ID # 1824367 c/o Men’s Central Jail
441 Bauchet Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012
RichardIFine@gmail.com

Edmund G. Brown, Jr.
Attorney General of California
California Department of Justice
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Ste. 1100
San Francisco, CA 94102

Please consider this a formal complaint requesting the prosecution of Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge David P. Yaffe and the members of the LA County Board of Supervisors, in particular, and all other superior court judges and county supervisors who have, respectively, received and authorized “benefits provided to a judge under official action of a governmental entity” for violation of the California Penal Code sections prohibiting “misappropriation of funds” (§ 424), “bribery” (§§ 92-94) and “obstruction of justice” (§§ 146(a) and 153), amongst others. Prosecution is also sought against all judges who have received any “supplemental benefit payments” from any county since May 21, 2009, and all county officials who have authorized the appropriation of such payments.

Request is further made for your office to seek to reopen any case that has been decided by or presided over by any judge who has received immunity for criminal acts under Senate Bill SBX2-11 or who has received payments from any county since May 21, 2009, due to the “integrity of the court” having been compromised by the judge having received such criminal payments from a county.

“judicial benefits” paid by LA County to LA Superior Court judges was “compensation” and, as such, violated Article VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution. Such Article states in relevant part that only the state legislature can “prescribe” the compensation of the judges. The Court confirmed that this was a “non-delegable duty” which could not be undertaken by counties.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr.
Attorney General of California
September 14, 2009
Page 2

In response to theStur geon decision, the Administrative Office of the Judicial Council of California drafted Senate Bill SBX2-11. (The history of the bill shows such drafting.) The bill, sponsored by Senate President Pro Tem Darrell Steinberg, was introduced as part of the budget process on February 11, 2009, passed by the State Senate on February 14, 2009, passed by the State Assembly on February 15, 2009, and signed by the Governor on February 20, 2009. The Bill became effective on May 21, 2009.

“Judges of a court whose judges received judicial benefits provided by the county or court or both, as of July 2008, shall continue to receive supplemental benefits from the county or court then paying the benefits on the same terms and conditions as were in effect on that date.”

The second Section provided for the termination of the benefits with 180 days’ notice to the administrative director of the Courts and the “impacted judge”, but precluded termination while the judge remained in office in that court.

The last Section of Senate Bill SBX2-11 recognized that the county benefits violated the criminal law by giving retroactive immunity to the judges and government employees for past violations. The immunity does not extend, however, to the current payments. Such paragraph states as follows:

“Notwithstanding any other law, no governmental entity, or officer or employer of a governmental entity, shall incur any liability or be subject to any prosecution of any disciplinary action because of benefits provided to a judge under the official action of a governmental entity prior to the effective date of this act on the ground that those benefits were not authorized under law.”

As shown above, the immunity was limited to actions “prior to the effective date of this act” (May 21, 2009). No immunity exists for the current “benefits provided to a judge under the official action of a governmental entity … on the ground that those benefits were not authorized by law.”

The Penal Codes which are being and have repeatedly been violated are: (a) misappropriation of funds (§ 424), (b) bribery (§§ 92-94), and (c) obstruction of justice (§§ 146(a) and 153), amongst others. (In People v. Sperl (54 Cal.App.3rd 640 (1976)), for example, the Court of Appeals held that a county marshal was properly convicted of misappropriation of public money within the meaning of Penal Code§ 424 after he used deputies and county vehicles in conducting non-county business.)

Edmund G. Brown, Jr.
Attorney General of California
September 14, 2009
Page 3

Additionally, the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and to the California Constitution have been violated. U.S. Supreme Court cases have long and consistently held that: it is a violation of due process for a judge to preside over a case when his campaign committee had received a significant contribution from the party who later appeared before him after he won the election (see Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) decided June 8, 2009). It is a violation of due process for a judge to preside over cases where the fines or fees he imposes go to the city treasury and are used to supplement his salary, and also because of his interest in helping the city as its mayor (see Tumey v. Ohio

, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) – due process clause incorporated the common law rule that a judge must recuse himself when he has “a direct personal substantial pecuniary interest” in a case. Page 523,Ca per ton, Slip Opinion page 6); it was a violation of due process for a mayor to preside over cases as a judge without a salary and without any payment because the fines and penalties he imposed went into the town’s “Fisc.”. (See Ward v.

, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) – the mayor’s “executive responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution (to these finances] from the mayor’s court”. Page 60,Caperton, Slip Opinion page 8); it was a violation of due process for an administrative board composed of optometrists to preside over the case of a competitive optometrist. (See Gibson v. Berryhill

, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973); it was a violation of due process for an Alabama Supreme Court Justice to uphold a bad faith damage award against an insurance company’s refusal to pay a claim when he was the lead plaintiff in a nearly identical lawsuit in Alabama’s lower courts. (See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1975),Ca per ton Slip Opinion page 8), and it was a violation of due process for a judge to judge his own actions. (See In Re Murchison , 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) – the court recited the general rule that “no man can be a judge in his own case”, adding that “no man can be permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome”. Page 136,

preside over the contempt proceedings of the “contemnor”. (See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455,466 (1971) – “that by reason of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a defendant in a criminal proceeding should be given a public trial before a judge other than the one reviled by the contemnor”. Page 466,Ca per ton Slip Opinion page 10).

“This constitution, and the laws of the United states which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges of every state shall be bund thereby, anything in the constitutions or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”