Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Download
Standard view
Full view
of .
Look up keyword
Like this
1Activity
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
Exercise Managerial Economics - Angewandte Wirtschaftstheorie

Exercise Managerial Economics - Angewandte Wirtschaftstheorie

Ratings: (0)|Views: 54 |Likes:
Published by Dietmar Lengauer

More info:

Published by: Dietmar Lengauer on Dec 25, 2009
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

12/25/2009

pdf

text

original

 
Maximization and minimization under inequality constraints
1) Write the first order conditions of the following problem:
max
,
 ∙ ∙ 
 
..
 
100m − ∙ ≥ 0
 
≤ 4
 
 ≥ 0
 2) Solve the following problem:
min
,
100−∙ 
 
..
 
 ∙ ≥ 10
 
≤ 2
 
 ≥ 0
 
Principal – agent problem
Company 
 
 X 
produces a good
 x 
and it is characterized by a revenue function
= 3
. C
ompany X 
delegates theproduction of 
 x 
to firm
Y.
The cost function of 
 firm Y 
is given by
=  x
; by probability
 
 = 0.1
, otherwise
 = 0.3
, (by probability
).
Company X 
wants maximize his profits.Consider the case of complete information1.
 
Write the problem of 
 firm P
and find the optimal set of contractsConsider the case of incomplete information,
at interim
 2.
 
Write the incentive compatibility constraints3.
 
Assume that
 firm P
wants implements the quantities you find in point
a
. Write the optimal contracts.4.
 
Write the problem of firm
P
and find the optimal set of contracts.5.
 
Compute the optimal contracts in the case of shutdown of less efficient agent and prove if it is preferred tothe contracts you find in point
.Consider the case of incomplete information,
at the ex-ante stage
6.
 
Finds the optimal quantities to implement7.
 
Write the participation constraint8.
 
Find the optimal set of contracts with lump-sum paymentFind the optimal set of contracts with lump-sum payment
Moral hazard
1) The revenue of a firm from the execution of a project is stochastic and can be either 100 or 50. The execution of the project is delegated to an agent. The agent can exert either high effort or low effort. High effort cost
M>0
, loweffort cost 0. The firm cannot observe the effort of the agents but only the revenue of the project, then the firm willpay to the agent a transfer
when revenue is 50 and a transfer of 
when revenue is 100. Assume that theprobability to have the revenue equal to 100 is 0.6 if the agent exerts high effort, otherwise, if the agent exerts loweffort this probability is 0.4.a) Assuming that agent utility function is
 = 
:1) write the firm’s maximization problem to implement high effort,2) compute the optimal contracts to implement high effort in the case of lump sum payment and3) check if the principal prefers to do it.b) Assuming that agent utility function is
 = 
and
≥ 0
,
≥ 0
 4) compute the optimal contracts to implement high effort and5) check if the principal prefers to do it.2) A manufacturer supplies at marginal cost c=1 good x to the retailer. Demand can be either low (X = 10 – p) or high(X = 20 – p). The probability of high demand is 0.8 if retailer exerts high effort; it is equal 0.2 if he exerts low effort.

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
scribd
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->