of all aeroplanes with MTOM >27000kg to have non-punitive FDMP in place by 1
3. Comparative analysis
Proactive vs reactiveBoth methods of data acquisition have elements of reactive and proactiveprocesses. However, most personnel will hesitate to report observations thathave not resulted in an incident unless they have proof/evidence that it ispotentially unsafe and is a re-occurring event. As a result most ASR comprisemostly of events or near misses that have already occurred. Human error isinevitable and according to Helmreich and Merritt, how we learn manage it is thekey to improving aviation safety; mitigate, trap or avoid (*3). To furthercomplement the NASA led ASRS, the FAA initiated another confidential and non jeopardy reporting aimed at pilots; Aviation safety action programme (ASAP) in1997.The FDM is designed to be more of a proactive accident prevention tool. This isachieved in the detection, analyses and logical depiction of routine operationaltrends and exceedances such as:
Exceedences or Events deviation data; e.g. engine, speeds, flaps,gears, unstabilised approach criteria.
Routine data measurements. Monitoring subtle trends andtendencies before they result in incidents or accidents; e.g. take off weight, Flap settings, temperature, rotations rates, speeds, pitch.
Ease of investigation. The FDMP makes it much easier to conclusively investigate a great number of mandatory occurrence reportable incidences as well as prescribe the bestremedial action or cost effective training. Such events include; go arounds,altitude deviations, Stalls, engine failures, high speed RTO’s, tail strikes, Heavylandings, wake/severe turbulence and flight control difficulties accompanied byexcessive control deflections, e.t.c.Of course ASR will provide useful contextual information, though it relies on theability of the human element to recall complex events during periods of highstress. The FDMP is definitely a more versatile tool in this regards.
Reported vs unreported eventsThe number and quality of safety reports in an organisation is largely dependenton the safety culture prevailing within the organisation. Bearing in mind, thatevidence from research indicates inadvertent human error is complicit in 75% of accidents. Line observations show flight crew were unaware of about 50% of theerrors noticed by observers. Most of these errors were inconsequential, notreported and therefore not investigated. Resulting in lost opportunities to learnfrom such events. The logic is simple; people cannot report what they fail tonotice.