1

SOCIOLOGY ON THE MOVE

I.S.A: XVII W.G GOTHENBURG

APPLYING
THE
WIN-WIN-WIN PAPAKONSTANTINIDIS MODEL
IN SCHOOL MANAGEMENT CRISIS
THE GREEK CASE

Abstract

“Sociology on the move” may be the perfect title for new

sociology methodological tools and their applications in new
fields. From this point of view, the present paper explores the
implementation of the well known “win-win-win
papakonstantinidis model” in managing crises at schools (both
primary and secondary schools), so that schools work more
effectively for everyone.
More specifically, the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model
should be applied in a classroom crisis, as well as when
managing a school conflict, transforming thus the school
management perception from a top-down operation into a
bottom-up concept, involving (A) teachers, (B) parents and (C)
students in a “decision making triangle”, instead of imposing
“solutions ” on students.

1. Introduction
The paper focuses on attempted school reforms which usually fail.
Why do reforms usually fail? Should we blame the teachers? The
answer is NO. Should we blame the students? The answer is also
NO. It has been proved that about 90% of those planning central
state education blame the “C” factor (imposed reforms):
Parents, State, bureaucracy with numerous organizations involveing
both the Community -as an interactive behavior with School-
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socioeconomic, political, and cultural environment and the

Community (the “C” factor) itself.
This is usually the case of the countries of South Europe, where
social networks (of Northern Europe) are substituted by family
patterns; family patterns do not allow students to take decisions for
their own future; there is no “discrimination line”, between what the
student’s choice is, and what “family choice” for the student is;
therefore, there are indiscernible and vague roles among students
and their families (as well as social environment and neighbor
families) in taking decisions concerning students’ future. From this
point of view, we have to include the opportunity cost in the total
education cost, coming from “solutions” imposed upon students

The present paper will attempt to introduce an alternative model-

the win-win-win papakonstantinidis, methodological model- by
following key-practices based on “everyone matters”. It could also
be applied in the Learning organization, the School that practice
systems thinking, a new organizational architecture, called “Getting
Back to Schools” (I. D. B. E), for older people.

For this reason, the paper brings up a number of issues, such as

(a) why school reforms usually fail (b) how to understand
organizations (c) what is that successful organizations do that
most schools don’t (d) steps schools can take to become
sustainably effective for all stakeholders: students, parents,
teachers, office personnel, administrators, boards, governments,
and the larger community- the “C” factor, according to the “win-
win-win papakonstantinidis model”.

During the last decades,many school reforms have been

introduced into schools; however, most of them have failed
Decision makers in Greece are aware of the fact that steady
flows and schools reforms haven’t improved the Greek primary
and secondary education system. What is needed is to transform
Greek schools into sustainably effective organizations that are
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relevant to our times and that work well for all stakeholders
(teachers, parents, students).

On the other hand, we have to launch the well known “win-win-

win papakonstantinidis model” : this theory was inicially
developed for the explanation of the local development
theoretical foundation, from a behavioral analysis point of view.
However, it can also serve as an approach-“umbrella”, with
numerous applications in many other fields, such as social
sciences, economics, decision making, psychology,
communication, education, history etc..
In a few words, the “win-win-win Papakonstantinidis model -a
twenty-five year output, coming from both theoretical/ academic
and empirical level- could be regarded as an extension of the
Nash “Non Cooperative Games Theory (trust theory)” : Starting
from the "bargaining/ games theory, it analyzes individual
winning strategies, through the potential utilities/shares that
can arise through possible interactions between two “players”.

The concept may be interesting if a transfer of the pure trust

theory to a school crisis management context can be achieved,
in order to analyze school management phenomena, especially
the hermeneutics of the types of possible conflicts between
teachers and students: all the involved parts in the educational
process come through a number of disputes and conflicts, such
as the exam process and grades assigned. The exact nature of
the transaction will take place will eventually lead to an
agreement among all involved parties.

It should be assumed that as a pure methodological tool, the win-

win-win papakonstantinidis model can contribute to
conceptualization in Educational Management as well. It could
be also seen if conflict negotiations (bargaining) can be
approached as an alternative school management strategy to
fixed management parameters. It allows for “capturing” more
educational operations, as it allows a pure roles educational
discrimination.
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The concept of this NEW methodological tool, applied in school

management crisis is to transform a TWO POLES “bargain”
(teachers, on the one hand AND students and their families, on
the other) in “conflict resolutions” coming from THREE (3)
different POLES (3) , especially, teachers, students AND parents
who have developed interactive trends and competitive relations
among each other, by two: teachers-students, teachers-parents,
AND parents-students.
1. Teachers ask from students better school attainment &
performance in classroom.
2. Students ask from teachers better quality of studies even
with less attempt on their part, which will help them find a
job in labor market in the future.
3. Parents claim (a) from teachers: better quality of studies,
so that their children find a stable job in the future, (b) from
their children: better school attainment (expressed by
higher grades) , even if they have no time to help towards
both directions, actually.

F/N
[ Win-win-win Papakonstantinidis model (2002, August, SW) may, thus,
transform individual winning –instant reflection –strategies (the win-win Nash
Theory) in a NEW –three poles-equilibrium point, including the COMMUNITY
(Classroom, other people Environmental Protection, Value Systems, Ethic
etc), which is the “absolute cooperation” limit point in the bargain between
TWO.

lim Pi(&) Qi(&) Ri(&) = max Pi Qi Ri = max Ua Ub Uc = Ua+Ub+Uc

i→∞

According to referees, win-win-win papakonstantinidis model is a revolution in

Social Science Theory: By introducing the third pole (Community- in this case,
Educational Organizations, parents, etc) in any bargain between two players
in a game (through the sensitization process), this model is of great
contribution to behavioral Sciences. It forms the foundation for “Social Trust”
creation, leading to Social Cohesion (at Local Level, or School Crisis
Managing).
At the same time, the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model could be applied
in a number of other fields, especially, in the marketing field:
If a marketing aspect exists in this model, then we are not quiet far from a
 5

new era of the win- win- win papakonstantinidis model in the marketing
literature. Conceptualization can trigger a new research thrust in the fields of
promotion management and pricing in the Marketing Science, where new
definitions, assumptions and hypotheses can examine better the marketing
situations of the bargaining processes among the seller – the buyer – the third
pole (the community).

It seems that there are some limitations in the conceptualization related to

the parameters that determine whether the seller is willing to bargain. Such
parameters are religion (for example: Jews had a limit on the allowable profit
margin) and regional customization [for example: in North America and Europe
bargaining is restricted to expensive or one-of-a-kind items (automobiles,
jewellery, art, real estate, trade sales of businesses) and informal sales
settings such as flea markets and garage sales. In other regions of the world,
bargaining may be the norm even for small commercial transactions].

In terms of empowering the win-win papakonstantinidis model

conceptualization (strongly related to the integrative/interest based
bargaining), it must be proven how the underlined conceptual model
integrated].

2. Analysis
As far as the application of this model in school management
crisis is concerned, it should be noted that:

From the one hand there are a lot of organizations having as a

mission the reform of our schools. With so many organizations
helping to keep attention on school reform, why are our schools
still struggling? It has been showen ( J.Everts, 2008) that after a
number of decades of failed school reforms, it should be clear
that these failed reforms were all imposed on the system either
by authorities from outside the system or by bureaucrats within
the system. And the reforms were imposed without the
collaboration of all stakeholders. This fact breeds reluctance,
resistance, and out-right rejection by those on whom the reforms
were imposed.
However, true systemic transformation has to be an inside job

undertaken by all stakeholders. It has to come from the

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stakeholders (teachers, students, parents/ and/or/socioeconomic

environment) themselves and be applied by the stakeholders

themselves -- not by experts, not by bureaucratic imposition, not

even by a strong leader, but only as a result of the collaborative

effort of all stakeholders.

On the other hand, although the win - win - win

papakonstantinidis model has been built for local development
needs, since 2007-2008 it has been characterized as a new
Theory in Social Sciences in many countries. It has been
translated in Hungarian language. It has been pressented in
India, Philippines, Bangladesh, South Africa (Durban), as well as
in World Organizations, such as the International Sociological
Association (I.S.A). It produces a new “bargaining philosophy”,
where Community (parents, School Organizations, bureaucracy
etc.) is included.
It is interesting to note any feedback to such a model, which is
open and flexible to reforms, having as a principle the third “win”,
disseminated to all fields of local development, as well as/
schools, social and managerial development, in terms of
organizing from the inside.

The aim of applying the above suggested model to school crisis

management is to prove that:

(1) In order to understand a deep school reform, it is essential to

explore “which” school reforms usualy fail. A first approach
(Evers, 2008) is because they are imposed reforms, rather than
systemic reforms and they are imposed on a system that
operates under a management structure that by its very nature
cannot really build a sustainably effective learning community:
the “industrial” and “military” management model of command
and control. Indeed, “school” has a hierarchical structure,
originating from the Industrial Age (school as a micrograph of the
industrial unit) and a “military” discipline coming from the war
 7

discipline. System researchers clearly demonstrate that when a

system is pushed/ imposed, it will usually push back. Effective
changes must be made systemically within the system and
should not be imposed on it. Knowledge and understanding is
needed for success; but the system is composed, mainly of
organizations. “Organization” is the crucial valuable in our
Civilization:

(2) On the other hand we’ll try to present a NEW methodological

tool, the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model: Built for the
local development purposes, it could be perfectly applied in
conflict resolutions, coming from school management crisis, thus
making Schools work for everyone by changing a few parameters
of this methodological tool.
Taking into account that school reforms are imposed reforms
rather than systemic reforms, we’ll try to analyze the proposed
model as a “school reform” methodological tool, instead of a
typical local development model.
The point is to create bridges between Community and School,
so that a bottom-up approach be applied, building thus a stable
interactive decision making reversing the imposed (by the State,
the EU etc) reforms.

2.1 The suggested model

A) What the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” is

A1- The Bargaining problem

A two-person bargaining situation involves two individuals

(Neuman & Morgenstern 1947), who have the opportunity, either
to be competitors to each other (win-lose)[von Neumann-
Morgenstern, 1928/1947-“zero sum two players game” Theory]
Filinis Kostas (1973), or to make coalitions, or even to create
pure individual strategies, based on bargainers’ instant reflection
behavior (win-win) [Nash J. F, 1950, Arrow K 1954, Aumann
 8

Robert, 1987, Crawford V, 1997, Kottarides K, 2002, Varoufakis

Y, 1990)
J. F. Nash ( 1950) focused on payoff shares/utilities combination:
Bargain may result either in agreement or disagreement. (Kuhun
H.W-Nassar S, 2001) Papakonstantinidis, 2003, 2005, Varoufakis
Y, 1990)
Utility expresses the constraint or the “fear factor” of
disagreement for the negotiator who desires negotiations to be
led in agreement more than the other one. Who needs more,
negotiation leading to an agreement expects more utility, but –
probably there is a loss in terms of “shares”, due to lack of risk.
On the contrary, who is indifferent about “agreement” or expects
less utility /per unit, has- to win in “shares” under the dogma “the
more risk, the more profit” (Crawford V. 1997)
It is necessary to analyze the Nash “non-cooperative- instant
reflection game” /or a “win-win perception” as follows:
Non-co-operative game is a game between two (2) players/
individuals who have opposite interests (Aumann Robert , 1987)
Each player makes their own choices, based on instant
reflections’ rational movements and their physical cleverness.

The game/ bargain is defined by the result (pay-off) and not by the
players expectations- It presupposes best choices by both
players towards meeting individual interests [“winning
strategies”- Harsanyi John(1973]

Players/ or negotiators do not regret, a posteriori, for the

decisions they have taken, based on personal choices, during the
bargain. Each of the players knows a priori that the other
negotiator (or player) is as clever as he is.

During the bargain, a mutual respect between the two (2)

bargainers to each other’s best choices’ is necessary.
It is recognized that “The more DETERMINED to break down the
negotiation (= less utility), the more satisfied (=better shares) –
the more risk, the more profit.
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Social behavior is not recognized as an acceptable one in the

bargain, deriving, thus, unfair results: That means, “who needs
the agreement as the result of a bargain, has to loose in
shares, by accepting any result”.

Information may be the “link” between knowledge creation and

the bargaining process. In particular, “Information” is a power
factor in pure individuals winning strategies (Aumann Robert,
1987).

The more information, the better winning strategy, the more

profit. Each of the players / negotiators, starting negotiations
with the other, expects to gain the maximum profit.

Interaction, based on instant reflection individual winning

strategies, is the base of the Nash Non Cooperative Games
Theory A two (2) 2–person anticipation is based on utilities.

According to Nash Theory, a unique solution exists that

maximises the product of the participants’ utilities. There is,
therefore, an interaction between “utilities” and “strategies”. In
particular, “utility” expresses individual choices based on
individual necessities. “Strategies” express choices + will on a
personal level, taking into account the interaction factor (the
other’s choices). Utility is the subjective and strategy is the
objective factor of the same anticipation.

Negotiation may lead either to “agreement” or disagreement.

Utility expresses the “fear factor” constraint of disagreement for
those who desire the agreement, more than the other negotiators
(Aumann 1987).

In conclusion, –according to the “N. C. G Theory”- there is only

one “equilibrium point” at which any individual–at any moment-
makes the best choices for himself, in relation with the other
persons’ best choices.
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A-2 The bargaining problem Utility Theory

(math)
The Bargaining Problem is mainly based on “Utility Theory”- a
mathematical theory of the Neo-classical School of Thought, able
to satisfactorily explain individual expectations/ anticipations of
a possible outcome. Usually, it is expressed in the form of a
mathematical function, f(u) = u1/2
Individual winning strategies are corresponding 1-1 to utilities U
(A) and U (B) (Chun Youngub, 1990)
The Utility theory of the individual is mainly based on the
“concept of anticipation”.
In the “Two-person utility Theory” there are two (2) individuals in
a bargain who have the opportunity to collaborate for mutual
benefit in more than one way. In its simple/initial version, no
action, taken by one of the two individuals without the consent of
the other can affect the well-being of the other one, but in real
terms there is only ONE decision, taken by the individuals
involved in a bargain .
• Utility in the bargain is a personal matter: Utility “units” are
not compared.(Kuhun-Nassar, 2001)
• Utility “units” express “fear units of a disagreement
outcome”
• If “A” needs more the “agreement” to be achieved than the
payoff resulting from the bargain, then he should be ready
to accept any result of the agreement, even if it is not
favorable for him (loss of shares)
• If “A” has decided not to accept an agreement during the
bargaining process, then he risks more but –at the same
time- has to win more from the agreement, in terms of
shares.
• The “utility range” expresses the optimist and/or the
pessimist instant reflection of each party.
• “Utility” expresses individual choices based on individual
necessities and will. It is rather a subjective than objective
factor, influencing individual behavior. On the other hand,
“individual strategies” in the bargain –the objective factor-
are defined by personal choices and “will”, resulting from
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the necessity to meet personal “needs”. From this point of

view, “Utility”, as a subjective factor is expressed by
“strategy” – an individual winning strategy- in the bargain,
so as to meet “Utility”. There are “links” between “Utility”
and “Strategy”: “Utility” is the ability to meet “needs” and
“Strategy” is the plan – the individual plan- to achieve this
ability, step by step
• “Utility” is the subjective factor and the “Individual Winning
Strategy” is the objective factor of the same “thing”:
Bargainers have needs (=utilities). In order to satisfy these
“needs”, they use “individual winning strategies”, as a
result of their “instant reflections” in the Bargain. (table 1)

ð Lim U1i(&)U2i(&)=max U1iU2i (1)

ià∞

A-3 Nash’ win-win random sharing/utilities- An example

It expresses utilities/strategies, as the interaction between two

negotiators and (2) expresses the utility function- as a
shares/utility combination. The bargaining problem in decision
making during negotiations of A & B -Nash highlighted the
“payoffs” of the bargain, # personal expectations (Table 1):

Table 1
BARGAIN
Random Sharing between “A” and “B”

Share Share Utility Utility Utility

A B A B AXB
(%) (%)
100 0 0 71 0
90 10 1 70 70
80 20 5 68 340
70 30 10 64 960
60 40 16 60 960
50 50 23 52 1196
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45 55 40 31 1240
(max)
30 70 45 24 1080
20 80 50 12 600
10 90 61 4 244
0 100 80 0 0

A-4 The equilibrium point

Suppose that “winning strategies” [ Pi, Qi] are in a fine ratio with
the players’ (bargainers’) UTILITY ( linear function: corresponds
1-1 to bargainers’ Utility Function), under the dogma “the more
decisive to break the contract down, the more satisfied from the
bargain leading to the contract” (Kuhun-Nassar, 2001). That is
true: Bargainers’ expectations are 1-1 to expected Utilities for
each of them, resulting from the bargain. ( Bernheim & Douglas
B. 1984).
On the other hand, the more information, the more uncertainty.
Bargain gets its own rules out of cooperation. People are
competitive rather than co-operative: Winning strategies are led
by bargaining rules (rules of pure competition). Nash has
described the “bargaining problem” not by expectations, but,
directly, by the results (pay-off) of the bargain.

In our example, the crucial point [the max] is 1240 (40x31) :

this is the point of final agreement led by the bargain. On that
point, shares are: 40% for “A” and 60% for “B”. On that point,
personal satisfaction or utility units are 40 units for A and 31
units for B : That’s the point of agreement, expressing “fear of
breaking down the agreement for “player” “A” and , at the same
time, the risk for the “player” “B” of breaking down the
agreement. In a 2-person anticipation, each of the two (2)
bargainers may ask themselves one question, as a result of
“good strategies” [instant reflection thinking] in the bargain:

What should be the best for me, taking into

account that the other person (bargainer in a
negotiation) should try for the best for
 13

himself –thus recognizing that the other

person may be as clever as I am?

A-5 Suggestion: The “win-win-win papakonstantinidis

model”

A-5.1 Contribution

According to the afore-mentioned analysis, paper contribution in

the scientific thought (2008) should be summarized in introducing
“the third “WIN” for the COMMUNITY (the third-part pole).
According to my suggestion, COMMUNITY –the “C” factor- must
participate in any bargain by its “bargainers’ characteristics”
(shares/utilities), thus adding the THIRD “WIN” in any two
bargainers’ win-win expectation between TWO (the METRON
analysis or the THREE POLES analysis), like in other fields e. g
philosophy, economy, creating an interactional flow. By
introducing the THIRD POLE in the bargain, the crucial
bargainers’ QUESTION must be changed in:

What should be the best for me, taking into

account that the other person (bargainer in a
negotiation) should try for the best for
himself –thus recognizing that the other
person may be as clever as I am and, at the
same time, taking into account that
COMMUNITY, as the third or invisible part
also participates by the “bargainers’
characteristics” (shares/utilities)?

A-5.2 Win-win-win analysis methodology

The following methodology is adopted in points

(Papakonstantinidis)
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knowledge creation⇒ creating a “non conflict” behavior ⇒

inserting sensitization⇒ integrated information creation⇒
uncertainty due to negative entropy⇒ thus, smoothing potential
conflicts⇒closing differences in the competitive bargain⇒payoff-
utilities & shares, influencing behavior in the bargain /individual
winning strategies influencing by a “new behavior” ⇒in the
opposite, the more decisive, the more risk ,should derive more
profit in a globalizing world but ⇒ inserting sensitization in the
bargain⇒thus smoothing the conflict strategies taking into
account the “C” factor ⇒ converting a bilateral “conflict” into a 3-
part negotiation ⇒ leading to a “new” social perception , the win-
win-win perception, including a real cooperation between
negotiators, thus, carrying alongside a social market’s
perspective- the “INTERMEDIATE POSITION”

A-5.3 Information/ behavior & the bargaining problem

(Knowledge transfer, information, behavior)

Paper conception is mainly based on Games Theory – especially

on its “Non-Cooperative Games Theory’s version by J. F Nash,
1950- in relation with the Modern Innovation Theory” - (M. M.
Fischer, 2000)
M. I. T provides us with useful methodological tools as
knowledge creation and knowledge transfer (Table 2)
Table 2
Scheme: Knowledge Creation/ Information/ Types of
Behavior

Type of Type of Synthesis Resulted

Knowledge-1Knowledge-2 Behavior
tacit tacit Sympatheti Socialization
c
tacit codified Conceptual Externalizati
on
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codified tacit Procedural Internalizatio

n
codified codified Systemic Networking

sympatheti systemic Conceptual Sensitization

c
systemic systemic Procedural Strategic

Papakonstantinidis, 2003

Literature (Reinsmann, Fischer,2002 & others) introduced various

processes of “knowledge conversion” based on the proven and
“built” information systems incorporated in an organization.
Possible cases among different types of knowledge produce the
four (4) major processes of knowledge conversion : (1) Tacit
knowledge to tacit knowledge produces sympathized knowledge
(socialization) (2) Tacit knowledge to codified knowledge
produces conceptual knowledge (externalization) (3) Codified
knowledge to tacit knowledge produces procedural knowledge
(internalization) (4) Codified knowledge to codified knowledge
produces systemic knowledge (combination)
Each of these processes of “knowledge conversion” corresponds
[1-1] to a specific type of information (Papakonstantinidis 2003) i.
e,
• Social Information-Sensitization
• External Information- Participation
• Internal Information-Involvement
• Combined Information-Networking

A-5.4 The suggested win-win-win model

According to the above analysis, this paper’s contribution in the
scientific thought (2007) should be summarized in introducing
“the third WIN” or the third “person” in a two-party bargain, i. e
the “C” “invisible part, which should be the “ Community interest”
 16

= “C” , thus taking part as “community” be present in every two-

party bargain, claiming its own “share” from this
Suppose that:
• Ua = Pi, Ub = Ri , Uc = Qi , ....in a mathematical
approach (tables 1, 2):
• Ua = x , Ub = (100-x) k and f’ = [ x (100-x) k ]΄
= 0 , so that Ua + Ub = max
THEN
lim Pi(&) Qi(&) Ri(&) = max Pi Qi Ri = max Ua Ub Uc = Ua +
Ub + Uc
i→∞
or, how to transform a “competition” into the absolute
cooperation, taking into account the integrated
information, coming from knowledge transfer AND the
sensitization process in the community, thus
maximizing bargainers utilities and the Community
utility (Uc)

A-5.5 The “Sharing problem” in a Bargain [Utilities,

Shares, strategies, decision- choices, behaviour, Final
Agreement]
Having defined: (1) How information resulting from “knowledge
creation /knowledge transfer” should contribute to what we call
“social market” (2) How sensitization should be introduced to
given information, as to turn it to an integrated information
(Papakonstantinidis, 2006) (3) How “integrated information”
should influence human behaviour during the bargain, or
negotiations (4) How a human “social” behaviour could lead to a
“new” perception of thinking or taking a decision, in the bargain
(see at Calvert Randall, 1995, Berger, J 2005 Cinneide M. O’
1991, Coleman J 1988, Yitzak Samuel 1997, Bernheim Douglas
B. 1984 (5) How socialization could influence human choices or
winning strategies during the bargain, based on instant reflection
(Nash) (6) How scientific thought could transfer the problem
from “utilities” (personal perception”) to pay-offs (objective
perception = counting size) Harsanyi John(1973), then, the data
of Table 2 may be transformed in a new set of data, as Table 3.
 17

TABLE 3 (Papakonstantinidis Proposal)

Suggesting Sharing between “A , “B” and “C”

Share Share Utili Utili Utili Share Utili Utilit

Α Β ty A ty B ty C ty C y
(%) (%) AXB (%) AXBX
C
90 4 1 71 71 6 1 71
80 13 2 70 140 7 2 280
70 22 5 68 340 8 3 1020
60 31 10 64 640 9 4 2560
50 40 16 60 960 10 5 4800
max
41 50 23 52 1196 9 4 4784
32 60 31 40 1240 8 3 3720
23 70 40 24 960 7 2 1920
14 80 50 12 600 6 1 600
(Papakonstantinidis Proposal)

Notes, as to explain the symbols :

• “C” expresses the Community (an acceptable system
value at local level), as the “third” or invisible part in the
bargain. In real terms, it reflects the “confidence
indicators”, or, in other words, if and at which level each
member of the Community trusts the other, during the
bargain (H. Hans 1997)
• The less shares for A+ B the more share for “ C” part
• Utility is a personal matter: Utility units are not compared
to each other. They express the fear of breaking down the
agreement
• If “A” needs more the “agreement” than the payoff, then he
should be ready to accept any form of agreement.
Based on this concept ( the “C” factor) then, it is concluded
that the Sensitization process applied in local people has
managed to change/ transform individual winning strategies into
a NEW type of social trust behavior (Swensen, 2006), leading in
converging opposite positions.
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2.2 School Crisis Management in Greece

2.2.1 The Greek Case: Description

The Greek Educational System is based on nine (9) years

compulsory education, six (6) years in Primary School and three
(3) years in High School , imposed by the Greek State.

Greek School Management Crisis is directly correlated with the

final exams system, through which students change educational
level i. e from the 2nd educational level to the third (3rd)
educational level/cycle (Universities & Technological Educational
Institutes).
This system is characterised by frequent changes in the way
final exams are carried out (it is indexed after the world):

A) Direct exams organised by Universities:

It was a pure exams system, according to which, each University

Department had its own evaluation system, facilitating the best
students to follow Universities Studies. Candidates had to
complete each University claims, as the case may be.

B) “Akadimaikon” System (1966-1970):

That was a mixed system of eaxms, including uniform
examinations for all Greek students, who wished to go ahead
independently from student priorities or students orientation, in
their last Lykeion class of their studies. This education system
was imposed by the Greek State.
Candidates had to succeed in written exams for all subjects of
the last class of the 2nd educational cycle (about 13 lessons).

C) Entrance to the Universities by imposed Exams (1971-1981).

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This system has been characterized by uniformity, including

different exams for different University Schools all over the
Greek territory. Candidates had to succeed in a number (4) of the
2nd educational cycle’s lessons. Also, candidates AND their
families, had to decide –a priori- on their prefered University
Departments in the risk of fail. The crucial factor for entrance
the University was the competitiveness and the higher-marked
students succeeded.

D) Panellinies Exams (1981-1988):

This system was the same system (as the previous one) with the
addition of the “weighting subject”.
“Panellinies Exams” system was imposed by the State and
consisted of examinations for all students according to their
preferences in “clusters of lessons”. One of the lessons was of
higher “weight” in comparison to the others of the “cluster”. In
fact, it is the parents who decided on their children/students
preferences.

E) Panelladikes Exams (1990-up today):

Panelladikes Educational System is based on a mix system

including subject orientation, according to students’ preferences.
It is a system of examinations imposed by the State addressed to
all students according to their preferences in “clusters of
subjects”. Students are asked to “form” their preferences “a
posteriori”, in the base of exams scores they gather.
In fact there are parents who decide about “student preferences”
in a demand/supply system in relation with the potential future in
labor market the student will have later. In fact, there are
parents who decide about “students’ preferences”.

Besides, since 1980 Technical “Lykeion” has also started to

operate in a parallel basic educational process, operating in
“night hour, allowing students to work during day hours.
 20

At the same time, a “back to School” or “Learning for all

students’ life” (I. D. V. E) system is working now, with good
results, giving the chance to older people who had not studied
before, to be students.

2.2.2 School Management Crisis in Greece

As previously described, Greek School Management Crisis is

directly correlated with the final exams system by which
students try to change educational level i. e. from the 2nd
educational level to the third (3rd)educational level/cycle
(Universities & Technological Educational Institutes).
This system is imposed by the Greek State; every five or eight
years it has to change, due to its failure, and be replaced by a
system considered to be each time more stable. Greek
education system is arranged by these exams, which is the “x”
factor and the central axe for all (previous and after) school
years, as well as for the education cost (including the
opportunity cost, i. e the alternative ways to make people up to
15 years old –during the compulsory education- useful for society
and the State, thus contributing in GNP/ Gross National Product).
The State, by its offices, High Schools and Lykeion , Teachers as
well as a number of Organizations, bureaucracy, preparatory
“schools”, family budgets work for years and years around that
magic “exams moment”.
Everybody work on student employment future, except the
students theirselves. Students have no experience of the labor
market; but the biggest tragedy is that students have no idea,
what they really want to do in their adult age. They have no
voice. No voice, no vote, about their own future.
On the other hand, Schools are Organizations; Schools are
organizations, and because it is an accepted thesis that school
reforms fail mostly because they are imposed rather than come
from a systemic decision, I feel it is important first to review
some ways of thinking about organizations and about behavior in
organizations. This section gives a succinct but simplified
 21

overview of some of those ways, taken from the thoughts of

people such as Kleiner, whose writings, along with my personal
experiences, have influenced my thinking about how to best
structure, lead, and maintain a positive work culture - a culture
that I feel is necessary for sustainably effective schools.

There is some literature on this point, with “instructions”, as

described below, in points:

1- According to Senge “The Fifth Discipline”, systems thinking is the

cornerstone of a learning organization. It would do schools a lot of
good to pay close attention to these, so here they are in a synthesized
form:
• Today's problems come from yesterday's solutions that
were not systemic solutions.
• The harder you push a system, the harder the system pushes back.
• Systemic solutions don't push; they integrate.
• In non-systemic changes, behavior initially grows better before it
grows worse.
• A non-systemic easy way out usually leads back in.
• A non-systemic cure can be worse than the disease.
• Non-systemic changes are faster but end up being slower.
• Cause and effect are not closely related in time and space in any
kind of change.
• Small changes can produce big results --but the areas of highest
leverage are often the least obvious. (Leverage means applying
well-focused actions in the right place.)
• You can have your cake and eat it too -- but not at once. Systemic
changes bring the change (the eating) while maintaining the whole
• Dividing an elephant in half does not produce two small elephants.
Systemic change respects the integrity and the dynamics of the
whole.
• There is no blame; the fault is in the system.
 22

2- Also, according to Art Kleiner, in his excellent work titled “Who

Really Matters”:
"We are imposed to live in a civilization composed of
organizations...there are more organizations each year than there were
the year before... If we are going to act effectively in a society of
organizations, we need a theory that helps us see organizations
clearly, as they are." Art Kleiner, “Who Really Matters”
3- Furthermore, Dr Jim Everts, 2008 focuses on the contrast between
American democracy and educational system: “It is curious that an
organization dedicated to maintaining American democracy is
structured and managed in ways antithetical to democracy. There are,
however, organizations -- businesses, schools, non-profits, and even
governmental -- that for over two decades have demonstrated that
democratic principles and practices create more effectiveness and
sustainability then do our traditional principles and practices of
command and control”... It is the democratic organizational principles
and practices that I will discuss in this book, because I feel that if we
want to finally move our schools into the modern era we must first
address organizational structure and management practices. He says,
that, that if we want to finally move our schools into the modern era we
must first address organizational structure and management practices,
so to respond to these challenges by creating, or facilitating :
• ATMOSPHERE: If school is everyone matters, then the workplace
atmosphere has to be one that reflects that. Some times it would be
happened by different reflections as for example, the need to improve
the competitiveness of a “State objective” or a State priority or even of
an attractive labor market “job opportunity”
• TRANSPARENCY: If everyone matters, then everyone needs to
know the key realities of running the organization.
• RELATIONSHIPS: If everyone matters, then everyone has to be
treated as such and empowered to be a full partner of the organization.

According to the World Blu's Principles of Organizational Democracy,

modified to read "democratic schools:"
 23

1. They get naked. Say goodbye to the "secret society" mentality.

Democratic schools are authentic, open, and transparent with their
employees about their financial health, strategy, and agenda.

2. They have a conversation. Instead of the monologue or dysfunctional

silence that characterizes most schools, democratic schools are
committed to ongoing conversations and collaboration.

3. They loathe rankism. Democratic schools are all about fairness and
dignity, not treating some people like "some bodies" and others like
"nobodies."

4. They understand the meaning of life. Any employee in a democratic

school can tell why the school exists and where it is headed. A
democratic school's purpose and vision is their true north.

5. They point fingers. Not in a blaming way; in a liberating way!

Democratic schools know who is accountable for what.

6. They think the individual is as important as the whole. In democratic

schools, people are seen not only for what they bring to the collective
goals of the organization but also for their individual contribution. No
one is just a cog in the machine.

7. They're not Cyclopean. Democratic schools thrive on giving

employees choices.

8. They've got backbone. Integrity is the name of the game, and

democratic schools have a lot of it. They understand that freedom
takes discipline.
 24

9. They're so vain. Move over Narcissus, democratic schools have you

beat! Democratic schools are vain because they're so committed to
looking in the mirror and asking, "How can we be better?" not just
quarterly or annually, but daily.

10. They don't believe in the caste system. Democratic schools are
all about distributed and decentralized
power. They don't just derive (or hoard) power from one power source
at the "top" because in a democratic
school, there usually isn't a traditional top."

4- Traci Fenton hears about democracy in the workplace. "It may work
in small businesses," they say, "but not in mega corporations." Fenton,
however, is quick to point out that workplace democracy is definitely
scalable. In the Christian Science Monitor opinion piece quoted above,
Traci Fenton gives an effective variation version of the principles of a
democratic workplace. With Fenton's permission, I've slightly modified
her principles by changing the word "companies" in each principle to
the word "schools" so that you might get a deeper feeling for the
powerful impact these principles could have on our schools as well as
any organization

In any case, schools of the 2nd and 3rd cycle are obliged by the
State to follow educational stereotypes, either in learning or in
forms of changing educational level that is too bad for
Organizations.
In addition, what we need is School - as an Institutional
Organization - to be more independent rather than be forced by
the State to apply educational systems (either in Lykeion, or in
the third educational cycle school organizations with
autonomous budgets).
In this poly-parametric system, students have no voice neither
will.
School management crisis should be the result of all these
problems, arising either from the Greek, and/or/ E. U
organizational structure, or from the Greek family stereotypes.
 25

Blame the teachers? No. Blame the students? No. Blame the
organizational structure AND the students family? The answer is
YES.
The point is to create a systemic transformation, rather than
impose State reforms, by introducing a bottom-up approach,
instead of the existing top-down.
What we need now, is a NEW educational Approach and a NEW
methodological tool.
It is important first to review some ways of thinking about
organizations and about behavior in organizations.
We suggest the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model”, as a
new methodological tool, leading in a NEW education
management approach. There are may exist more than one
methodological tools, but the paper has to suggest this NEW
methodological tool.

2.2.3 Combining Educational Management with

the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model”

A truly transformed school is one that is consistently effective,

as it is an organization in which relationships among all
stakeholders are collaborative, trustworthy and transparent,
rather than antagonistic, mistrusting, and secretful. By
stakeholders, I mean students, parents, teachers, administrators,
boards, governments, and the larger community. Sadly, in most
schools relationships among these stakeholders are often
anything but collaborative, trustworthy, or transparent. Is it any
wonder then why so many school reforms fail? It is the right and
good relationships among all stakeholders that will finally make
our schools sustainable and highly effective. In my opinion, many
administrators and managers have a negative behavior towards
system transformation. Why do so many administrators and
managers behave in negative way? It would be too simple and it
 26

would be unfair to say that it's because these managers are

power-mongers or control freaks or people who love their own
rules. Some are, but many are not. Systems thinkers tell us that
organizational problems are caused more by the system than by
people.

On the other hand, the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model

(created for local development research) provides a new system
and the appropriate material for transforming school
management based on “conflict resolution” (as mentioned above)
and “social trust” , based on a bottom-up approach, instead of a
top-down one.

Using the shares/utility combination, the suggested model could

modify relationship from a two -poles system (students, on the
one hand and all the others on the other) into a THREE-poles
system (students, teachers, AND the Community- the “C” factor).
“C” factor may be defined by all the parties involved in
Educational Management i.e. State officers, Educational
Organizations, State bureaucracy and parents, or student
families, in terms, of a behavioral analysis approach.

The point is that a two - poles system has to be transformed into

a three - poles system, including students, as follows:

students

parents & Organizations teachers

 27

Transforming a school to one of trust and right relationships in

which everyone matters can be accomplished best through:
changing the structure of management from a top down
bureaucracy to one with democratic network structures,

and

instituting at least one of the proven successful democratic

management practices that fit such structures: Appreciative
Inquiry, Servant Leadership, Open Book Transparency and
Stewardship. However, you need to know that steps to
transformation will require a strong willingness by everyone to
carry out the -sometimes-hard work of achieving transformation,
and you, as the decision maker, need to be the leader model of
this willingness. Now, here's the additional good news: The cost
for putting these transformations into place is quite minimal
when compared to what we now spend on school reforms.
In a nut shell:
There is compelling evidence that organizations that are
collaborative with, respectful and appreciative of, and
transparent to all stakeholders are organizations that are
sustainably more effective than traditionally run organizations
whether they are businesses, non-profits, or schools.

♥
3. CONCLUSIONS
By composing the TWO independent parts of our analysis (school
management crisis AND the win-win-win papakonstantinidis
 28

model, as a new methodological tool) we are in a position to

propose a complex system, based on a 3-poles educational
perception.

Our conclusions, could be used as our final proposals:

• The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model seems to give

more than one answers to those, democracy, management,
systemic etc. problems; it works from nature itself, as a
theory-umbrella, meeting the needs of facing school
management crisis, in every version, either in terms of
democracy, or organizational structure.
• According to the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model,
students, teachers and parents work together keeping key-
practices based on “everyone matters” ; the concept is
based both on the bottom-up approach (as local
development adopts) and the school management reform by
transferring a two-poles system (State/teachers-
student/parents/family) into a three-poles system
(State/teachers AND students AND parents/family)
• Accepting the afore-mentioned point two, school
management crisis should be based on a triangle decision
making, thus promoting “conflict resolution” behaviors in
the “bargain”
• Accepting the afore-mentioned points two and three, it
should be better understood from all parts/players on how
the school as an organization works and how, could work,
by introducing the “C” factor in the education system
• Accepting all the afore-mentioned points, school reform
could be achieved under the condition of building social
trust among the three parts/players (according to games
theory); it presupposes that the sensitization process
should work toward building social trust among the three
parts, leading to social capital and social cohesion
perception (democracy, transparency, etc).
• The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model, as a new as
well as a pure methodological tool, has a contribution to
the conceptualization in Educational Managing; it facilitates
 29

sincere discussions among all the involved parts in

Education Management, especially in “school reform”
perception, based, until now, on industrial and military
perception for the industry and war emergency needs.
• In any case, it is obvious that school reforms applied so far
have failed, because they were imposed by State reforms,
rather than systemic reforms; the suggested
methodological tool facilitates both understanding and
contributing in the systemic school radical reform.
• Students are citizens, each of them with his/her personality.
In democratic terms, it is unfair for students not to
participate both in School management and School reform;
it is unfair for students and their families not to participate
in the general dialogue for the Educational System; it is
rather unfair for students and parents to accept “solutions”
imposed by the State without taking into account students
priorities and expectations.
• Students (15+) may have no labor market experiences; but
family patterns in South Europe have responsibility for this;
different patterns in North Europe generate different
students (15+) labor market behavior.
• “Solutions” imposed by the State have generated
interactive students and parents reflections, taking into
account the prevail labor market; the win-win-win
papakonstantinidis model should facilitate a systemic
approach to today’s problems; On the other hand, today’s
problems come from yesterday’s solutions that were not
systemic solutions; they were “solutions” imposed by the
State: the harder you push a system the harder the system
pushes back; thus, a conflict by imposed solutions.
Furthermore, as mentioned above in non-systemic changes,
behavior initially grows better before it grows worse; as a
methodologivcal tool, the win-win-win papakonstantinidis
model should contribute to “smooth the corners” of pushing
the system toward and backward.
• Taking into account the “individual instant reflection
winning strategies in a bargain” between three–instead of
two- parts or “players”, the win-win-win papakonstantinidis
 30

model (www.scribd.com) could be proved to be a tool of a

new world perception; it could work as an intermediate for
radical school reform, reopen thus the dialogue on applying
the Greek philosophy’s METRON in a two-poles west world
pattern, leading to a pure conflict.

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Behaviour, Princeton University Press, 1944 (second edition, 1947. third edition, 1953).
Wilkinson Kenneth(1991) “Social Stabilisation: The Role of Rural Society”-
International Center for Development Studies –U.C.G –IRL, special issue,1991
Walras S.(1980) “Global Rules for a Global Economy” N.Y Ed
Yitzak Samuel (1997) ”The Changing Realm of Organisations: New Challenges for
Sociological Practice” International Sociological Association (I.S.A –R.C 26), special issue,
Toronto Canada
Yunus Muhammad (2008) A World Without Poverty: Social Business and the Future
of Capitalism; Public Affairs; ISBN 9781586484934
Yunus Muhammad(2003) Banker to the Poor: Micro-Lending and the Battle Against
World Poverty; Public Affairs; ISBN 9781586481988
Yunus Muhammad (1994) Grameen Bank, as I See it; Grameen Bank.
Yunus Muhammad(1991) Jorimon and Others: Faces of Poverty (co-authors:
Saiyada Manajurula Isalama, Arifa Rahman); Grameen Bank.
 34

Yunus Muhammad(1976) Planning in Bangladesh: Format, Technique, and

Priority, and Other Essays; Rural Studies Project, Department of Economics, Chittagong
University.
Yunus Muhammad (1974) Three Farmers of Jobra; Department of Economics,
Chittagong University.

Prof Papakonstantinidis L. A
2009 May