460
8500C
ORRUPTION
Roger Bowles
School of Social SciencesUniversity of Bath
© Copyright 1999 Roger Bowles
Abstract
This chapter reviews the literature on corruption, which is both vast anddiverse. Analytically, corruption has been of great interest to economic theoristsin recent years because it is an archetypal problem of asymmetric informationinvolving collusion between agents and ‘outsiders’ against principals, orbetween supervisors and agents against principals. Most of the models up tonow have been essentially static, but recent papers have shown that there is areal prospect of developing dynamic models which can explain the persistenceof corruption.
JEL classification:
K14, K42
Keywords:
Bureaucratic Corruption, Private Sector Corruption, IllegalBehaviour
1. Introduction
Corruption has been around for just about as long as institutions of any sort. Inthe times of the Greek and Roman empires, for example, corruption waswidespread (MacMullen, 1988). Indeed, the corruption of tax officials was socommon at that time that it was found expedient to ‘privatize’ tax collection byauctioning rights to collect taxes (Webber and Wildavsky, 1986). Moderndemocratic government emerged from earlier structures which were ‘rotten tothe core’, and the professionalisation of the civil service in the nineteenthcentury in England was aimed in part at eliminating the sapping effects of corruption on public servants. In the present day, corruption ‘scandals’ arewidely reported in the press from almost all walks of life including politics,government and business. The sums involved can range from tiny payments oreven small personal favours to bribes running into millions of dollars.Corruption can be distinguished from ‘
fraud
’, ‘
embezzlement
’ and‘
extortion
’. The essence of corruption is that two individuals or groups act inconcert to further their own interests at the expense of a third party. Fraud, orextortion, by contrast involves an individual or group acting unilaterally tofurther their own interests at the expense of others. In the language of principal-agent theory this entails collusion between the agent and supervisor
Leave a Comment