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1. Executive summary
The human element is the most flexible and adaptable part of the aviationsystem, but it is also the most susceptible to influences that can unfavourablyaffect its performance. Aviation accidents are rarely caused by a single event oraction, but rather by a chain of factors or events. Though this makes it complexto analyse, it also infers that, the accident could be averted if one event in thechain is broken. The fast changing operating environment is posing new types of challenges to safety. As old risks are conquered, new risks and correspondingcounter measures are emerging. The human element and it’s interaction withtechnology still remains at the heart of the solution for improved safety systems.This paper will attempt to compare the flight data monitoring programme andsafety reporting as sources of safety data sources. This will involve examining thetype of operational issues they are able to detect as well as theiradvantages/advantages.
 
2. Definitions
Safety reporting.These involves the various mandatory, voluntary and confidential systems put inplace to enable all personnel and stakeholders involved directly or indirectly withaviation systems provide safety related information. The aim is to have a justculture in operation to foster a reporting culture that will both expose the rootcauses of accidents and incidents as well as prevent re-occurrence of such.These includes but not restricted to the following: Air safety reports (ASR),Cabinsafety report (CSR),Maintenance safety reports (MSR), Service difficulty reportingsystem(SDRS) only applicable to the FAA, Ground safety reports (GSR) andHuman factors reporting, e.g. (CHIRP).Modern aviation Safety reporting has it’s origins during the enactment hearings of 1958 in the USA. Finally became operational with NASA administering the systemfrom 15
th
April 1976.(*2)
F
light data monitoring programme (FDMP).This is “A systematic, proactive and non-punitive programme for gathering andanalysing data recorded during routine flights to improve flight crew performance,operating procedures, flight training, air traffic control procedures, air navigationservices, or aircraft maintenance and design.” It is the recording, collating, analysing and logical presentation of the interactionof the flight crew and the aeroplane usually from the time it is powered up at pre-flight to when the engines are shut down post-flight.Known as flight operations quality assurance (FOQA) to operators regulated bythe FAA. ICAO’s 26
th
amendment to annex6 3.6.3, requires member states whohave adopted this recommendation into national legislation to mandate operators
 
of all aeroplanes with MTOM >27000kg to have non-punitive FDMP in place by 1
st
Jan, 2005.
3. Comparative analysis
•
Proactive vs reactiveBoth methods of data acquisition have elements of reactive and proactiveprocesses. However, most personnel will hesitate to report observations thathave not resulted in an incident unless they have proof/evidence that it ispotentially unsafe and is a re-occurring event. As a result most ASR comprisemostly of events or near misses that have already occurred. Human error isinevitable and according to Helmreich and Merritt, how we learn manage it is thekey to improving aviation safety; mitigate, trap or avoid (*3). To furthercomplement the NASA led ASRS, the FAA initiated another confidential and non jeopardy reporting aimed at pilots; Aviation safety action programme (ASAP) in1997.The FDM is designed to be more of a proactive accident prevention tool. This isachieved in the detection, analyses and logical depiction of routine operationaltrends and exceedances such as:
Exceedences or Events deviation data; e.g. engine, speeds, flaps,gears, unstabilised approach criteria.
Routine data measurements. Monitoring subtle trends andtendencies before they result in incidents or accidents; e.g. take off weight, Flap settings, temperature, rotations rates, speeds, pitch.
•
Ease of investigation. The FDMP makes it much easier to conclusively investigate a great number of mandatory occurrence reportable incidences as well as prescribe the bestremedial action or cost effective training. Such events include; go arounds,altitude deviations, Stalls, engine failures, high speed RTO’s, tail strikes, Heavylandings, wake/severe turbulence and flight control difficulties accompanied byexcessive control deflections, e.t.c.Of course ASR will provide useful contextual information, though it relies on theability of the human element to recall complex events during periods of highstress. The FDMP is definitely a more versatile tool in this regards.
•
Reported vs unreported eventsThe number and quality of safety reports in an organisation is largely dependenton the safety culture prevailing within the organisation. Bearing in mind, thatevidence from research indicates inadvertent human error is complicit in 75% of accidents. Line observations show flight crew were unaware of about 50% of theerrors noticed by observers. Most of these errors were inconsequential, notreported and therefore not investigated. Resulting in lost opportunities to learnfrom such events. The logic is simple; people cannot report what they fail tonotice.
 
An FDMP on the other hand has a valid data capture rate of 96% of all man-machine onboard interaction. With the development of high data capacity disks,there’s no reason why the voice element cannot be included in the overall datacapture. Most airlines that run a FDMP also observe a corresponding increase inASR. This is more evident for events like unstabilised approaches and go-arounds.
•
Objective vs. subjectiveData from the FDMP is able to provide realistic, accurate and objective anddescription of the pilot-aircraft (livewire-hardware) interaction. Thus providing thevital “When” and “How” it happened. With data validity of at least 98%, thesystem is robust. However, there are many scenarios that this data alone doesnot provide a clear and comprehensive understanding of the event without inputfrom the operating crew. The knowing of “Why” it happened.Irrespective of the honesty and best intentions, the quality of an ASR’s is usuallyunwittingly subjective to a plethora of reporter biases. Including but not restrictedto frequency, selectivity, familiarity, conformity, group conformity andoverconfidence biases. This is more evident when it comes to describing theevents in the light of Liveware-Hardware interactions. The inaccuracies rangefrom subtle to glaring depending on the impact these and other human factors.
•
Quantitative vs contextual informationThough subject to cognitive lapses, the human reporter is still the preferred toolof choice that gives contextual and valuable insight to what influenced thedecision making process of the frontline operators. This is the “why” element. Itconstitutes a milestone in unravelling the root cause during an investigation.Conversely, though the FDMP is able to provide a realistic, accurate and objectiveinformation it’ s major drawback is, it still only quantitative in nature.Analysis can accurately depict how and when an event occurred but leaves out animportant part of the Jigsaw; the why it happened. Why certain decision/ actionswere made/not made.
•
Aircraft operational data only vs. Carte blanche broad based dataThough the FDMP can continuously detect up to an impressive 60,000 aircraftparameters with great precision, it is still restricted to detecting issues that canbe sensed by on-board systems only. These include environmental and surfaceconditions. This seriously limits it’s ability to detect most latent conditions apartfrom ergonomics. ASR have a rather “carte blanche” option when it comes to scope of reporting.Reference to ICAO doc 9859 highlights this fact. “ASR has the mandate toinclude….unsatisfactory behaviour or procedure which did not immediatelyendanger the aircraft but which, if allowed to continue uncorrected, or if repeatedin different, but likely, circumstances, would create a hazard.(CAP 382, 5.4.3).This could be anything at all that in the judgement of the reporter is likely toaffect safety.” 
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