The Rotating Homogenous Disc, Humean Supervenience and Macro-Indeterminacy

By Nathaniel J. Kan

1. Humean Supervenience and the Rotating Disc Argument

Humean Supervenience (henceforth simply HS) is the much-debated theory that

everything supervenes on the distribution of local qualities in 4D space. Almost every

paper discussing HS begins with a David Lewis quote from the introduction to

Philosophical Papers Vol. II. As a student I feel it is hardly my place to challenge this

tradition. Lewis writes that

[Humean Supervenience] is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a

vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then

another... We have geometry: a system of external relations of

spaciotemporal distance between points... And at those points we have

local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties, which need nothing

bigger than a point at which to be instantiated. (1987)

Here natural properties are properties "which make for intrinsic similarity between their

instances" (Robinson 1989, 398).1 Robinson also formulates a contingent version of HS:

worlds in which there are no natural properties not instantiated in w do not differ unless

they possess different arrangements of qualities.

Since its conception, the rotating homogeneous disc argument has been a constant

thorn in the side of Humean Supervenience. The problem brought up by the rotating disc
1
Thus, extrinsic and disjunction properties are not natural.
argument (RDA), originally given by Armstrong (1980) and Kripke (1979 APA, Eastern

Division and elsewhere) is as follows. Imagine two worlds with two perfectly

homogeneous identical discs (spheres and liquids have also been used, but it makes no

real difference to the experiment, here we will consider only discs). In one world the disc

is spinning about the axis through its center. In the other world the disc is still. In all other

respects the worlds have the exact same distribution of qualities. The argument against

HS is then that HS is incapable of capturing the movement of the rotating disc in terms of

distribution of local matters of fact. Let a holographic representation2 be defined a

snapshot of the world at a moment t which captures all information of the Humean

distribution of qualities as a "holographic representation" of t.3 Then each holographic

representation of the world with the spinning disc seems identical to each holographic

representation of the world with the still disc.

The discs are perfectly alike and perfectly cylindrical, which is to say that there

can be no marks, nicks or otherwise with which rotation would be observed. Because the

matter composing the discs is not discrete it appears we cannot draw the world-lines of

identity through 4D space to observe presence or lack of spatial movement (Callender

2001, 27).

The Humean may be inclined to immediately claim that the idea of the

homogenous material is too far from the realm of possibility to be taken into

consideration. This would be rash—the idea of homogeneous matter is compatible with

the fundamental point-quality idea of HS. Even if homogeneous matter does not exist in

the actual 'inner sphere' of possibility, the set of worlds where every world is one in

2
The term "holographic representation" is due to Katherine Hawley (1999).
3
We will find it convenient to use this terminology throughout this paper interchangeably with
"distribution of Humean qualities."
which there are no natural properties instantiated which are not instantiated (or

constructible by conjunction) in the actual world, we can imagine the still and rotating

disc worlds where it does exist. We posit these are worlds where HS holds. If these two

worlds are exactly alike in quality distribution, then they do not differ at all, else HS does

not hold. But they seemingly do differ, in the rotation of one disc and the non-rotation of

the other, and thus the problem.

This paper will cover several of the responses to RDA: that it is necessary to

modify HS to include vectors as Humean local qualities, that there is in fact no real

difference between the two worlds, and that there must be a difference in origins of

motion. There are many theories that are offered as alternatives to HS that do not have

the same problems as RDA. Katherine Hawley proposes "non-supervenient relations"

(Hawley 1999, 55) which are essentially extrinsic relations between the parts of the disc.

Douglas Ehring maintains that tropes can distinguish between rotation and non-rotation

(Ehring 1997). This paper, however, will focus on the RDA as it pertains to HS and

proposed reworking of HS theories. Through this process I will deliver arguments that

another theory, macro-indeterminacy, adapts RDA with HS the best.

2. No Difference Reply

There seems to be a contradiction between the fact of the difference between the

discs and the supposition of HS. One first instinct may be to give up the intuition that

there is a real difference between the discs. After all, if we cannot see this rotation, how

are we to know that one disc is actually in motion? Craig Callender offers a scenario to

reinforce our initial intuitions that a difference exists. Imagine that the rotating disc is
perfectly homogenous, except for colored dots equally spaced along its circumference.

The disc is spinning. We can measure the angular speed of the disc by observing the rate

that the dots revolve. A force that does not affect the rotation of the dots is applied, and

the dots gradually fall off, one by one. When the last dot falls off, it seems as if there

would need to be a reason for the disc to simultaneously halting its rotation, or for the

rotation to immediately become irrelevant. But there is no reason, and so this thought

experiment gives us cause to believe in the possibility of a rotating homogenous disc.

There are also counterfactual objections to this argument, which are pointed out

by Hawley (1999). "If there is no fact of the matter about whether a given disc is rotating,

then there is no fact of the matter about what would have happened if someone had

touched the disc, or had splashed paint on it" (Hawley 1999, 55). Because our world must

support counterfactuals, then there must be a fact of the matter about whether or not the

disc is rotating. Thus the disc must be either spinning or still. Because we assume there is

no difference in the Humean qualities, there is a contradiction with HS.

Callender responds to this argument by comparing the case to Kant's lonely hand

thought experiment. Imagine a single hand in a lonely universe. This hand must be left

handed or right handed, that much seems obvious. An externalist might argue that as the

two worlds share all the same relations, however, they are "at best two descriptions of the

same possible world" (Callender 2001, 32). Handedness does not exist without an

external asymmetrical object. Similarly, the two disc worlds are descriptions of the same

possible world. 'Spinning-ness' does not exist without external physical signs of rotation.

Consequently Callender's argument goes that in order for us to make sense of the

discs rotation externally we must see physical effects of the rotation (angular momentum,
rotational distortion, surface tension). We would know what were to happen if we

splashed paint on the spinning disc, because we are familiar with its motions. This seems

fairly circular. We can imagine rotation without certain physical effects—which effects

are present is dependent on the laws. For a disc that does not exhibit any of the effects of

rotation, there is no reason for us to posit rotation.

To address why we would posit a rotation without physical effects we might be

inclined to draw a parallel with quantum mechanics, and argue that a similar rotation is

found on the level of elementary particles. It has been shown that the spin of an electron

can be derived from the angular momentum density obtained by the observable energy-

momentum density in the classical manner, which is to say simply that quantum spin is

precisely analogous to classical spin.4 While this is a debated point in the interpretation of

physics, the actual fact of the matter does not have an extreme significance on the

outcome of this argument. It could still be argue that even if the property of quantum spin

were not analogous to classical spin, there would be a close possible world of which we

can easily conceive where the two properties are perfectly analogous. Whether true

elementary particles in the standard model are homogeneous is also debated (a topic of

contemporary physics research is the search for the existence of an electron dipole

moment, which would suggest the inhomogeneity of the electron), however, the standard

model suggests nothing to the contrary. Thus there may be precedence for the existence

of rotating homogeneous objects, on the quantum level.

This really does not make a difference to Callender's argument. As Callender

observes, spin is only posited on the quantum level because of the necessity for a

nomological property to explain certain scientific observables. "RDA's rotation, by

4
See Hans C. Ohanian (1986) for proof and discussion of this interpretation.
contrast, does not ever distinguish itself" (Callender 2001, pg. 38). In the spinning disc

case, there are no observed phenomenon to require the rotation phenomenon—if there

were there would be no conflict with HS.

Despite this I remain unconvinced by Callender's argument for the necessity of a

difference in physical phenomenon between the discs. We can imagine worlds with

objects that have distinct properties that are not detectable at certain moments. For

example, we might imagine the X particles have a property P1 such that when they meet

Y particles, that have property P2, they form a new Z particle. P1 and P2 have no other

effects (that is to say that they are otherwise undetectable). Up until the present X and Y

particles have never met, but at this moment a scientist is beginning an experiment with a

particle accelerator to collide an X and a Y. It seems there must be a difference between

the worlds where the Y particle has P2 and the worlds where it does not, as this will

directly impact the future creation of the Z particle.

This is directly analogous to the spinning or still disc. It seems obvious that there

must be a difference between the disc being spinning or still, regardless of the presence of

physical phenomenon, as there will be a difference between the distributions of Humean

qualities if the disc comes into contact with some other property when it is spinning

versus when it is still. Callender might return and claim that there is no property that

interacts with the rotational property of the disc. However it seems that we can

presuppose the two disc worlds are worlds that have close counterparts in which the

respective rotation or non-rotation is discovered. As we will see later, Callender supports

the application of the Best Systems analysis on the disc worlds, which supports a close

counterpart theory of counterfactuals.

 Hawley also states that certain counterfactuals lead to a macroscopic analog of

quantum measurement indeterminacy. For example, if there was never a fact of the

matter about whether or not the disc is rotating until a measurement is done (a mark is

applied, etc), then it seems the act of measuring determines the disc's rotation or non-

rotation. "Yet neither rotation nor measurement of the disc is supposed to be an

indeterministic process" (Hawley 1999, 59). Here the opponent of the 'no difference'

reply relies on our intuition that the disc should exist either as a spinning disc or a still

disc, but not as a superposition of spinning and still states.

To deal with backtracking counterfactuals, Callender suggests the Mill-Ramsey-

Lewis best systems analysis of laws. In this case, as the distributions of qualities would

be identical between the two worlds with the exception of the discs, and thus will most

probably share the same best system. "The landing of the speck of dust on the disc

doesn’t cause the disc to rotate, but it may be the reason why the Best System counts the

disc as rotating" (Callender 2001, 35).

This can be expanded on. Although it may at first startle our physical intuitions, it

seems that if quantum indeterminacy is allowed in the actual world (fits the best systems

analysis, if we are considering that theory of laws), we can imagine worlds where a kind

of macro-indeterminacy is the best theory of the laws. Furthermore, an application of the

best systems analysis must yield a macro-indeterminacy law, as that is the best

generalization to describe the rotating disc that does not exhibit physical signs of rotation.

A counterargument can be made against this idea of macro-indeterminacy. It

appears that the fact of the matter of the rotation of specific segments of the disc then

depends on the facts of the matter of the rotations of the other segments. If I measure a
point on the disc and this determines the disc's rotation or non-rotation, then it seems it

determines the rotation or non-rotation for a point on the opposite side. Then any macro-

indeterminacy law system would have to be non-local (support seemingly instantaneous

causation). This is a problem for Humean Supervenience, as non-local causation implies

the existence of relations between points separated by space-time.5

I believe that we can fix this macro-indeterminacy system to work with this non-

local causation. The combined disc world then is a superposition of spinning disc world

and stationary disc world. We already have a model for the counterfactuals (Let X be 'if

the disc is measured', A be 'the disc is spinning' and B be 'the disc is still'):

(A1) (X  (A ∨ B))

(A2) ¬ A

(A3) ¬ B

Our macro-indeterminacy would easily support counterfactuals then, of a

probabilistic nature. The specific probabilities and counterfactuals would depend on the

laws yielded by the Best Systems analysis.

But Hawley's objection shows us that HS must give up something to support this

macro-indeterminacy. In this case we may be able to learn a lesson from rigidity. At first

it seems that perfect rigidity may pose problem for HS. Assume a rod is perfectly rigid. If

a force is applied to push one end of the rod, then the other end moves instantaneously,

which is non-local causation, and seems to imply a non-local relation between the two

ends. However, we can trace the causal path that goes through every point in the rod and

causes the next point over in the rod to move. It seems as if all the points in the rigid

object share the instantiation of certain properties. When attempting to find an

5
Paul Teller (1986) discusses the effects of quantum entanglement on the existence of relations.
appropriate modification of HS we might be inclined to develop a system where a single

property can somehow be instantiated in multiple points.

While perfect rigidity may be allowable under HS, quantum non-locality does

pose a problem for Humean Supervenience, as it implies the existence of non-local

relations. If we have two entangled particles separated by a distance as in a Bell locality

experiment, and we measure one particle either spin up or spin down, this has a seeming

effect on the measurement of the other particle. What distinguishes this seeming causal

action at a distance from rigid objects is that there are no Humean qualities in the

intervening space to "transmit" the causation. Barry Loewer addresses this by

incorporating Bohm's theory of the ontological reality of the wave function into HS

(Loewer 1996). I am not going to go into much detail here about Bohm's theory, it is

sufficient to say that it posits a "configuration space" behind the space that we actual

observe. Every point in the configuration space has the amplitude of the wave function

for a particle as a property. We can use the idea of a space behind the observable space to

generate a new theory in this case, one that may end up being very similar to Bohm's.

Perhaps instead of quantifying over the observable space, we quantify over the

sets of points of the observable space. Then the "real" space is the space where every

point is a set of points in the empirical space. Then in this model the points of the

observable space that constitute the disc form a single real point. This single real point S

has instantiated in it either the rotation or non-rotation property. This modified version of

Humean Supervenience would be ontologically committed to the space of sets of points

of observable space, and the properties instantiated in these sets.

This model (which will be referred to henceforth as the "real space" theory) would
solve the problems of non-locality for both entangled quantum states and the

indeterminate motion of the disc. We might argue that different points in the disc are

moving at different velocities depending on their location regarding the center of the disc,

and that this does not seem to fit with the instantiation of a single property over a set of

points. It might be necessary to admit an instantiated property in S which ties together all

the points in the disc, and then admit that different sets of points in the disc have yet

different properties instantiated. Specifics of the model clearly remain to be developed.

However for the purposes of this paper we will simply see how the basic theory stands

against some of the other solutions to RDA.

3. Difference in Distribution of Qualities

There are other possible adaptations the Humean can make to reconcile HS and

RDA. One of these would be the adoption of velocity or momentum vectors as Humean

qualities. Lewis (1998) does just that, to square HS with both RDA and with

electromagnetism (Lewis' view is discussed at the end of this section). Hawley contends

that no "holographic representation" can capture instantaneous (angular) velocity, as that

would allow the holographic representations to capture information about future

moments, which would violate Humean Supervenience (Hawley 1999, 60) (footnote, her

arguments address angular velocity, however, they are of course the same for linear

velocity). She quotes Wesley Salmon:

It is important to note ... that this notion [of instantaneous velocity] is

defined by a limit process, so the value of the velocity at an instant

depends logically upon what happens at neighboring instants ... Although

 instantaneous velocity does characterize motion at an instant, it does so by

means of implicit reference to what goes on at neighboring times. (Salmon

1970, 24)

Therefore instantaneous velocity is just hidden information about the holographic

representations of other times, and therefore not a legitimate ontological constituent of

the holographic representation. The holographic representation at one moment contains

the entire distribution of Humean qualities at that moment, and none other.

Hawley also provides a possible counterargument. We might argue that the

instantaneous velocity does not wholly determine the holographic representations of other

times, as other acceleration-causing forces affect later displacements. Perhaps this

inclusion of the velocity vector into holographic representations is not in violation of HS,

as it is not the complete story. She rejects this idea, however, as the instantaneous

velocities ground counterfactual conditionals of future displacements ("If net force F had

been applied to object A then ...") which concern the holographic representations at other

times.

I have two arguments to against this. First, if we admit that instantaneous velocity

does not wholly determine future holographic representations and then reject

instantaneous velocity as a valid part of the holographic representation because of this,

then we must also reject other things. Force vectors, which are grounded by two

properties of different objects, in turn ground counterfactuals about future displacements

of objects of the form "If object A has instantaneous velocity v then ..." If we reject

instantaneous velocity, it seems we would also need to reject properties which constitute

force vectors. But these (categorical) properties are valid constituents of the holographic
representation. Thus the rejection of instantaneous velocities seems arbitrary.

The second argument is that instantaneous velocity at one moment does not

necessarily have any effect on future displacement at all, that is to say, Salmon is wrong,

the instantaneous velocity of an instant is logically independent of displacements at

neighboring moments. For example, consider three identical perfectly rigid spheres (A,

B, C) in a frictionless environment, such that A, B, and C form a closed system.6 Here we

are presuming we are in a world that obeys classical Newtonian mechanics. If this seems

physically unrealistic, remember that we are dealing with rotating homogeneous matter;

these spheres do not even need to be homogenous. Let B and C be touching and at rest,

while A has velocity V, the direction component of which is along the line which runs

through the centers of B and C, towards B and C. According to the classical mechanics of

rigid bodies, when A strikes B, A will stop, B will not move, and C will begin moving

with velocity V. The kinetic energy is transferred from A to B and then from B to C.

There is one instant then where B has velocity V. It has this instantaneous velocity at

moment t without ever having had a series of moments before and after t such that V is

the limit of the velocities at those series.

For these reasons it seems that instantaneous velocity could be a part of

holographic projections. Both Dennis Robinson (1989) and Lewis (1999) agree that the

adoption of vector fields as a set of local qualities is necessary. As a solution to the

problem in HS that RDA points to, Lewis adopts vectors as Humean local qualities

(Lewis 1998, 209-210). Thus in a holographic representation of the spinning disc world

for every point in the disc there is a non-zero velocity vector quality. The vector field for

the points inside the spacio-temporal area of the still disc would be a zero-vector field.
6
This thought experiment was originally given by Bigelow and Pargetter (1989).
Thus the Humean distributions of qualities differ, and there is a captured difference

between the discs.

Dean Zimmerman raises an objection (Zimmerman 1998) to this solution.

Suppose there are multiple vector fields pervading the discs. How then are we to tell

which distribution of vector qualities is the correct one to distinguish between spinning

and still discs? It seems we need to formulate a law that differentiates which vector field

decides the lines of persistence for matter within the discs. However, the laws we might

devise do not seem to work. For example, if we state a law that the vector is such that its

possession by an object at time t0 together with some coordinates (x,y,z) and interval

length ∆ t, we could determine where this "very same object" is at the end of ∆ t

(Zimmerman 1998). However this law has a circular definition in that it assumes the

there are lines of persistence. There are problems with several other expressions of the

law (Lewis 1999, 210). According to Zimmerman, the Lewis formulation then does not

support causal lines through time, and this is not a solution to RDA.

In response Lewis provides a law that does not mention any a priori causal lines:

"Let p be any spacetime point, and let t be any smooth timelike trajectory

through spacetime with p as its final limit point. Let each point of t before

p be occupied by matter with its vector pointing in the direction of t at that

point. Then, ceteris paribus, there will be matter also at p." (Lewis 1999,

211)

In this case there is no circular reference to temporal persisting lines. Lewis suggests that

this solves the problem of RDA, as there is no explicit reference in this law of the matter

at p being the same matter that is at every point before p in the trajectory. From this law
we then can derive a definition of persistence in HS. Of course if p has space coordinates

(x1,y1,z1) and the moment before7 p in the trajectory t, call this p', has space coordinates

(x2,y2,z2), we still observe matter at (x2,y2,z2) when there is matter at p. This poses no

problem for the theory, however, as that instance of matter at the space-time point

(x2,y2,z2) and time of p is part of a different smooth time-like trajectory running next to t.

So each distinct space-point in the spinning disc has its matter at one moment because of

a different distinct space-point at the previous moment. This is enough to define lines of

causality.

One may have the initial instinct that there is a contradiction between this law and

discontinuous motion. Take the Bigelow and Pargetter three-sphere motion example

above. It may seem at first there are spatial disjunctions between the motions of A and C.

However the motion of A and the subsequent motion of C do not form one "smooth time-

like trajectory," and Lewis' law does not account for the sudden halting or beginning of

motion. If we take any smooth trajectory of A or C, we find this motion obeys the law.

Ehring provides an objection to the Lewis/Robinson fix (Ehring 1997, 111-2).

Consider an indeterministically rotating disc. The velocity and position of the disc at one

moment are not determined wholly by its velocity and position and the applied forces the

previous moment. Thus the velocity of the disc is underdetermined by the vector

qualities. But the spinning disc has a determinate angular velocity, and so there is a fact

of the matter about the velocity, which goes uncaptured by the vector qualities.

I would argue that there is another thing that remains to be worked out with the

Lewis account. At a given instant the appropriate vector for one point P on the outmost

point-thin shell of the spinning disc is tangent to the surface of the disc, and at the next
7
Lewis considers a discrete time world, but claims this could be adapted to a continuous time world.
instant no matter appears in the location the vector pointed. This will be true of all

rotational motion, and in fact true of all motion on which there is a net force on the object

that does not coincide with the direction of the velocity vector. Lewis' account only

works for continuous linear motion, and does not solve the RDA problem for HS. It may

be the case that there is a model where another Humean quality can be adopted to

distinguish the two discs.

We need not posit a difference in the distribution of Humean qualities for the

macro-indeterminacy theory. The discs would need a property instantiated in S, but this

property would interact with the property of the detector under a probabilistic law to yield

either rotation or non-rotation phenomenon. Because there is no difference in Humean

distributions of qualities, none of these problems pertain to the theory.

4. Differences in Origins of Motion

Another intuitive response to RDA is that in order for one disc to be spinning and

one to be stationary, there must have been a difference in qualities between the two

worlds at some point in the past or at the present. We can a priori rule out a present

difference in force fields within the discs, as this would presuppose a difference in

Humean qualities. Then for the spinning disc world, at some time in the past there would

have been a force applied to the disc that caused its rotation. This force would not be

present in the still disc world.

Robinson makes the point that a difference in forces in the past leads to causation

at a distance, which does not seem plausible for HS (Robinson 1989, 405). Imagine there

is an initial force that causes the rotation of the spinning disc at some time t0. At some
time later t1, there does not appear to be any difference in the holographic representations

between the spinning disc world and the still disc world. Then at some time later still t2,

another object K comes into contact with the spinning disc and is affected by the rotation.

In the stationary disc world the object comes into contact with the disc and is not

affected. Then it seems that because in the time interval from t0 to t2 there was no

difference in the distribution of Humean qualities between the two worlds, there is causal

action at a distance in the spinning disc world. In this world the application of the force at

t0 causes the effect on K at t2. This poses a problem for HS, and thus it seems the Humean

cannot claim that a past difference distinguishes the discs.

What effect does this causal action at a distance have on our theory of macro-

indeterminacy? It seems that if there were a definite past cause for rotation, the Best

Systems analysis would not give us a macro-indeterminacy law. We can still reconcile

this causation at a distance with HS would be by applying our real space theory. The

space-time points ({X,Y,Z},T) such that {X,Y,Z} are the spatial coordinates of all points

in the disc, and T is every time point in the temporal interval between t0 and t2, then

would be one point in our real space. Then the quality of the force being applied would

be instantiated at this single real point, which would lie adjacent to the effect on K in real

space, thus no causation at distance. So it seems that macro-indeterminacy is only needed

in some worlds, worlds where there may have always been a spinning disc, while our real

space theory is applicable in all worlds to solve the non-local/causal action at a distance

problem.
5. Dispositionalism

Callender (2001) also briefly suggests that we might also apply some variant of

Sydney Shoemaker's thesis that properties are coupled to causal roles.8 Thus, as the two

discs play exactly the same causal roles in the two worlds, they have the exact same

properties. In this section I will present the dispositionalist solution to RDA.

David Armstrong uses the rotating disc argument as part of a proof that

fundamental properties are dispositional (Armstrong 1996). Let us assume

dispositionalism (that fundamental properties are dispositions) and see how it works as a

solution to RDA. Positing undetectable rotation in a homogeneous disc is equivalent to

positing some property, P, such that P is not detected by measurement. Callender makes

the acute point that supposing the rotation of one homogeneous disc and the non-rotation

of another is like supposing the one disc has a soul, and the other does not, and then

arguing that Humean Supervenience fails because it cannot tell the difference (Callender

2001, 38). A property that plays no causal role is a vacuous property, but P is not

necessarily vacuous, P may be quasi-inert, that is to say, P may play a causal role that is

dependent on the instantiation of a property that is uninstantiated in the world.9

Thus undetectable rotation is either a quasi-inert property, or a vacuous property.

If it is vacuous then it seems meaningless to say that there is rotation, and the very idea of

adopting dispositionalism or another theory over HS is because dispositionalism offers an

account that supports counterfactuals relying on the disc's motion. So it seems that the

rotation must be a quasi-inert property. If it is a quasi-inert property, then there must be

some uninstantiated property X where it can be detected, as it plays a causal role in this

8
See Sydney Shoemaker (1998) for his argument on coupling powers with properties.
9
See Troy Cross unpublished dissertation for discussion.
interaction. X might be a number of properties: friction possessed by another type of

matter, or some other unevenly applied force-interaction with the object in which X is

instantiated. In this case then we can imagine a world with both the rotation and X

instantiated, and the two properties would together have the causal power of some

rotational effect. And this is exactly what the dispositionalist has in mind. For the

dispositionalist there is no problem with supporting counterfactuals or a lack of a

Humean quality distribution difference between the worlds.

6. Conclusion

In the preceding sections we have discussed the main points of RDA and how

they affect a theory of Humean Supervenience. I contend that there are problems with HS

as it stands, and that the best adaptation to make HS compatible with RDA in general is

the macro-indeterminacy/real-space model. This model supports probabilistic

counterfactuals, explains a lack of physical phenomenon in the disc's rotation and comes

directly out of the Best Systems analysis.

There is no doubt in my mind that the macro-indeterminacy/real-space model

needs to be further developed. Specifics of the real space theory would need to be worked

out. However I believe it to be the most promising theory for reconciling HS and RDA.

One who is inclined towards dispositionalism for other reasons of course then finds

dispositionalism an appealing solution to RDA. However the Humean is no longer

immediately forced to abandon HS for another theory or allow Hawley's "non-

supervenient" relations or take up vector qualities (although he may desire to for other

reasons).
References

Armstrong, David. 1980: ''Identity Through Time', in P. van Inwagen (ed.), 1980, pp. 67-
78.

Armstrong, David. 1996: 'Categoricalist versus Dispositionalist Accounts of Properties'.

Acta Analytica 15, pp. 7-19.

Bigelow, John and Robert Pargetter. 1989: 'Vectors and Change'. British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 40, pp. 289-306.

Cross, Troy. Unpublished Dissertation.

Ehring, Douglas. 1997: Causation and Persistence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hawley, Katherine. 1999: 'Persistence and Non-Supervenient Relations'. Mind 108, pp.
53-67.

Lewis, David. 1987: Philosophical Papers Volume II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lewis, David. 1999: 'Zimmerman and the Spinning Sphere'. Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 77, pp. 209-212.

Loewer, Barry. 1996: 'Humean Supervenience'. Philosophical Topics 24, pp. 101-127.

Ohanian, Hans C. 1986: 'What is Spin?'. American Journal of Physics 54, pp. 500-510.

Robinson, Denis. 1989: 'Matter, Motion and Humean Supervenience'. Australasian

Journal of Philosophy 67, pp. 394-409.

Salmon, Wesley C. (ed.) 1970: Zeno's Paradoxes. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Shoemaker, Sydney. 1980: 'Causality and Properties'. Printed in Time and Cause.
Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Teller, Paul. 1986: 'Relational Holism and Quantum Mechanics'/ British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 37, pp. 71-81.

Zimmerman, Dean. 1998: 'Temporal Parts and Supervenient Causation: The

Incompatibility of two Humean Doctrines'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy
76, pp. 265-288.