The Pygmalion and Galatea Effects: An AgencyModel with Reference-Dependent Preferences andApplications to Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
∗
Kohei Daido
†
Hideshi Itoh
‡
First Version: February 18, 2005This Version: January 16, 2007
Abstract
We attempt to formulate and explain two types of self-fulfillingprophecy, called the Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her sub-ordinates will succeed, they are more likely to succeed) and the Galateaeffect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely to succeed).To this purpose, we extend a simple agency model with moral hazardand limited liability by introducing a model of reference-dependentpreferences (RDP) by K˝oszegi and Rabin (2004). We show that theagent with high expectations about his performance can be induced tochoose high effort with low-powered incentives. We then argue thatthe principal’s expectation has an important role as an equilibriumselection device, when the level of the agent’s ability is intermediate.
JEL Classification Numbers: B49, D82, M12, M52, M54Keywords: Self-fulfilling prophecy, Pygmalion effect, Galatea effect, reference-dependent preferences, agency model, moral hazard
∗
Earlier versions were circulated under the title “The Pygmalion Effect: An AgencyModel with Reference Dependent Preferences.” We are grateful to Kenichi Amaya, Mune-tomo Ando, Bj¨orn Bartling, Leonardo Felli, Michihiro Kandori, and seminar participantsat CESifo Area Conference on Applied Microeconomics, ChengChi University, KwanseiGakuin University, Osaka University, and the 20th Annual Congress of the European Eco-nomic Association, for helpful comments. Financial support from the 21st Century COEprogram “Dynamics of Knowledge, Corporate System and Innovation” at Graduate Schoolof Commerce and Management, Hitotsubashi University, and Murata Science Foundationis gratefully acknowledged.
†
School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University.
‡
Graduate School of Commerce and Management, Hitotsubashi University.
1
Add a Comment