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PROPERTY Professor E.

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Chapter III: Right of Accession 28 July 2009

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III. RIGHTS OF ACCESSION
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A. Concept
Art 440 The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is
incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.

Definition of Accession
TOLENTINO: Right by virtue of which the owner of a thing becomes the owner of everything that the thing may
produce or which may be inseparably united or incorporated thereto, either naturally or principally.
JBL REYES: Extension of ownership over a thing to whatever is incorporated thereto naturally or artificially (without or
with labor of man)
o Incorporation means a stable union or adherence, not mere juxtaposition
o Accession is one of the bundle of rights of ownership and is not a mode of acquiring property
o It does not depend upon a new title

B. General Principles of Accession

1. Applicable to both accession discreta and accession continua
a. Accessory follows the principal (accesio cedit principal)
Owner of the principal acquires or extends his ownership over the accessory
Art 437 Owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it
Art 446 Owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it
b. No one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another

2. Applicable to accession continua alone
a. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the improvement or repairs made thereon, belong
to the owner of the land, subject to the provisions of the following articles (Art 445)
b. All works, sowing, planting are presumed made by owner and at his expense, unless contrary is proved
c. Accessory incorporated to principal such that it cannot be separated without injury to work constructed or
destruction to plantings, construction or works (Art 447)
d. Bad faith involves liability for damages and other dire consequences
e. Bad faith of one party neutralizes bad faith of the other
Art 453 If there was BF, not only on the part of the person who BPS, but also on the part of owner, rights
of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.

3. Applicable to accession discreta alone
a. Ownership of fruits to owner of principal thing belongs the natural, industrial and civil fruits (Art 441 )
EXCEPTIONS:
i. Possession in good faith (to the possessor)
ii. In usufruct (to the usufructuary)
iii. In lease (to the lessee)
iv. In antichresis (to the creditor)

C. Obligations of receiver of fruits to pay expenses by 3rd persons in production, gathering and preservation
Art 443 He who receives the fruits has the obligation to pay the expenses made by a third person in their production,
gathering and preservation.

D. Kinds of Accession

1. Accession Discreta (Fruits)
Art 440 The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby

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Consolidated by Karichi Santos
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Extension of the right of ownership to the products of a thing
Based on principles of justice: It is only just that the owner of a thing should also own whatever it produces,
unless there is some special reason for a contrary solution
GENERAL RULE: Fruits go to the owner of the principal, unless otherwise provided by law or contract
EXCEPTIONS: possession in good faith, usufruct, lease, antichresis

Art 441 To the owner belongs:
a. Natural fruits
Art 442 the spontaneous products of the soil and the young and other products of animals
Those products of the soil in whose generation human labor does not intervene (e.g. wild herbs in
the mountains dedicated to pasturage)
b. Industrial
Art 442 are those produced by lands of any kind through cultivation or labor
Fruits that implies some kind of cultivation or labor (e.g. zacate grass fed to horses)
Products of the soil as a result of human labor
c. Civil
Art 442 are the rents of buildings, the price of leases of lands and other property and the amount of
perpetual or life annuities or other similar income
Periodical (reiterable) increase of incorporeal property due to operation of law (rents, annuities)
Rents of land, buildings, and certain kinds of incomes obtained from the land or building itself

BACHRACH v SEIFERT (1950; Ozaeta)
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o In his will, the deceased Emil Maurice Bachrach named his wife (Mary McDonald Bachrach) as usufructuary of
the remainder of his estate. The will further provided that upon the death of Mary McDonald Bachrach, one-half
of all his estate shall be divided among his legal heirs, to the exclusion of his brothers.
o The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc.,
received from the latter 54,000 shares representing 50% stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares.
o June 10, 1948, Mary (the widow), as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the lower court to
authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company (the administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach) to transfer to
her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend. She claimed that said dividend, although paid out in the form of
stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant.
o Sophie Seifert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground that the stock
dividend in question was not income but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the
usufructuary but to the remainderman
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.
o The lower court granted Marys petition and overruled S&Es objection. Seifer and Elianoff appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the stock dividend can be considered as a fruit/income (which belongs to the usufructuary) or part of
the capital (part of the corpus of the estate which will be delivered together with the rest of the future estate to the
remainderman)?

HELD: The stock dividend is a form of income. The SC cited Hite vs. Hite wherein the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, held
that "where a dividend, although declared in stock, is based upon the earnings of the company, it is in reality,
whether called by one name or another, the income of the capital invested in it. In the present case; the 108,000
shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The 54,000 shares of stock dividend are civil fruits of the original
investment.
Also, two US rulings figured in this case:
1. Massachusetts rule = stock dividend is not an income but merely represents an addition to the investment capital
The Massachusetts rule regards cash dividends, however large, as income, and stock dividends, however made, as
capital. It holds that a stock dividend is not in any true sense any dividend at all since it involves no division or
severance from the corporate assets of the subject of the dividend. This rule supports Seifert and Elianoffs contention
that a stock dividend is not an income (unlike a cash dividend), but merely represents an addition to the invested
capital.

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Camille Maranan
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According to my legal dictionary, a remainder is a future estate and a remainderman is the inchoate possessor of that future
estate
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2. The Pennsylvania rule declares that all earnings of the corporation made prior to the death of the testator-
stockholder belong to the corpus of the estate, and that all earnings, when declared as dividends in whatever form,
made during the lifetime of the usufructuary or life tenant are income and belong to the usufructuary or life tenant. This
rule supports Mary Bachrach's contention.
According to our SC, the Pennsylvania rule is more in accord with Philippine statutory laws than the Massachusetts rule
since under section 16 of the Corporation Law, no corporation may make or declare any dividend except from the
surplus profits arising from its business. Any dividend, therefore, whether cash or stock, represents surplus profits.
Therefore, the stock dividend, as part of the income of the usufruct, should be transferred to Mary since Article 471 of
the Civil Code (now Art. 566)provides that the usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the natural, industrial, and
civil fruits of the property in usufruct.

In My Understanding: The widow is saying that the stock dividend should be transferred to her account since this form
part of the income of the estate and since she is the usufructuary, she has the right over such income. On the other
hand, the legal heirs/ remainderman (or men) are contending that the stock dividend is part of the capital and
should be delivered to them (together with the rest of the estate upon Marys death). The court held that stock
dividends form part of the income and therefore, should be delivered to the usufructuary (the widow).

DISPOSITIVE: Order affirmed.

BACHRACH v TALISAY SILAY (1931; Romualdez)
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Plaintiff-appellee: Bachrach Motor Co., Inc.
Defendants-appellees: Talisay-Silay Milling Co. et al.
Intervenor-appellant: Philippine National Bank
Facts:
22 Dec 1923, Talisay-Silay was indebted to PNB. To secure the loan, Talisay induced its planters one of whom was
Mariano Lacson Ledesma to mortgage their land. The central, to compensate the planters for mortgaging their
property, undertook to credit the owners of the plantation every year with a sum equal to 2% of the debt
secured accdg to the yearly balance. The payment to be made as soon as the central was freed of its debts
Mariano sold his land to Cesar Ledesma for P7500
Bachrach on the other hand was a creditor of Mariano Ledesma. When Mariano could no longer pay Bachrach, it
went after Talisay (original complaint), praying for the delivery of P13850 Talisay owed to Mariano as bonus stated
in the first paragraph, or any instrument of credit. It also prayed for accounting of whatever the central owed to
Mariano by way of bonus, dividend, etc., as well as the nullification of the sale made to Cesar Ledesma
PNB filed third party claim alleging a preferential right over Marianos credit owed by Tali say as part of the civil
fruits of the land mortgaged to the bank. BAchrach contested this
Talisay prayed for the absolution of 7500 of the credit as it belonged to Cesar Ledesma as buyer in good faith. All
parties later agreed to respect Cesars credit and absolved him from the complaint and ordered delivery to him of
P7500
Trial court ruled in favor of Bachrach, awarding it P11,076.02 of Marianos bonus from Talisay. Hence this appeal
Issues: W/N the bonus was a civil fruit which formed part of the mortgaged land NO
Held and Ratio: NO. Art 355 of the old Civil Code (Art 442 of the current Civil Code) considers three things as civil fruits:
rents of buildings, proceeds from leases of lands, and income from perpetual of life annuities or other similar sources of
revenue.
The bonus in question was neither rent of a building nor land. For it to come under the coverage of income, it
must be obtained from the land. In this case however, [the] bonus bears no immediate but only a remote and
accidental relation to the land. The central granted it as compensation for the risk that the landowners entered in
mortgaging their lands. If the bonus was an income of any kind, it comes from the assumption of risk, and not from the
land itself. Thus, it is distinct and independent from the property referred to in the mortgage to the bank.

Disposition: Judgment affirmed

2. Accession Continua
Art 440 The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby
Acquisition of ownership over a thing incorporated to that which belongs to the owner
May refer to immovables (alluvion, force of river, change of river bed, formation of islands and BPS) or to
movables (conjunction/adjunction, specification, commixtion, confusion)
Based on necessity and utility: It being more practical that the owner of the principal thing should own the
new things instead of a co-ownership being established.

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Doms Obias
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a. Over Immovables

1) Artificial or Industrial BPS
ii. Owner is BPS using materials of another (Art 447)
Good faith
Bad faith
iii. BPS on anothers land using own materials
BPS in good faith
BPS in bad faith
- OPTIONS OPEN TO OWNER OF LAND:
1. To acquire building, planting and sowing
2. To sell BP and to lease land S
- RIGHTS OF BPS IN BAD FAITH
1. Landowner in BF but BPS in good faith
2. BPS builds, plants, sows on anothers land with materials owned by 3
rd
person

Art 456: Good faith does not exclude negligence

BERNARDO v BATACLAN (1938; Laurel)
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FACTS: Plaintiff Vicente Bernardo acquired a parcel of land from Pastor Samonte thru a contract of sale. Thereafter,
Bernardo instituted a case against said vendor to secure possession of the land. Bernardo was able to obtain a
favorable decision from the court. The plaintiff found the defendant herein, Catalino Bataclan, in the said premises. It
appears that he has been authorized by former owners, as far back as 1922, to clear the land and make
improvements thereon. Thus, plaintiff instituted a case against Bataclan in the Court of First Instance of Cavite. In this
case, plaintiff was declared the owner of the land but the defendant was held to be a possessor in good faith,
entitled to reimbursement in the total sum of P1,642, for work done and improvements made. Both parties appealed
the decision.
The court thereafter made some modifications by allowing the defendant to recover compensation
amounting to P2,212 and by reducing the price at which the plaintiff could require the defendant to purchase the
land in question from P300 down to P200 per hectare. Plaintiff was likewise given 30 days from the date when the
decision became final to exercise his option, either to sell the land to the defendant or to buy the improvements from
him. On January 9, 1934, the plaintiff conveyed to the court his desire "to require the defendant to pay him the value
of the land at the rate of P200 per hectare or a total price of P18,000 for the whole tract of land." The defendant
indicated that he was unable to pay the land and, on January 24, 1934, an order was issued giving the plaintiff 30
days within which to pay the defendant the sum of P2,212.
Subsequently, on April 24, 1934, the court below, at the instance of the plaintiff and without objection on the
part of the defendant, ordered the sale of the land in question at public auction. The land was sold on April 5, 1935 to
Toribio Teodoro for P8,000.

ISSUE: WON DEFENDANT BATACLAN IS STILL ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE COURT MANDATED COMPENSATION ARISING
FROM THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY TO TORIBIO

HELD: NO. The defendant avers that he is a possessor in good faith and that the amount of P2,212 to which he is
entitled has not yet been paid to him. Defendant further claims that he has a right to retain the land in accordance
with the provisions of article 453 of the Civil Code. While the said argument is legally tenable, the same must perforce
be denied because defendant Bataclan has lost his right of retention as he failed to pay for the land. The law, as we
have already said, requires no more than that the owner of the land should choose between indemnifying the owner
of the improvements or requiring the latter to pay for the land.

IGNACIO v HILARIO (1946; Moran)
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Facts: Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres filed a complaint against Damian, Francisco and Luis Ignacio concerning
the ownership of a parcel of land, partly rice-land and partly residential. After the trial of the case, the lower court
under Judge Alfonso Felix, rendered judgment holding Hilario and Dres as the legal owners of the whole property but
conceding to the Ignacios the ownership of the houses and granaries built by them on the residential portion with the
rights of a possessor in good faith, in accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code.

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Phoebe Hidalgo
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Obet Bunagan
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Subsequently, in a motion filed in the same CFI (now handled by respondent Judge Hon. Felipe Natividad), Hilario and
Dres prayed for an order of execution alleging that since they chose neither to pay the Ignacios for the buildings nor
to sell to them the residential lot, the Ignacios should be ordered to remove the structure at their own expense and to
restore Hilario and Dres in the possession of said lot. After hearing, the motion was granted by Judge Natividad.
Hence, the petition for certiorari was filed by the Ignacios praying for (a) a restraint and annulment of the order of
execution issued by Judge Natividad; (b) an order to compel Hilario and Dres to pay them the sum of P2,000 for the
buildings, or sell to them the residential lot for P45; or (c) a rehearing of the case for a determination of the rights of the
parties upon failure of extra-judicial settlement.
The Supreme Court set aside the writ of execution issued by Judge Natividad and ordered the lower court to hold a
hearing in the principal case wherein it must determine the prices of the buildings and of the residential lot where they
are erected, as well as the period of time within which Hilario and Dres may exercise their option either to pay for the
buildings or to sell their land, and, in the last instance, the period of time within which the Ignacios may pay for the
land, all these periods to be counted from the date the judgment becomes executory or unappealable. After such
hearing, the court shall render a final judgment according to the evidence presented by the parties; with costs
against Hilarion and Dres.

1. Right of retention of builder in good faith
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the
land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453. Article 453 provides that Necessary expenses shall be
refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until such expenses are made
good to him. Useful expenses shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the
person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or paying
the increase in value which the thing may have acquired in consequence thereof."

2. Option of the landowner to pay for the building or sell his land to the owner of the building; Right of remotion only
available if he chose the latter and the owner of the building cannot pay
The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361, either to pay for the building or to sell
his land to the owner of the building. Article 361 provides that The owner of land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing or planting, after the
payment of the indemnity stated in articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of
the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. He cannot however refuse both to pay for the building and to sell
the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such
remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.

3. Order amends judgment substantially and thus null and void
The order of Judge Natividad compelling the Ignacios to remove their buildings from the land belonging to Hilario and
Dres only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings nor to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends
substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the Civil
Code.

4. Original decision did not become final as it failed to determine the value of the buildings and of the lot; and the time
to which the option may be exercised
In the decision of Judge Felix, the rights of both parties were well defined under articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code,
but it failed to determine the value of the buildings and of the lot where they are erected as well as the periods of
time within which the option may be exercised and payment should be made, these particulars having been left for
determination apparently after the judgment has become final. The procedure is erroneous, for after the judgment
has become final, no additions can be made thereto and nothing can be done therewith except its execution. And
execution cannot be had, the sheriff being ignorant as to how, for how much, and within what time may the option
be exercised, and certainty no authority is vested in him to settle these matters which involve exercise of judicial
discretion. Thus, the judgment rendered by Judge Felix has never become final, it having left matters to be settled for
its completion in a subsequent proceeding, matters which remained unsettled up to the time the petition is filed in the
present case.

SARMIENTO v AGANA ()
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DEPRA v DUMLAO ()
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TECHNOGAS PHILS v CA ()
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Grace Lazaro
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Aris Mascenon
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Vams Villar
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ORTIZ v KAYANAN (1979; Antonio)
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Facts: Homestead Application Lot belonged to Dolorico II, Ortizs ward located in Barrio Cabuluan, Calauag, Quezon
i
.
Dolorico II named as successor and heir his uncle Dolorico, then died.
All this time Ortiz was in possession and cultivation of the property.
Dolorico relinquished rights over property in favour of Comintan and Zamora.
Court found Ortiz to be in good faith, but held the public bidding to be valid. If petitioner was not found to be
the winner, Comintan and Zamora are to reimburse him for P13,632. Ortiz is to retain possession until the
amount is paid.
CA affirmed RTC
Respondent Judge discovered that after the decision of the lower courts, Ortiz collected tolls on portions of
the land even if he had not introduced any improvements on said portions estimated to amount to P25,000.
Petitioner contends that he is entitled to the fruits of the property while the P13,632 has yet to be paid, this
being considered as civil fruits.

Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to fruits while Comintan and Zamora have yet to pay the indemnity due petitioner.

Decision: NO.
Before possession is legally interrupted, possessor in good faith is entitled to fruits. This right ceases upon
defects being known. This is known as a right to retention, for the creditor to obtain payment of a debt.
Also we must consider that tolls were collected from portions with no improvements of petitioner, therefore he
really has no right to said fruits.

GEMINIANO v CA ()
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PLEASANTVILLE DEVT CORP v CA ()
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FACTS
Edith Robillo purchased a parcel of land, Lot 9, from Pleasantville Devt Corporation in Pleasantville
Subdivision, Bacolod City. Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was
vacant.
Upon completing all payments and securing a TCT in his name, Jardinico discovered that improvements had
been introduced on Lot 9 by Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof.
It appears that Kee bought on installment Lot 8 from CT Torres Enterprises Inc (CTTEI), the real estate agent of
Pleasantville.
Under the Contract to Sell, Kee could and did possess the lot even before the completion of payments.
Zenaida Octaviano, CTTEIs employee, was the one who mistakenly pointed out Lot 9 (instead of Lot 8) to
Kees wife. Thereafter, Kee built his residence, a store, an auto repair shop, and other improvements on the
lot.
Jardinico confronted Kee after discovering that the latter was occupying Lot 9. Kee refused to vacate, hence
Jardinico filed an ejectment suit with damages.
RTC: Kee is a builder in bad faith. Assuming arguendo that Kee was acting in good faith, he was nonetheless guilty
of unlawfully usurping the possessory right of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he was served with notice to
vacate said lot, and was thus liable for rental.
CA: Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the mix-up when he began construction of the
improvements. The erroneous delivery was due to the fault of CTTEI and thus imputable to Pleasantville, the
principal.

ISSUE: W/N Kee is a builder in good faith? YES

HELD/RATIO:
The roots of the controversy can be traced in the errors committed by CTTEI when it pointed the wrong lot to Kee.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and he is ignorant of any defect
or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, Pleasantville has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of
Kee.
At the time he built the improvements on Lot 9, Kee believed that the said lot was the one he bought. He was not
aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Pleasantville failed to prove otherwise.
Violation of the Contract of Sale on Installment may not be the basis to negate the presumption that Kee was a
builder in good faith. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good faith,
that is, on his state of mind at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. These alleged violations may give rise

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Mark Yam
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Krissy Conti
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Nessa Abad
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to petitioners cause of action against Kee under the said contract (contractual breach) but may not be bases to
negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith.

FELICES v IRIOLE ()
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Sorry I cant find the case online

SPOUSES NUQUID v CA (1993;)
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SPOUSES NUQUID v CA (2005;)
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FACTS:
Pedro Pecson owned a commercial lot in Kamias and built a four-door two-storey apartment building. He failed
to pay realty taxes, so the LOT was sold at public auction to Mamerto Nepomuceno, and later to the Sps. Juan
and Erlinda Nuguid.

Case 1: Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale. SC: Sps. Nuguid owned the lot, while Pecson still owned
the building (May 5, 1993).

Case 2: Nuguids sought delivery of possession of the lot and apartment building, i.e., they want to acquire the
building. SC (Nov. 15, 1993):
1. Art. 448, NCC: Case is apposite as when the landowner is the BPS who then later loses ownership through sale;
2. Current market value of the building should be the basis of the indemnity;
3. Pecson entitled to retain ownership of the building and the income therefrom;
4. CA erred in upholding TCs determination of indemnity (P53,000.00 construction cost) and in also ordering
Pecson to account for rent.
5. Remanded to TC for determination of CMV.

Case 3 (Case at bar): CMV = P400,000. Pecson already received P300,000 from Sps. Nuguid; balance of P100,000 paid
thereafter. TC directed Sps. Nuguid to also pay P1.34 million for rentals from Nov. 1993 to Dec. 1997 (@ P28K/mo.) Thus,
petition.

ISSUE: W/N the spouses should pay rent collected during period of Pecsons dispossession of the building? YES.

HELD:
Pecson is a builder in good faith. Nuguid is the landowner.
Art. 448, NCC entitles landowner (Nuguid) to either appropriate the building upon payment of indemnity or sell
the land. Nuguid sought appropriation.
Art. 546, NCC entitles the BPS to full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses, and the right of
retention until full reimbursement is made.
However, until the payment of indemnity is full, the BPS (Pecson) has a RIGHT of RETENTION (which includes the
right to the expenses and the right to the fruits) as a builder in good faith. Thus, he cannot be compelled to pay
rentals during the period of retention nor be disturbed in his possession by ordering him to vacate. The landowner
is prohibited from offsetting or compensating the necessary and useful expenses with the fruits received by the
BPS in good faith.

DISPOSITIVE: TC decision reinstated.

2) Natural

a. Alluvium

REPUBLIC v CA ()
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GRANDE v CA (1962; Barrera)
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Facts:

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Chi Santos
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Jessa Alvarez
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Rory Lambino
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Victor Villanueva
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Angel Paglicawan
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- Grande siblings are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan,
Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), Isabela by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui who in turn
inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name the land is registered. When it was
surveyed for purposes of registration, sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River.
Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by
action of the said river, so much, so that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded t a distance of about 105
meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposite of 19,964 sq. meters more or less had been added to the
registered land. On Jan. 25, 1958, the siblings instituted a case to quiet title against private respondent
Calalungs and alleged that they were in former peaceful possession of said alluvial deposit when respondents
encroached the land claiming ownership.
- The trial court ruled in favor of the Grandes ratiocinating that, by accession the land in question pertains to
the original estate, and since the original estate is registered, the accretion consequently is automatically
registered too. There can also be no acquisitive prescription in favor of the Calalungs since the land is already
registered. The action to claim land by the owners which is registered is imprescriptible. Upon appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court thus this appeal by the Grandes.

Issue:
- WON the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered
by a Torrens title thereby making said land imprescriptible.
- WON respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription.

Held and Ratio:
- NO. The accretion does not ipso facto become registered like the land to which it is attached. Ownership of
land is different from registration. Ownership is governed by the civil code while the imprescriptibility of
registered land is governed by the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts. To obtain the protection of
imprescriptibility, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial
procedures must be observed. The fact remains that the Grandes have not sought registration of the alluvial
property in dispute up to the time they filed an action against respondents. Because of this, said accretion is
not protected by imprescriptibility.
- YES. The Court of Appeals have acquired evidence that respondent Calalungs were in open and continuous
possession of the accretion since 1933 or 1934 up to the time the action against them was filed. The
prescriptive period in this applied in this case is 10 years and not 30 since the law applicable is Act 190 and
not the Civil Code. Respondents possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil
Code were not yet in force.

Dispositive: Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed.


MENESES (1995;)
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b. Avulsion

NAVARRO v IAC (1997;)
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c. Change of course of river

BAES v CA (1995;)
20

BINALAY v MANALO (1995;)
21


d. Formation of Islands
e. Reverse accession


b. Over movables

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Unassigned
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Nathan Marasigan
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Krystel Bautista
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Iani Lauron
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1) Conjunction and adjunction
i. Inclusion or engraftment
ii. Soldadura or soldering
Plumbatura different metals
Ferruminatio same metal
iii. Tejido or weaving
iv. Escritura or writing
v. Pintura or painting

2) Commixtion and confusion

SIARI VALLEY ESTATES v LUCASAN (1960;)
22

FACTS:
On January 30, 1952, the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte rendered decision ordering Filemon
Lucasan to deliver to the Siari Valley Estates, Inc. the cattle inside the former's pasture or pay its value
amounting to P40,000.00 and damages in another sum of P40,000.00
After the said decision was upheld by the SC and became final and executory, the sheriff proceeded to levy
on certain parcels of lands belonging to Lucasan
These lands were sold by the sheriff at public auction to the corporation as the highest bidder
Lucasan failed to redeem the property within one year, hence the sheriff issued in favor of the purchaser the
final certificate of sale, copy of which was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga
Lucasan opposed said registration as regards one of the parcel of lands sold at auction.
Lucasan contends the ff:
he and his wife constituted this house and the lot on which stands into a family home, and this was
registered in the office of the register of deeds on June 21, 1955
the levy made by the sheriff on said property is legally ineffective because it was not effected in
accordance with what is prescribed in Section 14, Rule 39, in relation to Section 7, Rule 59, of the Rules of
Court

ISSUE: WON rules on writs of execution should be strictly construed?

HELD: YES.

the rule provides that real property shall "be levied on in like manner and with like effect as under an order of
attachment" (Section 14, Rule 39), and the provision regarding attachment of real property postulates that
the attachment shall be made "by filing with the register of deeds a copy of the order, together with the
description of the property attached, and a notice that it is attached, and by leaving a copy of said order,
description, and notice with the occupant of the property, if any there be," and that "Where the property has
been brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act, the notice shall contain a reference to the
number of the certificate of title and the volume and page in the registration book where the certificate is
registered"
These provisions should be strictly construed if their purpose has to be accomplished. The requirement that the
notice of levy should contain a reference to the number of the certificate of title and the volume and page in
the registration book where the certificate is registered is made in order that the debtor as well as a third
person may be properly informed of the particular land or property that is under the custody of the court.
Since the notice of levy made by the sheriff as regards parcel number 1 which is a registered land contains no
reference to the number of its certificate of title and the volume and page in the registry book where the title
is registered, it follows that said notice is legally ineffective and as such did not have the effect of binding the
property for purposes of execution. Consequently, the sale carried out by virtue of said levy is also invalid and
of no legal effect

SANTOS v BERNABE (1993;)
23

FACTS:
Urbano Santos (778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay) and Pablo Tiongson (1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay) both
deposited in the warehouse of Jose Bernabe palay with the same grade and quality. However, it does not

22
Ixara Maroto
23
Micha Arias
Page 10 of 10

tutubi2b | uplawb2012
appear which sack belongs to Santos and which is owned by Tiongson. There were no marks or signs, nor
were they separated from each other.
Tiongson filed a case against Bernabe for the recovery of the palay he deposited in his warehouse. The writ of
attachment for the said palay was granted and the attachable property of Bernabe including the 924
cavans and 31.5 kilos palay found in his warehouse were attached, sold in public auction and the proceeds
delivered to Tiongson.
Santos then intervened contending that Tiongson cannot claim the 924c & 31.5k palay because by asking for
the attachment thereof, he impliedly acknowledged that the same belonged to Bernabe and not to
Tiongson. Also because, some of these palay could be those deposited by Santos.

ISSUE: W/N Tiongson and Santos are entitled to recover the part belonging to each?

HELD/RATIO: YES. Art 381 of the CC prescribes that if by will of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature
are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the later case the things cannot be separated without injury,
each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him, according o the value of
the things mixed or commingled.

In the present case, since the number of kilos in a cavan has not been determined, only of the 924 cavans of palay
which were attached and sold shall be distributed proportionately between Santos (398.49 cavans) and Tiongson
(525.52 cavans) or the value thereof at the rate of P3/cavan.

DISPOSITIVE: Tiongson ordered to pay the value of 398.49 cavans at P3/cavan to Santos.


3) Specification

i
Because Prof. Labitag remembers cases by location

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