If one acts _, a colorable claim for ___ exists. | A plaintiff can recover for/under __ if __ | In establishing ___, a court considers[the following factors:] / [whether __]
—acts intending to cause anunprivileged harmful/offensive contact,or has substantial certainty act willcause contact, and such contact directlyor indirectly results-A contact is harmful if it injures,disfigures, impairs, or causespain to any bodily organ orfunction
Unlawfulness of intent functionof context
Depending upon jurisdiction, courtsmay adopt the rule of either singleor dual intent
. Single intent onlyrequires that the actor intend thecontact, whereas dual intent requiresthe actor intend the contact and theharmful consequence that results
—clear andconvincing evidence E deliberatelyintended to injure, or engaged inconduct E actually knew, based onsimilar accidents or explicitwarnings specifically identifyingknown danger, was virtually certainto result in injury or death.
Two-Prong Laidlow Test
—sub.cert. and whether Inj. result of everyday industrial life (if so, justwork. comp.)Cases:
(smoke—changing social standards,
—intending to cause harmful/offensivecontact, or imminent apprehensionthereof, and does put P in imminentapprehension.
without intent, actor notliable even though unreasonablerisky act—requires subjectiveawareness & reasonableapprehension
—t, space, prox., actual—not potential. Extra-sensitive P?no liability unless D knows of sensitivity.
—threat of violence & present ability to carryout threat
—unlawfulattempt w/ apparent present ability
intending to confine w/in boundariesfixed by actor & results in confinement &victim is conscious of confinement orharmed by it
words, acts, or both.
—restriction to countryinsufficient
—against P or P’s family
threats to use force toprevent escape
barriers actual or apparent
assertion of legal authority—
reasonable belief or doubt does,moral influence will not createcolorable claim.
—not necessary to applyphysical force, just constrain P
—P must not expressly orimpliedly consent.
Sindle v. NYC
—P falsely imprisoned notrelieved of duty of reasonable care forown safety in extricating himself fromunlawful detention.
—Restrained of personal libertyby fear of personal difficulty, it amountsto false imprisonment. If shop-keep hasreasonable grounds for believing Pcommit/committing larceny, detainmentallowed for reasonable length of time.
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OFEMOTIONAL DISTRESS
1) with intent to cause or recklesslyinflicts 2) severe emotional/mentaldistress (even in the absence of harm)3) through extreme/outrageous conduct.where conduct directed at 3
person,actor liable if 1) immediate familymember present at time regardless of bodily harm—or 2) any other personpresent at time suffers bodily harm.
: Goes beyond allpossible bounds of decency, and to beregarded as atrocious, and utterlyintolerable I a civilized community;conduct the average person is not, inour friction-filled world, expected to livewith.
Does not apply to
: Insults, indignities,threats, annoyances, petty oppressions—trivialities.
However, some of these maybecome outrageous givencircumstances such ascontinuousness, relationshipbetween P and D, situations inwhich constitutional rights are atstake(
Cohen v. Smith—
religiousbeliefs), the mishandling of corpses.Where D is at considerable remove,it’s questionable whether actionssatisfy reckless requirement.
Transferred intent inapplicable.
: A cause of action is establishedwhen it is shown that one, in absence of any privilege, intentionally subjectsanother to mental suffering incident toserious threats to his physical well-being,
whether or not the threats aremade under such circumstances as toconstitute a technical assault
StateRubbish Collectors Association
Even if P succeeds in proving elementsof prima facie case, D may escapeliability by proving existence of aprivilege to inflict the harmful oroffensive contact.
If necessary to savelife/impor. intrest
P acts such thatrsnble pers. would believe he consentedto invasion of rights.
view consent as anaffirmative defense. A few require P toshoe lack of consent as part of primafacie case.
may be consent,depending on what rsnble person wouldthink under circumstances. Failure toobject infers consent if manifest consentoutwardly, regardless of inward feelings.
O’Brien v. Cunard
Bee Line, Inc
. (no rec. for stat.rape, consent w/minor)
Hackbart v.Cincinnati Bengals
(no consent toconduct outside scope of regular play)
State Farm v. SS & GW
(no battery insex. context, consented to conduct, Dnot substantially certain contact will beharmful—dissent: whether man subst.cert. intercourse without first disclosingwould injure her even if she did notcontract herpes, did not consent toexposure to herpes )
—unauthorized and performed withoutconsent = battery.
Bang v. Charles T. Miller
where doc canascertain options in advance &no emergency exists, patientshould be informed of alternative treatment, givenopportunity to decide.
Kennedy v. Parrott
where P cannotgive consent, no one authorizedto give consent, generalconsent given to remedyconditions proximate to theoriginal incision which, in doc’sprofessional judgment, shouldbe remedied then.
RS 2d 892D
—only in cases of emergency in which D has noreason to believe P woulddecline.
If D usesexcessive/unreasonable force, D liablefor damages arising from amount of force excessive.-D must satisfy obj. and subj.standards
D must subjectively believefacing threat;
such belief must be reasonable(subj. & obj.)
One may avoid liability for __ if [he can show__] | One can rebut a claim of __ if _.