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Table Of Contents

INTRODUCTION
PATHOLOGIZING
AREA EXPERTS VS. STRATEGIC EXPERTS?
ISLAM AS THE ENEMY?
TAKFIR AMERICAN-STYLE
DEFINING THE ENEMY
ISLAMOFASCISM
ISLAMISM
PARALLELISM
“SELLING” THE WAR OF IDEAS
STRATEGIC MESSAGES ABOUT VIOLENT MUSLIMS
BLURRING
ENDING RESISTANCE
ZEALOUS TRANSFORMATION
A is for Allah
A is for Apostasy
B is for Bin Ladin
C is for the Caliphate
C is for the Crusaders
D is for Democracy
E is for Education (Islamic)
E is for Epidemiology
E is for Europe
F is for Fitna
G is for Guantanamo (and Renditions)
H is for Hakmiyyah
I is for the Internet
I is for Iraq and Insurgency
I is for Islamofascism (see also p. 11)
J is for Jihad
J is for Justice
K is for Karbala
K is for the Khawarij (Kharijites)
K is for Kufr
L is for Law (Islamic)
M is for Mahdism
M is for Martyrdom
M is for the Moderates
M is for Muslim Americans
N is for the New Middle East
O is for (New) Orientalism
P is for the Palestinians
P is for Preachers
Q is for the Qur’an
S is for Secularism
T is for Takfr
T is for Tawhid
T is for Torture
U is for the Ummah
V is for the Veil
V is for Violence
W is for Wahhabism
W is for Women
Z is for Zakat
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ENDNOTES
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PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR: INCITING MUSLIMS THROUGH THE WAR OF IDEAS Sherifa Zuhur

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR: INCITING MUSLIMS THROUGH THE WAR OF IDEAS Sherifa Zuhur

Ratings: (0)|Views: 235 |Likes:
Published by ikhwanscope
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR
SHERIFA ZUHUR is Research Professor of Islamic
and Regional Studies at the Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College. She has lectured
internationally, has been the recipient of a Fulbright
Senior Scholar Regional Research award, and has been
a faculty member at various universities including
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the
University of California, Berkeley, and The American
University in Cairo. One of her research areas is
the ideology and development of contemporary
Islamist movements. She has published 15 books and
monographs and more than 103 articles and chapters in
edited books. Her most recent government monograph
was Egypt: Security, Islamist and Political Challenges. She
holds a B.A. in Political Science and Arabic Language
and Literature, an M.A. in Islamic Studies, and a Ph.D.
in Middle Eastern History, all from the University of
California, Los Angeles.

ix
SUMMARY
This monograph questions the messages conveyed
to Muslims about their religion and extremism in the
war of ideas. Why do American strategic messages on
this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite
broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in
surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders,
has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan
and in Pakistan since some polling suggests bin Ladin’s
approval in Jordan suffered a great deal after the hotel
bombings?
A reason that the United States is winning so few
“hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world
is confusion and imprecision in American strategic
messages. The grand strategy of defining, isolating,
and destroying Islamism or radical Islamism may not
be possible if America does not proceed more carefully,
and listen to what its allies think, know, and feel about
their faith.
This monograph will not revisit the origins
of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with
conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the War
on Terror and discourages Muslims from supporting
it. They are unable to identify with the proposed
transformative countermeasures because they discern
some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.

1
PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:
INCITING MUSLIMS THROUGH THE
WAR OF IDEAS
INTRODUCTION
Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11)
attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained
strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more
lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate
of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now
than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue
to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European
nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in
Germany. Bruce Riedel states:
Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq
rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization
now has a solid base of operations in the badlands
of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its
reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in
Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful
propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more
followers than ever.2
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are
still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have
heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism
that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely
effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the
efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the
Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United
States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader
Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages
on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite
2
broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in
surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders,3
has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan
and in Pakistan?4
This monograph will not revisit the origins of
Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of
conceptual failure th
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR
SHERIFA ZUHUR is Research Professor of Islamic
and Regional Studies at the Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College. She has lectured
internationally, has been the recipient of a Fulbright
Senior Scholar Regional Research award, and has been
a faculty member at various universities including
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the
University of California, Berkeley, and The American
University in Cairo. One of her research areas is
the ideology and development of contemporary
Islamist movements. She has published 15 books and
monographs and more than 103 articles and chapters in
edited books. Her most recent government monograph
was Egypt: Security, Islamist and Political Challenges. She
holds a B.A. in Political Science and Arabic Language
and Literature, an M.A. in Islamic Studies, and a Ph.D.
in Middle Eastern History, all from the University of
California, Los Angeles.

ix
SUMMARY
This monograph questions the messages conveyed
to Muslims about their religion and extremism in the
war of ideas. Why do American strategic messages on
this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite
broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in
surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders,
has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan
and in Pakistan since some polling suggests bin Ladin’s
approval in Jordan suffered a great deal after the hotel
bombings?
A reason that the United States is winning so few
“hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world
is confusion and imprecision in American strategic
messages. The grand strategy of defining, isolating,
and destroying Islamism or radical Islamism may not
be possible if America does not proceed more carefully,
and listen to what its allies think, know, and feel about
their faith.
This monograph will not revisit the origins
of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with
conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the War
on Terror and discourages Muslims from supporting
it. They are unable to identify with the proposed
transformative countermeasures because they discern
some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.

1
PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:
INCITING MUSLIMS THROUGH THE
WAR OF IDEAS
INTRODUCTION
Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11)
attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained
strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more
lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate
of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now
than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue
to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European
nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in
Germany. Bruce Riedel states:
Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq
rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization
now has a solid base of operations in the badlands
of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its
reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in
Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful
propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more
followers than ever.2
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are
still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have
heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism
that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely
effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the
efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the
Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United
States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader
Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages
on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite
2
broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in
surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders,3
has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan
and in Pakistan?4
This monograph will not revisit the origins of
Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of
conceptual failure th

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Published by: ikhwanscope on Dec 26, 2009
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