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The Security Council and Iraq: An Incremental PracticeAuthor(s): Thomas D. GrantSource:

The American Journal of International Law,

Vol. 97, No. 4 (Oct., 2003), pp. 823-842Published by: American Society of International LawStable URL:

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3133683

Accessed: 13/05/2009 17:56

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2003]AGORA(CONTINUED):FUTURE IMPLICATIONSOFTHEIRAQCONFLICT003]AGORA(CONTINUED):FUTURE IMPLICATIONSOFTHEIRAQCONFLICT

systemremainsthe mostwidely recognizedandlegitimatemechanismfor the conductofenforcement action.Nevertheless,thechallengeto the Council'sauthoritydid notcome withoutwarning.Theenforcement function envisioned in1945hadalreadybeenreducedtoa minimum insubse-quentCharterpractice.Furthermore,the erosion ofthe Council'senforcementmonopolycorrespondswithabroadercritique,whichpostulateshat,as amatterofpolicy,therequirementof centralized enforcementshould notbesacrosanct; instead,it shouldbe balancedagainstothercardinalprinciplesof theinternationallegalorder,such as theprotectionofpeoples'rightsand fundamental humanrights(Kosovo),and themaintenance ofChapterVII-definedsecurityinterests(disarmament,amongothers,in thecase ofIraq),iftheseobligationshaveconstantlybeenviolatedbythetargetedstate.Finally,evenifthereare validgroundstoregretthedecline oftheenforcementfunctionoftheCouncil,one cannotfail tonotethat,overall,as aninstitutionithas beenstrengthenedratherthan weakenedbytheIraqiincident. TheChapterVIImachineryhasbeenusedmorethaninanyother case.Moreover,theCouncilhasbeenthecentral actor intheconflictsince1990,shapingitseveryphase.Fromthebeginning,theCouncil hasexercisedfar-reachingnormativepowers.Mostnotably,tdeterminedtheconditionsofpeaceinitsResolutions 687135and

1441,136

whosebreachconstituted theproclaimedlegalbasisforOperationIraqiFreedom(theCouncil's"normativerole").Duringthecrisis,theCouncilserved asthe mainforumforinterstate discourseconcerningauthorization ofmilitaryaction(its"discursiveunction").Aftertheconflict,theCounciluseditspowerto"legalize"hepostwaroccupation(Resolu-tion1483)

137

to"neutralize"heprocessofgovernanceand statebuildinginIraqthroughtheestablishmentof theUnitedNationsAssistanceMission forIraq(Resolution1500),138ndtorestoresecuritybyauthorizingamultinationalmilitary presence(Resolution1511)139its"postconflictsettlementfunction").Theexercise ofthese threedifferentfunctionsforcefullydemonstratesthat theSecurityCouncil isanythingbut"irrelevant" r"optional."t isurgentlyneeded-perhapsmoreurgentlythanever-bothbefore andafterthelaunchingofinterven-tionstoenforce thecollectivewill.

CARSTENSTAHN*

THESECURITYCOUNCILANDIRAQ:ANINCREMENTALRACTICETheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil,ratherthanissue aglobalstatement ofoutlookordecree asinglemasterplanwithrespectto thesituation inIraq,haschanneled aninterna-tionalpracticeevolving byincrements.Todate,thiscoursehasbeenseen intwoimportantmatters.One is theinternationalstatusoftheIraqi government.Theother istherelativeposi-tionoftheseveralinstitutionsinvolvedin thetransitionprocessthat aimsatsecuringthatgovernment.Theinstitutionalstructuresnowresponsibleforpublicorder inIraqdonotasyetpossesstheunquestionedauthoritytorepresentthestateofIraqontheinternationalplanethatanygovernmentalauthoritymustpossess,ifit isfairlyto becharacterizedasthecompleteagentofthestateitclaimstoserve.Inshort,theIraqigovernmentemergingout ofthepresent

135

SCRes.687,supranote11,paras.8-34.

136

SCRes.1441,supranote11,paras.2-8.

137

SCRes.1483,supranote94, paras.4,8.

138

SCRes.1500,para.2(Aug.14,2003).

139

SCRes.1511, supranote97, para.13.*Fellow,MaxPlanckSocietyfortheAdvancement ofScience. IamgratefultoPhilipAlstonforcommentsandconstructivecriticismofthisessay.

systemremainsthe mostwidely recognizedandlegitimatemechanismfor the conductofenforcement action.Nevertheless,thechallengeto the Council'sauthoritydid notcome withoutwarning.Theenforcement function envisioned in1945hadalreadybeenreducedtoa minimum insubse-quentCharterpractice.Furthermore,the erosion ofthe Council'senforcementmonopolycorrespondswithabroadercritique,whichpostulateshat,as amatterofpolicy,therequirementof centralized enforcementshould notbesacrosanct; instead,it shouldbe balancedagainstothercardinalprinciplesof theinternationallegalorder,such as theprotectionofpeoples'rightsand fundamental humanrights(Kosovo),and themaintenance ofChapterVII-definedsecurityinterests(disarmament,amongothers,in thecase ofIraq),iftheseobligationshaveconstantlybeenviolatedbythetargetedstate.Finally,evenifthereare validgroundstoregretthedecline oftheenforcementfunctionoftheCouncil,one cannotfail tonotethat,overall,as aninstitutionithas beenstrengthenedratherthan weakenedbytheIraqiincident. TheChapterVIImachineryhasbeenusedmorethaninanyother case.Moreover,theCouncilhasbeenthecentral actor intheconflictsince1990,shapingitseveryphase.Fromthebeginning,theCouncil hasexercisedfar-reachingnormativepowers.Mostnotably,tdeterminedtheconditionsofpeaceinitsResolutions 687135and

1441,136

whosebreachconstituted theproclaimedlegalbasisforOperationIraqiFreedom(theCouncil's"normativerole").Duringthecrisis,theCouncilserved asthe mainforumforinterstate discourseconcerningauthorization ofmilitaryaction(its"discursiveunction").Aftertheconflict,theCounciluseditspowerto"legalize"hepostwaroccupation(Resolu-tion1483)

137

to"neutralize"heprocessofgovernanceand statebuildinginIraqthroughtheestablishmentof theUnitedNationsAssistanceMission forIraq(Resolution1500),138ndtorestoresecuritybyauthorizingamultinationalmilitary presence(Resolution1511)139its"postconflictsettlementfunction").Theexercise ofthese threedifferentfunctionsforcefullydemonstratesthat theSecurityCouncil isanythingbut"irrelevant" r"optional."t isurgentlyneeded-perhapsmoreurgentlythanever-bothbefore andafterthelaunchingofinterven-tionstoenforce thecollectivewill.

CARSTENSTAHN*

THESECURITYCOUNCILANDIRAQ:ANINCREMENTALRACTICETheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil,ratherthanissue aglobalstatement ofoutlookordecree asinglemasterplanwithrespectto thesituation inIraq,haschanneled aninterna-tionalpracticeevolving byincrements.Todate,thiscoursehasbeenseen intwoimportantmatters.One is theinternationalstatusoftheIraqi government.Theother istherelativeposi-tionoftheseveralinstitutionsinvolvedin thetransitionprocessthat aimsatsecuringthatgovernment.Theinstitutionalstructuresnowresponsibleforpublicorder inIraqdonotasyetpossesstheunquestionedauthoritytorepresentthestateofIraqontheinternationalplanethatanygovernmentalauthoritymustpossess,ifit isfairlyto becharacterizedasthecompleteagentofthestateitclaimstoserve.Inshort,theIraqigovernmentemergingout ofthepresent

135

SCRes.687,supranote11,paras.8-34.

136

SCRes.1441,supranote11,paras.2-8.

137

SCRes.1483,supranote94, paras.4,8.

138

SCRes.1500,para.2(Aug.14,2003).

139

SCRes.1511, supranote97, para.13.*Fellow,MaxPlanckSocietyfortheAdvancement ofScience. IamgratefultoPhilipAlstonforcommentsandconstructivecriticismofthisessay.

82323

THEAMERICANJOURNALOFINTERNATIONALLAW

transition awaits ullinternationalrecognition.TheSecurityCouncil andstatepracticeasso-ciated withithavebeguntoaddress the status of theIraqi governmentinwaysthatreflectthecontours of anuncertainandchangeableinternationallandscape.Simultaneously,threeinstitutionsexistascomponentsofthe transitionprocessinIraq-theCoalitionProvisionalAuthority,heGoverningCouncil ofIraq,and the UnitedNations AssistanceMissionforIraq-buttheirareasofcompetenceand theboundaries between them areonlyambiguouslydefinedand remain mutable. TheSecurityCouncil has addressed thesematters inthree resolu-tions-Resolution1483 ofMay22, 2003;Resolution1500ofAugust14,2003;andResolution1511ofOctober16,2003-whileadditionalstatements,publisheddeliberations,and asec-retary-general'sreportofJuly15havefurtherdevelopedtheinternationalposition.'Thepresent piecesurveystheforegoingandpresentssomeobservations,necessarilytentative inviewof theearly stageof the transition to the"internationally recognized,representativegovernment"that the Council has set asthegoal.2

I.AMANDATE MPLIED

The United NationsSecurityCouncil,deadlockedinMarch2003onthequestionofuseof forceinIraq, engagedanew with the American-led coalitionintheinitialpostwar phase.3Resolution1483 ofMay22, 2003,resulted fromdiscussionsamongthefivepermanentmem-bersof theCouncil,asthey attemptedto resuscitate aworkingrelationship duringthe tran-sition toIraqi self-government.The resolution borethe hallmarks ofcompromise through-out. Its salientoverarchingfeature a blendofspecificityandpurposive vagueness,Resolu-tion1483atonce defined a mandateforactionbythecoalition,the UnitedNations,and otherparticipantsinIraq-andleftspacefor the mandatetoevolve. It amountsin thisrespectasmuchto an invitationto furtherdialogueasto adetailedblueprint.Resolution1483describedthree entitiesinvolved in thereturnto self-rule.A transitionalauthority,comprisingthe unifiedcommandof theUnitedKingdom,theUnitedStates,andothercoalitionpartners,is termed the"Coalition ProvisionalAuthority"bythe UnitedStatesand the UnitedKingdom,andsimply"theAuthority"bytheSecurityCouncil. Theprevalentform-"CPA"-willbe usedhere.Iraqirepresentativeswere calledoninResolution1483toforman "interim administration"distinct fromthe CPA. This seemsto have beenenvisagedas asort ofprotogovernment,preliminarytoaconstitutionalprocessand theestablishmentof afullyrepresentativeIraqi government.Theinterimadministrationfor thefirstweeksof thetransitionremainedmore notionalthanreal. Itbecameclear,however,that theCPAconsideredthe formationof an interimadministrationpursuanttoResolution1483 apriority.The interimauthorityinfactwasgivenmoredefiniteshapeonJuly13,withthe nominationbytheCPA of theGoverningCouncilofIraq(GCI),itstwenty-fivemembers,thoughnotpopularlyelected,drawnfrom varioussegmentsofIraqisocietyandpolitics.Resolution1483,inparagraph9,prospectivelyen-dorsedthisdevelopment,

"[s]upport[ing]

theformation,bythepeopleofIraqwith thehelp

ReportoftheSecretary-GeneralPursuanttoParagraph24ofSecurityCouncil Resolution1483(2003),UNDoc.S/2003/715;seealsoUN PressReleaseSC/7821(July22,2003)(containingsynopsisof4791stmeetingofSecurityCouncil);UN Press ReleaseSC/7831-IK/372(July29,2003)(containingNon-PaperontheImplementa-tionofParagraph23ofResolution1483(2003));UNPress ReleaseSC/7843(Aug.14,2003)(containingsynopsisof 4808thmeetingofSecurityCouncil);UN PressReleaseSC/7850(Aug.20,2003)(containingsynopsisof4811 thmeetingofSecurityCouncil);UNPress ReleaseSC/7851(Aug.21,2003)(containingsynopsisof 4812thmeetingofSecurityCouncil).UNpressreleasesare availableonlineat<http://www.un.org/Documents>.2SC Res.1483,para.9(May22,2003),42ILM1016(2003).

3

OnpracticepriortocommencementofoperationsagainstIraq,see SeanD.Murphy,ContemporaryPracticeof theUnitedStates,97AJIL419,422(2003)(detailingexhaustionof effortsbytheUnitedStates,theUnitedKingdom,andSpaintoobtainfurtherSecurityCouncilaction);id.,96AJIL956(2002);FredericL.Kirgis,SecurityCouncilResolution1441 onIraq'sFinalOpportunityoComplywithDisarmamentObligations,ASILINSIGHTS,ov.2002,availableat<http://wwwAs.asil.org>.

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