Professional Documents
Culture Documents
______________________
A Thesis
Presented to
College of Business
Ohio University
______________________
In Partial Fulfillment
______________________
by
June 2005
This thesis has been approved by the Management Systems Department of the
College of Business.
______________________________
John Schermerhorn
O’Bleness Professor of Management
Management Systems Department
______________________________
______________________________
Glenn E. Corlett
Dean
College of Business
Table of Contents
Footnotes
References
Figures
Appendixes
I
1
CHAPTER 1
Introduction and Purpose
With the destruction of global barriers that for centuries have kept the world
divided by its continents, the latter part of the 20th century and into the 21st have been
internationally as a way of securing less expensive labor than that which can be found in
the more industrialized countries. Cost driven expansion often relies on the international
who participate in this type of expansion use the resources of the country into which they
While increasing profit margins are one reason for international expansion, other
companies pursue expansion for other reasons. One such key reason for
internationalization is the opportunity for expansion into new markets. Tyson (1997)
says that this will become the major goal of international expansion in the 21st century.
He argues that international growth strategies will replace the current strategy of
The purpose of this thesis is to examine, through secondary sources, the transfer
The theoretical background will be supplemented with the case of Disney’s expansion
into foreign markets, and the interpretations of their corporate practices in different
national cultures. Finally, it will offer an analysis and implications from the data that will
offer transferable recommendations to any company that must transfer soft technologies
Companies who are expanding internationally for market based purposes do not
solely transfer physical processes from their home country to the destination country, but
instead transfer their entire business structure to the international asset. Because of the
non-concrete nature of people dependent, “soft” technologies (Hall, 1993), the transfer of
cultural aspects can be subject to varied interpretations. They can also face issues
regarding cultural understanding and acceptance, which are generally not a concern with
Understanding “hard” and “soft” technologies, and the way that they transfer
organizations. Soft, people driven technologies are fundamental for market driven
move their market into new territories. An example can be seen in the hotel industry.
When entering a new market, a hotel builds the same, basic room types. They also
generally use the same business practices and guiding principles. In reality, they clone
expansion. These technologies are used by companies which send physical processes
abroad, such as those in manufacturing industries. These processes have few specific
cultural implications. Figure 1.1 illustrates the differences in hard and soft technologies.
3
off shoring production to China. The company produces widgets in the United States for
$2 apiece. If they have their widgets produced in China, they can be produced for $.10
production of their widgets. They use their technology in the new Chinese factory, but
the factory is run in a Chinese fashion. The technology that they transferred to China is
hard technology (the machinery); the soft technology (the business practices and style) is
not transferred.
The example of Disney’s decision to open Tokyo Disneyland contains the transfer
of both hard and soft technologies. The Oriental Land Company created an exact clone
of the original Disneyland Park. All of the physical processes and amenities were
replicated (the hard technologies), but in addition, the company sent its business
structure. All of the policies and practices that make Disney a market leader and give it a
competitive advantage in its American market were applied in the same way in Japan that
they would have been applied in America. These policies and practices make up the
using international expansion as a way of expanding into a new market. While all
companies will also be transferring some hard technologies, the success of many
multinational enterprises (MNEs) is more dependent on the way that their business
practices transfer between national cultures than their physical processes (Brannen,
2004).
practices will be interpreted by the national culture into which they expand. These
practices fall under the broader umbrella of corporate culture, which, defined in its
simplest form, is “The way we do things around here” (Blank, 2003). In order for
the corporate culture must be in synch with the perception of the soft technology in the
but takes place on a much broader scale. Geert Hofstede defined culture as “the
collective programming of the human mind, obtained in the course of life, which is
common to the members of one group as opposed to another.” By “one group as opposed
to another” one can infer that this can analyze contrasting “collective programming”
between a corporations culture and the culture of the market into which it is expanding.
It is from this definition that the conflict between national and corporate culture begins to
take shape. If the corporate practices are defined as part of a company’s corporate
culture, and are in the context of one national culture, then as they are transferred they
come to be translated into a definition relative to the context of the new national culture.
In cases of highly differing cultures, two sets of distinct values may come into conflict
Interpretation of Practices
Saussure (1916) explained that one word or symbol may hold different meanings in
5
different cultural contexts. Cultural contexts, therefore, lead different words to have
differently interpreted meanings. This theory was then expanded to symbols, which is
the study of semiotics. A further extension of that theory suggests that whole concepts
2004).
If this theory holds true in words, symbols, and concepts, one can infer that
corporate practices could also be interpreted differently within different cultural contexts.
One more magnification of the concept shows that not only could corporate practices be
interpreted differently by the national culture into which they are transferred, but
different interpretations could come from both the employee and the consumer in that
they cross national borders. This yields the secondary research question for those
companies which are looking to expand internationally: How are corporate practices
changed due to differing interpretations as they are transferred between national cultures?
practices are changed in order to meet the needs of the new national culture of which they
are part. Then, these changes are repatriated to the culture of the parent company in the
interpretations. In this way, the international expansion of businesses which rely heavily
chains of cultural conflict resulting from Hofstede’s definition of culture. While conflict
is one result, another possibility could be the merging of international cultures through
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this continuous feedback loop. This could fit Tyson’s (1997) hypothesis that expansion
of international business in the 21st will lead to weakly defined cultural differences as the
Hofstede (2001) defined five cultural dimensions that are important in helping to
orientation. Hofstede’s study was the first serious, empirical research into culture and
was met with much resistance, especially his article in 1980, “Motivation, leadership, and
the basis for examining how interpretations affect business practices in different national
contexts.
Focus on Disney
is essential to look at a company that is well known for its deep-seated corporate
practices. The Walt Disney Company is a corporation which has innovated unique and
powerful corporate practices which are key parts of its culture and competitive
advantage. It has also had experience transferring both soft and hard technologies across
national borders. The company is divided into five business units, one of which is “Parks
and Resorts.” This business unit is in charge of Disney’s two American theme park
resorts, as well a park in Marne-la-Vallée, France. It also guides the management of the
Tokyo Disneyland resort in Tokyo, Japan, which is operated by the Oriental Land
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Company. This business unit’s responsibilities also include the development of future
Disney theme park resorts, including the Hong Kong Disneyland Resort, which is
scheduled to open September 12, 2005. This division has had both unbridled success and
indebted failure when it comes to the transfer of its business practices to Japan and
While Disney parks worldwide lead their geographical regions in attendance, this
successful international opening and has been one of the most profitable parks in terms of
net revenue for the park’s operating company, the Oriental Land Company. Spurred by
its success in Japan, Disney decided to open a European park, Euro Disney. With the
exception of this park, renamed Disneyland Paris, all of Disney’s previous theme parks
have been unqualified successes (Goodman, 1999). The Euro Disney project was met
with marked cultural resistance from the French due both to the company’s choices and
practices (Lainsbury, 2000). While Euro Disney has had success in drawing attendance,
The prevailing wisdom concerning the problem at Euro Disney was a breakdown
Tokyo, it failed to take into account many of the cultural aspects that made Tokyo
these two distinctly different cultures, and their variation from the home culture of the
Disney Company, it is possible to analyze the cultural communication issues that have
France.
8
into both Japan and France, it can be shown how two similar international expansions,
done in similar ways by the same company, could yield such different results. By
selecting specific business practices, and showing them in the context of the United
States, the home country, as well as in the context of Japan and France, it will be possible
to understand the issues that a company must face when expanding its own cultural
Organization of Thesis
will provide the basis for the case study. The theory section of the thesis will focus on
Saussure’s semantic model and its application to corporate business practices. It will also
look at the cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede as a way of creating the context
which will be applied into Saussure’s model. Following the theory section will be three
parks in America, Japan, and France, and applying these practices to the aforementioned
model. The thesis will conclude with an analysis of the cases and transferable
For the purpose of analysis, this thesis will focus on four of Disney’s most well
known and unique corporate practices. These practices, which are well ingrained in their
culture, will provide a basis for understanding the changes and effects on the business as
they cross cultural borders. The practices are as follows: the training program, family
orientation, fanatical attention to detail, and their customer service orientation. These
9
practices are part of the Disney corporate culture and have helped it to become a
It will analyze these four corporate practices and interpret them in the context of
the American, Japanese, and French business. It will evaluate the changes that they
underwent in order to allow them to be accepted by the country into which they were
immigrating, and then analyze any changes that may also occur in the home country
CHAPTER 2
Semiotic Theory and National Culture
Various explanations have been made to account for the lack of fit as
multinational enterprises transfer soft technologies across national borders. One such
model is the semiotic model, which is based on the linguistic theories developed in the
early 20th century by Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure developed the concept that
linguistics was made up of two distinct parts, langue and parole; language and speech
respectively. Language, defined by Saussure, was the rules in which speech finds its
context. Speech is what we do with language, putting it into a tangible form (Gordon,
1996). It is through this simple fact that one can derive the semiotic model of
recontextualization.
In examining the theory behind this model, I will first look explain the theory as it
was written for linguistics, and then examine several expansions of the theory, most
examples and expound upon the theory, by utilizing the cultural dimensions of Hofstede
as the context (language) into which a series of business practices (speech) fit.
Saussure saw the world as being made up of signs. In a technical sense, the word
sign means that one thing stands for something else. For example, when driving, we see
a red light which indicates that we should stop. The red light is not there to make us
think of the color red, it represents to us the concept “stop.” In the same vein, a line on a
graph is not meant to make us think of jagged lines, but instead represents the series of
Saussure’s concept was that a sign was made up of two distinct parts. The first
part is the physical image itself. This is called the signifier. In the above examples, the
signifiers would be the red light and the graph. The second part is the signified. This is
the concept which the signifier represents. The signified in the above examples are the
idea “stop” and the changes in variables. Together the image and concept (signifier and
While this is an easy concept to illustrate with tangible objects, Saussure’s true
series of signs, which could either be written or spoken. Written letters, according to
Saussure, are signs that represent certain sounds that are part of a given language. In the
case of written words, the set of letters which make up a word are the signifier for the
concept which the word represents. In spoken language, Saussure said that the sounds
were the signifiers for the concept. The concept can then be either the denotative or
explained that the original choice of the signifier that represents a certain signified is
completely arbitrary. He indicates this by using the example of two different languages.
In French, Saussure’s native language, the word “mouton” means the same thing that
“sheep” means in English. The two words are different signifiers, but they both represent
the same signified. Arbitrarily, the English language decided to signify this animal with
one word, while the French language chose to signify it with another (Saussure, 1966).
Barthes (1967) expanded on the arbitrary nature of signs, saying that in some
cases they are arbitrary, as when they are selected by unilateral decision, but more often
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signs are motivated, meaning that the sign comes in some way from the world in which it
finds its context. The example given by Barthes is those words which are onomatopoeic
for “it hurts,” where as ouch is motivated, and it hurts is arbitrary. But, he points out;
sometimes even motivated signs can be partly arbitrary. Whereas “ouch” is motivated in
Saussure’s semiotic theory puts all signs into the context of their own language,
but the theory does not elaborate as to what would happen when one sign is put into the
using Saussure’s coin example. Coins are made of metal, usually copper, nickel, or
silver. This metal is the signifier. An un-pressed coin has no value as legal tender. It is
not until the coin has been minted that it has legal value. The impression by the mint is
the signified. If the mint were to stamp another substance, other than the one deemed
legal by the government, it would not be considered legal tender either. Therefore the
sign, the completed coin, is the metal and the impression, the signifier and signified
Brannen (2004) suggests that a sign, when transferred to a different context (an
expansion of Saussure’s idea of language), can have a different meaning. Thus the sign
from the previous context becomes the signifier in the new context. The concept which it
represents in the new context becomes the new signified, and the new sign is then
created. The new sign is not arbitrary, but motivated by the old sign (Barthes, 1967).
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transfer between contexts. If one were to take the coin into an area deep in the jungle,
that had never seen a coin before, they would have different view of the coin. To them
the coin would become the new signifier. The meaning which they attach to it would
become the new signified, and to them, the coin and its use will become the new sign.
While that example is extreme, one can see a more toned down example when
they take a currency from one country to another. Perhaps the sign’s value in one
country would allow them to buy a candy bar. In another country’s context, the people
will know that it is currency, but the value could be worth two candy bars, or in contrast,
This example illustrates the concept pointed out Brannen (2004) that the more that
communicators’ cultural worlds overlap, the more effective their communication will be.
As languages are similar, their words (signs) can be similar to one another and more
likely understood. In linguistics, this explains the existence of cognates, words that are
very similar across different languages. English and French share many cognates such as
“elephant” and “elephant.” These words can be understood across the two cultures, but
the difference between the English word “elephant” and the Japanese word “象”
(pronounced zō), meaning elephant, is significant. The Japanese version neither sounds
nor looks nor sounds like the English word with which we are familiar. In reality, this is
because the Japanese language system overlaps with the English language much less than
Brannen (2004) took this concept and applied it to the Walt Disney case by
interpreting three major aspects of the Disney Company’s culture as Saussure’s parole,
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and took the national contexts and used them as the context, or langue. Broken down into
products, practices, and ideologies, Brannen identified specific signifiers and matched
them with the signified that they represented in different cultural contexts. Her
comparisons showed very different signified meanings for the same signifier across
cultures.
transfer. That is, when a sign’s signified is changed as it crosses cultures; a new sign is
created, which could take on a new signified in the home culture. She provides the
example of sushi to support this concept. In Japan the word for raw fish is sashimi, and
the pickled rice in which it is stored is called sushi. When transferred to the west, the
sign is the sushi and sashimi together, but has come to be known by the term sushi, with
the underlying concept being the raw fish. Therefore in the United States, the word sushi
means raw fish. This exemplifies a sign changing across cultures to better fit into its new
culture.
United States, the California Roll is created, which is a type of American sushi with
cooked crabmeat and avocado. The California Roll is then repatriated into the Japanese
context and known as a sushi, even though that word originally meant a pickling agent
place according to semiotic theory. It is a process that fits into the mechanism described
above. Because signs are made up of signifiers and their signified, and because different
cultures apply different signified to the same signifier, corporate practices can be
15
interpreted differently in different cultures. What now must be explained is “why” these
I will expand upon Brannen’s (2004) research by defining the three different
will then take the corporate practices that are core competencies to Disney’s service
based business model, specifically the training program, grooming policy, fanatical
attention to detail, and their customer service orientation. Using this information, I will
then, in the following chapters, apply the theory to the cases of Walt Disney World in
work related values, his results indicated four spectrums across which different national
define Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, and explain his results as they relate to the three
First is power distance; this is how society defines the fact that people are
unequal. High power distance cultures accept the power distribution among leaders and
subordinates as being unequal and therefore develop towering vertical hierarchies (Ohtsu,
2002). In Hofstede’s research, he asked the core question “How frequently, in your
experience, does the following problem occur: employees being afraid to disagree with
their managers?” Hofstede’s (1984) test for power distance found Japan to be very close
to middle-of-the-road. On the scale of 1-100, Japan was given a score of 54, whereas, for
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comparison, the mean was 51 and the United States had a score of 40. France was the
Hofstede also found that countries that had high Power Distance Index scores
often agreed with the following statements: The average human has a dislike of work
(McGregor’s Theory X), and employees lose respect for a consultative manager. These
statements may help us to analyze the differences in acceptance of the same corporate
collectivist society, there are high bonds between individuals. The individualist society
lacks those connections (Ohtsu, 2002). Hofstede (1984) compares the individualist
society to the solitary nature of the tiger, and the collectivist society to the gregarious
face” is an important facet of culture. This is true of Japan, in which the individuality
index is relatively collectivist. They are, though, less collectivist than most other Asian
nations that Hofstede studied, including Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand.
For a point of reference the United States was the most individualistic country
with a score of 91; Japan scored a 46, and the mean was 51. France lies about half way
between the United States and Japan, with a score of 71 (Hofstede, 1984). This score is
Hofstede says that the amount of individualism in a society will affect the nature
of the relationship between the person and the organization in which they belong.
Particularly, it can affect the person’s reasons for complying with an organization’s
avoidance scores are more apt to take risks and less likely to feel the effects of anxiety
associated with those risks (Ohtsu, 2002). On this scale, Japan and France were very
similar, while the United States differed significantly. Japan had a very high uncertainty
avoidance score of 94, only the fourth highest of those nations surveyed. France
followed the Japanese closely as the sixth highest uncertainty avoidance score, an 86.
These scores show a tendency against risk taking. The United States has an uncertainty
avoidance score of 46, and the mean score for this value was 64 (Hofstede, 1984).
To look at the idea of uncertainty in organizations, Hofstede uses the terms logical
and non-logical as originally used by Pareto. Logical behavior is behavior that relies on
data and facts, or even custom. They are “logically linked to an end, not only in respect
to the person performing them, but also to those people who have more extensive
does not fit into the aforementioned category (Pareto, 1966). Hofstede pointed out that
different context.
Cultures that have high uncertainty avoidance often use ways of making the
uncertain tolerable. Application of strict rules and regulations is one such way of doing
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this. Rules, in order to help eliminate uncertainty must account for both logical and non-
logical actions of the group. Rituals are another way or reducing uncertainty. While a
ritual serves a purpose to believers, unbelievers may find ritualistic actions non-logical,
but that point is moot because in the context of the organization they are logical
(Hofstede, 1984).
In the context of Disney, we often find executives asking the question “What
Would Walt Do?” The ritualistic question, referring to company founder Walt Disney,
helps to deal with the uncertainty of the selecting possible options by putting themselves
in the shoes of the founder (Blank, 2003). To an outsider, this may seem non-logical
because Walt has been deceased for over 30 years and the business world has
dramatically changed, but to a Disney Cast member, this ritual helps to guide the
The fourth cultural value originally identified by Hofstede was a scale he called
between the roles of males and females in the society. At issue are sex roles (Ohtsu,
2002). In the study done by Hofstede (1984), Japan was by far the most masculine of the
39 countries. Its score was 95, and the next closest was Austria, with a score 16 points
less! The United States scored a 62 and the mean was 51. France was well below the
The stereotypical masculine and feminine values play an important part in the
division of labor within societies. This could be particularly true for the Disney
Corporation, which stresses many of both the stereotypically feminine and masculine
values. Hofstede’s research showed that high masculinity countries have orientation
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towards money and things, live to work, are decisive, and believe that big and fast are
people, people work to live, decisions are more intuitive, and small and slow are
considered beautiful (Hofstede, 1984). These distinct societal differences will help us to
analyze the success of Disney’s corporate practices as they relate to both the employees
Conclusion
These four cultural dimensions will become more and more important in
assessing the transfer of corporate practices and appeal to international markets as the
world continues to globalize in the 21st century. Tyson (1997) predicts that in the 21st
intelligence, and the concept of perpetual strategy. In addition, he stresses the importance
of global alliances through joint ventures. Hofstede’s cultural dimensions will affect all
The four aforementioned cultural dimensions will be the context into which the
following case studies will be examined. Each Disney theme park has had distinctly
different results. A major part of the differing results can be seen as a function of how
well key Disney business practices transferred into the culture of the nation in which the
Disney park came to reside. We will examine how the business practices are perceived
by that culture using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. In most cases, the perception on the
business practice will be the result of a combination of these dimensions. For the sake of
clarity, when examining the practices, I will examine them each in the context of no more
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than two interplaying dimensions. In reality, the perception of each practice involves all
The following three case studies will examine each of the four previously
mentioned corporate practices. This will be the signifier. We will then use the context of
Hofstede to derive the signified meaning in the culture. This will provide the differences
based on cultural dimensions which provide explanation for the differing successes of the
CHAPTER 3
Walt Disney World Case Study
Walt Disney World (WDW) may not have been the first amusement park
developed by the Disney Company, but it is the most profitable, most visited, and largest
amusement park in the world (Amusement Business, Dec 2004). With a property in
central Florida that is as expansive as the city of San Francisco, the WDW resort holds
four theme parks, nineteen resort hotels, a shopping area, and much more. The property
runs much like any city, but without the residential areas.
WDW is well known for its many unique business practices which make it the
leader in its industry. Guests enter the Disney theme parks with high expectations, and
those expectations are often met. This could be a result of The Disney Company’s core
ideologies. These ideologies, which are the basis on which the practices to be evaluated
These core ideologies are the guiding principles of Disney’s tightly-knit corporate
culture. In that the company focuses on strong guest service before anything else, the
corporate culture has often been called cult-like. Collins and Porras (1994) write that
“when examining Disney, it can be hard to keep in mind that it is a corporation, not a
social or religious movement.” They argue that this cult-like culture is a result of Walt
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Disney’s relationship with his employees, in which he demanded total dedication and
commitment to the company and its values. He saw his relationship with employees as a
This overzealous dedication to service and the company lead to what could be
vacation at WDW is intended to be a magical experience that takes guests away from
reality. Walt Disney World’s mission, vision, and brand essence (appendix 1) truly
reflect this hyper-normal guest experience with statements such as “Here, we can wish
upon a star, experience the impossible and bring our dreams to life,” and “In this magical
The company presents the same image of magic, fantasy, and fun to its employees
as it does to its guests. While the employees are not necessarily always as happy as they
may seem, they are generally content because the company puts the same magical
elements that it presents “onstage” (where the guests are) as it does “backstage” (where
only cast members go). Backstage areas are vibrantly painted with Disney characters,
bulletin boards sharing information are developed in ways that are uniquely Disney,
awards programs are developed with the same magic that Disney uses in its stage shows,
and cast member celebrations, discounts, and giveaways occur regularly. This can be
seen even through the WDW guiding principles. Appendix one includes the Disney-
MGM Studios vision, mission and brand essence, which are written with the same unique
character that WDW writes its park guide maps, advertisements, and all other literature
business practices of WDW which help to create the magical guest experience. We will
also look at how they fit or do not fit into the American cultural values as defined by
Hofstede.
Business Practices
different from the national culture in which it resides. In defining the two, Hofstede
(2001) says that the two are entirely distinct from one another, but they can and should be
complementary. This section will look at aspects of the Walt Disney World corporate
culture, and examine how they are complimented by the national culture of the United
States.
The culture at Walt Disney World revolves solely around the guest. Everyone has
heard the saying “the customer is always right,” and at Disney, that statement is a way of
life. When you are in “the business of fantasy” (Bryman, 1995) it is important that
nothing interrupts the magical experience. Breaking the magic can be grounds for
counterfeiting, cast members are instructed not to say anything to the suspect, but just to
go about their normal business. After the guest/suspect has left the cast member is
directed to go back stage to report the illegal activity to Disney security. Anything else
24
would ruin the magic for those around, and that would not be Disney’s style of customer
service.
The guest service aspect that I will focus on for this research is Disney’s policy of
guest service recovery. This is the Disney policy which empowers all cast members to do
response to a problem a guest is having, or just a way to brighten the guest’s day. It
involves going beyond the guest’s expectations. If a guest knocks their ice cream off of
its cone and down their shirt, a cast member will offer the guest not only new ice cream,
A classic story of guest service came from Disney recruiter David Horvath
(2004). As he recruits across the country, he tells the story that he fondly refers to as
“The Yogurt Story.” His story tells of his childhood, when his family stayed at a Disney
resort. His little brother had only eaten strawberry yogurt for breakfast all of his life.
Finding that the resort did not have strawberry yogurt, the boy cried all morning through
breakfast. The cast member working at the restaurant that morning asked the mother if
they would be back there for breakfast the following morning. She nodded her head and
said “Yes, we’ll be doing this all over again, all week.” The next morning, when his
family arrived for breakfast, there was a fresh container of strawberry yogurt for the boy.
something to make the Horvath family’s vacation a little bit more special. These types of
activities happen all day, everyday. Turning a negative experience into a positive
experience is what guest service recovery is about. If a cast member ever needs
suggestions on what can be done to create a guest service recovery, they can just read the
25
Main Street Diary, Walt Disney World’s weekly newsletter written by Disney World’s
Brannen (2004) suggests that this service orientation is beyond the normal for
most American businesses, and indeed this shows true through the research of Hofstede.
The guest service culture can be linked to Hofstede’s values of power distance and
uncertainty avoidance.
From the viewpoint of power distance, the United States scored moderately, but in
order to have such a strong guest service culture, it would be important to have,
theoretically no power distance. The guest service culture at WDW gives front line cast
members the same power as managers, or even executives, in addressing the needs of the
guests. The power to meet these needs is dispersed through the organization, and cast
members rely more on their personal experience than on formal rules or chains of
command to meet these needs. Therefore, what is seen from this aspect of Disney’s
culture is a representation of power distance that could be termed significantly lower than
Walt Disney World’s guest service recovery policy also defies the cultural norm
on the uncertainty avoidance dimension. The United States is seen through Hofstede’s
research as having a moderately weak uncertainty avoidance score. The guest service
recovery policy can be seen by Disney as an attempt to eliminate uncertainty in its parks.
Whereas in many American businesses a “you break it, you buy it” policy exists, Disney
guests never have to worry about such things. They can be certain that they will not have
to buy anything that they did not want, nor will they have to be disappointed by
something that they break or lose. Therefore, the company’s policy eliminates the
26
uncertainty that is often found in the American society, creating a more pleasurable guest
experience.
Through the interplay of abnormally seen cultural dimensions, WDW has created
a guest service policy that is highly regarded by the theme park’s guests. Internally, the
policy breaks down power barriers to a greater level than which are usually seen in
American companies. Outwardly, the company presents a feeling of safety and certainty
that are also hard to find in a country that thrives on uncertainty. The interactions of
these two dimensions create a positive experience in Disney’s American theme parks.
Training Program
Walt Disney World is also very well known for its training program that all cast
members must attend. This training, called Traditions, is very much an indoctrination
into Disney’s unique corporate culture. The course is taught by the faculty at “Disney
philosophies, organization, and the way we do business” (Collins et al.). The rooms in
which Traditions takes place are often decorated with pictures of the Walt Disney, Disney
This training program deviates from the American norm of being a highly
individualistic society. Hofstede’s research showed that the United States was the most
and act as individuals, the Disney Company is creating a highly collective group of
employees which work for the common good of the organization, not for themselves.
While Disney cast members are still very individualistic when they are off stage, on stage
you could assume that they are all brothers and sisters.
27
Disney’s policy is to hire for personality and train for skill. This is an aspect that
Hofstede defines as part of a collectivist culture. While Disney does not hire from an in-
group of relatives, as Hofstede defines it, it hires from an in-group of people with the
same personality traits and family centered beliefs. This in-group is very much a group
of individuals who share the same value system that Disney exemplifies. By going
through the Traditions course, employees become part of another in- group, the Disney
Cast Members. This group, which presents an outward appearance of being cult-like, has
its own language (Disneyese, see appendix 2), symbols, and beliefs.
This culture created by Disney’s training program creates a strong bond between
employees, on a level that is seen only in the few American companies with comparable
training programs. It creates a dedication and commitment to Walt Disney World and the
ideals that are represented by it. This collectivist aspect is part of what allows Disney to
have such a powerful and unmatchable corporate culture, which is vital to its success.
Family Orientation
Throughout the history of the Disney Company, there has always been a focus on
the family. It is said that Walt Disney developed Disneyland as a place that he and his
daughter could go to escape reality and just spend some quality time together. That
dedication to the family can be seen in everything that the Disney Company continues to
do. The park is full of attractions that are family oriented. The WDW parks are less
about thrills and excitement than they are about fantasy, magic, and family fun.
Disney theme parks continually have a focus on education. From the rides
originally developed by Walt Disney such as the Carousel of Progress and the Hall of
Presidents (formerly Great Moments with Mr. Lincoln), to the conservation theme of
28
Disney’s Animal Kingdom and the ever-changing Innoventions pavilion at Epcot (see
appendix 3 for explanations of attractions). These rides, parks, and attractions are all
designed so the family can learn together, in an atmosphere that stimulates creativity and
innovation. If Disney theme parks were to abandon their roots as family based theme
parks, they would be just like any other amusement park. This helps them to carve out
their niche. But having this niche does not explain the overwhelming success of the park.
orientation reflects the United States’ position as a highly masculine country. When
examining family values, Hofstede found that countries with higher masculinity ratings
place more importance on the family, while those with lower masculinity ratings are
more apt to place importance on friends and acquaintances. Also, with the aspect of
family, Disney’s advertisements, culture, and themes are always indicative of the
traditional family. Hofstede found that masculine cultures are more dependent on these
traditional family concepts, while feminine cultures generally have more unmarried
The high individuality of the United States also compliments the family oriented
culture of WDW. As with masculinity, cultures with high individualism index scores
more often have nuclear families. Also, the child tends to think more in terms of “I”
(Hofstede, 2001). The ways that these aspects are reflected in society help to make
Disney successful. The nuclear family is the market segment to which Disney is
oriented, and it the sales of its product are aimed at making children happy. This is in
The relationship that can be seen is a link between the values of the culture and
the values of the organization. The success of Disney’s culture in being family oriented
is a reflection of the importance the culture places on the family. When I examine this
concept further in chapter six, I will show one aspect of how the internationalization of
Disney theme parks has detracted from that family oriented culture through the Disney
alcohol policy.
Since the beginning, Walt Disney’s theme parks have been known for their
attention to detail. When walking through the park, a guest rarely finds a piece of trash
on the ground; all cast members are trained to pick up anything that they see. Nightly,
crews touch up paint that has been chipped or scuffed during the day. The attention to
detail is done on levels that guests can both recognize, and that they cannot. For
example, in The Hall of Presidents, each animatronics president’s clothing is made using
the common stitches of the time period. Cinderella’s Golden Carousel is not covered
with gold paint, but adorned with 24 karat gold leaf (Connellan, 1997).
Disney pays fanatical attention to detail concerning their employees. The Disney Look,
as it is called, is the policy consisting of strict guidelines which establish the standards of
appearance for all Disney employees. It regulates things such as hair color and style,
length of fingernails, makeup, jewelry, earring sizes, cleanliness, smell, sunglasses, and
more (Poisant, 2002). Horvath (2004) tells the fictional story of the girl with green hair
who worked outside Disney’s Alien Encounter attraction. He argues that the guests who
went in and watched Alien Encounter would still be thinking about the green hair of their
30
host instead of their visit to the attraction. Poisant (2002) explains that, while there was
much opposition to his strict dress code (which Walt, himself, did not follow: He had a
mustache, which until the 1990’s was against the policy), Walt fought for it, and it is a
major part of Disney’s current corporate culture. Even cast members who do not work in
The attention to detail which permeates the company’s culture shows how a sign
(the policy) can be viewed differently by the consumer than by the employee. To the
employees, the policy is highly controlling and often unpleasant. One Disney employee
with whom I spoke said that half way through a shift his manager directed him to return
to the cast locker rooms to shave. He had already shaved once that morning, but a long
shift left him at work with a 5 o’clock shadow. In low uncertainty avoidance cultures,
like that in the United States, employees, if necessary will try to break the rules
(Hofstede, 2000). Disney’s strict rules are often secretly broken, with cast members
hiding tongue piercing and wearing dirty uniforms. This can create a highly noticeable
conflict between cast members and management, although this conflict is often secretive.
This policy also goes against the highly individualistic personalities that are typical of
attempt at perfection and adds to the overall experience at WDW. Often guests comment
that Disney employees have a certain look about them (Poisant, 2002). The positive
experience caused by the Disney grooming policy can be correlated to Hofstede’s power
distance index. His research found that in low power distance countries like the United
States, subordinates and superiors have the understanding that they are alike one another.
31
Disney’s policy reflects this, treating each the same. As viewed from the customer’s
perspective, this creates a constructed similarity between the guest and the cast member
that plays on the low power distance of the American culture. The typical cast member
looks like what Walt Disney felt the “typical American” should look like. By creating
this policy, it further breaks down the distance between employee and guest, improving
corporate practices in the context of Saussure’s semantic theory. The sign, in this case, is
the Disney grooming policy and its effect on the employee. The signifier is the physical
grooming policy, while the signified is the cast member’s internal stress, but outward
appearance. This outward appearance becomes the signifier for the guest. The
understanding of attention to detail and the breaking down of power distance are what is
signified by the outward appearance of the cast member. This is the second sign, but is
defined the same as the first sign. Figure 3.1 illustrates this concept.
Conclusion
complimented by the cultural dimensions of the national culture in which is lays. This
helps to create a product that is appreciated by both customers and employees. While not
all is perfect as may seem from the external appearance, the negative effects of the
interplay between national and corporate culture are much less than the positive effects.
If this were not the case, it is likely that the consumers would not be as likely to be
effected by it.
32
In the following chapters, I will examine the same business practices in the
contexts of the Japanese and French national cultures. By continuing to examine these
practices in the context of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, and by adding the dynamics of
Saussure’s semiotic theory, I will identify the clash in cultures that lead to the success in
CHAPTER 4
Tokyo Disneyland Case Study
The Oriental Land Company was developed as a partnership between Mitsui Real
Estate Development and the Keisei Electric Railway. In the 1960’s the company asked
the government for the rights to fill in part of Tokyo Bay for developing the land for
housing use. The company granted them the right to use the land (in the case that they
could persuade fishermen to give up the fishing rights), but they could not use the land
for housing. Instead, it was decided that the land must be used for a major recreational
facility. Oriental Land was not too happy that this was the case, but they chose to go
ahead with the filling. They decided the most profitable recreational facility that they
Over the next eight years (1966 – 1974), the Oriental Land Company traveled the
world in search of the best theme park experience. They decided upon the idea of
modeling a Disneyland park for their property. In 1974, Oriental Land approached the
Walt Disney Company with their proposal, but at the same time, Mitsubishi proposed a
Disney Park near Mount Fuji. Mitsubishi soon dropped out of negotiations; speculation
was that they were pressured by the government in a “you’ll get your turn” fashion
(Koren, 1990).
The eventual agreement by Oriental Land and Disney gave licensing rights to the
admissions profits and 5% of food and souvenir sales (Koren, 1990). According to Pete
Blank (2003), teacher at Disney University, this small cut of the profits for Disney, which
served as a management fee, was one of the company’s biggest blunders in its history.
There was early speculation that the Japanese would not be able to hold the park to
34
Disney’s high standards. In other words, they thought that there may be problems
transferring the company’s soft technologies. This was proven false. The Japanese
attention to detail was superb at keeping the squeaky-clean Disney image (Koren, 1990).
one of the most attended amusement parks in the world, and the top amusement park in
Asia. The success spurned the opening of a second gate, Tokyo DisneySea, in September
2001. This park has been just a successful as Tokyo Disneyland. In addition it operates
The goal of the Tokyo Disneyland Resort is to present the image of a vacation to
America, while still actually being in Japan. While the Walt Disney Company would
have liked to include more traditional Japanese lands, this was not the goal of the Oriental
Land Company (Tobin, 1992). The park was, therefore, developed to be a nearly exact
There were, however a few changes made in the hard technologies of Disney in
creating Tokyo Disneyland. The entrance to the park, which in the American parks is
called Main Street USA, has been replaced by a covered area called the World Bazaar. A
glass covering was added to the area in an attempt to deal with the climate driven issues
Outside of these changes, much of Tokyo Disneyland was run the same as Walt
Disney World. We will, therefore, look at the same business practices that were analyzed
in the previous case study, but see how they fit into the cultural context of Japan. By
35
using semiotic theory, the differing interpretations of the business practices will be
Business Practices
Brannen (2004) suggests that the more two countries national cultures overlap, the
less likely it becomes that there will be changing interpretations as business practices
cross cultures. Thus, one could hypothesize that the cultural differences between the
United States and Japan would cause misinterpretation of the business practices. In fact,
this section will present evidence that Disney’s business practices are easily understood
by the Oriental Land Company, employees, and consumers in Japan. The is a result of
the fact that Disney’s business practices fit better into Japan’s national culture than in
America’s.
The Tokyo Disneyland culture focuses on guest satisfaction in the same way that
Walt Disney World does, through service and magic. They hear the same stories that are
heard at Disney parks around the world, of children dropping their box of popcorn, and a
cast member refilling it for them. But there are differences in the ways that the strong
Brannen (2004) suggests that while the strong orientation toward guest service
Japan. This can be seen in the stories of Tokyo Disneyland employees as well. In fact,
evidence is presented by Raz (1999) that guest service is generally more important in
Japanese culture than it is at Disney. The example that follows shows an occasion when
keeping the magic was more important than meeting the needs of the guest.
36
The example cited by a Tokyo Disneyland cast member dealt with park safety.
The cast member indicated that he was told not to tell guests that the park has a park-
wide public address system, because it was only to be used in the case of an emergency.
Excessive use would destroy the magic, so even when a mother is missing her child, it is
not appropriate to use the system. The cast member suggested that bottom line is “the
Other Tokyo Disneyland cast members point out that Disney’s stories of guest
service always revolve around children. Rarely is the story told of a cast member
refilling the popcorn box of an adult who has dropped it. This suggests that the Disney
idea of guest service is motivated by creating magic rather than a genuine interest in
serving the guest. Another example in which Disney’s policies in guest service are
questioned by the Japanese deals with their policy following personal accidents. Cast
members are instructed first to call their supervisor, then to call first aid, then to write
The aforementioned examples show the differences in the way the policies of
Disney are interpreted differently in the two different cultures. Both Walt Disney World
and Tokyo Disneyland have the same guest service policies in place, but in the former
they are considered as going above and beyond what is necessary, while in the latter, they
To analyze this change in interpretation between the two cultures, we will again
higher than it was in the United States, but they are both relatively close. Disney, a
mentioned earlier, creates a culture where everyone is on the same level, where power
37
power distance of Japan and the low power distance of Disney (Hofstede, 2001).
From a guest service perspective, they see higher power distances between
themselves and the guest, and therefore it is their duty to serve the guest in the best way
that they can. From an internal organization perspective, the higher power distance
culture says that cast members follow the rules of the organization, even though they may
feel that they are not in the best interest of the guest. Formal rules are important in this
culture and subordinates are expected to be told what to do, and to do what they are told.
they are told, but are empowered to do more. They follow the rules of the organization;
in so much as it helps the guests. While they feel that they could go further with service,
they organizations rules send them just far enough, which keeps the guests happy. In
summary, the business model of Disney is slightly below par with guest service ideals of
the Japanese culture, but is interpreted at a level which keeps guests satisfied none-the-
uncertainty avoidance index. In the United States we inferred that the customer was
appreciative of the low level of uncertainty associated with Walt Disney World’s policy
of guest service recovery. While the United States is associated with weak uncertainty
avoidance, Japan ranks very high on the uncertainty avoidance index (Hofstede, 2001).
By looking at this, we can suggest that Disney’s guest service policy is more in line with
the Japanese cultural dimensions than the American cultural values. The difference that
38
causes the hypernormal perception by WDW guests is virtually eliminated. In short, such
a guest service policy fits perfectly into the high uncertainty avoidance culture in which
The interplay of the higher power distance and stronger uncertainty avoidance
allow for a different interpretation of Disney’s guest service policies at Tokyo Disneyland
than at Walt Disney World. What is considered an excellent policy at WDW fits
Training Program
Tokyo Disneyland’s training and orientation programs are not unlike those at
Walt Disney World. The training consists of two parts, the first being an orientation
similar to the aforementioned “Traditions” which indoctrinates the new cast member into
the ways of the Disney Company. The second day part is training in the new hire’s line
of business, such as merchandise, food and beverage, or attractions. The cast members
are also instructed to read the Tokyo Disneyland manual entitled “Tips on Magic,” which
The training program promotes and understanding and dedication to the Disney
company and its brand. Raz (1999) suggests that this indoctrination into such a strong
a preliminary interview in which they are explained the culture of the organization and
judged for fit, in Japan employees already have an understanding of and are used to strict
Japan is a much more collectivist than the United States (although it is the most
individualistic of the Asian nations (Hofstede, 2001)). Whereas in the United States the
Therefore, the Disney training is not perceived as hypernormal, but is instead perceived
as normal.
This is a perfect example of the Saussure’s semiotic model of signs at work. The
Disney Company has the same policy as the Oriental Land Company, and the policy is
exemplified through the same training programs (signifier). But, the programs are
perceived differently (signified) in the two contextually different cultures. In this case,
both signified meanings still promote the success of the company instead of countering it.
Family Orientation
While Tokyo Disneyland is not technically owned or run by the Walt Disney
Company, it is guided by the Company’s core beliefs and values (by both tradition and a
strict contract). One of those beliefs is that Disney should be a family friendly place. In
Japan, Disney is more than just a children’s world, it makes magic for parents and
children alike. The Japanese Mickey Kids television station shows many of Disney’s
culture, the park had no alcohol. When the park opened in 1983, the only Disney theme
park which allowed alcohol was EPCOT Center, which had opened a year earlier. In that
case, alcohol was allowed because it was an important part of the World Showcase
40
theme. Currently, alcohol is not allowed at Tokyo Disneyland, but is allowed at Tokyo
The cultural dimension of lower individualism also plays well toward the
Japanese audience. Having a family orientation in a collectivist culture such as Japan fits
well with many of the key points Hofstede (2001) found with collectivist family values.
In collectivist cultures, a marriage is not complete without children. Families are larger
because they are generally more extended, and responsibility of children to their parents
is important. But there are also negative effects of the collectivist culture. In such
cultures happiness is discouraged. Also, the focus on “we” in a collectivist culture can be
seen as a positive or a negative. While children may be less demanding of the souvenirs
purchased for them, there is more of an emphasis on giving and sharing (Raz, 1999).
family oriented culture. While the Japanese may be known for their saké, they
understand that alcohol does not belong at a place with such a family orientation. The
masculine traits of the culture lead it to be a very successful place for Disney’s focus on
the family. Being only slightly collectivist, the country’s culture has some aspects the
clash and some that match with the Disney ideal of being a location for the whole family
to enjoy.
something new to the Japanese. The Japanese term “midashinami” refers to appearance
management, a concept that the Japanese are very familiar with. As early as elementary
example of this policy follows: All hair should be uniformly cut, straight, and for boys,
should not touch the ears, eyebrows, or back collar. If a student’s hair is naturally curly,
they must inform the school and carry around a certificate showing such. When asked
Once again, this is an example of how Disney’s policies are interpreted by the
more collectivist Japanese culture. In the context of the worker, whereas in the United
States the grooming policy could be seen as an affront to one’s individual identity, in
Japan it is seen as highly accepted, if not expected. Identity is based on the social system
as opposed to the individual, which in this context would be the company. Also, in the
The grooming policy, when examined from the guest perspective, deals with the
trait of uncertainty avoidance. By implementing this policy, Disney play to the idea that
guests come to Disney theme parks expecting a certain experience, and the attention to
detail that Disney exudes makes sure that the guests’ expectations are met. Japan’s high
uncertainty avoidance makes Disney fit well into that nation’s culture. In the United
States, the uncertainty eliminated by Disney’s attention to detail was an added benefit, in
Conclusion
proved to be a success for cultural reasons. Disney’s business practices transferred well
into the Japanese national culture because the Disney culture and the Japanese culture
42
had natural fit with one another. Based on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, the practices
of the Disney Company were actually more suited for business in Japan than for business
In the context of Tokyo Disneyland the idea is often expressed that there was a
“Japanization” of Disneyland. While this may be partly true, it seems to only have had a
prevalent effect on Disney’s hard technologies, such as the renaming of certain areas, and
changing of the main shopping area as earlier mentioned. In reality, Disney’s soft
technologies, such as the aforementioned business practices, went through very minor
As Brannen (2004) mentioned, the closer two countries’ cultures are, the less
reinterpretation the business practices will have as they cross cultures. In this case, the
Disney practices transferred well because the business cultures of Japan and the United
States are similar. But more importantly, the practices transferred well because they were
more representative of the Japanese business culture than American business culture.
43
CHAPTER 5
Disneyland Paris Case Study
On the coattails of the success of Tokyo Disneyland, The Walt Disney Company
turned its focus to Europe. Determined not to make the mistake that it did with Tokyo
Disneyland, Disney took a much greater stake in the development of its European park.
Throughout the 1980’s, the company negotiated with both the French and Spanish
and a site on the Mediterranean coast just outside of Barcelona. The Spanish site had the
advantage of a more amiable climate, but the relatively central location and government
incentives offered by the French eventually led to the selection of the 5,000 acre site in
As with the Tokyo Disneyland resort, many of the hard technologies were
the European tradition of looking discovery and innovation (Lainsbury, 2000). Along the
same vein, the Space Mountain rollercoaster, which is themed as a space transport system
at the Walt Disney World result, was reinterpreted and merged with the storyline of Jules
Verne’s classic From the Earth to the Moon. Also, The Walt Disney Company, returned
Sleeping Beauty’s Castle to its French name, Le Château de la Belle au Bois Dormant,
and developed it into a more fantasy based attraction than those which are found in the
other parks. This was in attempt to appeal to the Europeans, who are used to seeing
The park opened on April 12, 1992 and reviews were scathing. Euro Disney had
attendance rates lower than expected and a considerable debt due to Disney CEO Michael
Eisner’s disregard for the soaring costs of the project. One journalist called the park a
44
“cultural Chernobyl” and an Economist writer said that “Investors in Euro Disney might
as well have climbed aboard Indiana Jones and the Temple of Peril. Jitters about the
theme park’s popularity are giving them a ride every bit as stomach-churning as Euro
(Lainsbury, 2000).
Michael Eisner, the word “Euro” may have sounded glamorous to Americans, but to the
European market, the word was associated with business, currency, and commerce. This
changed the marketing plan of the park, associating it more with Disney’s original vision,
and differentiated the park from its first two years of bad press (Lainsbury, 2000).
To examine Disneyland Paris is to examine the failures that can occur in cross
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and in the context of Saussure’s semiotic theory, I will
show the different outcomes that can occur from the different signified meanings of these
business practices in the French cultures. Whereas in the American cultural context these
practices led to a hypernormal success, and in the Japanese context the result was a
business that fit well within the cultural norms, the French example will show significant
cultural discrepancies that lead the Disney business culture to not fit well within the
Business Practices
Upon the opening of Euro Disney, it was apparent that the French were not going
to warm to the American management style being offered by the parent company and by
Robert Fitzpatrick, the American executive in charge of Euro Disney who spoke French
45
and was married to a French woman. In April 1993, Philippe Bourguignon took the
reigns of the park with the specific goal of trying to make the park more European, but
still holding onto its American roots (Lovelock, 1996). This section will analyze the
business practices that Disney brought to France in its creation of Euro Disney, and the
way that these policies were interpreted by their French recipients. In addition, this
section will address changes made by Bourguignon which helped to eliminate the
French cultural norms. The idea of greeting each guest with a smile is something that is
abnormal and unfamiliar to French culture. In describing the French, Brown (2004)
suggests that their personalities can be compared to a coconut, hard on the outside but
Because of this cultural difference, both the Euro Disney cast member and guest
clashed with the guest service policy. To the French guest, the policy was considered
intrusive and annoying, to the employee it was uncomfortable and uncalled-for. While at
Disney’s American parks, this dissonance was considered a competitive advantage of the
In the context of Saussure’s semantic theory, the sign is the guest service
orientation and what it means to the employee or guest. The signifier is constant; the
policy is enacted in the same way both at Walt Disney World as at Euro Disney. What is
changed is the signified. In the American culture the strong guest service orientation
46
represents a hypernormal service policy that is in the best interest of the guests. In
contrast, the French see the policy as intrusive and uncomfortable. The same policy is
being interpreted differently as a result of differences in culture. Figure 5.1 shows this
To examine the reason for this dissonance between the American and French
signified meanings for this sign, we will once again refer to Hofstede’s cultural
dimensions. In our previous two examples, we examined the acceptance of the guest
service culture in the context of power distance and uncertainty avoidance. To keep the
France’s power distance score is significantly higher than either Japan or the
United States. This indicates a stronger tendency towards a work culture that focuses on
higher authority and a more tiered hierarchy. The French power distance dimension
would also focus on a centralized decision making structure with expressed formal rules
(Hofstede, 2000).
The reality is that the Disney guest service policies do not fit this cultural
dimension at all. As earlier mentioned, the policy of guest service recovery (in which the
cast member is empowered to fix the problem) is really an example of low power
distance. At Tokyo Disneyland, because the power distance was only moderate, it was
able to reinforce the Disney corporate culture. At Euro Disney, the difference in power
distances between Disney and France are significant and therefore create a dissonance
that makes Disney’s service culture seem abnormal. This is an example of Brannen’s
(2004) suggestion that the closer cultures are, the more easily their policies will mesh. In
this case, the difference between the American and French culture is greater than the
47
difference between the American and Japanese. It is due to that that we see greater
dissonance.
Japan and the United States, but is closer to the Japanese score than the American. It
would appear, therefore, that the guest service polices, which eliminate uncertainty,
would fit well into the French culture as the do in the Japanese culture. In fact, the
interplay of both of these two cultural dimensions is very similar to the scores given to
the Japanese. Yet, the results and interpretation are very different.
The deeper analysis of the uncertainty avoidance dimension provides a reason for
this intuitive dissonance. Hofstede found that the French agreed with the uncertainty
convinced.” This indicates that the French must be convinced to follow the procedures of
the company, and it is clear that the French are not convinced that high levels of service
are what the guests or cast members want. Lovelock (1996) cites one Euro Disney
executive as saying that “the French are not known for their hospitality. But Disney is.”
even though they eliminate uncertainty avoidance. Figure 5.2 shows this concept in the
While Hofstede’s values of power distance and uncertainty avoidance are similar
in Japan and France, the transfer of corporate policies between the national cultures
yields significantly different results. Deeper analysis shows that the nuances of these
48
cultural dimensions seem to project the reasoning for such distinct differences in
interpretation of the signified meanings of the guest service polices in Japan and France.
Training Program
which include such courses as “traditions,” are viewed as totalitarian in the context of
French national culture. The Disney Company did little to soften that image during the
development of Euro Disney, and in fact, seemed to cultivate the feeling with its
American attitude. In the 1990 Annual Report the company made it “a leading priority to
indoctrinate all employees into the Disney service philosophy, in addition to training
them in operational policies and procedures” (Lovelock, 1996). Those who were
individualism and collectivism spectrum, we can see differences that lead to the signified
meaning (totalitarian) of Disney’s training policies. On this scale, France falls about half
way between the highly individual American culture and slightly collective Japanese
culture. In the context of the American culture, we suggested that the training program
was hypernormal because it lay outside the norm in a positive way. In France, it is
apparent that the policy is not considered positive. Hofstede (2001) explains this as an
example of the interplay between France’s high individuality and large power distance.
He calls this dependent individualism. He suggests that the French (as well as other
cultures that fit into this group) have a need for authority, but they reject the collectivity
of the company.
49
To exemplify this concept we look can look at the idea of Disney’s “traditions”
course. The French have a moderately large power distance rating. This allows them to
understand and ultimately thrive on the importance of such programs as the training
program offered by Disney. While they understand the importance, they are in conflict
because Disney’s training indoctrinates them into a highly collective organization. The
signifier in this model is the training course itself. The signified is the feeling of
Family Orientation
To look at family orientation at Euro Disney, we see that some concepts of family
orientation are different than in the United States, creating one of the most prevalent and
the effects of Hofstede’s cultural values in the acceptance of the family oriented business
practices, then we will look at Disney’s alcohol policy and the reason that it did not
First, we analyzed the family orientation of Walt Disney World in the context of
masculinity. The French culture values femininity more than masculinity, according to
Hofstede (2001), though not by much. Therefore, we still see an acceptance and
index.
Where Euro Disney did not mesh was with the sales of souvenirs. I look at this in
represent the memory of the vacation and are often mementos for children (Brannen,
2004). Euro Disney’s sales of souvenirs were significantly lower than anticipated in its
early financial projections (Hartley, 1997). Because the French are less individualistic
than Americans, children are less subject to the idea of “I” (Hofstede, 2001). This caused
reduced sales to the customers, while still showing an acceptance of the family oriented
culture.
the terms of American culture, we analyzed the Disney policy banning alcohol from its
park as a reflection of its family orientation. The reason that Walt Disney banned alcohol
from Disneyland was “to create a safe, family haven, free of drunken, boisterous
behavior” (Lainsbury, 2000). At Euro Disney, that analysis does not hold true. The
French consume alcoholic beverages such as wine on a daily basis, and to remove it from
their daily regimen can be seen as stepping on their personal liberties (Lainsbury, 2000).
In June 1993, Euro Disney changed its alcohol policy, allowing the sale of wine
and beer at four of its restaurants (Lovelock, 1996). Some analysts say that this decision
showed deference to French and European culture over the typical American attitude of
crosses national borders. The sign at Walt Disney World was the concept of being family
oriented, represented by the prohibition on alcohol. The signifier was the prohibition on
alcohol, and the signified was the family atmosphere. When transferred to France the
sign needed to be changed because it clashed with French culture. The signifier to the
51
French was the prohibition on alcohol. This signified an out-of-touch company, not
family orientation. Therefore at Euro Disney, a policy shift reconciled this difference.
Further, since the opening of Euro Disney, all new Disney parks have been built
with policies that allow the sale of alcohol. This represents the reciprocal model
provided by Brannen (2004). Figure 5.4 shows the reciprocal model as it relates to
Disney’s alcohol policy. Note that while The Disney Company has changed their alcohol
policy to allow alcohol at their new parks, they have not lost their family orientation. The
concept of being family oriented is a function of numerous policies, not this one alone,
therefore the company can change this and still be seen as family oriented.
Disney’s family orientation shows that in some cases the cultural transfer of
business practices is hard to predict because it can rely on both cultural practices and
cultural dimensions. While Euro Disney supports a family oriented philosophy (which is
in step with its cultural dimensions), its standard cultural practices show that a family
difference has caused Disney to change its policy not only at Euro Disney, but at its new
As earlier identified, The Disney Company is known for its attention to detail. It
is an important part in the guest experience. Euro Disney is no exception to this concept.
The “Euro Disney Look” manual says that “Euro Disney is a show… an immense, three-
dimensional show in which our guests are the audience… and in which our cast members
are the actors” (Lainsbury, 2000). This statement exemplifies the concept that Disney
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takes an ordinary activity such as shopping, and turns it into an event through its attention
to detail.
“The Euro Disney Look” is the policy guidebook that sets the guidelines for
Walt Disney World and Tokyo Disneyland. Whereas in the United States and Japan the
from one of France’s largest unions attacked the policy saying that it impeded upon the
employee’s personal liberties. It was understood the companies may need to impose
guidelines to strengthen the image of their firm, but it was seen that Disney took those
guidelines too far. Regulations were imposed on such things as fingernail length and
skirt length, and makeup such as eyeliner and lipstick were banned (Lainsbury, 2000).
As with other Disney policies, what was strong at Walt Disney World and Tokyo
Disneyland was considered problematic at Euro Disney. The French saw the personnel
management detail issues as invasive into the private nature of the individual (Brannen,
2004). This dissatisfaction with the grooming policy can be seen as a reflection of
level of emphasis on the individual over the collective. In fact, it is rated in Hofstede’s
top ten individualistic countries. As with the Walt Disney World case study, we see that
Euro Disney cast members feel that the policy can be thoroughly annoying. Whereas the
American customer seems to appreciate the attention to detail shown by the Disney Look
(refer to Figure 3.1), the more collective nature of the French in relation to America gives
them the “we” consciousness (Hofstede, 2001) that causes the union leaders and society
in general to feel for the plight of the Euro Disney cast member.
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The sign for this policy was that the Disney grooming guidelines, which were a
function of attention to detail, and how they were interpreted by the culture. The signifier
therefore was the grooming policy itself, and it signified an attack on individualism. The
original concept would have been for the signified to be “attention to detail to present the
Because of the way the policy was signified in France, external forces such as the
union leader earlier mentioned attempted to defend the rights of the individual. The
urgings of these external forces (who due to all of the previous problems, were already at
odds with Disney) led the changing of this policy to make it more in tune with the French
national culture. The “Euro Disney Look” was changed because “what is considered
classic beauty in Europe was not considered classic beauty in America” and vice-versa
(Lovelock, 1996). Included in these policy changes were the allowance of red lipstick
company-wide policy change, the same result can be seen in the case of the “Disney
Look.” Currently at the Walt Disney World resort, the grooming policy has been
recent changes have allowed corn-row hairstyles and hoop-earrings (Disney, 2005).
Therefore, we see that there is an overall change in policy as a result of the dissonance
between the intended signified and the actual signified related to the grooming policy in
France.
Conclusion
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The differences between the cultures of France and Japan lead to the differences
in the way that the Disney corporate practices were interpreted in each case. Whereas
Disney’s practices transferred well into Japan, they had much less success transferring to
American culture leading on to assume that the practices would be transferred similarly,
Deeper analysis shows that there are key differences in the individual cultural
dimensions, and the way that they interact with one another, that caused the relative
failure of Euro Disney in its early years. I would be remiss if I did not also point out that
anti-American sentiment played a role in its early failures. While this chapter suggests
that Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are essential in determining the success of the
transfer of business practices, in the case of France, the negative sentiment toward the
greater extent.
In addition to the idea that we must fully analyze the data to get past the intuitive, this
chapter also showed the reflexive concept of reinterpretation of signs. With the alcohol
and grooming guideline examples, we showed that the modifications in a policy for the
improvement of that policy’s acceptance in one culture can lead to a change in the parent
making process should be aware. In making regional, cultural decisions, they may, in the
Overall, Euro Disney had its problems due to a clash between the Disney culture
and the French culture. While the park had problems in its first few years, the company
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took the steps necessary to reconcile many of the differences between the intended
signified meanings of their policies, and the actual signified meanings of their policies.
This, along with the renaming of the park Disneyland Paris, has helped the park remain
CHAPTER 6
Analysis and Conclusion
The example of The Walt Disney Company provides model from which we can
see how business practices are transferred across cultures. The Disney Company has a
strong corporate culture that it has developed over the past fifty years of theme park
operation. This culture is highly effective in creating a sustainable business in the United
States, the nation in which it was founded. When transferred to the foreign cultures of
Japan and France, the business practices which are imbedded in this culture produce
Barthes (1967) and Brannen (2004), we are able to view business practices as a system of
signs, in the same way that words and objects can be seen a signs. These signs maintain
the same signifier across cultures, but can have numerous different signified meanings.
Just as words have meanings in different contexts; the business practices can have
In order to understand how different cultures will interpret the business practices,
done by establishing various degrees of foreignness from the culture in which the
business practices were formed. Greater degrees of foreignness create greater likelihood
that the practices will not be accepted by the new culture (Brannen, 2004).
The most accepted and widespread research on cultural differences is the work
This is the system that I used in identifying the differences between the American,
Japanese, and French cultures, in which Disney theme parks reside. By using these four
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original dimensions, it is possible to see the reasons that Disney had problems
transferring their business practices from Walt Disney World to Euro Disney, and success
In reality, more than one gauge is needed to fully examine the degree of
foreignness. For this research, I used no more than two of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions
to analyze the foreignness, except in the case of Euro Disney, in which I took into
consideration some established cultural norms. Therefore, future research into the
practice in terms of all five of Hofstede’s dimensions, as well as cultural norms and other
aspects of the country’s national cultures. This would provide for a more detailed insight
into the reasons for the changes in signified as signifiers cross international cultural
boundaries.
This concept could be used further to predict the acceptance of soft technologies
as they cross national borders. Companies which are considering international expansion
can use this model to analyze the culture of the company into which they would like to
expand. By applying a detailed analysis to the semiotic model, they can analyze the
future acceptance of their business practices and use this as one of the criterion on which
The case of Disney shows the need for such a detailed analysis. Had Disney
examined the culture into which it moved, they would have found several items of great
interest. In regards to Tokyo Disneyland, they would have found that, while externally it
appears that Walt Disney World and Japanese culture have little in common, internally,
the company’s business practices are very similar to standard cultural practices in Japan.
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In fact, there is little foreignness between the Walt Disney World corporate culture and
the culture of Japan. Knowing this may have convinced Disney to increase their
investment in the original development of Tokyo Disneyland, and therefore reaped the
financial rewards of having the most successful park in the Pacific Rim (Amusement
Business, 2004).
In the case of Euro Disney, using this examination would have shown that there
Japan and in France. Whereas the business practices fit well into Japan’s national
culture, they created a serious dissonance with the French culture. This caused the
results can be provided. France and Japan had some cultural dimensions that were very
similar to one another, but further examination showed cultural differences which, when
taken into consideration showed that there was a likelihood that the two cultures would
to one that has a more desirable signified. This can be seen by the case of the Disney
Look. The Disney Look policy in France was seen as overbearing and an attack on
individuality. This signified showed that the signifier had a negative connotation within
the French culture. To alleviate this problem, Disney edited its personnel grooming
policy to create one that was more acceptable to the French. By analyzing the acceptance
of a certain signifier, particularly in the context of Hofstede’s cultural dynamics and other
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One interesting phenomenon that was identified was the ability for one of the
aforementioned changes to penetrate the whole organization. For example, the change in
the Disney Look policy that was made for the Euro Disney is now standard Disney Look
policy at Walt Disney World. Also, the company’s policy on allowing alcohol at Euro
Disney seems to be common policy at Disney parks. All parks opened since then now
lead to loosely defined cultural differences in the 21st century. If the trend indicated in
this thesis is true on a large scale, as companies expand internationally, they will take
their soft technologies with them, and as needed, these technologies will adapt first
In September 2005, the Walt Disney Company will open Hong Kong Disneyland
as its flagship park in China. It will take an ownership stake similar to Euro Disney than
to Tokyo Disneyland. Thus far, the company seems to be imitating their expansion into
issuing on-the-job training for 500 Hong Kong Disneyland employees at the Walt Disney
World Resort. This opportunity to learn about the culture of Disney is important, but
some of the Chinese feel that cultural differences will be lost on the people in their home
country.
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practices, but instead to look at the culture of the country into which you are moving, and
develop a compromise between corporate culture and national culture. That is what has
made Disney a success in the United States and Japan. In the United States, cultural
differences between the business and nation create a better than average company. In
Japan, the compromise creates a uniquely American experience, while still meeting the
needs of employees and customers. In France, the failure to compromise early created an
interpreted by the employees and customers who will be affected by the practice. Using
Saussure’s semiotic theory as the mechanism for analyzing this, and measures of
foreignness such as Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as the context, a company can better
predict the acceptance that their soft technologies will have in the new national culture.
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1
In regards to cohabitation, Hofstede’s research shows that cohabitation in low masculinity cultures is often a long term
commitment which involves the decision not to marry. This is different than the cohabitation that is taking place in the
United States, where couples are more often moving in together as a sign of commitment or for convenience, with the
ultimate goal of being married.
2
Hofstede and Bond later collaborated to develop the “Confucian Dynamic” later called long-term orientation, a value that
was not used in this research due to the complexity and restraints of adding this fifth value.