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United Nations peacekeeping is yet again at a cross-roads: it may finally succeed in establishing itself as thepreeminent force for conflict prevention and peace, or itcould continue operating with a severe mismatch of mandates and resources. Which option will materializedepends on the policies of UN member states, particu-larly those of the United States.Following a brief but stellar rise, UN peacekeeping vir-tually collapsed in the mid-to-late 1990s. Operationsundertaken by the "blue helmets" in Somalia, Bosnia,and Rwanda were widely considered to have ended infailure, eclipsing successes in Nicaragua, Mozambique,Namibia, and Eastern Slavonia/Croatia. Right-wingRepublicans in the U.S. Congress eagerly heaped blameon the organization and cultivated the view that it wasnot to be entrusted with challenging missions.But what seemed like a mori-bund organization hasreemerged as a beehive of activity. In the last two years,the UN has taken on severalnew challenging missions indifferent parts of the world.The peacekeeping budgets andthe number of people involvedin the missions reflect thisrollercoaster development.From peak expenditure levelsof about $3.5 billion per yearin the mid-1990s, expendi-tures dropped to a low of $838million in the July 1998-June1999 budget year. But then, appropriations for July1999-June 2000 doubled to $1.6 billion and are nowprojected to top $2.2 billion for July 2000-June 2001.The number of troops, observers, and civilian policepeaked at almost 80,000 in the mid-1990s, falling to12,000 in 1999. Rising again, peacekeepers totaled37,000 in August 2000 (in addition to about 11,700civilian personnel).Four missions initiated in 1999 and 2000 precipitatedthis latest upswing. They are the UN Mission in SierraLeone (UNAMSIL); the UN TransitionalAdministration in East Timor (UNTAET); the UNObserver Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo(MONUC); and the UN Interim AdministrationMission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The UN SecurityCouncil has authorized 13,000 peacekeepers for SierraLeone (and Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked for anincrease to 20,500 in August 2000), 10,790 in EastTimor, 5,537 in the Congo, and 4,756 in Kosovo. (Thefragility of a peace accord in the Congo casts doubts onwhen, if ever, the UN mission will be deployed; onlyabout 260 observers have thus far been dispatched.)Further increases will come as an existing mission insouthern Lebanon is bolstered from 5,000 to 8,000troops and as a new observer force monitoring a cease-fire between Ethiopia and Eritrea grows to an expectedstrength of about 4,200.The challenges inherent in these new missions are man-ifold. For example, UNAMSIL was created in October1999 to oversee a peace agreement between the weak government of Sierra Leone and the RevolutionaryUnited Front (RUF), a brutal force that imposes its willthrough massacres and mutilations. But the agreementwas revealed as a sham when RUF forces, unwilling todisarm or relinquish their control over lucrative dia-mond smuggling operations, ambushed UN peacekeep-ers in May 2000 and reignited the fighting. The SecurityCouncil's preference for "peacekeeping on the cheap"—having dispatched an undersized, ill-equipped, and ill-trained peacekeeping force--nearly resulted in an embar-rassing failure. The Council only belatedly moved toreinforce the peacekeeping contingent, and the UnitedStates decided to train several thousand West Africansoldiers to augment the UN mission. It remains to beseen whether these efforts will bear fruit.In Sierra Leone, as elsewhere, UN peacekeepers face anarray of complex tasks that include repatriating refugees,facilitating humanitarian relief, developing plans foreffective disarmament and demobilization of combat-ants, and maintaining public order. In Kosovo and EastTimor, the UN has even been asked to administer theterritories and prepare the foundations of a democraticorder. But intense ethnic and factional hatreds, efforts tosabotage peace agreements, and the persistence of des-perate economic conditions could easily confound theUN's efforts and trigger substantial new violence inmany of these troubled places.The challenge posed by these new missions is aggravat-ed both by the continued ad hoc nature of UN peace-keeping and by the organization's financial crisis. Whenthere is success, it is taken for granted. But in the eventof setbacks, members of Congress and other UN criticsunfailingly rush to condemn the world body as hope-lessly ineffective. The UN's revival is tenuous at best.

Key Points

UN peacekeeping is at a crossroads:it could become a permanent force,or it could continue to repeat pastmistakes.•UN peacekeeping virtually collapsedafter several failed missions in the1990s.•By 2000, UN peacekeepingoperations

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and their budgets

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were again rapidly expanding.

UN Peacekeeping: An Uncertain Future

By Michael Renner, Worldwatch Institute

Vol. 5, No. 28 • September 2000

FOREIGN POLICY

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Notwithstanding its earlier multilateralist rhetoric, theClinton administration chose not to expend any signif-icant political capital in support of the United Nations,even as congressional hostility toward the UN rose to afever pitch. The United States has for many years short-changed the UN financially, attached debilitating con-ditions to reluctant U.S. arrears payments, and failed toprovide political backup to the world body.The U.S. policy of routinely paying its peacekeepingdues late and withholding portions of the money legal-ly owed has weakened the UN. Even though the UnitedStates is assessed at 30.4% of total peacekeeping costs,Congress decided in a unilateral move in October 1995to ignore UN assessments beyond a 25% share. Thus,U.S. payments are automatically falling short each bud-get year. In exchange for partial payment of its arrears,the United States has demanded that the unpaid balancebe written off. But these are notions that other UNmembers, increasingly irritated with U.S. policy, do notaccept without intense U.S. lobbying and arm-twisting.In 1995, the United States paid only 40 cents of eachdollar assessed by the United Nations, and just 70 centsin 1996. From 1997 to 1999, as the United Statesteetered on the brink of forfeiting its vote in the GeneralAssembly, Congress moved closer to full appropriationof U.S. peacekeeping assessments, paying about 90cents per dollar assessed.Full payment of dues remains a distant prospect. In July2000, for example, the Senate and House appropria-tions committees cut President Clinton's FY2001peacekeeping request from $739 million to about $500million, though it is clear that even the administrationrequest falls short of covering U.S. assessments for theyear. Congress also turned down a supplemental requestof $107 million for missions in Kosovo and East Timor.A substantial amount of U.S. peacekeeping arrears hasbuilt up over the years—-some $1.36 billion as of July2000 or two-thirds of the sum owed by all UN mem-bers. Conservatives in Congress have sought to wieldthe outstanding arrears as a weapon to force a series of debilitating "reforms" onto the UN. In November1999, the Clinton administration accepted the so-called"Helms-Biden package," which stipulates that $926million in back dues be released over three years. Eventhough this amount would not repay all U.S. debts,actual disbursement of the money is conditional upon along list of demands. Among other stipulations, thepackage bars creation of any standing UN militaryforce, opposes any special agreements earmarking forcesto be available for UN call-up (as stipulated in Article43 of the UN Charter), and requires the election of U.S.candidates to an advisory UN budgetary panel.Washington has repeatedly blocked efforts to create anddispatch peacekeeping missions in a timely manner,because those who would have benefited did not quali-fy under the rarefied definition of U.S. "strategic inter-ests." Perhaps the most egregious case occurred in 1994,when the Clinton administration delayed SecurityCouncil approval of a UN force that could have stoppedthe genocide in Rwanda, a policy the president laterapologized for during a tour of African countries. Morerecently, in 1999, the United States opposed a 15,000-strong force for the Congo—requested by many Africanleaders—consenting only to a mission one-third thatsize. During the May 2000 Sierra Leone crisis, the UNneeded help in dispatching additional peacekeepers.The Pentagon was at first reluctant to make airtransport available and onlyoffered it at triple thecommercial charter rate.Washington has been far morewilling to initiate operationsoutside UN purview—so-called "coalitions of the will-ing." Two NATO-led opera-tions, SFOR in Bosnia andKFOR in Kosovo, fieldedmore than 88,000 soldiers in1999 and cost an estimated$11 billion—seven times thetotal resources available for allUN peacekeeping. But suchoperations are problematic,because they are likely to servethe interests of the intervening military alliance morethan the interests of humanity as a whole. In Kosovo,KFOR was born of an end-run by the United States andits NATO allies—around the UN Security Council—when NATO initiated a bombing campaign againstYugoslavia and forced Yugoslav military forces towithdraw from Kosovo.

Key Problems

•The U.S. has shortchanged the UNfinancially, imposed debilitatingconditions, and failed to providepolitical support.•By mid-2000, U.S. arrears totaled$1.36 billion, two-thirds the amountowed by all UN members.•Washington has repeatedly blockedUN peacekeeping missions whileinitiating incursions outside UNpurview.

Problems with Current U.S. Policy

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Even though there have been more than 50 individualUN peacekeeping missions since 1948, the organizationhas repeatedly had to improvise. The chronic lack of funds and the absence of a truly permanent, reliablepeacekeeping structure usually result in a severe mis-match between the expectations attached to peacekeep-ing missions and the actual capacity to fulfill them.Each time a new peacekeeping mission is authorized,UN officials scramble to find governments willing tocommit personnel and equipment. This has proven tobe an agonizingly slow, months-long process, eventhough a speedy dispatch canmake all the difference betweenmission success and failure.Often the contingents offeredare poorly trained and equipped,particularly in the areas of trans-port, logistics, and communica-tions. Additionally, national con-tingents all too often refuse orsecond-guess orders from themission commander.A supportive U.S. policy couldmake a vast difference. First andforemost, the United Statesneeds to pay off its legally owedarrears quickly and without thecrippling conditions thatCongress now routinely attaches.New assessments need to be paidin full and on time. Peacekeeping cannot succeed on ashoestring budget. Even an adequately funded UNpeacekeeping system is a bargain compared with annualU.S. military budgets of $300 billion or more.The United States has long opposed the creation of anypermanent UN peacekeeping force, considering it anunwanted appendage. However, experience suggests theneed for a robust, versatile system that can be availableto accomplish a broad variety of delicate tasks in time tomake a difference. For that purpose, it would besensible to establish several different well-coordinatedtiers or branches within a larger, permanent peacekeep-ing structure, staffed by well-trained, well-coordinated,and experienced volunteers.These tiers could cover the range of specialized activitiesfound in most UN peacekeeping missions, which arecurrently ad hoc in manner. They could include militaryobservers, to help hostile armies disengage and to patrolcease-fire lines; specialists in disarming and demobiliz-ing former combatants; civilian police, to help reestab-lish order after a civil war ends; a roster of legal andadministrative personnel; human rights observers; dem-ining experts; specialists in electoral assistance; and oth-ers. The UN also needs better early-warning capacityand a strengthened conflict-prevention capability.But consideration should eventually be given to a morecontroversial idea: the establishment of a rapid inter-vention force that is able to provide protection for civil-ians under assault, perhaps by setting up "safe zones"secure enough to prevent the mass killings that occurredin the ad hoc safe zones in Bosnia. Such a force could berelatively small (perhaps in the range of 5,000 to10,000) but should be backed up by specially trainednational forces. By prior arrangement, such forceswould need to be designated in advance by theirgovernments and quickly released for UN duty, once aSecurity Council resolution determined a needfor them.Greater care is needed in training and preparing peace-keeping personnel for the specific challenges awaitingthem. Soldiers trained for combat duty cannot beexpected to be proficient in the delicate tasks of defus-ing conflicts and patrolling tense civilian areas. The UNneeds to ensure that peacekeepers can be transportedquickly to their deployment areas and that they haveready access to equipment commensurate with theirtasks. Last, but not least, the personnel strength, con-tingency planning capacities, and communicationsinfrastructure at UN headquarters in New York need tobe substantially scaled up and supplemented by amobile command headquarters. Currently, there areonly 32 UN officers providing planning and guidanceto almost 30,000 troops and only nine UN staff forabout 8,600 civilian police in the field.Some of these ideas exceed what current political reali-ties permit. But for starters, the recommendationsissued by an independent "Panel on UN PeaceOperations" in August 2000 would help reduce the adhoc character of UN peacekeeping, eliminate many of the arbitrary limitations of the current system, and givethe UN a greater chance at succeeding in complex peacemissions. If permitting the UN to establish a permanentpeacekeeping structure is more than Washington orother UN members states can currently stomach, thenthey could at least implement the panel's suggestion toset up national pools of experienced personnel, to bemade available at the UN's request. The initial U.S.reaction to the panel's report was positive, thoughit remains to be seen how much U.S. policy willactually change.Fundamentally, the United States needs to decidewhether it wants multilateral peacekeeping to be a seri-ous option. On the one hand, Washington wants toretain the ability to act unilaterally. On the other hand,it does not want to be dragged into conflicts that it judges insignificant or too messy to resolve, like those inRwanda, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Congo. Itwants the UN to be available for such purposes and toserve as a convenient scapegoat when things go wrong.The broader—and more troubling—context is thatWashington does not want to be bound by the veryrules governing international conduct that it urges oth-ers to respect. U.S. policy toward UN peacekeepingbears the tell-tale signs of an exceptionalism that rejectscommon, reciprocal obligations. The struggle overpeacekeeping policy is also a struggle involving the legit-imacy of international law and institutions. Both strug-gles hinge on cooperatively reconciling the contradic-tions of national sovereignty in a globalizing world.

Michael Renner <mrenner@peconic.net> is a senior researcher at the Worldwatch Institute.

Key Recommendations

•The U.S. must quickly, fully, andunconditionally pay its legally owedUN arrears and meet newassessments on time.•The UN should create a robust,permanent, multitiered, and well-coordinated peacekeeping forcestaffed by well-trained volunteers.•Other UN needs include greaterearly-warning capacity, astrengthened communicationsinfrastructure and conflict-preventioncapability, and a new rapid-intervention force.

Toward a New Foreign Policy

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