CIA LOAN COPY DONOT COPY Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General SPECIAL REVIEW UBB) COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES (SEPTEMBER 2001 ~- OCTOBER 2003) (2003-7123-IG) 7 May 2004TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION SUMMARY... BACKGROUND: DISCUSSION GENESIS OF POST 9/11 AGENCY DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVETIES ‘Dire CAPTURE OF ABU ZUBAYDAH AND DEVELOPMENT OF EITS DO] LEGAL ANALYSIS. NOTICE 70 AND CONSULTATION WITH EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICIALS. GUIDANCE ON CAPTURE, DETENTION, AND INTERROGATION. DCI Confinement Guidelines. DCT interrogation Guidelines Medical Guidelines, ‘Training for Interrogations. xn nereanocattov ores 1 Videotapes of interrogations. Background and Detainees... A acGuidance Prior to DCI Guidelines .. Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques... 41 Handgun and Power Drill serch ‘Threats ... Smoke. Stress Positions ..:...... Stiff Brush and Shackles Waterboard Technique. Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Technique: 69 Pressure Points... 69 Mock Executions... 70 Use of Smoke renner TD Use of Cold. Water Dousing. Hard Takedown .. ,Program ANALYTICAL SUPPORT 10 INTERROGATIONS. ‘EFFECTIVENESS. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING THE: DETENTION: AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM, eenimnennncenseeei DL Policy Considerations. Concerns Over Participation in the CTC Program ENDGAME ww CONCLUSIONS... RECOMMENDATIONS... APPENDICES A, Procedures and Resources B. Chronology of Significant Events C. Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, Re: Interrogation of an Al-Qa‘ida Operative, 1 August 2002 D. DCI Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 28 January 2003 DCI Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the january 2003 ‘ii LL aEcm —_ — _ TS 33. Cre RRR 14's OTS obtained data on the use of the proposed EIT and their potential long-term psychological effects on vetinees, OTS input was based in part on information solicited from ‘a number of psychologists and knowledgeable academics in the area of psychopathology. 34. TES ARRAY OTS also solicited input from DoD /Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (PRA) regarding techniques used in its SERE training and any subsequent psychological effects on students. DoD/JPRA concluded no long-term psychological effects resulted from use of the EITs, including the most taxing technique, the ‘waterboard, on SERE students.!4 The OTS analysis was used by OGC in evaluating the legality of techniques. 35. (rSRRRRRRIBBIEE) Preven BITS were proposed for adoption in the CTC Interrogation Program. As proposed, use of EITs would be subject to a competent evaluation of the medical and psychological state of the detainee. The Agency eliminated one proposed technique fer learning from DoJ that this could delay the legal review. The following textbox identifies the 10 BITs the Agency described to DoJ. 14 Yo According to individuals th authoritative krowlege the SERE progam the duatesbennd sv aed for demonstaton porpeses ona very sal amber of studens ino das. eet toe Navy SERE training oe of the wateoard was dacontined because of ts dramatic eftecon the shdents who were subjects u ResEnhanced Interrogation Techniques |) The attention graap consists of grasping the detainee with both hands, with one Had on each ade of the collar opening, ina conicoled and quick motion. In the ‘same motion as the grasp, the detainees drawn toward the interogalor, 4+ During the walling tecigue the detainee is pulled forward and then aie y and Beoyt pushed inte a flexible false wal so thaths holder blades hit the wall, is hhead and neck are supported with a rolled towel to prevent whiplash 4 The facial hotd is used fo hold the detainee’s head immobile, The interrogator ‘places an open palm on ether side ofthe detainees face and ‘he interrogator’s Fingertips are kept well away from the detainee’ eyes. 4s With the facial or insult slap, the fingers are slightly spzead apart. The interrogator’ hand makes contact with the ae between the Up of the detainees chin and the bottom of the couesponding earlobe 4 Incramped confinement, the detainee is placed ina confined space typically 2 sere igs oan which i usually datk. ConSnementin the smaller space lasts aren Se thes tur hous and inthe larger space tem lst up fo 18 hows 44 Tnsects placed in a confinement box involve placing harmless insect in the box ‘with the detainee 4 During wall standing, the detainee say stand about 4 108 fect fom a wall fis fee spread approximately to his shoulder width. His anms are stretched out front of him and iis Gngess rest on the wall to support all of his body weight: The detainee is not allowed to reposition his hands or feet 4 The application of sess postions may indude having the detainee sit onthe feos with hig lege extended straight cot in front of him with his arms raised above bis ead or kneeling on the floor while leaning back at a45 degree angle 4 Sleep deprivation will not exceed 11 days ata time 4 The application ofthe watesboard technique invoives binding the detainee 0 2 bench with his feet elevated above his head. The detainee’s head is immobilized and an interrogator places a cloth over the detainee’s mouth and nose while pouting water onto the cloth in a controlled manner. Aisflow is cesricted fos 9960 410 seconds arid the technique produces the sensation of drowning and suffocation Lo ToreSE a {aE DOJ LEGAL ANALYSIS 36. ed CIA’ OGC sought guidance from Do} ‘the legal bounds of EITs vis-a-vis individuals detained ‘The ensuing legal opinions focus on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Innumane and Degzading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention) # especially as implemented in the U.S. criminal code, 18 US.C. 2540- 2340A. re 37, (U//FOUO) The Torture Convention specifically prohibits "torture," which it defines in Article 1 as: any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical oF mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes 25 Gbtaining from him ora thied person information or a confession, punishing him for an acthe ora third persor has comuniited ois Suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any Kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include ppain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to awful sanction. [Emphasis added.] “Article 4 of the Torture Convention provides that states party to the Convention are to ensure that all acts of “torture” are offenses under their criminal laws. Article 16 additionally provides that each state party “shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to acts of torture as defined in Article 1" 15 (U//POUD) Adopted tO Deceber 1984, 5.Treaty Bec. No, 100201986) 166 UNS. 89 (eosesed int force 26 fune 1967). The Torture Convention entered iat fers forthe United States e on 20 November 19%. ~ s ee |38. (U//BOUO) The Torture Convention applies to the United States only in accordance with the reservations and understandings ‘made by the United States at the time of ratification.'6 As explained to the Senate by the Executive Branch prior to ratification Article 16 is arguably broader than existing US. law. The phrase “cruel, inhuman ot degrading treatment or punishment” is a standard formula in international instruments and is found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant ‘on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on ‘Human Rights, To the extent the phrase has been interpreted in the context of those agreements, “cruel” and "inhuman’ treatment oF punishment appears to be roughly equivalent to the treatment or punishment barred in tae United States by the Fifth, Bighth and Fourteenth Amendments. “Degrading” treatment or punishment, however, has been interpreted as potentially including treatment ‘that would probably not be prohibited by the U.S. Constitution. {Citing a ruling that German refusal to recognize individual's gender change might be considered "degrading" treatment} To make clear that the United States construes the phrase to be. coextensive with its constitutional guarantees against cruel, ‘unusual; and inhumane treatment, the following understanding is recommended: “The United States understands the term ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as used in Article 16 of the Convention, to gnean the cruel, unusual, and inhumane ent prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth 16 (UY) Viernna Convention on the Lav of Treaties, 2 May 1969, 1155 UNTS. 381 (entered into foxce 27 janviary 1980), The United States isnat 3 parly to the Vienna Convention on treaties, bt it gononilly regards its provisions as customary intercational lav 17 (U//FQUO) 8. Teeaty Doe. No. 100-20, at 5-16. |Tors! 39. (U//FOUO) In accordance with the Convention, the United States criminalized acts of torture in 18 USC. 2340A(@), which provides as follows: Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to comunit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any tetm of years or for life. ‘The statute adopts the Convention definition of "torture” as “an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control." "Severe physical pain and suffering” is not further defined, but Congress added a definition of "severe mental pain or suffering” {t]he protonged mental harm caused by or resulting fror- (A) the intentional infliction ox threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering: (8) the administration or application, or threatened ‘administration of application, of mind-altering substances o= other procedures calculated to disrupt profounclly the senses or the personality; (C) the threat of imminent death; oF (D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected, to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. ...!? “These statutory definitions are consistent with the understandings and reservations of the United States to the Torture Convention. 18 (U//EQUO) USC. 25401). 19 (y//FOUO) 18 US.C. 23800). 15, ri eSor 40. (U//BOUO) Dof has never prosecuted a violation of the torture statute, 18 U.S.C. $2340, and there is no case law construing its provisions. OGC presented the results ofits research into relevant issues under US. and international law to DoJ's OLC in the sumuner of 2002 and réceived a preliminary summary of the elements of the torture statute from OLC in July 2002. An unclassified 1 August 2002 OLC legal memorandum set out OLCs conclusions regarding the proper interpretation of the torture statute and concluded that "Section 2340A proscribes acts inflicting, and that ate specifically intended to inflict, severe pain or suffering whether mental or physical."20 Also, OLC stated that the acts must be of an “extreme nature” and that "certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading, but still not produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity to fall within Section 2340A's proscription against torture." Further describing the requisite level of intended pain, OLC stated: Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as orgen failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. For purely ‘mental pain or suffering to amount to torture under Section 2340, it must result in significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g, lasting for months or even years OLC determined that a violation of Section 2340 requires that the infliction of severe pain be the defendant's “precise objective.” OLC also concluded that necessity or self-defense might justify interrogation methods that would otherwise violate Section 2340. The August 2002 OLC opinion did not address whether any other provisions of U.S. law are relevant to the detention, treatment, and interrogation of detainees outside the United States. 20 (15//FOUO) Legal Memorandum, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under TBUSC. 240-2804 (1 August 200) 24 (UI /FOUO) Bid, p.1. B. (Uy /FOUO) bid,,p.39, 23 (3 FOUO) OLC's analysis of the tecture statute was guided in part by judicial decisions under the Torture Viens Protection Act (TVPA) 28 US.C. 1350, which provides a tort remedy {or vietims of torture. OLC noted that the courts this context have looked atthe entire course a aue umes ae ee Seren ——_ |_ __ E 44, (//FOUO) A second unclassified 1 August 2002 OLC opinion addressed the international law aspects of such interrogations2# This opinion concluded that interrogation methods that do not violate 18 US.C. 2340 would not violate the Torture Convention and would not come within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. 40, (SBIR wv adition to the two unclassified opinions, OLC produced another legal opinion on 1 August 2002 at the requestof CIA (Appendix C.) This opinion, addressed te CIA’ Acting General Counsel, discussed whether the proposed use of Elf in interrogating Abu Zubaydah would violate the Title 18 prohibition on torture. The opinion concluded that use of EITs on ‘Abu Zubaydah would not violate the torture statute because, among other things, Agency personnel: (1) would not specifically intend to inflict severe pain or suffering, and (2) would not in fact inflict severe pain or suffering. 15, VS ERED his O1C opinion was based upon specific representations by CIA concerning the manner in which EITs wroulld be applied in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, For example, OLC was told that the EIT "phase" would likely las more than several days but could would be used on “ar as be used. Further, the “no last up to thirty days." The EITs needed basis" and all would not necessarily were expected to be used "in some sort of escalating fashion, culminating with the waterboard though not necessarily ending with this technique.” Although some of the EITs ‘feonduct although a single ineldent could constitute torture, OLC also noted at may te vein to finds vide range of physical pain ca rise tothe evel of severe pal ont ee leing” Ultimately, however, OLC conclude that the eases show that only acs ofa xtreme nature have been cedressed under the Counsel Menorandium at 22-77 2% (Uj /PO (August 2002) ES inteligence Agen ‘TVPA's civil remedy for torture.” White House OLC Opinion by fon C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General OLC emorandam for Jot Rizzo, Acting General Comnsel of the Centre] interrogation of al Qaida Operative” (1 August 2002) at 1. $$; EErr aight be used more than once, “that repetition will not be substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several repetitions.” With respect fo the waterboard, it was explained that: «the individual is bound securely to an inclined bench .... The individual's feet are generally elevated. A cloth is placed over the forehead and eyes. Water is then applied to the loth in a controlied manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and complétely covers the mouth and nose, the air flow is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth, This ‘causes an increase in carbon dioxide level in the individual's blood. ‘This increase in the carbon dioxide level stimulates increased effort to breathe. This effort plus the cloth praduces the perception of suffocation and incipient panic," i.e, the perception of drowning, ‘The individual does not breathe water into his lungs. During those 120 to 40 seconds, water is continuously applied from a height of (12 to 24] inches, After this period, the cloth is lifted, and the individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full breaths. The sensation of drowning is immediately relieved by the removal of the loth. ‘The procedure may then be repeated. The water is usually applied froma canteen cup or small watering can with a spout. ... [TThis procedure triggers an aniomatic physiological sensation of drowning that the individual cannot control even though he may be aware that he isin fact not drowning. {I]tis likely that this procedure would not lest more than 20 minutes in any one application. Finally, the Agency presented OLC with a psychological profile of ‘Abu Zubaydah and with the conclusions of officials and psychologists associated with the SERE program that the use of EITs would cattse no long term mental harm. OLC relied on these representations to support its conclusion that no physical harm or prolonged mental harm would result from the use on him of the EITs, including the waterboard.* 26 Yrs AMBRE, According to te Chit, Medial Services, OMS was nether eonstled nor iqvotved thera analysis the isk and benefits of Be nox provided wth the OTS pot cited in the OLC opinion. Inetaspect, based onthe OLCexrael of Ue OTSrepart,OMS Contends thal the reported sophiscatlen ofthe prelininary ETT review was exaggerated) at east ‘Sitvlate tothe tear and tht he power of hs EF as appecely crested inthe report. Pethertore, OMS contend thatthe expertise ofthe SERE psychologitterogetors on 2 p< aes44. OGC continued to consult with Do] as the CTC Interrogation Program and the use of BITs expanded beyond the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. This resulted in the production of an undated and unsigned document entitled, "Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of Captured ‘Al-Qa‘ida Personnel."7 According to OGC, this analysis was fully coordinated with and drafted ini substantial part by OLC. In addition to reaffirming the previous conclusions regarding the torture statute, the analysis concludes that the federal War Crimes statute, 18 U.S.C. 2Ha1, does not apply to’ AF-Qa’ida because members of that group are not entitled to prisoner of war status. The analysis adds that “the [Torture] Convention permits the use of [eruel, inhuman, oF degrading treatment] in exigent circumstances, such as a national emergency or war.” Talso states that the interrogation of AL-Qa‘ida members does not violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because those provisions do not apply extraterritorially, nor does it violate the Righth Amendrnent because it only applies to persons upon whom criminal sanctions have been imposed. Finally, the analysis states that a wide range of BIT’ and other techniques would not constitute conduct of the type that would be prohibited by the Fifth, Bighth, or Fourteenth Amendments even were they to be applicable: ‘The use of the following techniques and of comparable, approved techiiques does not violate any Federal statute or other law, where the CIA interrogators do not specifically intend to cause the detainee to undergo severe physical or mental pain or suffering Ge, they act with the good faith belief that their conduct will not 4 cause suich pain or suffering): isolation, reduced caloric intake (50 long as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health of the detainees), deprivation of reading material, loud music or white the waterboard was probably misrepresented at the time, a5 theSERE waterboard experience is sodifferent from tne subsequent Agency usage as to makeit almost irrelevant. Consequently, secording to OMS, there waa no prior eason to believe that applying the waterboard with the itequency and interty with which it was used by the psychologist/Intertogater was ether efficacious or medically safe 27 ‘Legal Principles Applicable to CLA Detention and interrogation of : CORRE Oni: Peronnel” attached aR oe 502) aS *‘TOP noise (ata decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the ‘detainees’ hearing), the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial slap (insult slap), the abdominal slap, cramped confinement wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, the use of diapers, the use of harmless insects, and the water board. According to OGC, this analysis embodies DoJ agreement that the reasoning of the classified 1 August 2002 OLC opinion extends beyond the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and the conditions that were specified in that opinion. NOTICE TO AND CONSULTATION WITH EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICIALS 45, RYOBI) tne same time that OLC was reviewing the legality of BITS in the summer of 2002, the Agency was consulting with NSC policy staff and senior Administration officials. The DCI briefed appropriate senior national security and legal officials on the proposed HITS. In the fall of 202, the Agency briefed the leadership Of the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committees on the use of both standard techniques and EITs. 26, (TORRRRABB 1m carly 2003, CIA officials, at the wging of the General Counsel, continued to inform senior Administration officials and the leadership of the Congressional Oversight Committees of the then-current status of the CTC Program. The ‘Agency specifically wanted to ensure that these officials and the Committees continued to be awaie of and approve CIA's actions. ‘The General Counsel recalls that he spoke and met with White House Counsel and others at the NSC, as-well as Do's Criminal Division and Office of Legal Counsel beginning in December 2002 and briefed them on the scope and breadth of the CTCs Detention and Interrogation Program. 47, (SERRE, Representatives of the DO, in the presence of the ‘Director of Congressional Affairs and the General Counsel, continued to brief the leadership of the Intelligence Oversight Committees of the use of EIfs and detentions in February _ 23and March 2003. The General Counsel says that none of the participants expressed any concern about the techniques or the Program. 48, (SQM) on 29 july 2003, the DCI and the General Counsel provided a detailed briefing to selected NSC Principals on CIA's detention and interrogation efforts involving "high value detainces," to include the expanded use of BITs.2® According to a Memorandum for the Record prepared by the General Counsel following that meeting, the Attorney General confirmed that Do} approved of the expanded use of various Eis, including multiple applications of the waterboard28 The General Counsel said he believes everyone in attendance was aware of exactly what CIA was doing with respect to detention and interrogation, and approved of the effort. Ac ding to OGC, the senior offi Is were again briefed regarding the CTC Program on 16 September 2003, and the Intelligence Committee leadership was briefed again in September 2003. Again, according to OGC, none of those involved in these briefings expressed any reservations about the program. GUIDANCE ON CAPTURE, DETENTION, AND INTERROGATION 49. (SRB Guidance and training are fundamental fo the success and integrity of any endeavor as operationally, politically, and legally complex as the Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program. Soon after 9/11, the DDO issued gitidance on the standards for the capture of terrorist tar rets | 50. CSR The DCL in January 2003 approved formal “Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees” (Appendix D) and "Guidelines on Interrogations Conductedvia informal {Appendix E}. which to the DCI Guidelines, Headquarters provided guidan briefings and electronic communications, to include cabl Headquarters, 0 (< ‘<1: Seas aber 2002, CTC initiated taining — oo courses for individuals involved in interrogatiDCI Confinement Guidelines 87, ro EBB serore january 2003, officers assigned to manage detention facilities developed: an Limplemented cantina! condition procedures. The January 2003 TDCI Guidelines govern the conditions of confinement for C1 detainees held in detention fi |A They must Teview the Guidelines and sign an acknowledgment that they have done so. 59. 0 The LCI Guidelines specify legal “:inimums" and require that "due provision must be taken to protect the health and safety of all CIA detainees.” The Guidelines do not require that conditions of confinement at the detention facilities conform to U.S. prison or other standards. Ata minimum, however, detention facilities are to provide basic levels of meciical care Further, the guidelines provide t—_ _ _ DCI Interrogation Guidelines 60. SPANE\ Prior to January 2003, CTCand OGC disseminated guidance via cables, e-mail, or orally on a case-by-case basis to address requests to use specific interrogation techniques. ‘Agency management did not require those involved in interrogations to sign an acknowledgement that they had read, understood, or agreed to comply with the guidance provided. Nor did the Agency maintain a comprehensive record of individuals who had been briefed on interrogation procedures. The DCI Tnterrogation Guidelines require that all personnel directly engaged in the interrogation of persons detained have reviewed these Guidelines, received appropriate training in their implementation, and have completed the applicable acknowledgement. 62. (SPFNE) The DCT Inierrogation Guidelines define “Permissible Interrogation Techniques" and specify that "unless otherwise approved by Headquarters, CIA officers and other personnel acting on behalf of CIA may use only Permissible Interrogation Techniques. Permissible Interrogation Techniques consist of both (a) Standard Techniques and (b) Enhanced 29 (A eee‘Techniques."88 EITs require advance approval from Headquarters, as do standard techniques whenever feasible. The field must document the use of both standard techniques and EITs. ‘The DCI Inierrogation Guidelines define “standard interrogation techniques" as techniques that do not incorporate significant physical or psychological pressure. These techniques include, but are not limited to, all lawful forms of questioning employed by U.S. law enforcement and military interrogation personnel. Among standard interrogation techniques are the tse of isolation, sleep deprivation not to exceed 72 hours reduced caloric intake (so long as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health of the detainee), deprivation of reading imaterial, use of loud music or white noise (at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the detainee’s hearing), the use of ers for limited periods (generally not to exceed 72 hours aM A "paychological pressure. The DCI Interrogation Guidelines do not specifically prohibit improvised actions, A CTC/Legal officer has said, however, that no one may employ any technique outside specifically identified standard techniques without Headquarters approval, 64. CES ERR) EITs inchude physical actions and are defined as-"techniques that do incorporate physical or psychological pressure beyond Standard Techniques.” Headquarters must approve the use of each specific EIT in advance. Elv's may be employed only by trained and certified interrogators for use with a specific detainee and with appropriate medical and psychological monitoring of the process. “The 10 approved FIs are described in the textbox on page 15 of this Review. 24 (rs RRS According to the General Coursel, in late December 2008, the period for sleep deprivation was reduced to 48 hows. 35 TRS ABMMIIRMBRH) Before ETTs are administered, detainee must cocelye s detsied logical sssesament and physical om. 30 |Medical Guidelines 65. (SSBB M's prepared draft guidelines fo5 medical and psyenologjcal suppott to detaince interrogations ‘Training for Interrogations 66 nNovender 2) aa init ‘dated a pilot running of a two-week Mnterrogator Training Course designed to train, qualify, and cen individuals as Agency interrogators” Several CIC officers, B __— s 36 (U//AIUO) A 28 March 2003 Lotus Note from C/CTC/Lepal advised Chie Metal ‘Services that the “Seventh Floor” "would ried to approve the promulgation of eny & fruldelines... For now, therefore, tes remain atthe discussion tgs 3 27 Ls Leuulum, which including a former SERE instructor, designe included a week of classroom instruction followed by aweeleot "hands-on" training in ‘Once certified, an: interrogator is deemed qualified to conductan intersoge tion ‘ROTAStudents completing the Interrogation Course are required to sign an acknowledgment that they have read, understand, and will comply with the DCI’s Interrogation Guidelines. 69, USED tn june 2003, CTC established a debriefing course for Agency substantive experts who are involved in. questioning detainees after they have undergone interrogation and have been deemed “compliant.” The debriefing course was established to train noninterrogators to collect actionable intelligence from high value detainees in CIA custody. The course is intended to familiarize non-interrogators with key aspects of the Agency interrogation Program to include the Program's goals and legal authorities, the Del Interrogation Guidelines, and the roles and res} yonsibilities of all who interact with a high value detainee. Deravrrow anb nerexrocarion oreeaTions <7 ao 70.de errogation of Abu Zutaydab ‘where ElTs were used The pve st /interroygators « with [ERM cen members before each intertug session. Psy erformed by) 15 November ‘The interroy; the nec ation of Al-Nashiri proceeded afterEES peychologist/interrogators began Al-Nashiri’s interrogation Hsing Ev immediately upon his arrival. Al-Nashiri provided lead information on other terrorists di t day of interrogation. On the twelfth day of coro gtion RB sytotoaist / interrogators administered two applications of the waterboard to ‘Al-Nashiri during two separate interrogation sessions. Enhanced contintied through 4 December 2002 Il ‘Videotapes of Interrogations 77. ‘Headquarters had intense interest in. Keeping abreast of all aspects of Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation] HERR i ctecing compliance with the guidance provided to the mite relative to the use of FIs. Apart from this, however, and before the use of EITs; the interrogation earishMMMRMIRMIM decided to videotape the interrogation sessions. One initial purpose was to ensure a record of Abu Zubaydah’s medical condition and treatment should he succumb to his wounds and questions arise about the medical care provided to him by CIA. Another purpose was to assist in the preparation of the debriefing seports, although the team advised CTC/Legal that they rarely, ifever, were used for that purpose. There are 92 videotapes, 12 of which include EIT applications. An OGC attorney reviewed the videotapes in November and December 2002 to ascertain compliance with the ‘August 2002 Dof opinion and compare what actually happened with what was reported to Headquarters. He reported that there was no deviation from the DoJ guidance or the written record. | | 18 OIG reviewed the videotapes, logs, and { cables May 2003. OIG identified 83 waterboard i applications, most of which lasted less than 10 seconds.‘ a For the purpose ofthis Review, a wateiboasd application constituted exch iscrett netanee in Which watec Was applied for any period of time during a session.found Ti interrogation videotapes to be Hhlank. Two others were blank except for one or two minutes of recording. Two others were broken and could not be reviewed. OIG compared the videotapes tof gs and cables andl identified a 21-hour period of time, which included two waterboatd sessions, that was not captured on the videotapes. 79, RGGI 16's review of thevidegiapes revealed hat the waterboard technique employed atl as different from the technique as described in the Do} opinion and used in the SERE training. The difference was in the manner in which the Getainee’s breathing, was obstructed. At the SERE School and in the of opinion, the subject’ aisflow is disrupted by the firm application of adamp cloth over the air passages; the interrogator applies a small amount of water to the cloth in.g controlled mannes. By contrast; the Agency interrogator continuously applied large volumes of water to a cloth that covered the detainee'’s mouth and nose, One of the paychologists/ interrogators acknowledged that the Agency's use of the technique differed from that used in SERE training and explained that the Agency’ technique is different because itis "for real" and is more poignant and convincing. 80. TH Piseptember 2003, From December 2002 until During this time, Headquarters issued the formal DCI Confinement Guidelines, the DCI Interrogation Guidelines, and the additional draft guidelines specificallyaddressing requiremenis for OMS personnel. This se strengthen the command and control exercised over the CTC Program, Background anc Detainees Co . a po gad ana $$i Guidance Prior to DCI Guidelines 89. fe Agency was providing legal and operational briefings and cables| that contained Headquarters’ guidance and discussed the torture statute and the Do} legal opinion. CIC had also established a precedent of detailed cables between and Headquarters regarding the ferropation and debriefing of detainees, ‘The written guidance did not address the four standard interrogation techniques that, according to CTC/Legal, the Agency had identified as early as November 2002.48 Agency personnel were authorized to employ standard interrogation techniques on a detainee without Headquarters’ prior approval. ‘The guidance did not specifically techniques were: (1) sleep deprivation net to sass, (2) continsal se of ight or darkness ina cl, (@) loud music, and (4) white nolseq i = Beaten address the use of props to imply a physical threat to a detainee, nor did it specifically address the issue of whether or not Agency officers could improvise with any other techniques. No formal mechanisms were in place to ensure that personnel going to the field were briefed on the existing legal and policy guidance. Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques 00. TS BREED This Review heard allegations of the use of unauthorized techniques RABI The most significant, the handgun and power drill incident, discussed below, is the subject of a separate OIG investigation. In addition, individuals interviewed during the Review identified other techniques that caused concern because Dof had not specifically approved them. These included the making of threats, blowing cigar smoke, employing certain stress positions, the use of a stiff brush on a detainee, and stepping on & Hetainee’s anide shackles. For all of the instances, the allegations were disputed or too ambiguous to each any authoritative determination regarding the facts, Thus, although these allegations are illustrative of the nature of the concems held by individuals associated with the CTC Program and the need for clear guidance, they did not warrant separate investigations or administrative action ‘Handgun and Power Drill 61, (REIEEIE » tcrxogation team members, whose purpose it was to "Nashiri and debrief Abu Zubaydah, initially | ‘The interrogation team continued EITs on Al-Nashiri for two weeks in December 200? they assessed him to be "compliant." Subsequently, CTC offices at Headquarters ‘to debrief and assess Al-Nashiri 02, TRIE 1 - cebriefer assessed Al-Nashiti a withholding information, at which point gM est HGRRBBAE ) ooding, and handcuffing. Sometime between 41 AE CE28 December 2002 and 1 January 2003, the debriefer used an unloaded semi-automatic handgun as a prop to frighten Al-Nashiri into disclosing information After discussing this plan with PiBBilere debrieter entered the cell where Al-Nashiri sat shackled and racked the handgun once or twice close to Al-Nashiti's head." On what was probably the same day, the debriefer used a power drill to frighten Al-Nashiri. i RR con set the debriefer entered the detainee’s cell and revved the drill while the detainee stood naked and hooded. The debriefer did not touch Al-Nashiri with the power drill. 93. BANE), Thefknd debriefer did not request authorization or report the use of these unauthorized techniques to 's, However, in January 2003, newly arrived TDY officers hho had leamed of these incidents reported them to adquarters. OIG investigated and referred its findings to the Criminal Division of DoJ. On 11 September 2003, DoJ declined to prosecute and turned these matters over to CIA for disposition. ‘These incidents are the subject of a separate OIG Report of Investigation46 ‘Threats 9, vo ERE owing another incident} the same Headquarters debriefer, according to al vho was present, threatened Al-Nashiri by saying that if he did not talk, "We could get your mother in here," and, "We can bring your family in here." A reportedly wanted Al-Nashiri to infer, for psychological reasons, that the debriefer might bei PRIA oo elligence officer based on his Arabic dialect, and that Al ‘Nashiri was in] custody because it was widely believed in ‘Middle East circles that interrogation technique involves 44 (Sp /RU This individual was nota trained interrogator and was not authorized to use EIT, 45 (G//FOUO) Racking is a mechanical procedure used with firearms to chamber « bullet oF simulate abulletbeing chambered 46 (SANE Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques} 29 October 2003, 42 “v= SEER asexually abusing female relatives in front of the detainee. The debriefer denied threatening Al-Nashiri through his family. The debriefer also said he did not explain who, he was or where he was from when ti [he debriefer said he never said he was] telligence officer but let Al-Nashiti draw his own conclusions. ‘An experienced Agency interrogator xeported that the| errogators threatened Khalid Shaykh Muhamuiad] [According to this interrogator, the jinterrogators said to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad that if anything else happens in the United States, "We're going to Kill your children.” According to the interrogator, one of the With respect to the report provided to him of the threat that report did not indicate that the law had been violated. Smoke interrogator admitted that, in December 2002, he and another moked cigars and blew smoke in ‘Al-Nashin's face during an interrogation. ‘The interrogator claimed they did this to "cover the stench” in the room and to help keep the interrogators alert late at night. This interrogator said he would not do this again based on "perceived criticism." Another Agency interrogator admitted that he also smoked cigars during two sessions with Al-Nashiri to mask the stench in the room. He claimed he did not deliberately force smoke into Al-Nashiri’ face.ps Stress Positions 97. ae OIG received reports that interrogation team members employed potentially injurious stress positions on ‘ALNashiri, Al-Nashiri was required to kneel on the floor and lean pack. Onat least one occasion, an Agency officer reportedly pushed Al-Nashiti backward while he was-.in this stress position, On another occasion een oinees: eae xpressed concern that ALNashiri’s arms might be dislocated from his shoulders. MMMM e*P!cined that, at the time, the interrogators were attempting to put Al-Nashiri ina standing stress position, AL-Nashiri was reportedly lifted off the floor by his arms while his arms were bound behind his back with a belt. Stiff Brush and Shackles 9: Eo eee at he witnessed other techniques used on Al-Nashiri that the interrogator knew were not specifically approved. by DoJ. These included the use of a stiff brush that was intended to induce pain on ‘ALNashizi and standing on Al-Nashit\’s shackles, which resulted in cuts and bruises. When questioned, an interrogator who was at acknowledged that they used a stiff brush to bathe "Al-Nashiri. He described the brush as the kind of brush one uses ina path to remove stubbom dirt. A CTC manager who had heard of the incident attributed the abrasions on, Al-Nashiri’s ankles to an Agency officer accidentally stepping on Al-Nashiri’s shackles while repositioning him into a stress position. Waterboard Technique 99, (iS REMI The Review determined that the interrogators used the waterboard on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad in a manner inconsistent with the SERE application of the waterboard and the description of the waterboard in the Do OLC opinion, in that the technique was used on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad a large number of times. According to the General Counsel, the Attorney> ‘TOP SECRET General acknowledged he is fully aware of the repetitive use of the waterboard and that CIA is well within the scope of the Do} opinion and the authority given to CIA by that opinion. The Attorney General was informed the waterboard had been used 119 Himes on single individual 100. (rg }) Cables indicate that Agency interrogator applied. the waterboard technique Khalid Shaykh Muhammad 18; TOP ERR| informed v in any one 2p108,a |ea 119. 5ment certifying they hav Tnterrogators are required to sign a state read ancl understand the contents of the folder.54tiE T‘mapa TS Specifié Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques 164. T33| fwras but one eventin the early months 0 Agency activity in that involved the use of interrogation techniques that Do} and Headquaxters had not approved. Agency personnel reported a range of improvised actions that interrogators andl debricfers reportedly used at that time to assistin obtaining faformation from detainees. The extent of these actions is illustrative of the consequerices of the lack of clear guidance 2\ ties ia, and the “Agency's insufficient attention to intertogations i 168. OIG opened separate investigations into two incide and the death of a detainee ata military base in Northeast ‘afghanistan (discussed further in paragraph 192), These tivo cat presented facts that warranted criminal investigations Some of the techniques discussed below were used wit and will be further addressed in connection with a Repor Trother cases of undocumented or unauthorized techniques, the facts are ambiguous or ess serious, not warranting forther investigation Somé actions discussed below were taken by employees or ‘contractors no longer associated with the Agency. Agency management has also addressed administratively some of the achons. Pressure Points 36s |" operations officer, participated with another rations officer in a custodial interrogation of 2 det el ope [reportedly Maeda pressure point” technique: with both of his hands on the detainee's neck, manipulated his fingers to restrict the detainee's carotid artery.AaB: ye oe facing the shackled detainee, reportedly ‘watched his eyes to the point that the detainee would nod and start to pass out; then, the shook the detainee to wake him. This ‘process was repeated for a total of three applications of the detainee. The acknowledged to OIG that he laid hands e made him think he was going to lose consciousness. The so noted that he haf ‘years of experience debriefing and interviewing people and until recently had never been instructed how to conduct interrogations. 168. GTANE) CTC management is now aware of this reported incident, the severity of which was disputed. ‘The use of pressure te ig not, and had not been, authorized, and CTC has advised the that such actions are not authorized. ‘Mock Executions 169 ae ‘The debriefer who employed the handgun and pow on AN se that those actions were predicated on a technique he had participated, in ee debriefer stated that wherthe wa efween September and October 2002, offered to fire a handgun outside the interrogation room while the debriefer was interviewing a detainee who was thought to be withholding information ae aged the incident, which included, screaming and yelling outside the cell by other CLA officers an guards. When the guards moved the detainee from theinterrogation Boom, they passed a guard who was dressed ava hooded detainee, jing motionless on the ground, and made toappear as ifhe had been shot to death.170. TES MRR The debriefer claimed he did aot think he needed to report this incident because feo ae openly discussed this plan MAMI se) Ss aoa and after the incident, When the debriefer was ae believed he needed a non-traditional technique to induce the detainee to cooperate, he told wanted to wave a handgun in front of the detainee to scare him. The debriefer said he did not believe he was required to notify Headquarters of this tectaique, citing the earlier, unreported mock executio 171. RRB + senior operations office recounted that around September 2002)fheard that the debriefer had staged a mock execution. not present but understood it ont baclly, it was transparently a ruse and no benefit was derived from it ‘pserved that there is a need to be creative as long as it is not considered torture. tated that if such a proposal were made now, it would involve a great deal of consultation. It would begin wit management and would include CTC/Legal, nd the 172. GPANE) The} ladmitied staging a "mock execution” in the first days that was open. According to the the technique was his idea but was not effective ‘because it came across as being staged. It was based on the concept, from SBRE school, of showing something that looks real, butis not. The BRERA recalled that a particular CTC interrogator later told him about employing a mock execution technique. Thee RE ic not know when this incident occurred or if it was Nuccessful. He viewed this technique as ineffective because it was not believable.(| TT [Four] sho were interviewed admitted to either participating in we-deseril i lent hearis described staging a mock execution of a detainee. "Reportedly, a detainee who witnessed the “body” in the aftermath of the ruse “sang like a bird.” 1-795 EI ea four days before his interview ‘with OIG, the stated he had conducted a mock execution] in October or November 2002. Reportedly, the firearm was discharged outside of the building, and it was done because the detainee reportedly possessed ctitical threat information AMM stated that he told the IARI oot to do it again, He stated that he has not heard of asimilar act occuring AMA nce then. ‘Use of Smoke oximately A CLA. officey revealed that cigarette smoke was once used as an interrogation technique in October 2002. Reporiedly, at the request of| jan interrogator, the officer, who does not ‘smoke, blew the smoke from a thin cigarette/cigar in the detainee’s face for about five minutes. The detainee started talking so the smoke ceased ai neord that a different officer had used smoke as an interrogation technique. OIG questioned numerous personnel who had wor a. the use of smoke as a technique. None reported any knowledge of the use of smoke as an interrogation technique. 176, (Sa dmitted that he has personally used smoke inhalation techniques on detainees to make them ill to the point where they would start to “purge.” After this, in a weakened state, 72 or ATSinformation| abusing detainees or knowing anyone who has. Use of Cold 177.) 178. (25 BRI nate July to early August 200 detainee was being | Prior to proceeding with any of th ethod: officer responsible for the cies I 59 Fleadquariers authority to employ a prescribed interrogation plan over a two-week period. The plan included the following: Physical Comfort Level Deprivation: With use ofa window air conditioner and a judicious provision/deprivation of warm Stothing /blankets, believe we can increase [the detainee’s} physical discomfort level to the point where we may lower his ‘mental trained resistance abilities. CTC /Legal responded and advised, "[Claution must be used when employing the air conditioning /blanket deprivation so that {the detainee’s] discomfort does not lead to a serious illness o worse.” 179) tated in party the CIA officer who participate inthis act with thevena 183. 18S RRR tony ofthe oicers interviewed about the use of cold showers a5 a technique cited thatthe water heater was inoperable and there was no other recourse except for cold showers. However ERIM plained that if a detainee was cooperative, he would be given a warm shower. He stated that when a detainee was uncooperative, the interrogators accomplished two goals by combining the hygienic reason for a shower with the tunpleasantness of a cold shower. 184. In December 2002] jcable reported that a detainee was left in a cole-room, shackled and naked, until he demonstrated cooperation. 185. 1S REE! When asked cuary 2003, if cold was used as an interrogation technique, RR cc oncied, “not per se." He explained that physical and environmental discomfort was used to encourage the detainees to improve their environment. | sbserved that cold is hard to define. He asked rhetorically, "How cold is cold? How cold is life threatening?” He stated that cold water was still employed Seal however, showers were administeted in a heated room. He stated there was no specific guidance on it from Headquarters, and BBM was left to its own discretion in the use of cold. HB coca there is a cable from documenting, the use of “manipulation of the environment." 186, (SERRE Ath ough the DCL Guidetines donot mention cold as a technique, the September 2003 draft OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Interrogations specifically identify an "uncomfortably cool environment” as a standard interrogation measure. (Appendix F}) The OMS Guidelines provide detailed instructions on safe temperature ranges, including the safe temperature range when a detainee is wet or unciot! hed. 75ak: pate ee ae Water Dousing 187. others who have worked| since early 2003 when| According ‘oA 2 water dousing” has been used officer introduced ee reraque (o the facility. Dowsing involves laying a detainee down on a plastic sheet and pouring water over him for 10 to 15 minutes. Another officer explained that the room was maintained at 70 degrees or more; the guards used water that was af room, temperature while the interrogator questioned the detainee 188. Are! May 2003 revealed that RRR 0m Apriland [sought permission from CT CREE employ specific techniques for a number of detainees. Tncladed in the list of requested techniques was water dosing,” Suibsequent cables reported the us detainee per interrogation session. ‘e and duration of the techniques by 72 One certified interrogator, noting that water dousing appeared to be a most effective technique, requested CTC to confirm guidelines on water dousing. ret cable directed that the detainee must be placed ona towel or sheet, may not be placed naked on the bare cement floor, and the air temperature must exceed 65 degrees if the detainee will notbe dried immediately. DCI Guidelines do not mention water dousing as a technique. The 4 September 2008 draft OMS Guidelines, however, identify "water dousing’ as one of 12 standard mneagures that OME listed, in ascending degree of intensity, a5 the ith standard measure. OMS did dousing'" in its guidelines. not further address “water ater dousing, a8 a technique used, butEE Hard Takedown 190. 191. a According to the hard takedown was used often m interrogations at part of the atmospherics.” For a time, it was the standard procedure for moving a detainee to the sleep deprivation cell. Itwas done for shock and psychological impact and signaled the transition to another phase of ing 4 detainee into a diaper can the interrogation. ‘The act of putt the detainee struggles because the floor of the cause abrasions if t facility is concrete. ‘Thel tated he did not discuss the hard takedown with| managers, buthe thought the undeistood what techniques were being used a eG tated that the hard takedown had not been used recent ‘After taking the interrogation class, he und ood that ifhe was going to do a hard takedown, he must report it to Headquarters, Although the DCI and OMS Guidelines address physical techniques and treat them as requiring advance ‘Headquarters approval, they do not otherwise specifically address the "hard takedown.” 192. (5 RR 2100 that he was generally familiar with the technique of hard takedowns. He asserted that they are authorized and believed they had been used one or more times at it. order to intimidate a detainee. SAME stated that he would not necessarily know if they have been used and did not consider it a serious enough handling technique to require ‘Headquarters approval. Asked about the possibility that a detainee may have been dragged on the ground during the course of ahard takedown SRRRREEEEEres ponded that he was unaware of that and did not es and the point of dragging someone along the corridor in Abuse MRM] >¢ Other Locations Outside of the CTC Program 198. CTC Program, two other not within the scope of the were reported in ‘As noted above, one ath of a detainee at Asadabad Base”4 194. (SP ANE)_In June 2003, the U.S. military sought an Afghan citizen who had been implicated in rocket attacks on a joint US. Ammy and CIA position in Asadabad located in Northeast Afghanistan. On 18 June 2003, this individual appeared at Asadabad Base at the urging of the local Governor. ‘The individual was held in a detention facility guarded by US. soldiers from the Base. During 766 forme tana CA ened Aes zgsex: the four days the individual was detained, an Agency independent contractor, who was a paramilitary officer, is alleged to have severely beaten the detainee with a large metal flashlight and kicked him during interrogation sessions. The detainee died in custody on 21 June; his body was tumed over toa loca cleric and returned to his family on the following date without an autopsy being performed. Neither the contractor nor his Agency staff supervisor had been trained or authorized to conductinterrogations. The Agency did not renew the independent contractor's contract, which Was up for Fenewal soon after the incident. OIG is investigating this incident in concert with DoJ” 195, (SHANE) In July 2003] officer assi teacher ata religious school “This assault occurred during the course of an interview i ‘a joint operati during “The objective was to determine if anyone at marhool nad information about the detonation of a remote- controlled improvised explosive device that had Killed eight border guards several days earlier. (SAANE), A teacher being interviewed aaa eportedly smiled and Jaughed inappropriatel ‘whereupo ‘used the butt stock of his rifle : to strike or "buttstroke" the teacher at least twice in his torso, followed by several knee kicks to his torso. This incident was witnessed by 200 students. The teacher was reportedly not seriously injured, In response to his actions, Agency management returned the to Headquarters. He was counseled and assignment. 196.A ANALYTICAL SUPPORT TO INTERROGATIONS 204. CREED Directorat assigned to CIC provide analytical support to int the field, Analysts are responsible for developing requirements for the questioning of detainees as well as conducting debriclisaas some cases. ce analysis of Intellig gation teams in however, do not{ EE 205. "CSE ccordling to a number of those interviewed for this Review, the Agency’ intelligence on ALQa‘da was limited prior to the initiation of the CTC Interrogation Prograst ‘The Agency lacked adequate linguists ot subject matter experts and had very litle hard knowledge of what particular ALQwida leaders—who later became detainees—knew. This Jack of knowledge led analysts to speculate about what a detainee “should know," vice information the analyst could objectivels demonstrate the detainee did know. 206. BBemince did not respond to a question posed to him, the Assumption at Headquarters was that the detainee was holding back and ksiew more; consequently, Headquazters recommenced resumption of EITS, a — 83, LTed 209. TE jah. of Alu Zubay evidenced in the final waterboard ses: y According to a senior CTC officer, the interrogation team Il considered Abu Zubaydah to be compliant and wanted to terminate EITs. aydah continued to withhold information] fat the ime itsams, generated substantial pressure from Headquarters {0 continue use of the EITs. According to this senior officer, the decision to resume use of the waterboard on Abu Zubaydah was made by senior officers of Me assess AbU Zubaydah’s compliance and witnessed the inal waterboard session, after which, they reported back to Headquarters that the EIfs were no longer needed on Abu Zubaydah. 210. EFFECTIVENESS o11. (re [MBRBEREEEEE The detention of terrorists has prevented them from engaging in further terrorist activity, and their interrogation has provided intelligence that has enabled the identification and apprehension of other terrorists, waned of terrorists plots planned for the United States and around the world, and supported articles frequently used in the finished intelligence publications for senior poli¢ymakers.and war fighters. Tn this regard, there is no doubt that the Program has been effective. Measuring the effectiveness of EITs, howev without some concern. 212, CIS MMRREBBRBRHM) Wren the Agency began capturing judged the success of the effort to be gettin, , ig a more subjective process and not terroris them offsnermai hth thie capture of terrorists who had access to muuch more significant, actionable information, the méasure of success of the Program increasingly became the intelligence obtained from the detainees. 213. (SRY Ouantitatively, the DO has significantly increased the number of counterterrorism intelligence reports with the inclusion of information from detainees in its custody. Between 9/11 and the end of April 2003, the Agency produced over 3,000 intelligence reports from detainees. Most of the reports came from intelligence provided by the high value detainees at! 24. TC frequently uses the information from one detainee, as well as other sources, to vet the information of another detainee. Although lower-level detainees provide less information than the high value detainees, information from these detainees has, on many occasions, supplied the information needed to probe the high value detainees further. the triangulation of intelligence provides a fuller knowledge of Al-Qaida activities than would be possible from a single detainee. For example, Mustafa Ahmad Adam al-Hawsawi, the Al-Qa’ida financier who was captured with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, provided the Agency's first intelligence pertaining to| another participant in the 9/11 terrorist plot. Hawsawi's information to obtain additional details about} role from 215. TEM, Detainees have provided information on Al-Qa'ida and other terrorist grow Information of note includes: the modus operandi of Lo 5 who ate capable of mounting attacks in the ‘United States216. TYS|EREREEIMED Detainee information has assisted in the identification of terrorists. For example, information from Abu Zubaydah helped lead to the identification of Jose Padilla and Binyam Muhartaned—operatives who had plans to detonate a uuranium-topped dirty bomb in either Washington, D.C. or New York City. Riduan “Hambali' Isomuddin provided information that led to the arrest of previously unknown members of an Al-Qa‘ida cell in Karachi. They were designated as pilots for an aircraft attack inside the United States. Many other detainees, including lower-level detainees such as Zubayr and Majid Khan, have provided leads to other terrorists, but probably the most prolific has been Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. He provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including Sayfullah Paracha and his son Uzair Paracha, businessmen whom Khalid Shaykh Muhamunad planned to use to smuggle explosives into the United States; Saleh Alma, a sleeper operative in New York; and Majid Khan, an operative who could enter the United States easily and was tasked to research attacks a effet inthe subject. See Section 2340A Mésnorandum at 20-12. We have previously concluded that tis requires thatthe procedave cause substantial interference withthe individual's cognitive ables or fundamentally ater his personality. See fd. at 11. Moreover, the statute requires that such procedures must be calculsted to produce dhis effect, See Id at 10; 18 US.C. § 2340(2)8), ‘With respect to the small confinement box, you have informed us that he would spend er ‘most (wo hours in thisbax. You hve informed ws tht your purpose in using these boxes isnot to interfere with his senses or his personality, butt cause him physical discomfort et will ‘encourage him to disclose critical information, Moreover, your imposition of time limitations on (hs use of either ofthe Boxes elso indieszes thatthe use ofthese boxes is not designed or calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality, Forth larger box, in which he can royatines bae reponse ‘oth stand and sit, he may be placed i this box fc up eighteen howrs ala time, while you have informed us th be will never spend more tan an hour atime a the salle box. Thess tise firsts further ensure that no profound disruption of the senses or persouslty, were it even possible, would result, As such, the use of tie confinement boxes docs nat constiute 2 procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. Nor does te use of die boxes threaten Zubaydah with severe physical pain or suffsing ‘white eitonal time spent inthe boxss may e threatened er ws i nt accompaniod by any ‘express threats of severe physical psn ar sulting. Like tbe sess postions end walling, ‘placement in the boxes is physically uncomfortable but any such diseafort does not ise to the level of severe physieal pain or auertg. Accordingly, a reasonable person inthe subject's position would not infer tram te use ofthis technique that severe physical pains the next Inbisintersgator's treatment ofhim. Therefore, we couchits thatthe ute ofthe confinement ‘boxes doesnot fal within the stetute's required predicate ats. In eddlton to using the 6onfinemeat bots alone, you also would like to intrgee an insect into one af the boxes with Zubsydsh, As we understni it, you plan to inform Zubayde that you are going ta place astnging insect into the bo, but you will actoely place « harmless insect in the bax, such asa caterpillar. Ifyou do so, to ensure that you sre outside the predicate ct requirement, you must inform hie tha the insects will aot have a sting thet would produce deat or severe pain. [fhotwever, you ete fa place the insect in dhe box without informing biss ‘hee you are doing 20, haa, in adore aot commit a predicate act, va should not affirmatively. lead bim to belleve that any inscet ie pseseat whlch bas agp Renee et | approscies we have deserted, te insets placement inthe box wuld aot constinue a threst of severe physical pain or suffeting to 4 ressonable person in is position. An individus! pleced Ja box, even an individual witha fear of inséots, would no reasonzbly feeL threatened with severe physieal pain or suffering if caterpillar wns placed in he box. Purther, you have infoxmed us that you ere nat avave that Zubaydah has any allergies t Insects, and you have not informed us of any other faetas that would eause a reascnable person in that same situation co believe that an unlrow inseot would esuee him severe physica! pain or death, Thus, we conafuda that the placement ofthe insect in the confixenient box with Zubaydah would act constitute a predicate act. ‘leap deprivation aso clearly docs not involve a thteat of imminent death. Although it produces physical discomfort it ezanot be said to constinte a treat of severe physical pain or suffering from the perspective of ¢ reasonable person io Zubaydah’s position. Nor cauld sleep deprivation constitute procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the seuss, so long as sleep deprivation (as you have infbemted us is your intent) i used for fimited periads, before hallucinations or other peofound disruptions ofthe senses would occur, To be sure, seep Ceprivation may reduce the subject's ability to think on his feet. Indeed, you indicate that ths is tor peCret irorsgcher the intended resol, is mere reduced ably t evade your questions and resist angwering does not, however, ise tothe level of distupion require by the sate, As see explained above, disruption within the meaning ofthe satu isan extern one, substnaly interfering with ex individual's cognitive abilities, for example, inducing hallucinations o driving him (0 engage i= uncharacteristic seifdestrutive behavior. See infa 13; Section 2340A Memorandum at [1 Therefore, the limited use of sleep deprivation does not constitute one of the requted predicate sess. ‘We find thar the use of the wwserbosri constitutes «threat of uminent death. As you have expleined the watesoard procedure ro us, it cess in de subject the unoonyolable shysiologiet! sendation tha the subjects droming. Although the procedace wil be monitored by peesorlael with medical ualning me extnsive SERE school exprituee with this preeadere ‘who val essure the subjet's ment ax pyscl safety, the subjects not awace of anyof thse recautions, From the vantege point of any reasonable person undegoing this procedure in such cireumstancet, he would fel ns ihe is drovming at very mameat ofthe procedure duet the ‘uncontrollable physiological sensation he is experiencing. Thus, is procedure cannot be ‘viewed as too uncertain to satisfy the imminesce equifement, Accordingly, i coustttes @ threat of imrainent dest end full the predcae act requirement under the statute, Although the waterhoard constntes that of fmaminent deat protonged mental har soust noneteless result vals the statutory prohiiton on inition of severe meatal psin or suffering. See Section 23408 Memorandum at 7. Wehave previously conelided fat prolonged ‘mente harm is mental f= of some lasting futon, tment hart esting months or years See i. Prolonged mestal barn isnot sinply te sess experience in, foc example, en intervogation by state police. See id. Based on your research iio the vse ofthese methods atthe 'SERE school and covsullation with osbers with experi in the field of poyshology and interrogation, you do not anticipate at any prolonged mental acm would result fiom te use of the watesbuard. Indeed, you have advised ut et he eles amos immediate when the cloth is removed from the nose sd mauth, tn the sbsenee of prolonged mente berm, oo severe mertel in or suffering would have oon ince, aed the use ofthese procedures Weuld not consti torture within te meaning ofthe statute, ‘Whsn these acts are considered as acourse of conduct, we are unsure whether these acts may constitute athrest of severe physics pan or suffering. You have indicated tous that you tave not determined either the order or the pecse ting for implensenting these proceduies, IC is conceivable that ese procedures could be used ina cause of escalating conduct, moviag inerementally and rpidly Gon least physically inrsve, eg, facil hold, othe roost physica contact, eg, walling or the waterbasré. As we understend it based on his weatment 9 Fx, abaya has come to expest hat no physical harm wl be dane wo him. By using these techniques in increasing intensity and fo api sucessiqa, the gol would bet dislodge is expectation, Based on the facts you have provided wus, we enna say definitively that the cmtre course of conduct would esuse a reasontble person tobefieve that eis being teatened songs rropstcret ‘with severe pain or suffering within the meaning of seoion 2340. On.the other hand, hewever, ander certain circurnstances—for example, rapid escalation is the use of these. techniques ‘culminating in the waterboard (which we acknowledge constitues = threat of imuninent death) secampanied by vebsl ar aes suggestion that physical violence wil follow-—tuight cause & ensonable personto believe dat they aro faced with sch adveat. Without more information, tee are uricertsia whether the course of condust would constiute a predicate aot under Section 2340), ven ifthe course of conduct were thouglit to pose a threet of physical pain or suffering, {it yould pevertheless—on the facis before us—not constinute a violation of Sectlaa 23408. Not ‘only must the course of conduct be a peedieale ac, but also those who use the procedure must actually cause proloagéd mental kann, Based on the informstion that you have provided (0 us, indiceting tha oo evidence exists that this course of conduct produces any prolonged mental hare, we conclude that @ course of conduct using chase procedures and enirainating in he ‘waterboard would nat violate Section 23404. ‘Soesifie fates, To violate the salute; an individual must have the specific ioteat to inflict severe pain or suffering. Because specific intent is ax element of the offaise, the absence! ‘of specific intent negaies the charge of torture. As we previously opined, e have the cequired specific intent, an individea! must exprecly intend to cause such severe pain or suffering, St Sretion 240A Memarandum at 3 citing Carter v, United Stoie, 330 U.S. 255, 267 (2000), We hhave fucthet found that if a defendant acts with the good faith belief that bis actions will not cause stich sffering, he has rot acted with spenific intent. See i at 4 citing South Ark. Linch Porshp. of Ter. » Reise, 218 F.34 518, 531 th Cir. 2002). A defendant acts i good faith ‘wtiea he has an honest belief that his ations will hot result in severe pain or suffering, See td. citing Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991). Although an honest belief nsed uot be reasenable, such a belie? is easier to establish whore there i ¢ reasonable basis focit. See iat 5. Good faith may be established by, among other things, the ean onthe advice of experts. See id a8. ‘Based on the isormation yos have provided us, we believe that chose carrying out these procedures woud not have the specific intent t iflice severe physical pain or suffering. The ‘objective ofthese techniques is nao cause Severe physical pain. Fir, the constent presence of ‘personnel with medical training who have the authority to stop the interrogation should if appear itis medically necessary indicates tha itis nol your inkent (a cause severe physical pain. The personnel oa site have extensive experience with these specific echniques as they are used in SERE sehool taining. Second, you have informed ws tht you ae cing steps to ensure that Zulaydal's injury is not worsened or his ecdvéry impeded by the use of these tochniques. ‘Third, as you have described them to vs, the proposed techniques invelving physical contact between the intesogmor and Zubaydah actually contain precautions to prevent any serious physical harm to Zubaydah, fn “walling,” a zolled hood or owel willbe used to prevent ‘vor genet 6tor sécret ‘whiplash and fe wil be pected to eebound fem he flexible wall ta reduoy he liked of injury. Similarly, inthe "cal hol," he Gngetis wil be kept well way from the is egesto censure that there isao‘njry to them. ‘The purpose of thot cal hod is otajure him ut to Told the head inumebile. Adaionally, whilethe sess pestGons and wall standing will uundoutiedly result in physical discomfort by tring the muscles, itis obvious that thee pasiiens re not intended fo predoce the kind of extreme pain required byte tae ore, ne specific intent 10 cause severe moni! pain or suffering appears to be ‘present. AS we explained in our recen opinion, an individual must have te spectfc intent to prolonged mental harm in arder te have the specific inset to inflict severe mental pain or snffeving, See Section 2340A Memorandom at 8. Prolonged avental harm is substantial mental ion, eg har lasting woatls or even years after the acts were inflicted ‘npon the prisoner. As we indicated above, good faith belie can negate this element. Acoordingly, ifen individu conducting the interragation basa good faith beef that che procedures he will eply, separscly or together, would not result in prolonged mentathsem, that individual lacks the requisite specific intent. This conclusion conceraing speifioftent is futher bolstered by the due diligence that has keen cosducted concening the effects ofthese Smterrogation procedures ‘The menal health experts thal you have eansilied have indicated thet the psychologic: impact of @ course of eanduct must bs essessed with reference tothe subject's psythotogical [isory and current ental health status. The healthier the individual, dhe less likely that the use of eny one procedure or set of procedures asa course of conduct wll result in prolonged mental arm. A comprehensive psychological profile of Zubaydah has been created. In ereating this As we indicated above, you have informed us that your proposed interrogation wethods hhave been used and continue o be used in SERE training. Teis our understanding that the fechniques are not used ane by ane ia isolation, but asa fll course of conduct cb reser interrogation. Thus the fofonmtion derived ftom SERE taining bears both upon the impactof the use of the individual techniques and upon their use as a course of conduct. You have found that dhe use of dese methods together ar separately, including the use ofthe waterbaard, bas aot resulted in any negstive long-tenin mental health consequences. The contioued use of these ethods without mental health consequences to the trainees indicates that i is highly improbable Tor gécrer ”ropa that such consequences would result here. Because you have conducted the due diligence to determina that these procedures, ether alone arn combination, do net produce prolonged mental than, we believe that you do nat meet the specific iment requiretaent necessary to violate Section 23404. ‘You have’ alsoinformed ws tha you have reviewed the relevant literature om fhe subject, and consulted with autside psychologists: Your seview of the litereire uncovered wo eipiziesl ala on the ue of these procedures, withthe exteption of deep deprivation for which no Tonge term health. onsequeacns cesolted. The outside psychologists with whom yeu consulted indicated were uiawere of any case where long-teom problems have occurred as a result ofthese techiniques, ’ss described above it appears you have conducted an extensive inquiry to ascertain what Impact, fay, these procedures individually and as «course of conduex would have on Zaluydah, You have consulted wih interrogation experts, acting those with substantial SERE school experience, consulted with ouside psychologists, completed a psychological asseerient and vviewee the relevant literature om tis topic. Besed on this inquiry, you believe thatthe use ofthe procedures including do waterbom, and as scours of tonduct would not result in prolonged mental han. Reliznce on this informston abou! Zubaydah and about the ‘ffect of the use ofthese techniques mato generally demonstaes the resents of a good faith belie hat no prolonged mental hara wil esl ffom using these rathods in the inferrogstion af Zubaydah, Moreover, we think tht tis represents not only an honestbelief but also a reasonable belief based on the informationthat you have supplied tous, Thus, we believe dhst the specifi infeu o inflict prolonged meatal snot present, and consequently, there iso sptciie intent toilet severe mental psn or sufeding. Accoungly, we conelude tht on the facts inthis case the use of dese methods separately ora course of conduct would not violate Section B40A, Based onthe foregoing, and based on the fats hat you have provided, we conclu thet ‘he fnterogation procedures that you propose would wot violate Seaton 23404.: We wish to ‘emphasize tat this i our best reading ofthe la; however, you should be aware that chere aren: ‘cases construing ths statutes just as there have been no proseetTons brought under i, Please let us know if we can be of futher assistance, x Anamey tserat Topstcur 8Appendix DGuideZines on Confinement Conditions Fox CIA Detainees ‘These Guidelines govern thé*conditions of confinement for CTA Detainees, who axe persons Boedebaation facilities that are unde: the control of *) Sop Gacilitios™ Whese Guidelines recognize that environmental and other conditions, as wall as particularized considerations affecting any given Detention Facility, will waty from case to case and location to location. 1. Miniizoms * Due provision must be taken to protect the health and safety of all ora Detainecs, including basic Levels oi medical care 2. taplementing Proceduxesi Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees + Responsible cra officer ‘The Director, DCT Counterterrorist Center shall etisure (a) that, at all times, a specific agency state employee (the “Responsible CEA Officer‘) is designated as responsible for each specific Detention Facility, (b) that each Responsible CIA Officer has been provided with a copy of these Guidelines and has reviewed and signed the attached Aelmowledgnent, and. (¢) that each Responsible Gia Office: and each CIA officer participating i individuals detained pursuant to a jowLedgment attached thereto. Subject to operational and security considerations, the Responsible CIA Officer shall be present at, or visit, each Retention Pacility at intervals appropriate to the Foumstances, 5, RC Ta APPROVED: Azeles ral intelligence Date. ro & Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees t * , am the-Responsible CIA Officer for the Detention Facility mown as _____._ By my signature below, I acknowledge that I have read and understand and will comply with the "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees" of , 2003. ACKNOWLEDGED: bateAppendix EThese Guidelines address the conduct of interzogations of persons who are detained pursuant to the authorities sot, ‘Thede Guidelines complement internal Directorate of Operations guidance relating to the conduct of interrogations, In the event of any inconsistency between existing DO guidance and these Guidelines, the provisions of these Guidelines shall control i. vormigsible Tatesxegation Techniques Unless otherwise approved by Headquarters, CTA officers and other personnel acting on bebalf of CIA may use enly Peraissible interrogation Techniques. Permissible Theaxrogation Techniques consist of Both (a) standard Techniques and (b) Fohancéd Techniques. wd iqiea are techniques that do not incorporate physical or substantial psychological pressuxte These techniques include, but are aot Limited to, all lawful forms of questioning, employed hy US law enforcement and military interrogation personnel. Among Standard Techniques are the use of isolation; sleep deprivation nat to exceed 72 hours, reduced caloric intake (so long as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health of the detainee), deprivation of reading material, use of, loud music or white noise (at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the detainees hearing), and the use of diaps: A yori ods = is ot to exceed 72 hours,| PORTIONS OF Be FIED TOP gi roo iii Enhanced Technigtes are techniques that do Ancoxporate physical ox psychological pressure bayond Standard Tethniques. The Use of each specific Enhanced Technique must be approved by Headquarters in advance, and may be employed only by approved interrogators for use with the specific detainee, with appropriate medical and psychological participation in the process. ‘These techniques are, the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial slap (insult slap}; the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, wall standing; streas positions, sleep deprivation’ beyond 72 hours, the use of Aiapers for prolonged periods, the use of harmless insects, the water board, and such other techniques as may be specifically approved. pursuant to paragraph 4 below. The use of each Enhanced Technique is subject to specific temporal, physical, and related conditions, including a competent’ evaluation of the medical and psychological state of the detainee. 2. Medicil and Payshological Personnel Bopropriate medical and psychological personnel siall be Jreadily available for consultation and travel to the interrogation site during, all detainee interrogations enploying Standard Techaiquas, and appropriate medical and psychological personnel myst be on aite during all detainee interrogations employing Enhanced ‘Techniques: In each case, the medical and psychological personnel. shall suspend the interrogation if thoy determine that significant and prolonged physical or mental injury, pain, or suffering is likely to result if the interrogation is not suspended. in any such instance, the interrogation team shall mediately report the facts to Headquarters for managesiest gnd legal review to determine whether the interrogation may @ resumed, 3. mterrogation Parisonnel the Dixector, por’ Countartervorist Center shall ensure that all persoanel directly agesed meer rocation af carson detainee con ll (eemmaeees © bean appropriately screened (from metieabepeyerefogical, and security standpoints) , have Feviewed those Guidelines, haye received appronriate’ training in their implementation, and have completed the attached Acknowlédgment. TT703 Guideliné on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the 4. Approvais Required Whenever feasible, advance approval is. required for cha use of Standard Yeorniques by an interzogation team. all instances, thelr use shall be documented in cable traffic, . Prior approval in writing (e.g., by written menorandua or in Gable traffic) from the Director, DCL Counterterrorist Center, with the concurrence of the Chiet, CRC Legal Group, is reqiived for. the use of any Enhanced Tochnique(s), and may be provided only where D/CTC bas determined that. (a) the specific detainee is believed to possase information about risks to the citizens of the United States or other nations, (b) the use of the Enhanced Pecknique(s) is appropriate in order to obtain that information, (c) appropriate medical and psycuological personnel have- concluded that the use of the Eahanced Technique(s) is not expected to produce “severe physical or mental pain oz suffering,” and (d) the personnel authorized taemploy the dhanced Tachaiqua(s) have completed the attached Acknowlecgnent. Nothing in these Guidelines alters the right to act in self-defense. 5. Recordkeaping tm each interrogation session in which an Pohanced ‘Techniqua is employed, a contemporaneous record shall be created setting forth the nature and duration of each such technique employed, the identities of these present, and = citation to the required Keadquarters approval cable. This information, which may be in the form of a cable, shall be provided £o weadquarters APPROVED: Birditer o te Jonuayee eos Date Pr TTidol izie on Interrogations Conducted co the =, acknowledge that I have read and (@ will’ comply with the “Guidelines on oF ACHOIOWLEDGED ame BateAppendix FDRAFT ‘OMS GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS ‘September 4, 2003 ‘Tho following guidelines dfer general references for medical officers supporting the detention of terzorists captured and turned oyer to the Central Intelligence Agency for interrogation and debriefing, There are three different contexts in which these guidelines be applied: (1) duting the; petiod of initial intercogation, (2) during the more fod of debricfing at an interrogation site, and (3 INTERROGATION SUPPORT (Captured terrorists turned over to the C.L.A. for interrogation may be subjected to a vide range of legally saictioued techniques, all of which are also used on US. military petsoinel in SERE taining programs. ‘These are designed to psychologically “dislocate” the detainee, maximize his feeling of vulnerability and helplessness, and reduce or eliminate bis wil to resist our efforts to obtain critical intelligence, Sanctioned interrogation techniqies nmst be specifically approved in advance by thé Director, CTC in the ease of each individual case. They incinde, in approximately astonding degree of intensity: Standard measures (., without physical or suistantial psychological pressure) Shaving Steipping Diapering (generally for periods not greater than 72 hows) i Hooding Isolation ‘White noise or loud music (at a decibel level that will not damage hearing) ‘ i Cojtinuous light or darkness Uncomfortably cool environment Restricted diet, including reduced caloric intake (sufficient to maintain general health) Shackling in upright, siting, or horizontal position ‘Water Dousing : Sleep deprivation (lip to 72 hours) ‘Enhanced measures (with physical or psychological pressure beyond the above) ab Attention grasp Facial hold Insult (facial) slap 1 ~~Abdominal slap Prolonged diapering Sleep deprivation (over 72 hours) Stress positions on knees, body slanted forward or backward leaning with forehead on wall Walling ‘Cramped confinement (Confinement boxes) ‘Waterboard In all instances the general goal of these techniques is a psychological impact, and not some physical effect, with a specific goal of “dislocat[ing] his expectations regarding the treatment he believes he will receive...” ‘The more physical techniques are delivered in-a manner carefully limited to avoid serigus physical harm. The slaps for example are designed “to intince shock, surprise, and/or humiliation” and “not to inflict ‘physical pain that is severe or lasting.” To this end they must be delivered in specifically circumscribed manner, e.g., with fingers spread, Walling is only against a springboard designed to be loud and bouncy (and cushion the blow). Al walling and ‘most attention grasps are delivered only with the subject’s head solidly suppotted with = towel to avoid extension-flexian injury. (OMS is responsible for assessing and monitoring the health ofall Ageacy detainees subject to “enhanced” intercogation techoiques, aid for determining that the suthorized administration of these techniques would not be expected to cause serious or permanent harm. "DCI Guidelines" have boen issued formalizing these responsibilities, and these should be read directly. ‘Whenever feasible, advance approval s required to use any measures beyond standard measures; technique-specific advanced approval is. required for all “enhan: sriéasures and is conditional on on-site medical and psychological personnel” confirming from direct detainee examination that the enhanced technique(s) is not expected to produce “severe physical or mental pain of suffering.” As a practical matter, the detainee's physical condition must be such that these interventions will not have lasting * ‘The standard used by the Justice Depertment for “mental” harm is “prolonged mental harm,” ie,, “mental harm of some lasting duration, eg, mental harm lasting months or years.” Jn the absence of protonged mental hacm, no severe mental pein or suffering would have been inflicted.", Memorandam of August 1, 2002, p15. Unless = a =a eal officer can be a physician or aPA; use ef the ‘waterboard requires the presence of a physicion, Torseffect, and his psychological state stroig enough that no severe result ‘The medical implications of the DCI guidelines are discussed below. General intake evaluation ‘New detainees are to have a thorough initial medical assessment, with a complete, documented history and physical addressing in dept any chronic or previous medical f, the data should reflect what was checked and include negative findings. ‘Medical treatment tis important that adequate medical care be provided to detainees, even those undergoing enhanced interrogation. ‘Those réguiting chronic wiediations should receive them, acute medical problems should bé treated, and adequate fluids and nut |“The basic diet duting the period of enhanced interrogation need not be palatable, ‘but should iriclude adequate fluids and nutrition, Actual consumption should be monitored and recorded, Liguid Ensure (or equivalent) is a good way to assure that there Tndividuals refusing adequate liquids d ‘administered at the earliest signs of dehydration. ie there is any question ‘about adequacy of fluid ialake, urinery output also should be monitored and recorded, stage should have fl Uncomfortably cool environments Detainees can safely be placed in uncomfa lengths of time, ranging from hours to days. Core body temperature falls after more than 2 hours at an ambicat temperature of 10°C/S0°R. At this temperature increased metabolic cate cannot compensate for heat loss. The WHO recommended minimum indoor temperature is 18°C/64°F, The “thermoneutral zone” where minimal compeasatory activity is required to maintain core, termperature is 20°C/68°F to 30°C/86°F . Within the thermoneutral zone, 26°C/78°F is considered o timally comfortable for lightly clothed individuals and 30°C/86°F for naked. ERROR sneer aa If there is any possibility that ambient temperatures are below the thermoneutral range, they should be monitored and the actual temperatures documentAt ambient temperatures below 18°C/64°F, detainees should be monitored for the development of hypothermia, White noise or loud music , there is no permane! k for continuous, 24-hours- ‘a-day exposures to sound at 82 dB or lower; at 84 dB for up to 18 hours a day; 90 dB for up to 8 hours, 95 dB for 4hours, and 100 dB for 2 hours, Lf acoessary, instruments can be provided to measure these ambient sound levels, Shackting ‘Shackling i non-

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