party [to]
the home, children, and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration provided to
the other, is not included in Article 148 (Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines by Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, 1988 ed., p. 209). Hence, if actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares (Agapay, supra at p. 348, citing Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines Volume I by Arturo M.
Tolentino, 1990 ed., p. 500).
In the instant case, no proof of actual contribution by Guillerma Tumlos in the
purchase of the subject property was presented. Her only evidence was her
being named in the Contract to Sell as the wife of [Respondent] Mario
Fernandez. Since she failed to prove that she contributed money to the
purchase price of the subject apartment building, We find no basis to justify her
co-ownership with [Respondent Mario]. The said property is thus presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership property of Mario and Lourdes Fernandez, it
being acquired during the subsistence of their marriage and there being no other
proof to the contrary (please see Article 116 of the Family Code).
The court a quo (RTC) also found that [Respondent Mario] has two (2) children
with Guillerma who are in her custody, and that to eject them from the apartment
building would be to run counter with the obligation of the former to give support
to his minor illegitimate children, which indispensably includes dwelling. As
previously discussed, such finding has no leg to stand on, it being based on
evidence presented for the first time on appeal.
x x x x x x x x x
Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly presented, the RTC
failed to consider that the need for support cannot be presumed. Article 203 of
the Family Code expressly provides that the obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs
it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or
extrajudicial demand. . . .1wphi1.nt
In contrast to the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the RTC instead
presumed that Guillerma and her children needed support from [Respondent
Mario]. Worse, it relied on evidence not properly presented before the trial court
(MTC).
With regard to the other [defendants], Gina and Toto Tumlos, a close perusal of
the records shows that they did not file any responsive pleading. Hence,
judgment may be rendered against them as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein, as provided for
in Section 6 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. There was no basis
for the public respondent to dismiss the complaint against them.
7
(emphasis in
the original)
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the consideration
of the Court:
I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion in not
outrightly dismissing the petition for review filed by respondents.
II. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioner is not the co-
owner of the property in litis.
III. Corollary thereto, the Court of Appeals erred in applying Art. 148 of
the Family Code in the case at bar.
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the substantive right of
support vis--vis the remedy of ejectment resorted to by respondents.
8

In resolving this case, we shall answer two questions: (a) Is the petitioner a co-
owner of the property? (b) Can the claim for support bar this ejectment suit? We
shall also discuss these preliminary matters: (a) whether the CA was biased in
favor of respondents and (b) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the
ejectment suit.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Preliminary Matters
Petitioner submits that the CA exhibited partiality in favor of herein respondents.
This bias, she argues, is manifest in the following:
1. The CA considered the respondents Petition for Review
9
despite
their failure to attach several pleadings as well as the explanation for
the proof of service, despite the clear mandate of Section 11
10
of Rule
13 of the Revised Rules of Court and despite the ruling in Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort.
11

2. It allowed respondents to submit the pleadings that were not
attached.
3. It considered respondents' Reply dated May 20, 1998, which had
allegedly been filed out of time.
4. It declared that the case was submitted for decision without first
determining whether to give due course to the Petition, pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
12

The CA, for its part, succinctly dismissed these arguments in this wise:
It is too late in the day now to question the alleged procedural error
after we have rendered the decision. More importantly, when the
private respondent filed their comment to the petition on April 26, 1998,
they failed to question such alleged procedural error. Neither have they
questioned all the resolutions issued by the Court after their filing of
such comment. They should, therefore, be now considered in estoppel
to question the same.
13

We agree with the appellate court. Petitioner never raised these matters before
the CA. She cannot be allowed now to challenge its Decision on grounds of
alleged technicalities being belatedly raised as an afterthought. In this light, she
cannot invoke Solar
14
because she never raised this issue before the CA.
More important, we find it quite sanctimonious indeed on petitioners part to rely,
on the one hand, on these procedural technicalities to overcome the appealed
Decision and, on the other hand, assert that the RTC may consider the new
evidence she presented for the first time on appeal. Such posturing only betrays
the futility of petitioner's assertion, if not its absence of merit.
One other preliminary matter. Petitioner implies that the court of origin, the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), did not have jurisdiction over the "nature of the
case," alleging that the real question involved is one of ownership. Since the
issue of possession cannot be settled without passing upon that of ownership,
she maintains that the MTC should have dismissed the case.
This contention is erroneous. The issue of ownership may be passed upon by
the MTC to settle the issue of possession.
15
Such disposition, however, is not
final insofar as the issue of ownership is concerned,
16
which may be the subject
of another proceeding brought specifically to settle that question.
Having resolved these preliminary matters, we now move on to petitioners
substantive contentions.
First Issue:
Petitioner as Co-owner
Petitioners central theory and main defense against respondents' action for
ejectment is her claim of co-ownership over the property with Respondent Mario
Fernandez. At the first instance before the MTC, she presented a Contract to
Sell indicating that she was his spouse. The MTC found this document
insufficient to support her claim. The RTC, however, after considering her
allegation that she had been cohabiting with Mario Fernandez as shown by
evidence presented before it,
17
ruled in her favor.
On the other hand, the CA held that the pieces of evidence adduced before the
RTC could no longer be considered because they had not been submitted
before the MTC. Hence, the appellate court concluded that "[t]he claim of co-
ownership was not satisfactorily proven . . ."
18

We agree with the petitioner that the RTC did not err in considering the evidence
presented before it. Nonetheless, we reject her claim that she was a co-owner of
the disputed property.
Evidence Presented on
Appeal Before the RTC
In ruling that the RTC erred in considering on appeal the evidence presented by
petitioner, the CA relied on the doctrine that issues not raised during trial could
not be considered for the first time during appeal.
19

We disagree. In the first place, there were no new matters or issues belatedly
raised during the appeal before the RTC. The defense invoked by petitioner at
the very start was that she was a co-owner. To support her claim, she presented
a Contract to Sell dated November 14, 1986, which stated that Mario Fernandez
was legally married to her. The allegation that she was cohabiting with him was
a mere elaboration of her initial theory.
In the second place, procedural rules are generally premised on considerations
of fair play. Respondents never objected when the assailed evidence was
presented before the RTC. Thus, they cannot claim unfair surprise or prejudice.
Petitioner Not a Co-Owner Under
Article 144 of the Civil Code
Even considering the evidence presented before the MTC and the RTC, we
cannot accept petitioner's submission that she is a co-owner of the disputed
property pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code.
20
As correctly held by the CA,
the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the
Family Code which provides:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article,
21
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions
and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences
of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the
co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties
are in bad faith.
Art. 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a
woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other,
22
or to one in which the
marriage of the parties is void
23
from the beginning.
24
It does not apply to a
cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to
create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or
absolute community between the man and his lawful wife.
25

Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those submitted by
petitioner herself before the RTC, it is clear that Mario Fernandez was
incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes
Fernandez. It is also clear that, as readily admitted by petitioner, she cohabited
with Mario in a state of concubinage. Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code is
inapplicable.
As stated above, the relationship between petitioner and Respondent Mario
Fernandez is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. Justice Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy points out
26
that "[t]he Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating in its Article 148 the property
relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Hence, petitioners argument that the Family Code is inapplicable because
the cohabitation and the acquisition of the property occurred before its effectivity
deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to say that the law itself states that it
can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired
rights.
27
In this case, petitioner failed to show any vested right over the property
in question. Moreover, to resolve similar issues, we have applied Article 148 of
the Family Code retroactively.
28

No Evidence of Actual Joint
Contribution
Another consideration militates against petitioners claim that she is a co-owner
of the property. In Agapay,
29
the Court ruled:
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that the actual contribution
is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one
who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-
ownership and no presumption of equal shares. (emphasis ours)
In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual
contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of
co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez.
Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation
is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for
nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the
property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition.
Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership. The property in
question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents. Hence, the MTC
and the CA were correct in ordering the ejectment of petitioner from the
premises.
Second Issue:
Support versus Ejectment
Petitioner contends that since Respondent Mario Fernandez failed to repudiate
her claim regarding the filiation of his alleged sons, Mark Gil and Michael
Fernandez, his silence on the matter amounts to an admission. Arguing that
Mario is liable for support, she advances the theory that the childrens right to
support, which necessarily includes shelter, prevails over the right of
respondents to eject her.
We disagree. It should be emphasized that this is an ejectment suit whereby
respondents seek to exercise their possessory right over their property. It is
summary in character and deals solely with the issue of possession of the
property in dispute. Here, it has been shown that they have a better right to
possess it than does the petitioner, whose right to possess is based merely on
their tolerance.1wphi1.nt
Moreover, Respondent Mario Fernandez' alleged failure to repudiate petitioner's
claim of filiation is not relevant to the present case.1wphi1 Indeed, it would be
highly improper for us to rule on such issue. Besides, it was not properly taken
up below.
30
In any event, Article 298
31
of the Civil Code requires that there
should be an extrajudicial demand.
32
None was made here. The CA was correct
when it said:
Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly presented,
the RTC failed to consider that the need for support cannot be
presumed. Article [298] of the [New Civil Code] expressly provides that
the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the
person who has a right to receive the same need it for maintenance,
but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial and extrajudicial
demand.
33

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death
benefits is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom
he married. 1wphi1.nt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in
toto the decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil
Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two
marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario
(hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings,
namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10,
1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee),
with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way
back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes
complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23,
1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00
from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,
3
while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial
(GSIS) and burial (SSS).
4

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia,
that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred
forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death
benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to
file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place
during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of
nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however,
claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she
became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner
who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the
required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the
marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage
license number;
5
and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses
SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this
municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy
or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for
whatever legal purpose it may serve.
6

On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee,
holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death
benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees
in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
7

On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE
CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE
CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE
BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE
ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE.
8

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting
a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage
to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void.
9
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case.
10
In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
11

It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon
the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the
deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage,
12
and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions,
13
renders the marriage void ab initio.
14

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license
requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of
their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and,
as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office
has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,
15
the
Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case,
the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being
the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of
petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required
marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court,
petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a
marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an
argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their
marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death
benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To
reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there
must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage
of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second
marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that
their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring
the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the
marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the
property of the spouses according to the applicable property
regime.
16
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable
property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of
property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man,
17
-
... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and
salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too,
contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual
or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
18

Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a
bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a
previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.],
NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations,
incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as
a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it
could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the
acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common
by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and
respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession,
the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And,
respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article
147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a
marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
x x x
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned
by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal
shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned
the wages and the other did not contribute thereto.
19
Conformably, even if the
disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government
employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the
petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the
present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith.
Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the
petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the
deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his
children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case
of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,
20
where the
Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first
wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void
the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has
the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under
the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she
survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting
marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands share in
the property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife,
this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still
there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the
conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before
judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable solution in this case
would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the
property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
21

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the
rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage.
This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the
parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,
22
however, the Court, construing Article 40 of
the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a
marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage.
That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second
marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first
marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise
the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first
marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for
themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes
other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money
anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial
declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present
evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from
which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the
determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage
involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with
the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,
23
the Court
explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When
such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if
the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code
connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of
P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.



















[G.R. No. 150611. June 10, 2003]
JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC,
MARINDUQUE and GINA S. REY, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of
parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless
live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will
only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
[1]

Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married,
[2]
but separated de
facto from her husband, when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque,
sometime in July 1987.
[3]
After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as
husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacintos father.
[4]
Their
cohabitation was not blessed with any children. Jacinto made a living as the
patron of their fishing vessel Saguid Brothers.
[5]
Gina, on the other hand,
worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from
1992 to 1994 when her relationship with Jacintos relatives turned sour. Her
periodic absence, however, did not ebb away the conflict with petitioners
relatives. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year
cohabitation.
[6]

On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and
Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner with the
Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque. She alleged that from her salary of
$1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute
P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own
earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and
accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total
value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these
personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her
contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.
Private respondent testified that she deposited part of her earnings in her
savings account with First Allied Development Bank.
[7]
Her Pass Book shows
that as of May 23, 1995, she had a balance of P21,046.08.
[8]
She further stated
that she had a total of P35,465.00
[9]
share in the joint account deposit which she
and the petitioner maintained with the same bank.
[10]
Gina declared that said
deposits were spent for the purchase of construction materials, appliances and
other personal properties.
[11]

In his answer
[12]
to the complaint, petitioner claimed that the expenses for
the construction of their house were defrayed solely from his income as a
captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that private respondents meager
income as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of
said house. Besides, selling fish was a mere pastime to her; as such, she was
contented with the small quantity of fish allotted to her from his fishing
trips. Petitioner further contended that Gina did not work continuously in Japan
from 1992 to 1994, but only for a 6-month duration each year. When their house
was repaired and improved sometime in 1995-1996, private respondent did not
share in the expenses because her earnings as entertainer were spent on the
daily needs and business of her parents. From his income in the fishing
business, he claimed to have saved a total of P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of which
was placed in a joint account deposit with private respondent. This savings,
according to petitioner was spent in purchasing the disputed personal properties.
On May 21, 1997, the trial court declared the petitioner as in default for
failure to file a pre-trial brief as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89.
[13]

On May 26, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
[14]
of the May
21, 1997 order, which was denied on June 2, 1997, and private respondent was
allowed to present evidence ex parte.
[15]
Petitioner filed another motion for
reconsideration but the same was also denied on October 8, 1997.
On July 15, 1998, a decision
[16]
was rendered

in favor of private
respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff Gina S. Rey against defendant Jacinto Saguid:
a) Ordering the partition of the house identified as plaintiffs Exhibit C and D
and directing the defendant to return and/or reimburse to the plaintiff the amount
of seventy thousand pesos (P70,000,00) which the latter actually contributed to
its construction and completion;
b) Declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive owner of the personal properties
listed on Exhibit M;
c) Ordering the defendant, and/or anyone in possession of the aforesaid
personal properties, to return and/or deliver the same to the plaintiff; and
d) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages in the sum of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[17]

On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; however,
the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages was deleted for lack of
basis.
[18]
The appellate court ruled that the propriety of the order which declared
the petitioner as in default became moot and academic in view of the effectivity
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It explained that the new rules now require
the filing of a pre-trial brief and the defendants non-compliance therewith entitles
the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.
Both parties filed motions for reconsideration which were denied; hence,
petitioner filed the instant petition based on the following assigned errors:
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN APPLYING RETROACTIVELY THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN THE PRESENT CASE AND HOLDING THE FIRST
ASSIGNED ERROR THEREIN MOOT AND ACADEMIC THUS, FAILED TO
RULE ON THE PROPRIETY OF THE TRIAL COURTS REFUSAL TO SET
ASIDE THE ORDER OF DEFAULT DUE TO MISTAKE AND/OR EXCUSABLE
NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY PETITIONER.
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN RELYING ON THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
WHICH RECEIVED THE EVIDENCE OF HEREIN RESPONDENT ONLY EX
PARTE.
[19]

The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not the trial court erred in
allowing private respondent to present evidence ex parte; and (2) whether or not
the trial courts decision is supported by evidence.
Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure
of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to
appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidence ex parte and
the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof.
[20]
The remedy of the
defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration
[21]
showing that his failure to file
a pre-trial brief was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect.
[22]
The motion need not really stress the fact that the defendant has a
valid and meritorious defense because his answer which contains his defenses
is already on record.
[23]

In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is
justified because he was not represented by counsel. This justification is not,
however, sufficient to set aside the order directing private respondent to present
evidenceex parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to be
represented by counsel. Even without the assistance of a lawyer, petitioner was
able to file a motion for extension to file answer,
[24]
the required answer stating
therein the special and affirmative defenses,
[25]
and several other motions.
[26]
If it
were true that petitioner did not understand the import of the April 23, 1997 order
directing him to file a pre-trial brief, he could have inquired from the court or filed
a motion for extension of time to file the brief. Instead, he waited until May 26,
1997, or 14 days from his alleged receipt of the April 23, 1997 order before he
filed a motion asking the court to excuse his failure to file a brief. Pre-trial rules
are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result in
prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be followed
except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
[27]

In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is
not a persuasive reason to relax the application of the rules. There is nothing in
the Constitution which mandates that a party in a non-criminal proceeding be
represented by counsel and that the absence of such representation amounts to
a denial of due process. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not
indispensable. The legal profession is not engrafted in the due process clause
such that without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed
ignored or violated.
[28]

However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically, Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered
moot and academic the issue of whether or not the plaintiff may be allowed to
present evidence ex parte for failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial
brief. While the rules may indeed be applied retroactively, the same is not called
for in the case at bar. Even before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect
on July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was required under Circular No. 1-89
which became effective on February 1, 1989. Pursuant to the said circular,
[f]ailure to file pre-trial briefs may be given the same effect as the failure to
appear at the pre-trial, that is, the party may be declared non-suited or
considered as in default.
[29]

Coming now to the substantive issue, it is not disputed that Gina and
Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was validly
married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their
property regime therefore is governed by Article 148
[30]
of the Family Code,
which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a
state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to
other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this
regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions ...
[31]
Proof of actual
contribution is required.
[32]

In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties
commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was
intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
[33]
Before
Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing
property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence,
even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the
Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
[34]

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang,
[35]
and Tumlos v. Fernandez,
[36]
which
involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a
bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that
proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The
claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the
bigamous and adulterous union is without basis because they failed to
substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the
disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals,
[37]
we ruled that the
fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must
be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness
of the opponents defense.
[38]
This applies with more vigor where, as in the
instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff
is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant
some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that
the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.
[39]
Indeed, the party alleging
a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.
[40]

In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal
properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she
contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in
her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the
record are receipts
[41]
in her name for the purchase of construction materials on
November 17, 1995 and December 23, 1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00.
On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the
disputed personal properties came partly from their joint account with First Allied
Development Bank. While there is no question that both parties contributed in
their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact
amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family
Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution,
their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal
properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were
not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-
half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
which granted the reliefs prayed for by private respondent. On the basis of the
evidence established, the extent of private respondents co-ownership over the
disputed house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution
in the construction thereof. Anent the personal properties, her participation
therein should be limited only to the amount of P55,687.50.
As regards the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the
Court of Appeals correctly deleted the same for lack of basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64166 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Private
respondent Gina S. Rey is declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto Saguid in the
controverted house to the extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to the
extent of P55,687.50. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the amount of
P67,100.50 to private respondent, failing which the house shall be sold at public
auction to satisfy private respondents claim.
SO ORDERED.














[G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005]
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, petitioner, vs. MIGUELA C.
DAILO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 59986 rendered on June 3, 2002, which affirmed with modification the
October 18, 1997Decision
[2]
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo
City, Laguna in Civil Case No. SP-4748 (97).
The following factual antecedents are undisputed.
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on
August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot
situated at Barangay San Francisco, San Pablo City from a certain Sandra
Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes under
Assessment of Real Property No. 94-051-2802. The Deed of Absolute Sale,
however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee
thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
[3]

On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain
a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the
spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA,
Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from petitioner. As
security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage
constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned
transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took
place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.
[4]

Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner
instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After
the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of
petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property
being redeemed, petitioner, through its vice-president, consolidated the
ownership thereof by executing on June 6, 1996 an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
[5]

In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died on December 20, 1995. In one
of her visits to the subject property, respondent learned that petitioner had
already employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her car,
a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the
premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the
subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City, Civil Case No. SP-2222 (97)
for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer
with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on October 18,
1997. The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having proved by the preponderance of evidence the
allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds for the plaintiff and hereby orders:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. The declaration of the following documents as null and void:
(a) The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated December 1,
1993 executed before Notary Public Romulo Urrea and
his notarial register entered as Doc. No. 212; Page No.
44, Book No. XXI, Series of 1993.
(b) The Certificate of Sale executed by Notary Public
Reynaldo Alcantara on April 20, 1995.
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by
the defendant
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by
the defendant over the residential lot located at Brgy. San
Francisco, San Pablo City, covered by ARP No. 95-091-
1236 entered as Doc. No. 406; Page No. 83, Book No. III,
Series of 1996 of Notary Public Octavio M. Zayas.
(d) The assessment of real property No. 95-051-1236.
2. The defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to
the plaintiff.
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P40,000.00 representing
the value of the car which was burned.
ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 as attorneys
fees;
2. The defendant to pay plaintiff P25,000.00 as moral damages;
3. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
4. To pay the cost of the suit.
The counterclaim is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
[6]

Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court
affirmed the trial courts finding that the subject property was conjugal in nature,
in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that
the subject property acquired during the marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to
their conjugal partnership.
[7]
The appellate court declared as void the mortgage
on the subject property because it was constituted without the knowledge and
consent of respondent, in accordance with Article 124 of the Family Code. Thus,
it upheld the trial courts order to reconvey the subject property to
respondent.
[8]
With respect to the damage to respondents car, the appellate
court found petitioner to be liable therefor because it is responsible for the
consequences of the acts or omissions of the person it hired to accomplish the
assigned task.
[9]
All told, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision,
but deleted the award for damages and attorneys fees for lack of basis.
[10]

Hence, this petition, raising the following issues for this Courts
consideration:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE
MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER
THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE
PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR.
THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.
[11]

First, petitioner takes issue with the legal provision applicable to the factual
milieu of this case. It contends that Article 124 of the Family Code should be
construed in relation to Article 493 of the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent,
the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code requires the
consent of the other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal properties, the framers
of the law could not have intended to curtail the right of a spouse from exercising
full ownership over the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to him under
the concept of co-ownership.
[12]
Thus, petitioner would have this Court uphold
the validity of the mortgage to the extent of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.s share
in the conjugal partnership.
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals,
[13]
it was held that the sale of a conjugal
property requires the consent of both the husband and wife.
[14]
In applying Article
124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of
one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal
property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. The same principle
in Guiang squarely applies to the instant case. As shall be discussed next, there
is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as an exception to
Article 124 of the Family Code.
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8,
1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community
or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between
respondent and her late husband.
[15]
With the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code
was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before
its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil
Code or other laws.
[16]

The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of
respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory manner. The
regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where
the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and
income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both
spouses through their efforts or by chance.
[17]
Unlike the absolute community of
property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner,
[18]
the
conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in
all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on
conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements.
[19]
Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband
shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of
the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil
Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions
on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the
knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate
mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal
partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the
absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the
spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the
rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law
does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
[20]
Thus, both the trial court
and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate
mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondents consent.
Second, petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of the principal
obligation obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the conjugal partnership to
the extent that it redounded to the benefit of the family.
[21]

Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership shall be
liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . .
For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which
clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal
partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is
to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the
utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.
[22]

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as
such.
[23]
Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove).
[24]
Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained
by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units
without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing
adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioners bare
allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that,
indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the
benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held
liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial,
petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive
property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial
court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the
family. Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from
the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court
below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him
to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive
to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
[25]
A party may change his
legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require
presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to
properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.
[26]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146294 July 31, 2006
JOHN ABING, petitioner,
vs.
JULIET WAEYAN, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
In this appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner John Abing (John, hereafter) seeks to set aside the Decision
1
dated
October 24, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675,
reversing that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet, Branch 64, which
affirmed an earlier decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mankayan,
Benguet in an ejectment suit thereat commenced by the petitioner against the
respondent.
In the main, the controversy is between a man and a woman who, during the
good old days, lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. During their cohabitation, they acquired properties. Later, they parted
ways, and with it this litigation between them involving one of their common
properties.
The facts:
Sometime in 1986, John and respondent Juliet Waeyan (Juliet, for short) met
and fell in love with each other. In time, the duo cohabited as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. Together, the couple bought a 2-storey
residential house from one Benjamin Macua which was erected on a lot owned
by a certain Alejandro Dio on Aurora Street, Mankayan, Benguet. Consequent
to the purchase, the tax declaration of the 2-storey house was transferred in the
name of Juliet.
On December 2, 1991, Juliet left for overseas employment in Korea. She would
send money to John who deposited the same in their joint bank account.
In 1992, the original 2-storey residential house underwent renovation. To it was
annexed a new structure which housed a sari-sari store. This new structure and
the sari-sari store thereat are the properties involved in this case.
In 1994, Juliet returned from Korea and continued to live with John. She
managed the sari-sari store while John worked as a mine employee of the
Lepanto Consolidated Mining, Inc.
In 1995, the relationship between the two turned from bad to worse. Hence, they
decided to partition their properties. For the purpose, they executed on October
7, 1995 a Memorandum of Agreement. Unfortunately, the document was left
unsigned by the parties although signed by the witnesses thereto. Under their
unsigned agreement, John shall leave the couples' dwelling with Juliet paying
him the amount of P428,870.00 representing John's share in all their properties.
On the same date October 7, 1995 Juliet paid John the sum ofP232,397.66
by way of partial payment of his share, with the balance of P196,472.34 to be
paid by Juliet in twelve monthly installment beginning November 1995.
Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. On account thereof, John
demanded of her to vacate the annex structure housing the sari-sari store. Juliet
refused, prompting John to file an ejectment suit against her before the MTC of
Mankayan, Benguet.
In his complaint, John alleged that he alone spent for the construction of the
annex structure with his own funds and thru money he borrowed from his
relatives. In fact, he added that the tax declaration for the structure was under
his name. On this premise, John claimed exclusive ownership of the subject
structure, which thereby gave him the right to eject Juliet therefrom upon the
latter's failure to pay the agreed balance due him under the
aforementioned Memorandum of Agreement.
In her answer, Juliet countered that their original house was renovated thru their
common funds and that the subject structure annexed thereto was merely an
attachment or an extension of their original residential house, hence the same
pertained to the two of them in common.
In a decision
2
dated March 15, 1997, the MTC, on its finding that the money
used in the construction of the structure in question solely came from John, ruled
that the same exclusively pertained to the latter, and accordingly ordered Juliet's
eviction therefrom, including the sari-sari store thereat, and required her to
surrender possession thereof to John, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff (John) and
against the defendant (Juliet).
Defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the store in
litigation covered by Tax Declaration No. 96-001-00445 in the name of
the Plaintiff and turn over possession thereof to the latter.
Defendant is hereby further ordered to pay the Plaintiff the sum
of P2,500.00 a month from the time she withheld possession of the
store in litigation in June 1996 until she vacates the same and turn over
possession thereof to the Plaintiff.
Defendant is finally ordered, to pay the sum of P5,000.00 to the Plaintiff
by way of Attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
On Juliet's appeal to the RTC, the latter, in its decision of July 29, 1995, affirmed
that of the MTC. Undaunted, Juliet then went to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
48675.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its Decision of October 24,
2000,
3
reversed that of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court is hereby reversed and set aside. Petitioner, Juliet
Waeyan is entitled to possess the property and maintain therein her
business.
SO ORDERED.
Partly says the CA in its reversal disposition:
It is undisputed that the parties lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage from 1986 to 1995 and that they
acquired certain properties which must be divided between them upon
the termination of their common law relationship.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . their property relations cannot be governed by the provision of the
Civil Code on conjugal partnership... but by the rule on co-ownership.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the parties' share in respect of the properties they have
accumulated during their cohabitation shall be equal unless there is
proof to the contrary.
To the CA, John's evidence failed to establish that he alone spent for the
construction of the annex structure. Hence, the same pertained to both, and
being a co-owner herself, Juliet cannot be evicted therefrom, adding that if ever,
John's cause of action should have been for a sum of money "because he
claims that Juliet still owes him the payment for the extension." According to the
CA, ejectment cannot lie against Juliet because Juliet's possession of the
premises in dispute was not by virtue of a contract, express or implied, nor did
she obtain such possession thru force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
Hence, John's present recourse, submitting that the CA erred in
1. not giving effect to the parties' Memorandum of Agreement which
should have been binding between them albeit unsigned by both;
2. in holding that the subject premises (annex structure housing the
sari-sari store) is owned by the two of them in common;
3. in ruling that the parties should settle their common properties in a
separate action for partition even as the community character of the
subject premises has not been proven.
We AFFIRM with modification.
Essentially, the issues raised center on the core question of whether or not the
property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner,
John. Departing from the factual findings of the two courts before it, the CA
found that the premises in dispute is owned in common by Juliet and John, the
latter having failed to establish by the required quantum of proof that the money
spent for the construction thereof solely came from him. Being a co-owner of the
same structure, Juliet may not be ejected therefrom.
While the question raised is essentially one of fact, of which the Court normally
eschews from, yet, given the conflicting factual findings of the three courts
below, the Court shall go by the exception
4
to the general rule and proceed to
make its own assessment of the evidence.
First and foremost, it is undisputed that the parties hereto lived together as
husband and wife from 1986 to 1995 without the benefit of marriage. Neither is it
disputed that sometime in December 1991, Juliet left for Korea and worked
thereat, sending money to John which the latter deposited in their joint account.
In fact, Juliet was still in Korea when the annex structure was constructed in
1992.
Other than John's bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money
he borrowed from his relatives, spent for the construction of the annex structure,
evidence is wanting to support such naked claim. For sure, John even failed to
reveal how much he spent therefor. Neither did he divulge the names of the
alleged relatives from whom he made his borrowings, let alone the amount of
money he borrowed from them. All that petitioner could offer by way of
reinforcing his claim of spending his own funds and borrowed money in putting
up the subject structure was the affidavit executed by a certain Manuel
Macaraeg to the effect that petitioner borrowedP30,000.00 from him. Even then,
Macaraeg stated in his affidavit that it was sometime in 1990 when John
borrowed said amount from him. With the petitioner's own admission that the
subject structure was constructed only in 1992, or two years after he
borrowed P30,000.00 from Macaraeg, it is even doubtful whether the amount he
allegedly borrowed from the latter went into the construction of the structure in
dispute. More, it is noted that while petitioner was able to present in evidence the
Macaraeg affidavit, he failed to introduce similar affidavits, if any, of his close
relatives from whom he claimed to have made similar borrowings. For sure, not
a single relative came forward to confirm petitioner's tale. In short, there is a
paucity of evidence, testimonial or documentary, to support petitioner's self-
serving allegation that the annex structure which housed the sari-sari store was
put up thru his own funds and/or money borrowed by him. Sure, petitioner has in
his favor the tax declaration covering the subject structure. We have, however,
ruled time and again that tax declarations do not prove ownership but at best an
indicia of claims of ownership.
5
Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership, any
more than indicating possession in the concept of an owner.
6
Neither tax
receipts nor declaration of ownership for taxation purposes are evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess realty when not supported by other effective
proofs.
7

In this connection, Article 147 of the Family Code is instructive. It reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property
acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is
presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in
equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-
ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common "in
equal shares." Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as
correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.
True it is that under Article 487
8
of the Civil Code, a co-owner may bring an
action for ejectment against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession and
asserts exclusive ownership of a common property. It bears stressing, however,
that in this case, evidence is totally wanting to establish John's or Juliet's
exclusive ownership of the property in question. Neither did Juliet obtain
possession thereof by virtue of a contract, express or implied, or thru
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. As borne by the record, Juliet was in
possession of the subject structure and the sari-sari store thereat by virtue of her
being a co-owner thereof. As such, she is as much entitled to enjoy its
possession and ownership as John.
We, however, disagree with the ruling of the CA that the subject Memorandum of
Agreement, being unsigned by Juliet and John, has no binding effect between
them.
It is a matter of record that pursuant to said Agreement, Juliet did pay John the
amount of P232,397.66, as initial payment for John's share in their common
properties, with the balance of P196,472.34 payable in twelve monthly
installments beginning November 1995. It is also a matter of record that the
Agreement was signed by the witnesses thereto. Hence, the irrelevant
circumstances that the Agreement was left unsigned by Juliet and John cannot
adversely affect its binding force or effect between them, as evidently, Juliet's
initial payment ofP232,397.66 to John was in fulfillment of what the parties had
agreed upon thereunder. However, and as correctly held by the CA, Juliet's
failure to pay John the balance of the latter's share in their common properties
could at best give rise to an action for a sum of money against Juliet, or for
rescission of the said agreement and not for ejectment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed CA Decision
is AFFIRMED, except that portion thereof denying effect to the parties'
Memorandum of Agreement for being unsigned by both.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.



































UPO ATIENZA,
Petitioner,





- versus -





YOLANDA DE CASTRO,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 169698

Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.


Promulgated:

November 29, 2006
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari
is the Decision[1] dated April 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 69797, as reiterated in its Resolution[2] of September 16, 2005,
reversing an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 61, in an action for Judicial Partition of Real Property thereat
commenced by the herein petitioner Lupo Atienza against respondent Yolanda
de Castro.
The facts:

Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the President and
General Manager of Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime
Corporation, hired the services of respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as
accountant for the two corporations.

In the course of time, the relationship between Lupo and Yolanda became
intimate. Despite Lupo being a married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived
together in consortium beginning the later part of 1983. Out of their union, two
children were born. However, after the birth of their second child, their
relationship turned sour until they parted ways.

On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint against
Yolanda for the judicial partition between them of a parcel of land with
improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 147828 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
In his complaint, docketed in said court as Civil Case No. 92-1423, Lupo alleged
that the subject property was acquired during his union with Yolanda as
common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them.

Elaborating, Lupo averred in his complaint that the property in question
was acquired by Yolanda sometime in 1987 using his exclusive funds and that
the title thereto was transferred by the seller in Yolandas name without his
knowledge and consent. He did not interpose any objection thereto because at
the time, their affair was still thriving. It was only after their separation and his
receipt of information that Yolanda allowed her new live-in partner to live in the
disputed property, when he demanded his share thereat as a co-owner.
In her answer, Yolanda denied Lupos allegations. According to her, she
acquired the same property for Two Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P2,600,000.00) using her exclusive funds. She insisted having bought it thru her
own savings and earnings as a businesswoman.

In a decision[3] dated December 11, 2000, the trial court rendered
judgment for Lupo by declaring the contested property as owned in common by
him and Yolanda and ordering its partition between the two in equal shares,
thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
147828 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City to be owned in
common by plaintiff LUPO ATIENZA and the defendant
YOLANDA U. DE CASTRO share-and-share alike and
ordering the partition of said property between them. Upon
the finality of this Decision, the parties are hereby directed to
submit for the confirmation of the Court a mutually agreed
project of partition of said property or, in case the physical
partition of said property is not feasible because of its nature,
that either the same be assigned to one of the parties who
shall pay the value corresponding to the share of the other or
that the property to be sold and the proceeds thereof be
divided equally between the parties after deducting the
expenses incident to said sale.

The parties shall bear their own attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation.

Costs against the defendant.

SO ORDERED.

From the decision of the trial court, Yolanda went on appeal to the CA
in CA-G.R. CV No. 69797, therein arguing that the evidence on record
preponderate that she purchased the disputed property in her own name with
her own money. She maintained that the documents appertaining to her
acquisition thereof are the best evidence to prove who actually bought it, and
refuted the findings of the trial court, as well as Lupos assertions casting doubt
as to her financial capacity to acquire the disputed property.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in its
decision[4] of April 29, 2005, reversed and set aside that of the trial court and
adjudged the litigated property as exclusively owned by Yolanda, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the
assailed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE .
The subject property is hereby declared to be exclusively
owned by defendant-appellant Yolanda U. De Castro. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.


In decreeing the disputed property as exclusively owned by Yolanda, the
CA ruled that under the provisions of Article 148 of the Family Code vis--vis the
evidence on record and attending circumstances, Yolandas claim of sole
ownership is meritorious, as it has been substantiated by competent evidence.
To the CA, Lupo failed to overcome the burden of proving his allegation that the
subject property was purchased by Yolanda thru his exclusive funds.

With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its
Resolution of September 16, 2005,[5] Lupo is now with this Court via the present
recourse arguing that pursuant to Article 144[6] of the Civil Code, he was in no
way burdened to prove that he contributed to the acquisition of the subject
property because with or without the contribution by either partner, he is deemed
a co-owner thereof, adding that under Article 484[7] of Civil Code, as long as the
property was acquired by either or both of them during their extramarital union,
such property would be legally owned by them in common and governed by the
rules on co-ownership, which apply in default of contracts, or special provisions.

We DENY.

It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry
each other because petitioner Lupo Atienza was validly married to another
woman at the time of his cohabitation with the respondent. Their property
regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148[8] of the Family Code, which
applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state
of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this
regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...[9] Proof of actual
contribution is required.[10]
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union
of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired
during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.[11]

Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in
1983, or way before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article
148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.[12] Before Article 148 of the Family Code
was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples
living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or
the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect,
Article 148 governs.[13]

The applicable law being settled, we now remind the petitioner that here,
as in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be
had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of
the opponents defense. The petitioner as plaintiff below is not automatically
entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of
protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that
the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.[14] Indeed, the party alleging
a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.[15]

It is the petitioners posture that the respondent, having no financial
capacity to acquire the property in question, merely manipulated the dollar bank
accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise the amount needed therefor.
Unfortunately for petitioner, his submissions are burdened by the fact that his
claim to the property contradicts duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to
Sell dated March 24, 1987, the Deed of Assignment of Redemption
dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all
entered into by and between the respondent and the vendor of said property, to
the exclusion of the petitioner. As aptly pointed out by the CA:

Contrary to the disquisition of the trial court, [Lupo]
failed to overcome this burden. Perusing the records of the
case, it is evident that the trial court committed errors of
judgment in its findings of fact and appreciation of evidence
with regard to the source of the funds used for the purchase of
the disputed property and ultimately the rightful owner thereof.
Factual findings of the trial court are indeed entitled to respect
and shall not be disturbed, unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked
or misinterpreted that would otherwise materially affect the
disposition of the case.

In making proof of his case, it is paramount that the
best and most complete evidence be formally entered. Rather
than presenting proof of his actual contribution to the purchase
money used as consideration for the disputed property, [Lupo]
diverted the burden imposed upon him to [Yolanda] by
painting her as a shrewd and scheming woman without the
capacity to purchase any property. Instead of proving his
ownership, or the extent thereof, over the subject property,
[Lupo] relegated his complaint to a mere attack on the
financial capacity of [Yolanda]. He presented documents
pertaining to the ins and outs of the dollar accounts of
ENRICO and EURASIAN, which unfortunately failed to prove
his actual contribution in the purchase of the said property.
The fact that [Yolanda] had a limited access to the funds of the
said corporations and had repeatedly withdrawn money from
their bank accounts for their behalf do not prove that the
money she used in buying the disputed property, or any
property for that matter, came from said withdrawals.

As it is, the disquisition of the court a quo heavily
rested on the apparent financial capacity of the parties. On
one side, there is [Lupo], a retired sea captain and the
President and General Manager of two corporations and on
the other is [Yolanda], a Certified Public Accountant.
Surmising that [Lupo] is financially well heeled than [Yolanda],
the court a quo concluded, sans evidence, that [Yolanda] had
taken advantage of [Lupo]. Clearly, the court a quo is in error.
(Words in brackets supplied.)

As we see it, petitioners claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is
without basis because not only did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution
in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its
purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In
contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of bank accounts,
which sadly find no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his
burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply
stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not
evidence.

True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person
does not foreclose the possibility that the real property covered thereby may be
under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the
registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest
subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already stated,
petitioners evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to
warrant the trial courts finding that the disputed property falls under the purview
of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to petitioners dismal failure to
prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present preponderant evidence
of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the
respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase
the property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a
businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry
retail. She presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial
dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank account statements and
bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the
purchase price of the subject property.

All told, the Court finds and so holds that the CA committed no reversible
error in rendering the herein challenged decision and resolution.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed issuances
of the CA are AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.








ALAIN M. DIO , G.R. No. 178044
Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, Promulgated:
Respondent. January 19, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review
1
assailing the 18 October 2006
Decision
2
and the 12 March 2007 Order
3
of the Regional Trial Court of
Las Pias City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood
friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided
to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together
again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of
Las Pias City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give
love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family,
choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that
depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not
faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time
of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America.
Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition
within the reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a
petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted
by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that
on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.

On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were
no indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial
on the merits.

Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological
report establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative
years. Dr. Tayag found that respondents disorder was long-lasting and by
nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground
that respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential
marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to
establish respondents psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even
without Dr. Tayags psychological report, the allegations in the complaint,
substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological
incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that respondent committed
acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and that
respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her
under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent
abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another
man.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M.
DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on
January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as
NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of
property.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be
issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the
Solicitor General, Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
4

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of
the absolute community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment
shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code.

In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and
modified its 18 October 2006 Decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and
defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its
effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and

2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the
Solicitor General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City
and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information and
guidance.
5


Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.
The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution
of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues
that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
6
(the Rule) does not apply to
Article 147 of the Family Code.

We agree with petitioner.

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void
marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code.
7
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void,
8
such as petitioner and respondent in the
case before the Court.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.


For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be
present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void.
9



All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article
147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and
respondent.

We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The
ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases
governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the
Rule provides:

Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the
petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance
with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the
Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.


The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule
are:

Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45.
10


The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody
and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.



All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the
conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.

In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it
is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 102 and 129.

Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all
common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the
trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities,
unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had
already provided for such matters.

The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask
for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no
way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing
upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value of the
properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute
nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of
the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared
void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or
bigamous marriage was contracted. Under Article 40, [t]he absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus we ruled:

x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.
11

Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages,
meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of
a competent court in an action for annulment.
12
In both instances under Articles
40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of
property
13
or conjugal partnership of gains
14
unless the parties agree to a
complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the
marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to
liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment
could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on
co-ownership.

In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article
36
15
of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the
rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of
parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
16
The rules on co-ownership apply
and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the
Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses
in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.


WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with
the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting for the liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.
SO ORDERED.





G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012
WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner,
vs.
AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERLAS-BERNABE, J .:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
1
under Rule 45 of the
Rules of CoLlli assailing the October 8, 2009 Decision
2
and January 24, 2011
Resolution
3
of the court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940, which
affirmed the February 28, 2007 Decision
4
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Negros Oriental, Branch 34 in Civil Case No. I 2884. The foregoing rulings
dissolved the conjugal partnership of gains of Willem Beumer (petitioner) and
Avelina Amores (respondent) and distributed the properties forming part of the
said property regime.
The Factual Antecedents
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29,
1980. After several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the
nullity of their marriage in the Decision
5
dated November 10, 2000 on the basis
of the formers psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership
6
dated December 14, 2000 praying for the distribution of the
following described properties claimed to have been acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage, to wit:
By Purchase:
a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the
Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
22846, containing an area of 252 square meters (sq.m.), including a
residential house constructed thereon.
b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21974,
containing an area of 806 sq.m., including a residential house
constructed thereon.
c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21306,
containing an area of 756 sq.m.
d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the
Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21307, containing an area
of 45 sq.m.
By way of inheritance:
e. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No.
23567, containing an area of 2,635 sq.m. (the area that appertains to
the conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).
f. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No.
23575, containing an area of 360 sq.m. (the area that appertains to the
conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.).
7

In defense,
8
respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2)
residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any
conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being that she used her own
personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds
and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance.
9
She submitted a joint
affidavit executed by her and petitioner attesting to the fact that she purchased
Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her own money.
10
Accordingly,
respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for dissolution as well as
payment for attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
11

During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were
registered in the name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the
money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit
12
since
respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also
claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of
Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.
13

For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the
lots came exclusively from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from
selling jewelry as well as products from Avon, Triumph and Tupperware.
14
She
further asserted that after she filed for annulment of their marriage in 1996,
petitioner transferred to their second house and brought along with him certain
personal properties, consisting of drills, a welding machine, grinders, clamps,
etc. She alleged that these tools and equipment have a total cost of
P500,000.00.
15

The RTC Ruling
On February 28, 2007, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 rendered its
Decision, dissolving the parties conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of
land to respondent as her paraphernal properties; the tools and equipment in
favor of petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on
Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties, the dispositive of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner Willem Beumer and respondent
Avelina Amores considering the fact that their marriage was previously annulled
by Branch 32 of this Court. The parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Titles Nos. 22846, 21974, 21306, 21307, 23567 and 23575 are hereby declared
paraphernal properties of respondent Avelina Amores due to the fact that while
these real properties were acquired by onerous title during their marital union,
Willem Beumer, being a foreigner, is not allowed by law to acquire any private
land in the Philippines, except through inheritance.
The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the complaint
which were brought out by Willem from the conjugal dwelling are hereby
declared to be exclusively owned by the petitioner.
The two houses standing on the lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
21974 and 22846 are hereby declared to be co-owned by the petitioner and the
respondent since these were acquired during their marital union and since there
is no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and residential units.
Petitioner and respondent are, thereby, directed to subject this court for approval
their project of partition on the two houses aforementioned.
The Court finds no sufficient justification to award the counterclaim of
respondent for attorneys fees considering the well settled doctrine that there
should be no premium on the right to litigate. The prayer for moral damages are
likewise denied for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
16

It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots 1, 2142,
5845 and 4, petitioner could not have acquired any right whatsoever over these
properties as petitioner still attempted to acquire them notwithstanding his
knowledge of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of private
lands.
17
This was made evident by the sworn statements petitioner executed
purporting to show that the subject parcels of land were purchased from the
exclusive funds of his wife, the herein respondent.
18
Petitioners plea for
reimbursement for the amount he had paid to purchase the foregoing properties
on the basis of equity was likewise denied for not having come to court with
clean hands.
The CA Ruling
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, contesting only the RTCs award of Lots
1, 2142, 5845 and 4 in favor of respondent. He insisted that the money used to
purchase the foregoing properties came from his own capital funds and that they
were registered in the name of his former wife only because of the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of
one-half (1/2) of the value of what he had paid in the purchase of the said
properties, waiving the other half in favor of his estranged ex-wife.
19

On October 8, 2009, the CA promulgated a Decision
20
affirming in toto the
judgment rendered by the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34. The CA stressed
the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional prohibition for aliens
to acquire lands in the Philippines."
21
Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support
his claim for reimbursement.
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the CA Decision due to the following error:
UNDER THE FACTS ESTABLISHED, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT
SUSTAINING THE PETITIONERS ATTEMPT AT SUBSEQUENTLY
ASSERTING OR CLAIMING A RIGHT OF HALF OR WHOLE OF THE
PURCHASE PRICE USED IN THE PURCHASE OF THE REAL PROPERTIES
SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.
22
(Emphasis supplied)
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For
Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller
23
the Court
had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels
of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former
Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot
seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly
and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign
ownership of Philippine land
24
enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited
constitutional prohibition"
25
and even asseverated that, because of such
prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the latters
name.
26
Clearly, petitioners actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the
constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no
reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny
petitioners claim for reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks
equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded
equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground
that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful.
27

In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the funds used
to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While
admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondents personal
funds were used to purchase Lot 1,
28
he likewise claimed that his personal
disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies
show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with
unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the
subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established
that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done
indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
29
Surely, a
contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no
rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.
30
Corollary
thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code,
31
petitioner cannot have the subject
properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the
purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or
agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.
32
Indeed, one cannot
salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of
unjust enrichment.
33
As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a
foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of
Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is
proscribed by the Constitution, to wit:
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which
reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.1wphi1
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER
DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just
cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not
apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the
petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from
recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield
stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is
immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times
very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the
objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which
the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him
and the plaintiff."
34
(Citations omitted)
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign
citizenship.
35
Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of
citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional
ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the
improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and
2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to
partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the
national patrimony
36
and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October 8,
2009 Decision and January 24, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.